Chattisgarh High Court
Guru Dhasidas Vishwavidyalaya vs Employees Provident Fund Organization on 23 February, 2022
Author: Narendra Kumar Vyas
Bench: Narendra Kumar Vyas
Page 1 of 15
AFR
HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH, BILASPUR
WPL No. 21 of 2022
Guru Ghasidas Vishwavidyalaya (A Central University
constituted Under the Central Universities Act, 2009), Koni,
Bilaspur (C.G.) through its Registrar.
---- Petitioner
Versus
1. Employees Provident Fund Organization, Regional Office, D-
Block, Scheme No. 32, Indira Gandhi Commercial Complex,
Pandri, Raipur- 492004 Through the Regional P.F.
Commissioner.
2. Assistant Provident Fund Commissioner, Employees Provident
Fund Organization, District Office, Ground Floor, BSNL Office
Complex, Near Agrasen Chowk, Bilaspur (C.G.)
3. Enforcement Officer, O/f Assistant Provident Fund
Commissioner, Employees Provident Fund Organization, District
Office, Ground Floor, BSNL Office Complex, Near Agrasen
Chowk, Bilaspur (C.G.)
4. State Bank of India, Lodhi Para, Koni Branch (18879) Bilaspur
(C.G.) 495001 through Branch Manager.
---- Respondents
For Petitioner : Mr. Ashish Shrivastava, Sr. Advocate with Mr. Soumya Rai, Advocate.
For Respondent No. 1 to 3 : Mr. Vinay Pandey, Advocate.
Hon'ble Shri Justice Narendra Kumar Vyas Order On Board 23.02.2022
1. The petitioner/Guru Ghasidas Vishwavidyalaya (for short "the University") has filed the present petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India challenging legality and validity of the order dated 30.12.2021 (Annexure P/1) passed under Section 7-A of the Employees' Provident Funds and Miscellaneous Provisions Act, 1952 (for short "the Act, 1952") assessing the dues amount to Rs. 1,37,43,353/- for the period from 01/2009 to 08/2018, order dated 31.12.2021 (Annexure P/2) under Section 7-Q of the Page 2 of 15 Act, 1952 by which respondent No. 2/Assistant Provident Fund Commissioner, Employees Provident Fund Organization, District Office, Bilaspur has assessed the interest amount of Rs. 36,92,417/-. The petitioner has also assailed the order dated 18.01.2022 (Annexure P/3) & 19.01.2022 (Annexure P/4) issued by respondent No. 2 to respondent No. 4-Branch Manager, State Bank of India, Lodhipara, Koni, Bilaspur (C.G.) under Section 8F of the Act, 1952, by which, entire amount of Rs. 1,37,43,353/- & Rs. 60,28,875/- have been recovered from bank account of the University.
2. Learned Senior counsel for the petitioner would submit that the petitioner is a Central University constituted under the Central Universities Act, 2009. The record of the case would demonstrate that the respondent-Employees' Provident Fund Organization has initiated proceedings for assessment of dues for the period from 01/2009 to 08/2018. The Employees' Provident Fund Organization/ Department has issued notices for hearing and on the basis of record available with the department, respondent No. 2 has assessed the dues under Section 7-A of the Act, 1952 to the tune of Rs. 1,37,43,353/- vide its order dated 30.12.2021 (Annexure P/1) and thereafter he has issued another order on 31.12.2021 (Annexure P/2) under Section 7-Q of the Act, 1952 assessing the dues to the tune of Rs. 36,92,417/-. Thereafter, he has issued order on 18.01.2022 (Annexure P/3) and 19.01.2022 (Annexure P/4) to the Banker to pay the dues of a defaulter as per provisions of Section 8F of the Act, 1952. These orders have been assailed by the petitioner by filing this writ petition.
3. Learned Senior counsel for the petitioner would further submit that impugned orders have been passed without waiting for giving any opportunity to the petitioner to file statutory appeal under Section 7-I of the Act, 1952. He would further submit that limitation for filing of the appeal is 60 days and thereafter as per the Employees' Provident Fund Tribunal Rules, 1997, further 60 Page 3 of 15 days can be extended by the tribunal, therefore, it is incumbent on the part of the respondent organization to wait atleast upto 60 days before exhausting such hard steps even without following the procedure as prescribed under the Act, 1952. He would further submit that seizure of the bank account is in contravention of Section 8F of the Act and against the law laid down by Hon'ble High Court of Madhya Pradesh in Ferro Concrete Construction (India) Ltd. Vs. Regional Provident Fund Commissioner, M.P. & others1 and also the judgment passed by Hon'ble High Court Delhi in Sun Pharmaceuticals Industries Ltd. Vs. Employees Provident Fund Organization & others2 and Vijaya Bank Vs. EPFO3 and would pray for quashing of the impugned orders. The petitioner by way of interim relief has also sought for stay of the impugned orders and restitution by returning the entire amount which has been recovered by the respondent under duress.
