Bombay High Court
Felguera Gruas India Pvt Ltd vs Tuticorin Coal Terminal Pvt Ltd And 8 Ors on 20 November, 2019
Author: G. S. Patel
Bench: G.S. Patel
906-CARBP1403-19.DOC
Arun
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY
ORDINARY ORIGINAL CIVIL JURISDICTION
IN ITS COMMERCIAL DIVISION
COMM ARBITRATION PETITION NO. 1403 OF 2019
Felguera Gruas India Pvt Ltd ...Petitioner
Versus
Tuticorin Coal Terminal Pvt Ltd And Ors ...Respondents
Mr Zal Andhyarujina, with Mr Vineet T and Mr Sayeed Mulani, i/b
Mulani & Co, for the Petitioner.
Mr Nirman Sharma, with Mr Ranjeet Shetty, Priyanka Shetty and
Vatsala Pant, i/b Argus Partners, for Respondent No.1
Mr Sachin Chandrana, with Mr Akash Mehta, i/b Manilal Kher
Ambalal & Co, for Respondents Nos. 3 to 7 and 9.
CORAM: G.S. PATEL, J.
DATED: 20th November 2019 PC:-
1. The application is under Section 9 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act 1996. It seeks protective orders after the making of an arbitral award and prior to its enforcement.
2. A few facts and dates are necessary.
3. The petitioner, Felguera Gruas India Pvt Ltd ("FGIPL") was the claimant in arbitration. It is a company registered in Vishakapatnam, Andhra Pradesh. It carries out turnkey projects Page 1 of 19 20th November 2019 ::: Uploaded on - 21/11/2019 ::: Downloaded on - 22/11/2019 00:16:16 ::: 906-CARBP1403-19.DOC offering compressive services in design, testing, commissioning, manufacturing, sourcing, supply and construction.
4. The 1st respondent is Tuticorin Coal Terminal Pvt Ltd ("Tuticorin Coal"). This is a company with its registered ofce in Mumbai. It entered into a Concession Agreement dated 11th September 2010 with the 2nd respondent, VO Chidambaranar Port Trust ("VOCPT"), a body constituted under the Major Port Trusts Act for the development, design, building, fnancing, operating, maintaining and transferring of what is known as the NCB-II project to handle coal and bulk cargo at Tuticorin Port at Tamil Nadu. Respondents Nos. 3 to 9 are lenders to Tuticorin Coal.
5. FGIPL and Tuticorin Coal had a contract comprised in a Letter of Intent dated 10th July 2012. Tuticorin Coal issued this to FGIPL for the supply, design, erection and commissioning of stackers and stacker-reclaimers. Tuticorin Coal then placed three purchase orders all dated 23rd August 2012 on FGIPL. There is also another Letter of Intent dated 1st November 2012 in regard to a conveyor system and three distinct purchase orders all dated 28th November 2012 under that further Letter of Intent.
6. The disputes and differences between the parties were referred to a three-member arbitral tribunal following a notice of invocation. These arbitral proceedings resulted in an award dated 3rd June 2019. A copy of this is at Exhibit "A" and runs from page 38 to page 291. Then there followed on 1st September 2019 a Page 2 of 19 20th November 2019 ::: Uploaded on - 21/11/2019 ::: Downloaded on - 22/11/2019 00:16:16 ::: 906-CARBP1403-19.DOC correction or corrective additional award. This was served on FGIPL on 6th September 2019.
7. Mr Andhyarujina for the petitioner submits that the 90-day period contemplated for the fling of Section 34 petition would thus have to be reckoned from 6th September 2019 and would run until 5th December 2019. He submits that he needs protection in the meantime.
8. The resultant award is almost entirely in FGIPL's favour. It partly allows a counter-claim to the extent of an adjustment that FGIPL had in any case admitted. The issues before the arbitral tribunal are at page 127 of the paper book. The dispositive portion of the award is at page 286. The award is in rupee terms starting with a frst award of Rs. 32 crores, then a credit to the respondent for about Rs. 27 crores, followed by another award in favour of the petitioner for nearly Rs. 44 crores (being the amount of bank guarantees that the respondent was found by the arbitral tribunal to have wrongly invoked) and so on. In addition, the respondent was ordered to pay costs of Rs. 75 lakhs. The arbitral award also notes that the respondent was in such a dire fnancial straits that it could not even pay the tribunal's fees.
