Telangana High Court
Mohd.Ahteshamuddin , Asif And Others vs The State Of Telangana.,Rep.,Pp And ... on 18 November, 2025
THE HONOURABLE SRI JUSTICE J. SREENIVAS RAO
+ CRIMINAL PETITION No.14109 of 2015
% Dated 18.11.2025
# Mohd. Ahteshamuddin @ Asif, S/o
Dr.M.A.Ahmed, aged about 53 years, occ:
Pvt. School Administrator, R/o Flat No.601,
H.No.11-3-848/1 to 5, Shaheen Heights,
New Mallepally, Hyderabad and others.
....Petitioners/Accused
VERSUS
$ The State of Telangana, through S.H.O., PS
Habeeb Nagar, Hyderabad, rep. by its Public
Prosecutor, High Court of Hyderabad for the
State of Telangana and for the State of
Andhra Pradesh, Hyderabad and another.
... Respondents
! Counsel for the petitioners : Ms. Vladimeer Khatoon
^ Counsel for Respondent No.1 : Mr. M.Vivekananda Reddy, Asst.P.P.
Counsel for Respondent No.2 : Mr.S.Someshwar Rao
< GIST:
> HEAD NOTE:
? CITATIONS:
1. (2001) 4 SCC 752
2. (2001) 1 SCC 169
3. (1993) 3 SCC 4
4. 1994 Supp (2) SCC 398
5. 2025 SCC OnLine SC 1783
2
THE HON'BLE SRI JUSTICE J.SREENIVAS RAO
CRIMINAL PETITION No.14109 of 2015
ORDER:
This Criminal Petition has been filed under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (for short, 'Cr.P.C.') by the petitioners, who are arrayed as accused Nos.1 to 4, 6 and 7, seeking to quash the proceedings in C.C. No.715 of 2015 on the file of the XVI Additional Chief Metropolitan Magistrate, Hyderabad.
2. Heard Sri D.Prakash Reddy, learned Senior Counsel, representing Ms. Vladimeer Khatoon, learned counsel for the petitioners, Sri S.Someshwar Rao, learned counsel for respondent No.2/de facto complainant and Sri M.Vivekananda Reddy, learned Assistant Public Prosecutor, appearing on behalf of respondent No.1-State.
3. Brief facts of the case:
3.1. Respondent No.2 has filed a complaint on 22.02.2009 at about 14-10 hours, stating that he is the owner and sole developer of a residential property admeasuring 811 square yards, bearing Municipal Nos.
11-3-848 to 11-3-848/5, situated at Mallepally, Hyderabad. The property consists of 25 flats, which had 3 been sold over the past four years, and the purchasers were in peaceful possession. He further stated that he had engaged security staff from Shah Security Services and other maintenance personnel for the building's upkeep. Despite receiving the entire sale consideration, the land owner had filed a civil suit O.S. No. 665 of 2008 before the II Additional Chief Judge, City Civil Court, Hyderabad, seeking an injunction that was not granted as the purchasers were already in possession. However, on the night of 22.02.2009 at about 12:30 a.m., petitioners, along with their associates assaulted the security guard Mr. Shekhar, confined him in a room, damaged the building, and attempted to trespass into the property. Based on this complaint, Crime No. 39 of 2009 under Sections 448, 427, 342, 323 read with Section 34 of the IPC has been registered. Based on the said complaint, the Investigating Officer after conducting detailed investigation filed charge sheet and the same was taken cognizance and numbered as C.C. No.715 of 2015.
4. Submissions of learned Senior Counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioners:
4.1 Learned Senior Counsel submitted that respondent 4 No.2 lodged a complaint against the petitioners on 22.02.2009 and basing on the same, Crime No.39 of 2009 was registered by the Police, Habeebnagar Police Station, Hyderabad. On 25.10.2012, the Investigating Officer filed final report. The Investigating officer filed application on 19.11.2013 before the learned XVI Additional Chief Metropolitan Magistrate, Hyderabad seeking condonation of delay in filing final report and the learned Magistrate passed Order in S.R.No.61 of 2013 in Crl.M.P. No.4751 of 2015 on 03.12.2013 condoning the delay in filing final report and directed the office to number the case. The learned Magistrate without giving notice and opportunity to the petitioners passed the order, dated 03.12.2013, and condoned the delay and the same is gross violation of the principles of natural justice and taking cognizance against the petitioners is also clear abuse of the process of law. 4.2 He further submitted that the trial Court issued notice to respondent No.2 on 19.09.2013 calling for objections if any with regard to filing of final report by the Investigating Officer. Pursuant to the same, respondent No.2 filed protest petition on 26.12.2013 deleting accused No.3 and when the said application was pending, learned 5 Magistrate issued another notice to respondent No.2 on 20.03.2015 directing him to appear before the trial Court with counsel on 10.04.2015 for filing objections about final report especially deleting the name of accused No.3.