4. The matter was listed on 18.02.2022, thereafter adjourned to 22.02.2022, on that day, this Court has directed respondent No. 1/Regional Provident Fund Commissioner, Raipur and respondent No. 2/Assistant Provident Fund Commissioner, Bilaspur to appear before this Court and in pursuance of the order passed by this Court, Regional Provident Fund Commissioner-I & Regional Provident Fund Commissioner-II have appeared to assist this Court for deciding the lis between the parties. Respondents No. 4/Bank is a banker who has acted on the instruction of the respondent No. 1 to 3, as such, no notice to respondent No. 4 was required to be issued.
5. This Court has posed a specific query, whether procedure contemplated under Section 8F of the Act, 1952 has been followed or not. The respondents' officers have not explained that they have followed the procedure, but they have informed this Court that there is no impediment for them to proceed against the petitioner without waiting for expiration of limitation of 1 2002 (1) MPLJ 116 2 2019 (III) CLR 774 3 2015 (1) CLR 485 Page 4 of 15 60 days of filing appeal and learned counsel for the department would refer to the judgment of Hon'ble High Court of Gujarat in Employees Provident Fund Organization Vs. Rollwell Forge Ltd. & another4, and also the judgment passed by Hon'ble High Court of Madhya Pradesh in Recovery Officer (Assistant Provident Fund Commissioner) & another Vs. Municipal Council, Dabra & another5, as such, the learned counsel for the department would submit that the contention raised by the petitioner that the department should wait till the expiration of period of limitation of 60 days for filing appeal cannot be accepted and deserves to be rejected by this Court.
6. Learned counsel for the department would further submit that against the order passed under Section 7-A of the Act, 1952 as well as order imposing damages under Section 14B of the Act, 1952, there is a remedy of filing appeal under Section 7-I of the Act, 1952 to the Employees Provident Fund Appellate Tribunal constituted under Section 7-D of the Act, 1952 and now the Central Government Industrial Tribunal-cum-Labour Court, Jabalpur has been empowered to hear the appeal against the order passed under Section 7-A & 14-B of the Act, 1952, therefore, the present writ petition challenging the impugned order under Section 7-A of the Act, 1952 dated 30.12.2021 (Annexure P/1) is not maintainable. Section 7-I provides appeal to tribunal. Section 7-I of the Act, 1952, reads as under:-
"7-I. Appeals to Tribunal.- (1) Any person aggrieved by a notification issued by the Central Government, or an order passed by the Central Government or any authority, under the proviso to sub-section (3), or sub-section (4) of section 1, or section 3, or sub-section (1) of section 7A, or section 7B [except an order rejecting an application for review referred to in sub-section (5) thereof], or section 7C, or section 14B, may prefer an appeal to a Tribunal against such notification or order. (2) Every appeal under sub-section (1) shall be filed in such form and manner, within such time and be accompanied by such fees, as may be 4 Letters Patent Appeal No. 12 of 2010 (Decided on 15.06.2011) 5 2017 (4) M.P.L.J. 219 Page 5 of 15 prescribed."
7. Section 7-O of the Act, 1952 also provides that no appeal by the employer shall be entertained by the tribunal unless he has deposited with its 75% of the amount due from him as determined by an officer referred to in Section 7-A. There is a proviso clause in the Act which provides that the tribunal may, for reason to be recorded in writing, waive or reduce the amount under the Section. From the bare perusal of the proviso clause, it is quite clear that tribunal has power to waive or reduce the amount to be deposited at the time of admission of the appeal. As such, the petitioner has alternate efficacious remedy filing appeal, is available, therefore, the present writ petition challenging the order under Section 7-A of the Act, 1952 is not tenable. The submission made by learned counsel for the department is sens merit and deserves to be accepted. Accordingly, it is held that the petition challenging the order under Section 7-A of the Act, 1952 is not maintainable. Similarly, against the order of imposition of penalty is also not maintainable. The next submission of the learned counsel for the department is that so far as imposition of interest under Section 7-Q of the Act, 1952, there is no remedy of appeal, is available as held by Hon'ble the Supreme Court in Aircot Textiles Mills Ltd. Vs. Regional Provident Fund Commissioner & others 6. When the order under Section 7-Q has been separately passed. In the present case also the order under Section 7-Q has been separately passed, therefore, the writ petition to that extent is maintainable before this Court.