9. Mr Andhyarujina frst fairly points out that the arbitration in question would be governed by the Arbitration and Conciliation Act as amended in 2015. That amendment came into effect on 23rd October 2015. The notice of invocation was dated 7th June 2016. Section 87 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act reads thus:
Page 3 of 1920th November 2019 ::: Uploaded on - 21/11/2019 ::: Downloaded on - 22/11/2019 00:16:16 ::: 906-CARBP1403-19.DOC "87. Efect of arbitral and related Court proceedings commence prior to 23rd October, 2015 --Unless the parties otherwise agree, the amendments made to this Act by the Arbitration and Conciliation (amendment) Act, 2015 (3 of 2016) shall --
(a) not apply to --
(i) arbitral proceedings commenced
before the commencement of the Arbitration and Conciliation (amendment) Act, 2015 (3 of 2016);
(ii) Court proceedings arising out of or in relation to such arbitral proceedings irrespective of whether such Court proceedings are commenced prior to or after the commencement of the Arbitration and Conciliation (Amendment) Act, 2015 (3 of 2016);
(b) apply only to arbitral proceedings commenced on or after the commencement of the Arbitration and Conciliation (Amendment) Act, 2015 (3 of 2016) and to Court proceedings arising out of or in reaction to such arbitral proceedings."
(Emphasis added) Sub clause (b) would thus clearly apply to the proceedings in question. This is of relevance because of Section 34(3) and its proviso and the amendment in 2015 to Section 36(3).
"34. Application for setting aside arbitral award.--(1) Recourse to a Court against an arbitral award may be made only by an application for setting aside such award in accordance with sub-section (2) and sub-section (3).Page 4 of 19
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(3) An application for setting aside may not be made after three months have elapsed from the date on which the party making that application had received the arbitral award or, if a request had been made under section 33, from the date on which that request had been disposed of by the arbitral tribunal:
Provided that if the Court is satisfed that the applicant was prevented by sufcient cause from making the application within the said period of three months it may entertain the application within a further period of thirty days, but not thereafter."
36. Enforcement.--(1) Where the time for making an application to set aside the arbitral award under section 34 has expired, then, subject to the provisions of sub- section (2), such award shall be enforced in accordance with the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (5 of 1908), in the same manner as if it were a decree of the Court.
(2) Where an application to set aside the arbitral award has been fled in the Court under section 34, the fling of such an application shall not by itself render that award unenforceable, unless the Court grants an order of stay of the operation of the said arbitral award in accordance with the provisions of sub-section (3), on a separate application made for that purpose.
(3) Upon fling of an application under sub-section (2) for stay of the operation of the arbitral award, the Court may, subject to such conditions as it may deem ft, grant stay of the operation of such award for reasons to be recorded in writing:
Page 5 of 1920th November 2019 ::: Uploaded on - 21/11/2019 ::: Downloaded on - 22/11/2019 00:16:16 ::: 906-CARBP1403-19.DOC Provided that the Court shall, while considering the application for grant of stay in the case of an arbitral award for payment of money, have due regard to the provisions for grant of stay of a money decree under the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (5 of 1908).
(Emphasis added) The opening lines of amended Section 36 make it clear that an award such as this one cannot be put to enforcement until the time for making a Section 34 application has expired. I believe this argument is correctly positioned.
10. The next argument is whether the nature of the reliefs, ad-
interim and interim that Mr Andhyarujina seeks in this post award petition properly fall within the frame of Section 9 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act. These are the prayers:
"a. Pass an order directing Respondent No. 1 to secure the amounts/ claims passed in favour of the Petitioner under the Arbitral Award dated 03.06.2019 (as clarifed vide further order dated 01.09.2019), by furnishing an unconditional and irrevocable frst demand Bank Guarantee of an amount equivalent to the amounts/ claims passed in favour of the petitioner under the Arbitral Award dated 03.06.2019 (as clarifed vide further order dated 01.09.2019);
b. Pass an order directing the Respondents to secure the amounts/ claims passed in favour of the Petitioner under the Arbitral Award dated 03.06.2019 (as clarifed vide further order dated 01.09.2019), jointly and severally, by:
i. Apportioning and securing an amount equivalent to the amounts/ claims passed in favour Page 6 of 19 20th November 2019 ::: Uploaded on - 21/11/2019 ::: Downloaded on - 22/11/2019 00:16:16 ::: 906-CARBP1403-19.DOC of the petitioner under the Arbitral Award dated 03.06.2019 (as clarifed vide further order dated 01.09.2019), from the monies coming into the Escrow Amount of Respondent No. 1 under the Concessionaire Agreement;
ii. Apportioning and securing an amount equivalent to the amounts/ claims passed in favour of the petitioner under the Arbitral Award dated 03.06.2019 (as clarifed vide further order dated 01.09.2019), from the receivables of Respondent No. 1 under the Concessionaire Agreement and/or otherwise;
iii. Not dealing with the goods (list of goods annexed as Exhibit C) supplied by the Petitioner to Respondent No. 1, in any manner whatsoever;
iv. Apportioning and securing an amount equivalent to the amounts/ claims passed in favour of the petitioner under the Arbitral Award dated 03.06.2019 (as clarifed vide further order dated 01.09.2019), from any of the bank accounts Respondent No. 1 may have in any bank of India.
