Patna High Court
Mohammad Khaliluddin And Ors. vs Union Of India (Uoi) on 31 October, 1961
Equivalent citations: AIR1962PAT109, AIR 1962 PATNA 109
JUDGMENT Raj Kishore Prasad, J.
1. This appeal under Sub-section (2) of Section 82-F, of the Indian Railways Act, 1890--which for the sake of brevity will be referred to hereinafter as The Act'--is from the decision of this Claims Commissioner, Patna, who was the District Judge of Patna refusing to grant compensation to the appellants, under Section 82-A of the Act, on the ground that their claim thereunder was not maintainable.
2. Appellant 1 is the father, and appellants 2 and 3 are his minor sons, and the deceased Jalilur Rahman, was his third son.
3. It is not disputed that the appellants, if their application under Section 82-A of the Act was maintainable, would be entitled to get a compensation of Rs. 4500/-, as claimed by them, in respect of the death of the deceased.
4. The sole question, for determination in the appeal therefore is whether the claim made by the appellants under Section 82-A of the Act, on-the facts here was maintainable?
5. The facts found by the Claims Officer, on the evidence on the record, which are not disputed in this Court, are these :
6. Deceased Jalilur Rahman, who was employed as a Health Assistant in the Public Health Department of the Government of Bihar and was posted at Patna, was ordered by the Assistant Director, Health Division, Patna, to go, along with others, to Sonepur in the district of Saran for working in the Sonepur fair. In accordance with this direction, Jalilur Rahman left his quarters on the 1st November, 1957, for proceeding to Sonepur. He went to Mahendraghut Railway station of North Eastern Railway and purchased a ticket for Sonepur and after having purchased the ticket, went to the jetty of the steamer, which was the usual place for the intending passengers to wait in the expectation of the arrival of the steamer and waited there. That Bay, there was a great Tush on account of the Sonepur fair, and, therefore, the Railway steamer, named 'Gomati', came fully loaded with passengers and it suddenly dashed against the jetty on which the deceased was waiting. As a result of the said collision between the steamer and the jetty, the thick iron chains, with which the jetty was tied for keeping it stationary, were broken and the jetty reeled round with strong jerk. As a result of the collision and because of the sudden jerk due to it, Jalilur Rahman was thrown down in the water of river Ganges and was drowned, and, his body was never recovered.
7. The appellants, who depended for their maintenance on the deceased, thereafter, made an application, on the foregoing facts, under Section 82-A of the Act claiming a compensation of Rs. 4500/-which has been found by the learned Claims Commissioner as proper and in accordance with Subsection (2) of Section 82-A of the Act. He, however, dismissed the claim, as stated before.
8. This appeal, therefore, involves the interpretation of Section 82A of the Act, and, it raises some questions of nicety.
9. The arguments put forward in support of the appeal, by Mr. Asghar Hussain, were :
(1) That the deceased, although not a passenger on the steamer which collided, was a passenger on the jetty waiting for the steamer, and, therefore, he must be deemed to be a passenger on the steamer, because the jetty was a part of the steamer and, (2) That in order to entitle the appellants, the admitted dependants of the deceased, within the meaning of Section 82-C of the Act, to claim compensation under Section 82-A, it was not necessary that the deceased should have been actually a passenger on the steamer itself, which met with the accident, and, therefore, it is enough if the deceased was a passenger, waiting for the steamer, on the jetty against which the steamer collided and duo to which collision the death of the deceased occurred.
10. Mr. Hussain sought to derive the greatest support for his first contention from the observations of the distinguished Lord Chancellor, Lord Halsbury, at page 64, in McCord v. Cammell and Go. Ltd., (1896) AC 57 decided by the House of Lords, and, also of Mathew, J. and Cave, J., at pages 109-110, in Cox v. Great Western Ry Co., (1882) 9 QBD 106.
11-12. Mr. P. K. Base, appearing for the Union of India representing the North Eastern Railway Administration, the owner of the steamer, which collided against the jetty, combated the above contentions on behalf of the appellants, by countering that:
First, a steamer is neither a 'railway', nor, 'a train', within the meaning of Section 82-A (1) of the Act; Secondly, that in order to entitle any dependent of the deceased to claim compensation under Section 82A (1) of the Act, it is essential even assuming a steamer to be a train that the deceased must have been a passenger on the steamer which met with the accident as a result of which', the death occurred. In support of this contention, reliance was placed on a decision of Krishnan, J. C., sitting singly, in State v. Lalman, AIR 1954 Vindh Pra 17, at p. 23; Thirdly, that a jetty cannot be considered to be a part of a steamer, much less of a steamer carrying passengers; and, Fourthly, that the deceased could not be said to be a ''passenger" within the meaning of Section 82A of the Act.
