Jharkhand High Court
The State Of Jharkhand Through The ... vs Rubi Kumari on 8 August, 2023
Author: Sujit Narayan Prasad
Bench: Sujit Narayan Prasad, Navneet Kumar
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IN THE HIGH COURT OF JHARKHAND AT RANCHI
L.P.A. No.309 of 2022
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1. The State of Jharkhand through the Secretary/Principal
Secretary, Road Construction Department, Government of
Jharkhand, having its office at Project Building, Dhurwa,
P.O. & P.S. Dhurwa, Town and District Ranchi.
2. The Joint Secretary, Road Construction Department,
Government of Jharkhand, having its office at Project
Building, Dhurwa, P.O. & P.S. Dhurwa, Town and District
Ranchi, State Jharkhand.
3. The Engineer-in-chief, Road Construction Department,
Government of Jharkhand, having its office at Project
Building, Dhurwa, P.O. & P.S. Dhurwa, District Ranchi.
4. The Superintending Engineer, Mechanical Circle, Road
Construction Department, having its office at near Ranchi
Municipal Corporation, P.O.:G.P.O. & P.S.:Kotwali, District-
Ranchi. (The office of Respondent no.4 made in writ petition
has been abolished and is attached with Superintending
Engineer, Road Construction Department, Road Circle,
Ranchi).
... ... Appellants/Respondents
Versus
Rubi Kumari, wife of Sri Arjuin Kumar, Resident of Village-
Mojfara, P.O. Bardih, P.S. Islampur, District Nalanda (Bihar).
... ... Petitioner / Respondent
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CORAM :HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE SUJIT NARAYAN PRASAD
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE NAVNEET KUMAR
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For the Appellant : Mr. Deepak Kumar Dubey, AC to AAG-II
For the Respondent : Mr. Manoj Tandon, Advocate
Ms. Neha Bhardwaj, Advocate
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ORAL JUDGMENT
Order No.06 : Dated 8th August, 2023 Per Sujit Narayan Prasad, J.
I.A. No.6922 of 2022
This interlocutory application has been preferred -2- under Section 5 of the Limitation Act for condoning the delay of 89 days in preferring this Letters Patent Appeal.
2. Heard the parties.
3. Having regard to the averments made in the application and submissions made on behalf of the appellants, we are of the view that the appellants were prevented from sufficient cause in filing the appeal within the period of limitation. As such, the delay of 89 days in preferring the appeal is hereby condoned.
4. I.A. No. 6922 of 2022 stands allowed.
L.P.A. No.309 of 2022
5. The instant intra-court appeal, preferred under Clause 10 of the Letters Patent, is directed against the order/judgment dated 15.03.2022 passed by learned Single Judge of this Court in W.P.(S) No.1557 of 2016 whereby and whereunder the order as contained in Memo No.306(S) dated 12.01.2016 issued by the Joint Secretary, Road Construction Department, Government of Jharkhand cancelling the appointment of writ petitioner, has been quashed and set aside directing the respondents to reinstate the writ petitioner by taking her date of birth as 20.07.1976.
6. Brief facts of the case as per the pleadings made in the writ proceeding, which are required to be enumerated herein, read as under :-
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7. It is the case of the petitioner that she was initially appointed as Peon for which office order was also issued vide letter No.196 dated 06.09.1995. The Service of the petitioner was thereafter terminated on 29.08.1998 along with others on the ground of being illegally appointed. This led to filling of a writ petition by the petitioner alongwith others before the Ranchi Bench of Patna High Court being C.W.J.C. No.2338/1998(R). The writ petition was disposed of on 27.11.1999 directing the respondents to fill up all the posts lying vacant in the Road Construction Department. However Civil Review was filed and the same was disposed of on 16.12.1999 modifying the original order dated 27.11.1999 to the extent by directing the respondents to consider the case of the petitioners of C.W.J.C. No.2338/1998 (R), as they have served the Department for a long time.
8. When the aforesaid order was not complied with, a Contempt Case (Civil) No.977/2002 was preferred. Thereafter the respondent Road Construction Department had initiated the process for filling up the posts. The petitioner submitted her application along with certificates for consideration of her case for appointment before the Deputy Commissioner, Ranchi. The Deputy Commissioner, Ranchi recommended the names of a number of persons for appointment including the petitioner on Class IV post.