c. Pass an order attaching the goods (list of goods annexed as Exhibit C) supplied by the Petitioner to Respondent No. 1;
d. Pass an order restraining Respondent No. 2 from transferring the right to concession under the Concessionaire Agreement dated 1.09.2010 to any third party;
e. Pass an order attaching the fght of the Concession Agreement awarded by Respondent No. 2 to Respondent No. 2 in favour of Petitioner Page 7 of 19 20th November 2019 ::: Uploaded on - 21/11/2019 ::: Downloaded on - 22/11/2019 00:16:16 ::: 906-CARBP1403-19.DOC f. Pass an order attaching the goods, assets and properties the Respondent No. 1 may have in India, for an amount equivalent to the amounts/ claims passed in favour of the petitioner under the Arbitral Award Apportioning and securing an amount equivalent to the amounts/ claims passed in favour of the petitioner under the Arbitral Award dated 03.06.2019 (as clarifed vide further order dated 01.09.2019).
g. Pass an ex-parte interim order in favour of the petitioner and against the Respondents in terms of the aforesaid prayers (a) to f )."
11. At this stage, I am asked to consider an order limited in terms of prayer clause (b)(iii) set out above. The other prayers can be considered at a later stage.
12. The fact that Mr Andhyarujina limits the present application to prayer clause (b)(iii) does not mean and is not to be construed to mean that he has given up or abandoned his right to press for the fullness of the other reliefs.
13. Now the prayer in question is a list of movables and we fnd this list from pages 301 to 317 in Volume II of the Court records. These were all clearly movables. Under the contract these items or machinery were covered by Clause 9.1 which has been reproduced in the petition itself at page 18. They are part of Article 9, captioned "property and risk". The relevant portion reads thus:
Page 8 of 1920th November 2019 ::: Uploaded on - 21/11/2019 ::: Downloaded on - 22/11/2019 00:16:16 ::: 906-CARBP1403-19.DOC "ARTICLE 9-- PROPERTY AND RISK 9.1 The GOODS shall become the property of the PURCHASER either;
(a) Upon issuance of the COMMISSIONING CERTIFICATE; or
(b) When a progress payment has been made in respect of the GOODS prior to such delivery."
14. It is and admitted position that no commissioning certifcate was ever issued. This leaves the question of 9.1(b). If read in a composite manner Clause 9.1 and its sub-clause (b) would mean that title in the movables listed at page 301 would pass to Tuticorin Coal once it made 'progress payment' in respect of these goods but before the goods were actually delivered. Thus, there were two conditions precedent to the passing of title in the movables: frst, there had to be progress payment by Tuticorin Coal; and, second, that this payment had to precede delivery of the movables. That these goods were delivered to Tuticorin Coal and that they are even now on site in Tuticorin is not in dispute. The question is whether there was in fact anything like a 'progress payment' made by Tuticorin Coal to FGIPL.
15. In this context the arbitral fndings is in paragraph 343 at page
226. For reasons that suggest themselves, I think it is best to reproduce that paragraph in full:
"343. Lastly, Tribunal in view of the present factual matrix is of the opinion that the POs, duly construed, clearly require Respondent to pay Claimant for goods purchased Page 9 of 19 20th November 2019 ::: Uploaded on - 21/11/2019 ::: Downloaded on - 22/11/2019 00:16:16 ::: 906-CARBP1403-19.DOC for the Contract Work, from time to time and not only when all the goods thereunder have been purchased. That payment upon reaching milestones was a term the Contract clearly shows this, regardless of the fact that thereafter the milestones did not come to be fxed. In fact, Respondent has made payments to Claimant from time to time, as admitted by it in its pleadings, in lump sums and not of the precise amounts as raised by Claimant in its invoices. Thus, it follows as a necessary corollary that Respondent is liable to pay Claimant under all invoices for goods purchased under the Pos."