8. Learned Senior counsel for the petitioner would submit that the respondents without following the procedure contemplated under Section 8-F & 8-G of the Act, 1952 have passed the orders. For better understanding the submission made by the parties, it is necessary for this Court to extract the provisions of Section 8-F & 8-G of the Act, 1952, which are extracted below:-
"8-F(1) - Notwithstanding the issue of a certificate 6 (2013) 16 SCC 1 Page 6 of 15 to the Recovery Officer under Section 8B, the Central Provident Fund Commissioner or any other officer authorised by the Central Board may recover, the amount by any one or more of the modes provided in this Section.
(3) (i) The Central Provident Fund Commissioner or any other officer authorised by the Central Board in this behalf may, at any time or from time to time, by notice in writing, require any person from whom money is due or may become due to the employer or, as the case may be, the establishment or any person who holds or may subsequently hold money for or on account of the employer or as the case may be, the establishment, to pay to the Central Provident Fund Commissioner either forthwith upon the money becoming due or being held or at or within the time specified in the notice (not being before the money becomes due or is held) so much of the money as is sufficient to pay the amount due from the employer in respect of arrears or the whole of the money when it is equal to or less than that amount.
(ii) A notice under this sub-section may be issued to any person who holds or may subsequently hold any money for or on account of the employer jointly with any other person and for the purposes of this sub-section, the shares of the joint-holders in such account shall be presumed, until the contrary is proved, to be equal.
(iii) A copy of the notice shall be forwarded to the employer at his last address known to the Central Provident Fund Commissioner or, as the case may be, the officer so authorised and in the case of a joint account to all the joint-holders at their last addresses known to the Central Provident Fund Commissioner or the officer so authorised.
(iv) Save as otherwise provided in this sub-section, every person to whom a notice is issued under this sub-section shall be bound to comply with such notice, and, in particular, where any such notice is issued to a post office, bank or an insurer, it shall not be necessary for any pass book, deposit receipt, policy or any other document to be produced for the purpose of any entry, endorsement or the like being made before payment is made notwithstanding any rule, practice or requirement to the contrary.
(v) Any claim respecting any property in relation to which a notice under this sub-section has been Page 7 of 15 issued arising after the date of the notice shall be void as against any demand contained in the notice.
(vi) Where a person to whom a notice under this sub-section is sent objects to it by a statement on oath that the sum demanded or any part thereof is not due to the employer or that he does not hold any money for or on account of the employer, then, nothing contained in this sub-section shall be deemed to require such person to pay any such sum or part thereof, as the case may be, but if it is discovered that such statement was false in any material particular, such person shall be personally liable to the Central Provident Fund Commissioner or the officer so authorised to the extent of his own liability to the employer on the date of the notice, or to the extent of the employer's liability for any sum due under this Act, whichever is less.
(vii) The Central Provident Fund Commissioner or the officer so authorised may, at any time or from time to time, amend or revoke any notice issued under this sub-section or extend the time for making any payment in pursuance of such notice.
(viii) The Central Provident Fund Commissioner or the officer so authorised shall grant a receipt for any amount paid in compliance with a notice issued under this sub-section, and the person so paying shall be fully discharged from his liability to the employer to the extent of the amount so paid.
(ix) Any person discharging any liability to the employer after the receipt of a notice under this sub-section shall be personally liable to the Central Provident Fund Commissioner or the officer so authorised to the extent of his own liability to the employer so discharged or to the extent of the employer's liability for any sum due under this Act, whichever is less.
(x) If the person to whom a notice under this sub-
section is sent fails to make payment in pursuance thereof to the Central Provident Fund Commissioner or the officer so authorised he shall be deemed to be an employer in default in respect of the amount specified in the notice and further proceedings may be taken against him for the realisation of the amount as if it were an arrear due from him, in the manner provided in Sections 8B to E and the notice shall have the same effect as an attachment of a debt by the Recovery Officer in exercise of his powers under Section 8B."