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9. It is case of the petitioner that when the case of the petitioner was not considered, she filed a writ petition being W.P.(S) No.7386/2012 which was allowed vide order dated 18.09.2013 with the direction to the respondents to appoint the petitioner on Class-IV post within eight weeks. The appointment letter was thereafter issued on 11.02.2014 in favour of the writ petitioner pursuant thereto, the petitioner submitted her joining on 12.02.2014 and the same was accepted on 19.02.2014.
10. After the petitioner was appointed, other similarly situated persons also filed writ petitions before this Court for similar relief which were also allowed. These judgments were passed on the basis of the judgment in the case of the writ petitioner. In view of the fact that several other persons were claiming appointment on the basis of the order passed in the case of the petitioner, the respondents decided to remove the petitioner from service. Thereafter, show cause notice was issued to the petitioner on 11.12.2015 to explain as to how the petitioner was having more than one address and two date of births, one is mentioned at the time of initial appointment and other is mentioned in matriculation certificate. The petitioner replied the said show cause notice on 18.12.2015 explaining the different addresses mentioned at the different points of time. The petitioner also explained that at time of initial entry in service, the petitioner was not -5- matriculate and as such her date of birth was mentioned as 20.07.1976 but after passing of matriculation examination, she claimed her date of birth to be 01.03.1981 on the strength of matric certificate. The respondents however not being satisfied with the reply cancelled the appointment of the petitioner by the order dated 12.01.2016.
11. Being aggrieved with the aforesaid order, the writ petitioner file writ petition being W.P.(S) No.1557 of 2016 which has been allowed by quashing the order dated 12.01.2016 and directing the respondents to reinstate the writ petitioner by taking her date of birth as 20.07.1976, which is the subject matter of the instant appeal.
12. It appears from the factual aspect as referred hereinabove based upon the pleading that the writ petitioner was appointed as Peon on 06.09.1995 but was terminated along with others on 29.08.1998. It further appears that at the time of appointment, the date of birth, according to the oral declaration of the writ petitioner, was entered in the service excerpts as 20.07.1976.
13. The writ petitioner along with others had preferred writ petition before the Ranchi Bench of Patna High Court being C.W.J.C. No.2338 of 1998(R) which was disposed of vide order dated 27.11.1999 by directing the respondents including the State of Bihar to take necessary steps for filling up of all the posts lying vacant in the Road Construction -6- Department. The aforesaid order, however, was modified on 16.12.1999 by an order passed in Civil Review.
14. The process, thereafter, begun and in pursuance thereto, the writ petitioner had submitted application along with certificates for consideration of her case for appointment before the Deputy Commissioner, Ranchi. The Deputy Commissioner, Ranchi had recommended the names of a number of persons including the writ petitioner for appointment on Class-IV post to the Superintending Engineer, Road Construction Department.
15. But, when the case of the writ petitioner was not considered, she filed another writ petition being W.P.(S) No.7386 of 2012 which was disposed of vide order dated 18.09.2013 by which the writ petition was allowed with a direction to the respondents to appoint the writ petitioner on Class-IV post within eight weeks. The writ petitioner in pursuance thereto, had made due representation along with the copy of the said order and, according the appointment letter was issued on 11.02.2014 in pursuance of which she joined the service.
16. It further appears that when the issue has been brought to the notice of the authorities of having two addresses and two dates of birth, then the respondents, in order to dispense with the service, issued show cause on 11.12.2015 to explain as to how the petitioner was having -7- more than one address and two dates of birth, i.e., one mentioned in the service excerpts and the another in the matriculation certificate.
17. The same was replied by explaining that at the time of initial entry in service the writ petitioner was not matriculate and, as such, the date of birth mentioned as 20.07.1976 but after passing of the matriculation she claimed her date of birth as 01.03.1981 on the strength of Matriculation certificate. The respondents, however, were not satisfied with the reply and cancelled the appointment of the petitioner vide order dated 12.01.2016.
18. Being aggrieved thereto, the writ petitioner approached to this Court by filing writ petition being W.P.(S) No.1557 of 2016 which has been allowed by quashing and setting aside the impugned order as contained in Memo No.306(S) dated 12.01.2016 and directing the respondents to reinstate the writ petitioner, against which the State has preferred the instant appeal.