(Emphasis added)
16. The fnding of fact returned by the arbitral tribunal is that Tuticorin Coal did make some periodic (or sporadic) payments to FGIPL. These payments were admitted. However, they were not in the precise amounts of FGIPL's invoices but were in what the tribunal describes as lump sums. In other words, when FGIPL raised an invoice, there was no corresponding payment or no evidence of any payment that would exactly correspond to any particular invoice. FGIPL appropriated the lump sum payments that it received including partly towards the sale price of one or more of these movables. This becomes relevant because, as we have seen, Clause 9.1 spoke of 'progress payments'. Evidently, this means that there had to be a schedule of progressive payments. In other words, there would have to be specifed milestones or markers defning the stages of payment. Again as a fnding of fact, the tribunal came to the conclusion that no milestones were ever fxed. Paragraph 343 reproduced above says so. Of necessity, this means that FGIPL's invoices were the only demands for payment. Unless it is therefore Page 10 of 19 20th November 2019 ::: Uploaded on - 21/11/2019 ::: Downloaded on - 22/11/2019 00:16:16 ::: 906-CARBP1403-19.DOC shown that those payments were, frst, agreed to be treated as 'progress payments' and, second, were in fact paid in full prior to delivery, title could not be said to have passed to Tuticorin Coal. This is how Mr Andhyarujina formulates his submission under Clause 9.1(b).
17. Mr Sharma for Tuticorin Coal not only draws attention to the clause itself, but submits that once payment has been made, whether in part or by appropriation, then on a plain reading of the clause, title to the good would pass to Tuticorin Coal. He also points out that before the arbitral tribunal it was FGIPL that argued that the default legal position, i.e. the provisions of the Sale of Goods Act, would not apply. In addition, he draws attention to the arbitral fnding in paragraph 318 at page 205 expressly accepting FGIPL's submission that the Sale of Goods Act 1930 would have no application to the facts of the case.
18. But if that be so, and if there is no challenge to this award then this presents something of a conundrum in law about when title can be said to have passed. Mr Sharma's response provides no answer at all, at least prima facie, to Mr Andhyarujina's formulation. Mr Andhyarujina does not say the Sale of Goods Act applies. To the contrary. He maintains it does not. He only says that neither of the two conditions precedent to the passing of title ever occurred; that this is a factual fnding returned by the arbitral tribunal; and there is as yet no challenge to it as of today. As matters stand, therefore, on facts there is nothing to show that the two conditions precedent were ever satisfed; and therefore title in the goods never passed Page 11 of 19 20th November 2019 ::: Uploaded on - 21/11/2019 ::: Downloaded on - 22/11/2019 00:16:16 ::: 906-CARBP1403-19.DOC under the contract to Tuticorin Coal. On a plain reading of Clause 9.1, what was required was a progress payment. Let us accept it as undisputed that milestones contemplated by this where never in fact set. This might therefore mean that every invoice for part-payment raised by FGIPL would itself constitute a progress payment. But that is arguable, and no one has argued it. It is equally possible to hold that clause 9.1(b) had no application and therefore title did not pass to Tuticorin Coal for the reasons I have already set out. Returning to paragraph 343 of the award at page 226, this is in fact the arbitral fnding in the last sentence of that paragraph. This had to be the rational and reasoning by which the tribunal came to that conclusion.
19. All this becomes necessary at this ad-interim stage is that Tuticorin Coal has purported to hypothecate or pledge all these goods to one or more of respondents No. 3 to 9, the fnancial institutions. I am informed that at least one of them has since taken action under the Securitisation and Reconstruction of Financial Assets and Enforcement of Security Interest Act 2002.
20. I am now making this abundantly clear that merely because a borrower has purported to place some property as security to a fnancial institution lender, unless the borrower had legal title and authority to so deal with that property, no lender can merely by operation of the SARFAESI Act proceed against property, the title to which vests in a third party.