Accordingly, respondent No.2 filed memo on 08.05.2015 stating that he is not having any objection for deleting accused No.3, in the final report. Taking into consideration the above said memo, the learned Magistrate closed the proceedings on 08.05.2015. Subsequently, respondent No.2 filed application on 18.09.2015 to reopen the case and proceed with the trial. The learned Magistrate allowed the application and reopened the case against accused Nos.1, 2 and 4 to 7. 4.3 He vehemently contended that by virtue of the closure of the proceedings through order, dated 08.05.2015, the learned Magistrate becomes functus officio and he is not having jurisdiction to entertain the application and reopen the case in view of the bar under Section 362 of Cr.P.C.
4.4 In support of his contention, he relied on the following judgments;
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i) State of Kerala vs. M.M.Manikantan Nair 1;
ii) Hari Singh Mann vs. Harbhajan Singh Bajwa and others 2; and
iii) Shiva Sankar Baba vs. State in Crl.O.P.No.23806 of 2021 of Madras High Court.
5. Submission of learned counsel for respondent No.2:
5.1 Learned counsel for respondent No.2 submitted that the Investigating Officer filed final report against accused Nos.1, 2 and 4 to 7 and deleted the name of accused No.3. Pursuant to the same, learned Magistrate issued notice to respondent No.2 calling for objections about final report filed by the Investigating Officer.
Pursuant to the same, respondent No.2 filed memo on 08.05.2015, wherein he specifically stated that he is not having any objection for deletion of accused No.3. In view of the same, learned Magistrate closed the proceedings against accused No.3 only. However, in the order, dated 08.05.2015 inadvertently mentioned that proceedings 1 (2001) 4 SCC 752 2 (2001) 1 SCC 169 7 closed.
5.2 He further submitted that respondent No.2 is not having right or power to seek closure of case against the other accused except accused No.3. Respondent No.2 with a prudent manner filed application on 18.09.2015 to reopen the case and proceed with the trial insofar as the other accused is concerned, the learned Magistrate after hearing both the parties, allowed the application on 23.10.2015. Aggrieved by the above said order, the petitioners have approached this Court and filed Crl.R.C. No.3310 of 2015, which was dismissed as infructuous basing upon the submissions made by the learned counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioners on 05.02.2016. The above said order, dated 23.10.2015, was merged in the Crl.R.C. and the same has become final. 5.3 He further submitted that under Section 473 of Cr.P.C., learned Magistrate is having power to condone the delay at any point of time. Not giving opportunity to the petitioners while condoning the delay in entertaining the final report is only a curable defect. Basing on the same, the petitioners are not entitled to seek quashing of 8 the proceedings. The petitioners filed the present criminal petition insofar as taking cognizance and the petitioners have not questioned the orders passed by the learned Magistrate, dated 03.12.2013. Hence, the petitioners are not entitled to seek quashing of the proceedings. 5.4 In support of his contention, he relied on the judgment of the Hon'ble Apex Court in Vanka Radhamanohari v. Vanka Venkata Reddy 3.
Analysis:
6. Having considered the rival submissions made by the respective parties and after perusal of the material available on record, it reveals that basing upon the complaint lodged by respondent No.2, Crime No.39 of 2009 was registered against the petitioners for the offences punishable under Sections 448, 427, 342, 323, r/w 34 of IPC on 22.02.2009 and the Investigating Officer after conducting investigation filed a final report before the learned Magistrate on 25.10.2012.
7. The record further reveals that the Investigating Officer filed final report after expiry of the statutory period 3 (1993) 3 SCC 4 9 of limitation for the above said offences. However, the Investigating officer filed an application before the learned Magistrate seeking condonation of delay in filing final report and the same was allowed by the learned Magistrate on 03.12.2013 while exercising the powers conferred under Section 473 Cr.P.C.
8. The record further reveals that the learned Magistrate before passing the order dated 03.12.2013 has not given any notice and opportunity to the petitioners and passed the order in their absence.