19. Mr. Deepak Kumar Dubey, learned A.C. to A.A.G.-II appearing for the State of Jharkhand, has submitted that there is no illegality in the order impugned by which the services of the writ petitioner has been dispensed with since the same has been passed after following the principle of natural justice as also by taking into consideration the conduct of the writ petitioner wherein the writ petitioner -8- consciously has tried to mislead by way of misrepresentation by submitting the matriculation certificate issued from the Bihar School Examination Board on 14.12.1995 showing her date of birth to be 01.03.1981.
20. It has been submitted that the aforesaid fact having been found to be admitted since the service record available of the writ petitioner shows her date of birth to be 20.07.1976 and in that view of the matter, if the aforesaid conduct of the writ petitioner has been considered by the appellant State to be fraud then the consequence of fraud will be separating such employee from service and, accordingly, the impugned order has been passed.
21. The submission has been made that the learned Single Judge has only delved upon the issue by holding the date of birth of the writ petitioner to be 20.07.1976 and has come out with the finding that showing the date of birth as 01.03.1981 cannot be considered to be a fraudulent act and hence, the impugned order has been interfered with by quashing and setting it aside.
22. It has been contended that when the show cause notice specifically refers about the fraudulent act of the writ petitioner being a Government servant and on that ground if the explanation was sought for as to why the appointment of the writ petitioner be not cancelled and in terms thereof when the reply has been furnished, it has been found to be -9- unsatisfactory and the fact about furnishing two dates of birth before the employer has been admitted and in that view of the matter the decision has been taken for termination of service, the same should have been considered by the learned Single Judge by considering the intent of fraud committed on the part of the writ petitioner.
23. Learned counsel appearing for the appellants, in the aforesaid premise, has submitted that the impugned order, therefore, is not sustainable in the eyes of law.
24. Per contra, Mr. Manoj Tandon, assisted by Ms. Neha Bhardwaj, learned counsel representing the respondent-writ petitioner, has defended the impugned order by advancing his argument that the intent of fraud has not conclusively been proved since there is no regular enquiry in this regard and hence, terminating the services of the writ petitioner in absence of any conclusive finding, cannot be said to be justified and after taking into consideration the aforesaid aspect of the matter, the learned Single Judge has come to conclusion that the matriculation certificate showing date of birth as 01.03.1981 will not be given any weightage then also the writ petitioner is entitled for reinstatement in service based upon her date of birth declared as 20.07.1976.
25. It has further been contended that the reply furnished in pursuance to the show cause has not properly been considered and that aspect of the matter has also been
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taken into consideration by the learned Single Judge while passing the order showing interference with the impugned order passed by the Administrative Authority.
26. The learned counsel, on the aforesaid premise, has submitted that the order passed by the learned Single Judge, therefore, needs no interference.
27. We have heard learned counsel for the parties, perused the documents available on record as also the finding recorded by the learned Single Judge in the impugned order.
28. The undisputed fact in this case is, as would appear from the material available on record that the writ petitioner was appointed on Class-IV post on 06.09.1995 showing her date of birth to be 20.07.1976, however, no documentary evidence in support of the said date of birth was produced. But the appointing authority has accepted the said date of birth and entered the same in the service excerpts. However, the appointment of the writ petitioner was terminated along with the others and according series of litigations have been filed and finally the writ petitioner was provided with appointment on 11.02.2014. But, in the meanwhile, the writ petitioner has come out with matriculation certificate at the time of appointment, i.e., in the year 2014 and has also appended but subsequent to the joining to the said post, based upon a complaint, the
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authorities concerned verified both aspects of the matter, i.e., furnishing the different addresses and two dates of birth. Show cause notice was issued on 11.12.2015 asking explanation as to why the services of the writ petitioner be not terminated on the ground of furnishing different addresses and two dates of birth as the aforesaid conduct has been treated by the appointing authority to be a fraudulent act.
29. Accordingly, reply has been submitted denying the charges by making reply that the different addresses have been furnished since, one time or the other she used to reside in the different houses belonging to her relatives, i.e., her parental house or the matrimonial houses.
30. So far as the issue of different dates of birth is concerned, the response has been submitted that at the time of appointment on the first instance, i.e., on 06.09.1995, the appellant was not matriculate. The date of birth was furnished as 20.07.1976 but in the meanwhile, she has got matriculation pass certificate. Accordingly, matriculation certificate was appended wherein the date of birth of the writ petitioner was mentioned as 01.03.1981. As such, at the time of consideration of her appointment again in pursuance to the order passed by this Court, the matriculation certificate showing the date of birth to be 01.03.1981 was produced.