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21. What this therefore requires is a consideration of how an order under Section 9 should be fashioned. For the present, I am not concerned with the provisions of Order 40 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 ("CPC"). There was an argument once taken before a learned Single Judge of this Court that a Section 9 Arbitration Act proceeding should be placed on the same footing as a proceeding for arrest or attachment before judgment under Order 38 of the CPC, and specifcally Order 38 Rule 5. GS Kulkarni J in an elaborate judgment in Mahyco Monsanto Biotech (India) Private Limited v Nuziveedu Seeds Ltd,1 considered the legal position including the Division Bench Judgment in Dirk India Private Limited v Maharashtra State Electricity Generation Company Limited and Anr.2 GS Kulkarni J held as follows:
"20. The Division Bench in Dirk India Pvt. Ltd. (supra) considering the object of section 9 in a situation as the present has held that an interim measure of protection within the meaning of section 9(2) is intended to protect through the measure, fruits of a successful conclusion of the arbitral proceedings. It is held that the object and purpose of an interim measure after the passing of arbitral award, but before it is enforced, is to secure the property, goods or amount for the beneft of the party which seeks enforcement. The observations of the Division Bench in para 13 are required to be noted which read thus:
"13. Two facets of Section 9 merit emphasis. The frst relates to the nature of the orders that can be passed under clauses (i) and (ii). Clause (i) contemplates an order 1 Judgment dated 6th March 2019 in Commercial Arbitration Petition No. 312 of 2019.
2 2013 (7) Bom CR 493.Page 13 of 19
20th November 2019 ::: Uploaded on - 21/11/2019 ::: Downloaded on - 22/11/2019 00:16:16 ::: 906-CARBP1403-19.DOC appointing a guardian for a minor or a person of unsound mind for the purposes of arbitral proceedings. Clause (ii) contemplates an interim measure of protection for: (a) the preservation, interim custody or sale of any goods which are the subject-matter of the arbitration agreement; (b) securing the amount in dispute; in the arbitration and (c) the detention, preservation or inspection of any property or thing which is the subject- matter of the dispute in arbitration; (d) an interim injunction or the appointment of a receiver; and (e) such other interim measure of protection as may appear to the Court to be just and convenient. The underlying theme of each one of the sub-clauses of clause (ii) is the immediate and proximate nexus between the interim measure of protection and the preservation, protection and securing of the subject-matter of the dispute in the Arbitral proceedings. In other words, the orders that are contemplated under clause (ii) are regarded as interim measures of protection intended to protect the claim in arbitration from being frustrated. The interim measure is intended to safeguard the subject-matter of the dispute in the course of the Arbitral proceedings. The second facet of section 9 is the proximate nexus between the orders that are sought and the Arbitral proceedings. When an interim measure of protection is sought before or during Arbitral proceedings, such a measure is a step in aid to the fruition of the arbitral proceedings. When sought after an Arbitral award is made but before it is Page 14 of 19 20th November 2019 ::: Uploaded on - 21/11/2019 ::: Downloaded on - 22/11/2019 00:16:16 ::: 906-CARBP1403-19.DOC enforced, the measure of protection is intended to safeguard the fruit of the proceedings until the eventual enforcement of the award. Here again the measure of protection is a step in aid of enforcement. It is intended to ensure that enforcement of the award results in a realisable claim and that the award is not rendered illusory by dealings that would put the subject of the award beyond the pale of enforcement. Now it is in this background that it is necessary for the Court to impart a purposive interpretation to the meaning of the expression "at any time after the making of the arbitral award but before it is enforced in accordance with section 36".
Under Section 36, an Arbitral award can be enforced under the Code of Civil Procedure in the same manner as if it were a decree of the Court. The Arbitral award can be enforced where the time for making an application to set aside the Arbitral award under Section 34 has expired or in the event of such an application having been made, it has been refused. The enforcement of an award ensures to the beneft of the party who has secured an award in the Arbitral proceedings. That is why the enforceability of an award under Section 36 is juxtaposed in the context of two time frames, the frst being where an application for setting aside an Arbitral award has expired and the second where an application for setting aside an Arbitral award was made but was refused. The enforceability of an award, in other words, is defned with reference to the failure of the other side to fle an Page 15 of 19 20th November 2019 ::: Uploaded on - 21/11/2019 ::: Downloaded on - 22/11/2019 00:16:16 ::: 906-CARBP1403-19.DOC application for setting aside the award within the stipulated time limit or having fled such an application has failed to establish a case for setting aside the Arbitral award. Once a challenge to the Arbitral award has either failed under Section 34 having been made within the stipulated period or when no application for setting aside the Arbitral award has been made within time, the Arbitral award becomes enforceable at the behest of the party for whose beneft the award ensures.