Page 8 of 15"8-G. Application of certain provisions of Income-tax Act.-- The provisions of the Second and Third Schedules to the Income-tax Act, 1961 (43 of 1961) and the Income-tax (Certificate Proceedings) Rules, 1962, as in force from time to time, shall apply with necessary modifications as if the said provisions and the rules referred to the arrears of the amount mentioned in section 8 of this Act instead of to the income-tax:
Provided that any reference in the said provisions and the rules to the "assessee" shall be construed as a reference to an employer as defined in this Act.
9. When this Court has asked the concerning officers whether the procedure prescribed under Section 8-F of the Act, 1952 has been complied with or not, it has been informed to this Court that only email was sent to the petitioner due to ongoing Covid-19 pandemic and except this, no procedure has been followed.
10. From bare perusal of the Section 8-F of the Act, 1952, it is quite clear that Section 8-F of the Act, 1952 empowers the recovery officer to recover the dues payable by the employer under the Act by other modes. It is pertinent to mention that Section 8-F(3) consists of 10 sub- section which is counter part of Section 226 (3) of the Income Tax Act, 1961. This section also provides other mode of recovery and Section 226 (3) provides that the Tax Recovery Officer should send notice in writing required any person from whom money is due to pay the Tax Recovery Officer either forthwith upon the money due or being held or act or within the time specified in the notice. Schedule-II & III of the Income Tax Act, 1961 has been applied as per Section 8-G of the Act, 1952. Schedule-II provides procedure for recovery of tax, the sub-clause (2) provides for issuance of notice to defaulter requiring the defaulter to pay the amount specified in the certificate within 15 days from the date of service of notice and intimating that in default steps would be taken to release the amount under this Schedule. Sub-clause (3) further provides that no steps in execution of a certificate shall be taken until the period of 15 days has elapsed since the date of service of the Page 9 of 15 notice required by the preceding rules. There is a proviso clause in sub-clause (3) which provides that if recovery officer is satisfied that the defaulter is likely to conceal, remove or dispose of whole or any part of such immovable property as would be available to attachment in execution of a decree of a civil court and that the realisation of the amount of the certificate would be delayed or obstructed, he may any time direct for reasons to be recorded in writing and attachment of the whole or any part of such property. It means, the recovery officer has to record a finding that the establishment/ petitioner is making an attempt to delay or obstruct the attachment proceeding. For that, he has to assign reason whereas in the present case, there is no such exercise is being carried out by the recovery officer. Sub-clause (4) provides mode or recovery, if the amount mentioned in the notice is not paid within the time specified therein or within such further time as the Tax Recovery Officer may grant in his discretion, then only the Recovery Officer shall proceed to release the amount by any of the following modes. Schedule-III provides procedure for distraint by Assessing Officer or Tax Recovery Officer.
11. Section 226 (3) of the Income Tax Act, 1961 came up for consideration before Hon'ble the Supreme Court in Biharilal Ramcharan Vs. ITO7, wherein Hon'ble the Supreme Court has explained the scope of Section 226 (3) of the Income Tax Act and had ruled guiding principle to the recovery authorities while exercising their power under these Sections. Hon'ble High Court of Madhya Pradesh in Ferro Concrete Construction (India) Ltd. (Supra) has examined the Section 8F of the Act, 1952 as well as application of Section 226 (3) of the Income Tax Act with regard to recovery of dues made in the Act, 1952 and has held as under:-
"11. In substance, the ratio of the Supreme Court decision rendered in the case of Biharilal, (supra), is that it is mandatory on the part of the Recovery Officer before passing any order under these two 7 1984 (131) ITR 129 Page 10 of 15 sections to hold an inquiry after giving due opportunity to the person concerned, allow him to state on oath whether he has to pay any amount to the defaulter and if so under what head, against which transaction or whether he holds any money on account of defaulter and if so how much, whether any money is due or not and if so, its extent? It is only after the person concerned files and makes a statement on oath on any of the facts referred supra, then depending upon the statement so made, the Recovery Officer will proceed to pass an order. In other words, holding of an inquiry into the requirement of Section 8F(3)(vi) is mandatory and any deviation from the compliance will result in vitiating the order.
12. The aforesaid principle equally applies to cases falling in Section 8F(3) of the Act and hence, Recovery Officer while exercising the powers under Section 8F(3), has to follow the aforesaid principle enunciated by the Supreme Court in the case of Biharilal.