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Hence, it cannot be said that the writ petitioner has committed any fraudulent act.
31. The authorities has considered the said reply and after finding the reply not satisfactory, based upon the record, more particularly, the issue of date of birth, has cancelled the appointment of the writ petitioner on the ground of committing fraud.
32. The said order has been challenged by filing writ petition being W.P.(S) No.1557 of 2016, which has been allowed by quashing and setting aside the order cancelling appointment of the writ petitioner with a direction for her reinstatement, which is the subject matter of the instant appeal.
33. At the outset, it needs to refer herein that it is not a case of termination or dismissal, rather, it is the case of cancellation of appointment. The cancellation is based upon the charges as per the show cause of fraudulent act of the writ petitioner wherein two allegations have been leveled, first furnishing different addresses and second, furnishing two dates of birth.
34. So far as the issue of furnishing different addresses are concerned, there might be a situation that addresses may be changed depending upon the shifting of the house but here this Court is mainly concerned with the issue of fraud as to whether the intent of fraud is there in the conduct of the
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writ petitioner while giving declaration regarding the date of birth.
35. It is not the case that the writ petitioner for the first time was appointed in the year 2014, rather, her first appointment was in the year 1995 and at that time, admittedly the writ petitioner was not matriculate and, therefore, there was no matriculation certificate. Hence, the date of birth disclosed by the writ petitioner to be 20.07.1976 was accepted and recorded in the service record. The basis of getting the appointment as on 06.09.1995 is the date of birth of 20.07.1976. At that time, the writ petitioner was having the age of 19 years. As such, was falling within the zone of consideration so far as the age criteria is concerned.
36. The appointment having been cancelled and on the basis of the direction passed by this Court, the case of the writ petitioner has again been considered. She was appointed but this time the writ petitioner has come out with the matriculation certificate issued on 14.12.1995 showing therein the date of birth to be on 01.03.1981. The aforesaid certificate has been accepted. The writ petitioner was allowed to join her duty. But, on the basis of complaint regarding the alleged fraudulent act, the fact about the same was verified from the service excerpts which were already opened since the writ petitioner was in roll with effect from 06.09.1995 till the date of termination wherein the date of birth was found to
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be 20.07.1976. But this time the date of birth has been shown to be 01.03.1981 for which explanation was furnished in terms of show cause that at the time of getting appointment for the first time the writ petitioner was not matriculate. Hence, 20.07.1976 was accepted as per the oral declaration of date of birth and the same was entered in the service excerpts. But, the second time, i.e., at the time of getting appointment in the year 2014, the writ petitioner claims to have got matriculation certificate showing therein the date of birth to be 01.03.1981.
37. The aforesaid conduct of the writ petitioner has been considered to be a fraudulent act. Such consideration is based upon the premise that there cannot be any change in the date of birth even accepting that at the time when the writ petitioner had obtained appointment in the year 1995 disclosure about her date of birth was 20.07.1976 but subsequent thereto, she has shown her date of birth as 01.03.1981. Therefore, there cannot be two dates of birth of a person.
38. It further requires to refer herein that the date of birth dated 01.03.1981, as mentioned in the matriculation certificate, cannot be considered to be genuine if the earlier appointment of the writ petitioner will be taken into consideration, at the time when the writ petitioner was appointed in the year 1995. If her date of birth was 1981,
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then in the year 1985 she was only of the age of 14 years. Hence, the said aspect of the matter suggests that the conduct of the writ petitioner is not bona fide.
39. The issue has been raised that the matriculation certificate even if will be given go bye, then also on the basis of the 20.07.1976, the writ petitioner is to be allowed to be retained in service but we are not in agreement of such submission since we are dealing with the issue of conduct of a public servant which leads to the fraudulent act which is utmost required for a person who is discharging the public duty.
40. The submission has also been made that no enquiry or no conclusive finding has been arrived at.
41. This Court on consideration of the said argument is of the view that if an act of fraud is apparent from the face of the record, then there is no need to conduct an enquiry to come to a conclusion, since, enquiry is required to be initiated in a case where the fact being disputed by the person concerned. For ready reference the judgment rendered by Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Vice-Chairman, Kendriya Vidalaya Sangathan and Another v. Girdharilal Yadav reported in (2004) 6 SCC 325 is required to be referred which reads hereunder as :-
"12. Furthermore, the respondent herein has been found guilty of an act of fraud. In our opinion, no further opportunity of hearing is necessary to be afforded to
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him. It is not necessary to dwell into the matter any further as recently in the case of Ram Chandra Singh v. Savitri Devi [(2003) 8 SCC 319] this Court has noticed:
"15. Commission of fraud on court and suppression of material facts are the core issues involved in these matters. Fraud as is well known vitiates every solemn act. Fraud and justice never dwell together.