9. In Sukhdev Raj v. State of Punjab 4, the Hon'ble Supreme Court held that an application for condonation of delay under Section 473 Cr.P.C. can be entertained at any stage before the conclusion of the trial if the delay is properly explained or if condonation is necessary in the interest of justice. The Court further observed that before passing order of condonation of the delay, notice and an opportunity of being heard must be given to the opposite party. This requirement ensures fairness in procedure and prevents any prejudice to the accused, reaffirming that 4 1994 Supp (2) SCC 398 10 orders condoning delay without such opportunity would not be proper in law.
10. In Shiva Sankar Baba supra, High Court of Madras held that the provisions relating to limitation in criminal prosecutions under Sections 468 and 473 of the Cr.P.C must be interpreted in light of the object of justice, the Court reiterated that while the bar of limitation applies to offences punishable with imprisonment not exceeding three years, the court is empowered under Section 473 Cr.P.C to condone the delay if it is properly explained or if such condonation is necessary in the interest of justice. The High Court further clarified that it is not mandatory for the prosecution to file an application for condonation of delay at the time of filing the charge sheet; such delay may be condoned at any stage before the conclusion of the trial, provided the court records its satisfaction that the delay has been duly explained and that condonation is warranted to serve the ends of justice.
11. In Vanka Radhamanohari supra, the Hon'ble Supreme Court explained that while Section 468 of Cr.P.C prescribes limitation periods for taking cognizance of certain offences to prevent stale prosecutions and ensure 11 timely justice, Section 473 Cr.P.C empowers the Court to take cognizance even after expiry of the prescribed period, if the delay is properly explained or if doing so is necessary in the interests of justice. The Court emphasized that Section 473 of Cr.P.C., being a non- obstante provision, has an overriding effect on Section 468 of Cr.P.C., thereby allowing Courts to condone the delay not only upon satisfactory explanation but also when the ends of justice so require.
12. In the case on hand, the learned Magistrate without giving any notice and reasonable opportunity to the petitioners condoned the delay in filing final report. Hence, this Court is of the considered view by virtue of the principle laid down by the Hon'ble Apex Court in Sukhdev Raj supra that the petitioners are entitled for notice and opportunity.
13. Insofar as the other contentions raised by the learned Senior Counsel that the learned Magistrate does not have jurisdiction to reopen the case is concerned, the Investigating Officer filed final report against the accused Nos.1, 2 and 4 to 7 and deleted the name of accused No.3. Pursuant to the same, learned Magistrate issued notice to 12 respondent No.2 on 20.03.2015 directing him to file objections if any in respect of final report insofar as deletion of the name of accused No.3. Respondent No.2 filed a memo on 08.05.2015 wherein he specifically mentioned that he is not having any objection for deletion of the name of accused No.3 in the final report. Taking into consideration the said memo, the learned Magistrate ought to have closed the proceedings against accused No.3 only through order, dated 08.05.2015, however, the learned Magistrate passed the following order on 08.05.2015, which reads as under:
"Defacto Complainant present. Memo filed reported no objections against final report (Charge Sheet). Hence the proceeding closed."
14. The said order reveals that the learned Magistrate taking into consideration the memo filed by respondent No.2, closed the proceedings. The de-facto complainant has not filed memo for closure of the proceedings against all the accused. It is also pertinent to mention that the respondent No.2 is not having power/authority seeking closure of the case against all the accused.
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15. The record further reveals that on 18.09.2015 respondent No.2 filed a petition in Crl.M.P.No.2514 of 2015 seeking to reopen the case, wherein he specifically mentioned that he is not having any objection for deleting the name of accused No.3 and he has not given any consent for closure of proceedings against other accused. Even respondent No.2 is not having such right to seek closure of proceedings against other accused. The learned Magistrate after due verification of the records, allowed the application on 23.10.2015, wherein it was specifically mentioned that the prosecution filed charge sheet against accused Nos.1 to 7 by deleting the name of accused No.3 only. The de-facto complainant filed memo reporting no objection for closure of the proceedings against the accused No.3 only and reopened the case against accused Nos.1, 2 and 4 to 7.
16. The record further discloses that aggrieved by the above said order dated 23.10.2015, the petitioners have approached this Court and filed Crl.R.C.No.3310 of 2015 and the same was dismissed as infructuous on 05.02.2016 basing upon the submissions made by the learned counsel for the petitioners therein. By virtue of 14 the dismissal of the Crl.R.C., the impugned order passed by the learned Magistrate dated 23.10.2015 was merged in the Crl.R.C. and the petitioners are not entitled to contend that the learned Magistrate is not having jurisdiction to reopen the case in the present criminal petition.