13. Coming to the facts of the case, I find that Recovery Officer (respondent No. 2) while initiating and eventually passing the order dated April 11, 2001 (Annexure P/9) did not even care to read Section 8F(3)(vi) what to say recorded a finding as contemplated therein. Indeed, while proceeding to pass an impugned order, he committed an error of law in proceeding ex pane against the petitioner. The recovery officer neither properly apprised the petitioner of the facts on which he was proposing to proceed against the petitioner, nor he allowed the petitioner to comply with the requirement of Section 8F(3)(vi) ibid. In substance, the whole proceedings are in total disregard to the provisions of Section 8F(3) ibid and hence, liable to be quashed."
12. Hon'ble High Court of Delhi in Vijaya Bank Vs. EPFO8, has held at paragraph 11 & 14 as under:-
"11. A plain reading of Section 8B of the EPF Act indicates that on receipt of the certificate by the Recovery Officer, the Recovery Officer is required to proceed to recover the amount specified in the certificate from the establishment or as the case may be from the employer by the modes specified therein. The modes of recovery indicated in Section 8B of the EPF Act are attachment and sale of property of the "establishment" or of the "employer".
Section 8B of the EPF Act does not contemplate 8 2015 (1) CLR 485 Page 11 of 15 any proceedings for recovery of dues by the Recovery Officer against assets of any entity other than the establishment. In the present case, the attachment order refers to CHF as the establishment. It is, thus, apparent that the impugned orders have been issued only in respect of the assets of CHF. In the given facts, where, evidently, the subject properties do not belong to CHF but to GKP and WCE, therefore the impugned orders are plainly erroneous.
14. The provisions of Section 8F(3) of the EPF Act provide for a machinery to recover amounts which are due from an establishment by directly recovering the same from its debtors. Thus if any amount or an asset is owed by any person to the establishment, the authorized officers of the Provident Fund Organization can directly recover the same from such persons. The proceedings under Section 8F(3) of the Act are similar to garnishee proceedings and the authorized officer of the Employees Provident Fund Organisation is placed is a position similar to that of a garnisher. And, can directly reach out to the funds owed to or held on account of, the establishment by other persons. However, the precondition to proceeding under Section 8F(3) is a conclusion that the third parties hold money for or on account of the establishment, which is liable to pay the provident fund dues."
13. Hon'ble High Court of Delhi in Sun Pharmaceuticals Industries Ltd. (Supra), has held at paragraph 18 as under:-
"18. The power vested in the authorities under Section 8F(3) of the EPF Act is meant to prevent unscrupulous employers from avoiding payment of its employees' provident fund dues by transferring the amount to a third party or asking its debtors not to pay the amount. The said provisions cannot be used in the manner to raise claims on parties who specifically dispute their liability qua the defaulting ` employer. Merely because the EPF Act is a beneficial piece of legislation, it cannot be read in such a manner so as to authorize the authorities to take upon itself to decide the inter-se liabilities of the parties or perform an adjudicatory task in this regard. In my view, such disputes have to be determined in appropriate legal proceedings and cannot be left to the provident fund authorities. If the provisions of Section 8F(3) of the EPF Act are interpreted in the manner as sought by the respondents, it would lead to absolute chaos and Page 12 of 15 give unbridled power to the authorities to adjudicate upon disputes between parties, one of whom has nothing to do with provident fund dues........"
14. Now coming to the facts of the case, the respondents have issued notice on 18.01.2022 treating the petitioner as defaulter directing him to deposit amount of Rs. 1,37,43,353/- forthwith on receipt of the order by registered post and on 19.01.2021 itself, the bank has sent the demand draft of the said amount. Similarly, they have sent the order to other branch on 19.01.2021 and bank has sent demand draft of Rs. 60,12,875/- on the same date. This clearly establishes that before issuing the notice, declaring the establishment as defaulter, no such procedure has been followed, as such, the whole action initiated by the authority suffers from arbitrariness, capricious and deserves to be quashed by this Court. Accordingly, the order dated 18.01.2022 (Annexure P/3) & order dated 19.01.2022 (Annexure P/4) are quashed. However, liberty is reserved to the department to exercise power under Section 8-F of the Act, 1952 strictly in accordance with the procedure enumerated under the Act, 1952.