16. Fraud is a conduct either by letter or words, which induces the other person or authority to take a definite determinative stand as a response to the conduct of the former either by word or letter.
17. It is also well settled that misrepresentation itself amounts to fraud. Indeed, innocent misrepresentation may also give reason to claim relief against fraud.
18. A fraudulent misrepresentation is called deceit and consists in leading a man into damage by wilfully or recklessly causing him to believe and act on falsehood. It is a fraud in law if a party makes representations which he knows to be false, and injury ensues therefrom although the motive from which the representations proceeded may not have been bad."
42. Further, relying upon the aforesaid judgment the Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of L.K.Verma v. HMT Ltd. and Another reported in (2006) 2 SCC 269 has held that things admitted need not be proved.
43. Herein, on the basis of the record itself, i.e., the service excerpts, the writ petitioner has referred his date of birth to be 20.07.1976 and she has come out with matriculation certificate showing her date of birth as
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01.03.1981 and in both the documents or disclosure of the date of birth are by the writ petitioner herself then where is the question to conduct an enquiry when the fact is admitted by the writ petitioner herself.
44. The question of conduct of enquiry is to provide a chance in case of disputed fact so that the truth may come to surface and if the fact is admitted and there is no chance of change of outcome, there is no necessity to conduct an enquiry otherwise it will lead to futile exercise and empty formality, reference in this regard be made to the judgment rendered by the Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Escorts Farms Ltd. v. Commissioner, Kumaon Division, Nainital, U.P. & Others [(2004) 4 SCC 281] wherein at paragraph 64 it has been observed which is quoted hereunder:-
64. ... ... Rules of natural justice are to be followed for doing substantial justice and not for completing a mere ritual of hearing without possibility of any change in the decision of the case on merits. In view of the legal position explained by us above, we, therefore, refrain from remanding these cases in exercise of our discretionary powers under Article 136 of the Constitution of India.
45. Further, the Hon'ble Apex Court in Dharampal Satyapal Ltd. v. Deputy Commissioner, Central Excise, Gauhati & Ors. [(2015) 8 SCC 519] has taken similar view at paragraph 45 which reads as under :-
"45. Keeping in view the aforesaid principles in mind, even when we find that there is an infraction of
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principles of natural justice, we have to address a further question as to whether any purpose would be served in remitting the case to the authority to make fresh demand of amount recoverable, only after issuing notice to show cause to the appellant. In the facts of the present case, we find that such an exercise would be totally futile having regard to the law laid down by this Court in R.C. Tobacco [(2005) 7 SCC 725]."
46. Otherwise also, it is not a case of dismissal/termination, rather, it is a case of cancellation of appointment.
47. The learned Single Judge has considered the fact in a very simple manner as if it is a case of date of birth and has given go bye to the specific imputation of commission of fraud as per the show cause wherein the explanation was sought for as to why due to this fraudulent act, the service be not cancelled.
48. Initiation of departmental proceeding only in a case of misconduct. Misconduct means while discharging duty, any duty has been discharged which ought not be discharged. Misconduct has been interpreted by Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of State of Punjab v. Ex-Constable Ram Singh reported in (1992) 4 SCC 54 which is being referred hereunder as :-
"5. Misconduct has been defined in Black's Law Dictionary, Sixth Edition at page 999 thus:
"A transgression of some established and definite rule of action, a forbidden act, a dereliction from duty, unlawful behavior, wilful in character, improper or wrong behavior, its synonyms are misdemeanor, misdeed, misbehavior,
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delinquency, impropriety, mismanagement, offense, but not negligence or carelessness."
Misconduct in office has been defined as:
"Any unlawful behavior by a public officer in relation to the duties of his office, wilful in character. Term embraces acts which the office holder had no right to perform, acts performed improperly, and failure to act in the face of an affirmative duty to act."