17. In M.M. Manikantan Nair supra, the Hon'ble Supreme Court held that the Code of Criminal Procedure does not confer any power upon the High Court to review or alter its judgment or final order once it has been signed, except to correct a clerical or arithmetical error as provided under Section 362 of Cr.P.C. The Court emphasized that this prohibition is absolute and that no criminal Court can reopen or reconsider its own final order. In that case, the High Court, after having earlier rejected a petition for quashing criminal proceedings, subsequently reversed its own decision on the same issue, which the Supreme Court held to be an impermissible review contrary to the express bar contained in Section 362 Cr.P.C.
18. In Hari Singh Mann supra, the Hon'ble Supreme Court held that Section 362 embodies the well-established 15 doctrine that once a court has finally disposed of a matter, it becomes functus officio that is, it ceases to have jurisdiction over that case and cannot entertain a fresh prayer for the same relief unless the earlier order is set aside by a court of competent jurisdiction. The above decisions affirm that once a criminal court has signed its judgment or final order, it cannot review, modify, or recall it, except for correcting clerical or arithmetical mistakes, ensuring the finality of judicial decisions in criminal proceedings.
19. In Vikram Bakshi v. R.P. Khosla 5, the Hon'ble Supreme Court reiterated that under Section 362 of Cr.P.C, 1973, a criminal court, including a Magistrate under Section 6 of Cr.P.C, 1973, has no authority to alter or review its judgment once it has been signed, except for the correction of a clerical or arithmetical error. The Hon'ble Supreme Court, however, clarified that this limitation does not prevent the rectification of a procedural or typographical mistake, which is a mechanical or inadvertent error committed by the court itself, not involving the court's reasoning or discretion, where the 5 2025 SCC OnLine SC 1783 16 order as recorded does not truly reflect what was intended or supported by the record. Such correction does not amount to a review on merits but only ensures that the judicial record speaks the truth.
20. In the present case, the Magistrate, by oversight, closed proceedings against all the accused though the de-facto complainant had given no objection only for accused No. 3. This mistake was purely clerical and procedural mistake only and did not arise from the Court's reasoning or discretion, as the order went beyond what was intended or warranted by the record. Hence, this Court is of the considered view that the said mistake falls within the scope of a clerical or procedural error, which the Magistrate, being a criminal Court, was competent to rectify the same to in order to prevent miscarriage of justice, and also the said mistake would cause prejudice to the parties and to uphold the principle that no party should suffer due to the mistake of the Court.
21. The judgments which are relied upon by the learned counsel for the petitioners in M.M. Manikantan Nair supra and Hari Singh Mann supra, are not applicable to 17 the facts and circumstances of the case, especially in view of the subsequent principle laid down by the Hon'ble Apex Court in Vikram Bakshi supra, it was specifically held that the provisions of Section 362 of Cr.P.C. does not prevent the rectification of a procedural or typographical mistake, which is a mechanical or inadvertent error committed by the Court itself, not involving the Court's reasoning or discretion where the order as recorded does not truly reflect what was intended or supported by the record. Such correction does not amount to a review on merits but only ensures that the judicial record speaks the truth.
22. For the foregoing reasons this Court does not find any grounds to quash the proceedings in C.C. No.715 of 2015 on the file of the XVI Additional Chief Metropolitan Magistrate, Hyderabad. However, taking into consideration of peculiar facts and circumstances of the case and also in view of the principle laid down by the Hon'ble Apex Court in Sukhdev Raj supra, this Court is of the considered view that the learned Magistrate ought to have given opportunity much less reasonable opportunity to the petitioners before passing the order dated 18 03.12.2013 while condoning the delay in filing a final report by the Investigation Officer. Hence, the order dated 03.12.2013 passed by the learned Magistrate is liable to be set aside and accordingly set aside. The learned Magistrate is directed to decide the application i.e., S.R.No.61 of 2013 filed by the Investigating Officer seeking condonation of delay in filing the final report afresh after giving opportunity to the respective parties and pass appropriate orders in accordance with law as expeditiously as possible, preferably within a period of two (2) months from the date of receipt of a copy of this order.
23. Accordingly, the criminal petition is disposed of.
As a sequel thereto, miscellaneous applications, if any, pending in this petition stand closed.
______________________________ JUSTICE J.SREENIVAS RAO Date: 18.11.2025 Note: Issue C.C. in a week.
L.R. Copy to be marked.
B/o pgp