15. It is well settled proposition of law that if a statute provides for a thing to be done in a particular manner then it has to be done in that manner alone and no other manner. Hon'ble the Supreme Court in Opto Circuit India Limited Vs. Axis Bank & others 9, has held at paragraph 14 as under:-
"14. This Court has time and again emphasised that if a statute provides for a thing to be done in a particular manner, then it has to be done in that manner alone and in no other manner. Among others, in a matter relating to the presentation of an Election Petition, as per the procedure prescribed under the Patna High Court Rules, this Court had an occasion to consider the Rules to find out as to what would be a valid presentation of an Election Petition in the case of Chandra Kishor Jha vs. Mahavir Prasad and Ors. (1999) 8 SCC 266 and in the course of consideration observed as hereunder: (SCC p. 273, para 17) "17........It is a well settled salutary principle that if a 9 (2021) 6 SCC 707 Page 13 of 15 statute provides for a thing to be done in a particular manner, then it has to be done in that manner and in no other manner".
Therefore, if the salutary principle is kept in perspective, in the instant case, though the Authorised Officer is vested with sufficient power; such power is circumscribed by a procedure laid down under the statute. As such the power is to be exercised in that manner alone, failing which it would fall foul of the requirement of complying due process under law. We have found fault with the Authorised Officer and declared the action bad only in so far as not following the legal requirement before and after freezing the account. This shall not be construed as an opinion expressed on the merit of the allegation or any other aspect relating to the matter and the action initiated against the appellant and its Directors which is a matter to be taken note in appropriate proceedings if at all any issue is raised by the aggrieved party."
16. The contention of the learned counsel for the respondents that it is not required for the department to wait till expiry of period of limitation of appeal for initiating recovery proceeding, is not acceptable looking to the facts and circumstances of this case as the authorities have not followed the procedure as provided under Section 8-B to 8-F of Act, 1952 which takes reasonable time to reach the stage of adopting coercive means. In the present case, the department has declared the petitioner as defaulter on 18.01.2022 and recovered the amount on 19.01.2022. Even from the judgment referred to by the department in the case of Municipal Council (Supra), it can be safely held that the Division Bench is also of the view that procedure for adopting coercive method takes reasonable time and between that time the period of limitation expires. On these premises, Hon'ble the Division Bench of High Court of Madhya Pradesh has taken a view that it is not necessary for department to wait till expiration of period of limitation in filing appeal. This situation is not available in the present facts of the case as the respondents have issued the order on 18.01.2022 and recovered the amount on the next date i.e. on 19.01.22.
17. This Court after appreciating the material on record, provisions of Page 14 of 15 law set aside the orders attaching the bank account of the petitioner by the respondents and the amount of Rs. 1,37,43,353/- & Rs. 60,28,875/- has already been lying with the department, the petitioner has also remedy of appeal under Section 7-A of the Act, 1952, the tribunal having jurisdiction over the subject has power to waive or reduce the amount to be deposited at the time of appeal, as such, interest of the respondents is also secured, therefore, contention of the department that amount which has been recovered without following the due process should not be directed to be refunded to the petitioner is not acceptable. Accordingly, the petitioner is entitled to claim restitution by returning the said amount from the department within 15 days from the date of receipt of copy of this order. Hon'ble the Supreme Court in Binayak Swain Vs. Ramesh Chandra Panigrahi & another10, has held at paragraph 108 (iii) as under:-
".......The principle of the doctrine of restitution is that on the reverse of a decree the law imposes an obligation on the party to the suit who received the benefit of the erroneous decree to make restitution to the other party for what he has lost. The Court in making restitution is bound to restore the parties so far as they can be restored to the same position they were in at the time when the Court by its erroneous action had displaced them from......"
18. In view of the legal position enumerated above, the order dated 18.01.2022 (Annexure P/3) & 19.01.2022 (Annexure P/4) under Section 8-F of the Act, 1952 are quashed. However, so far as, other relief sought by the petitioner challenging the order under Section 7-A & 14-B of the Act, 1952 is concerned, the petitioner is at liberty to file an appeal before the tribunal. It is also held that so far as interest is concerned under Section 7-Q of the Act, 1952, the petitioner is at liberty to file a fresh petition.
19. It is made clear that this Court has not commented on merits of the order passed by the department under Section 7-A & 14-B of the Act, 1952. It is for the tribunal to decide the case of the 10 AIR 1966 SC 948 Page 15 of 15 petitioner in accordance with law on in its own merits without there being influenced by any of the observations made by this Court while deciding this writ petition.
20. With the aforesaid observations and directions, the instant writ petition is partly allowed.
Sd/-
(Narendra Kumar Vyas) Judge Arun