P. Ramanatha Aiyar's Law Lexicon, Reprint Edition 1987 at page 821 defines 'misconduct' thus:
"The term misconduct implies a wrongful intention, and not a mere error of judgment. Misconduct is not necessarily the same thing as conduct involving moral turpitude. The word misconduct is a relative term, and has to be construed with reference to the subject matter and the context wherein the term occurs, having regard to the scope of the Act or statute which is being construed. Misconduct literally means wrong conduct or improper conduct. In usual parlance, misconduct means a transgression of some established and definite rule of action, where no discretion is left, except what necessity may demand and carelessness, negligence and unskilfulness are transgressions of some established, but indefinite, rule of action, where some discretion is necessarily left to the actor. Misconduct is a violation of definite law; carelessness or abuse of discretion under an indefinite law. Misconduct is a forbidden act; carelessness, a forbidden quality of an act, and is necessarily indefinite. Misconduct in office may be defined as unlawful behaviour or neglect by a public officer, by which the rights of a party have been affected."
6. Thus it could be seen that the word 'misconduct' though not capable of precise definition, on reflection receives its connotation from the context, the delinquency in its performance and its effect on the discipline and the nature of the duty. It may involve moral turpitude, it must be improper or wrong behaviour; unlawful behaviour, wilful in character; forbidden act, a transgression of established and definite rule of action or code of conduct but not mere error of judgment, carelessness or negligence in performance of the duty; the act complained of bears forbidden quality or character. Its ambit has to be construed with reference to the subject matter and the context wherein the term occurs, regard being had to the scope of the statute and the public purpose it seeks to serve. The police service is a disciplined service and it requires to maintain strict discipline. Laxity in this behalf erodes
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discipline in the service causing serious effect in the maintenance of law and order."
49. Here, it is not a case when the act done by the writ petitioner can be said to be in discharge of official duty, rather, he has committed a conduct by inducting herself in service.
50. The learned Single Judge, according to our considered view, ought to have taken into consideration the very issue which was raised by the authority concerned while issuing the show cause in order to test the element of fraud but as would appear from the impugned order, there is no consideration to that effect.
51. The law is well settled that in a case of fraud if the fact is apparent from the admission of the record itself, the concerned litigant is required to be dealt with on the principle that the fraud vitiates the very solemnity of the act and in case of fraud the same goes to the root and in that circumstances, such person who has committed fraud is having no right to claim any benefit, more particularly, the appointment, reference in this regard be made to the judgment rendered by Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Rajasthan Rajya Vidyut Prasaran Nigam Ltd. & another v. Anil Kanwariya, reported in (2021) 10 SCC 136 wherein at paragraph 8.5 it has been observed which reads hereunder as :-
8.5. In Jainendra Singh [Jainendra Singh v. State of U.P.,
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(2012) 8 SCC 748] , this Court summarised the principles to be considered in a case where the appointment is obtained by misrepresentation and/or suppression of facts by candidates/appointees as under :
29.3. When appointment was procured by a person on the basis of forged documents, it would amount to misrepresentation and fraud on the employer and, therefore, it would create no equity in his favour or any estoppel against the employer while resorting to termination without holding any inquiry.
52. Further, similar view has been reiterated by the Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Indian Oil Corporation Ltd. v. Sh. Rajendra D Harmalkar 2022 SCC OnLine SC 486, at paragraph 7.1 which reads hereunder as:--
"7.1 In the present case, the original writ petitioner was dismissed from service by the Disciplinary Authority for producing the fabricated/fake/forged SSLC. Producing the false/fake certificate is a grave misconduct. The question is one of a TRUST. How can an employee who has produced a fake and forged marksheet/certificate, that too, at the initial stage of appointment be trusted by the employer? Whether such a certificate was material or not and/or had any bearing on the employment or not is immaterial. The question is not of having an intention or mens rea. The question is producing the fake/forged certificate. Therefore, in our view, the Disciplinary Authority was justified in imposing the punishment of dismissal from service."
53. This Court, after taking into consideration the aforesaid fact having not been dealt with by the learned Single Judge, is of the view that the order passed by the
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learned Single Judge suffers from error. Accordingly, the order impugned needs to be interfered with.
54. Hence, the impugned order dated 15.03.2022 passed in W.P.(S) No.1557 of 2016 is quashed and set aside.
55. In the result, the instant appeal stands allowed.
56. In consequence thereof, the writ petition stands dismissed.
57. Consequently, I.A. No.6923 of 2022 (Stay petition) also stands disposed of.
(Sujit Narayan Prasad, J.) (Navneet Kumar, J.) Birendra/ A.F.R.