Contextually, therefore, the scheme of section 9 postulates an application for the grant of an interim measure of protection after the making of an Arbitral award and before it is enforced for the beneft of the party which seeks enforcement of the award. An interim measure of protection within the meaning of section 9(ii) is intended to protect through the measure, the fruits of a successful conclusion of the Arbitral proceedings. A party whose claim has been rejected in the course of the Arbitral proceedings cannot obviously have an Arbitral award enforced in accordance with Section 36. The object and purpose of an interim measure after the passing of the Arbitral award but before it is enforced is to secure the property, goods or amount for the beneft of the party which seeks enforcement".
21. Once the above position in law is clear, in the facts of the present case, the reliance on behalf of the respondent on the decision of the learned Single Judge in Mahaguj Collieries Ltd. (supra) may not be applicable in the facts of the present case inasmuch as the observations as made in Page 16 of 19 20th November 2019 ::: Uploaded on - 21/11/2019 ::: Downloaded on - 22/11/2019 00:16:16 ::: 906-CARBP1403-19.DOC the said decision referring to the provisions of Order 38 Rule 5 (attachment before judgment) are made in the context of an interim order passed by the arbitral tribunal under Section 17 of the Act and the learned Single Judge was considering a petition under Section 37 of the Act challenging the said order of the arbitral tribunal. In the present case there is a fnal award of the arbitral tribunal."
(Emphasis added)
22. The principles, therefore, would be those that guide the discretion of a Court of equity when presented with an application for a temporary injunction and an interlocutory order under Order 39 of the CPC. These are the very principles that must apply today to a consideration of the relief that Mr Andhyarujina seeks in terms of prayer clause (b)(iii). The principles are well established by now and require no great elaboration. They may be stated simply. The applicant must frst make out a sufciently strong prima facie case. The balance of convenience must be demonstrated to be with the petitioner or applicant and, there must be at least some demonstration of a likelihood of irreparable injury or prejudice should reliefs be refused.3
23. As the brief discussion above shows, FGIPL has a substantial monetary award in its favour. Tuticorin Coal is in a fnancial quagmire. The goods in question are on site with the 2nd respondent Port Trust, VOCPT. The fnancial lenders' claim over these movable goods is one that needs examination at an appropriate 3 See paragraph 18 of Adhunik Steels Ltd v Orissa Manganese and Minerals Pvt Ltd, (2007) 7 SCC 125.
Page 17 of 1920th November 2019 ::: Uploaded on - 21/11/2019 ::: Downloaded on - 22/11/2019 00:16:16 ::: 906-CARBP1403-19.DOC stage -- for now I am merely leaving all contentions open. I am not presently directing the redelivery of these goods to the petitioner, and in fairness this not a relief that Mr Andhyarujina even presses. The balance of convenience is clearly with the petitioner and there is no doubt that if, at a minimum, this relief is not granted very considerable prejudice will be caused to the petitioner.
24. For all these reasons there will be an ad-interim injunction until further orders in terms of prayer clause (b)(iii) reproduced above. For completeness it is reproduced again below:
"b. Pass an order directing the Respondents to secure the amounts/ claims passed in favour of the Petitioner under the Arbitral Award dated 03.06.2019 (as clarifed vide further order dated 01.09.2019), jointly and severally, by:
iii. Not dealing with the goods (list of goods annexed as Exhibit C) supplied by the Petitioner to Respondent No. 1, in any manner whatsoever."
25. Afdavits in Reply to be fled and served on or before 15th December 2019. Afdavit in Rejoinder to be fled and served on or before 31st December 2019.
26. List the Section 9 petition for fnal disposal on 15th January 2020.
27. In the meantime and without prejudice to the pendency of the Section 9 petition liberty to the petitioner to fle and move its Page 18 of 19 20th November 2019 ::: Uploaded on - 21/11/2019 ::: Downloaded on - 22/11/2019 00:16:16 ::: 906-CARBP1403-19.DOC application for enforcement under the Arbitration and Conciliation Act read with the Code of Civil Procedure 1908.
28. As an additional precaution, and to prevent further complication, I will direct the 2nd respondent, VOCPT, to give prior written notice of at least one week to the petitioner should it purport or propose to terminate its Concession Agreement with Tuticorin Coal.
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