In this connection, Mr. Bose relied on two Bench decisions, one of this court in Ramchandra Prasad Sinha v. Union of India, 1959 Pat LR 65 : (AIR 1959 Pat 316), and, the other of the Punjab High Court in Union of India v. Sardarni Harbans Kaur, (S) AIR 1957 Punjab 164, which was relied upon in the just mentioned Patna case.
13. On the above grounds, therefore, it was argued by Mr. Bose that the decision of the learned Claims Commissioner was correct in law and that he had put the correct construction on Section 82-A (1) of the Act.
14. In order to decide the points raised and to ascertain the true scope and effect of Section 82-A of the Act, it is necessary, first, to read it at this very stage. Sub-section (1), of Section 82A, of the Act, which alone is material for the decision of the appeal, (so far as material), is in these terms :
"82A. Liability of railway administration in-respect of accidents to trains carrying passengers:
(1) When in the course of working a railway an accident occurs, being either a collision between trains of which one is a train carrying passengers or the derailment of or other accident to a train or any part of a train carrying passengers, then..........the railway administration shall, notwithstanding any other provision of law to the contrary, beliable to pay compensation ............. for loss Occasioned by the death of a passenger dying as a result of such accident and for personal injury and loss .......... of animals or goods Owned by the passenger and accompanying the passenger in his compartment or on the train, sustained as a result of such accident".
On the arguments presented by the learned Counsel for both parties, therefore, if is, next, necessary to know the meaning of the words "Railway", ''train", and "passenger", used in Section 82A (1) of the Act.
15. The word "railway" has been defined by Sub-section (4) of Section 3 of the Act. Clause (d), of Sub-section (4), of Section 3, which alone is material here, is to the following effect :
"3. Definitions: In this Act, unless there is something repugnant in the subject or context, X X X X X (4) 'railway' means a railway, Or any portion of a railway, for the public carriage of passengers, animals or goods, and includes : x x x x x
(d) all ferries, ships, boats and rafts which are used on inland waters for the purposes of the traffic of a railway and belong to or are hired or worked by the authority administering the railway;"
(15-A) There are two forms of interpretation clause. In one, where the word defined is declared to mean so and so the definition is explanatory and prima facie restrictive. In the other, where the word defined is declared to 'include' so and so, the definition is extensive.
16. Here, the Act contains, in the form of an interpretation clause, a little dictionary of its own in which it endeavours to define arbitrarily, the chief terms used. The word 'Railway', in the ordinary sense, would not have meant a 'steamer', but it has been defined arbitrarily and given to it an artificial meaning, which otherwise it would not have conveyed ordinarily.
16A. The above definition of the word "Railway" is an inclusive definition and words used in an inclusive definition denote extension and cannot be treated as restricted in any sense. Where, therefore, the court is dealing with an inclusive definition, it would be inappropriate to put restrictive interpretation upon terms of wider denotation: State of Bombay v. Hospital Mazdoor Sabha, AIR 1990 SC 610.
17. From the above inclusive definition of the word "Railway", therefore, it is manifest that it includes a 'steamer' also. I, therefore, hold that the steamer, which met with the accident, must be deemed to be 'a railway', within the meaning of Section 82A of the Act. Admittedly, here, the steamer, in the instant case, was Operated by the Railway Administration and it was owned by them.
18. The next question is, whether a jetty is a part of a steamer and whether the jetty here, can be considered to be a part of the steamer which met with the accident.
19. In Clause (d) of Sub-section (4) of S. 3, wherein the word "railway" has been defined, the word "ferries" has also been included within the definition of the word "railway" under the Act.
20. The word "ferry" has been defined in Sub-section (2) of Section 3 of the Act, as below :
"3 "Definitions in this "Act, unless there is something repugnant in the subject or context, X X X X X X X (2) 'ferry' includes a bridge of boats, pontoons or rafts, a swing-bridge, a flying bridge and a temporary bridge, and the approaches to and landing-places of, a ferry;"
21. The above definition of the word "ferry" is also an inclusive definition. For the reasons, given above, from the above definition, it is reasonibly clear that a 'jetty' is included within the word "ferry", and, as such, it would be considered to be a Part of a 'steamer', in that, a 'jetty' is an approach to a steamer and a landing place for the passengers travelling on such steamer. Reading Sub-section (2), alongside Sub-section (4) (d), of Section 3 of the Act, I hold that a 'jetty' is a part of a 'steamer', which is included within the word "railway" within the meaning of Section 82A (1) of the Act.
22. The crux of the matter, however, is whether the "jetty" against which the steamer which met with the accident, dashed in the present case, can be considered to be a part of the said steamer? Unless it is so, the appellants will not be entitled to claim the benefit of Section 82-A of the Act. To show that it is so, reliance was placed on the two English decisions referred to before which deal with a railway train.
23. The word "train", however, has not been defined in the Act anywhere. In McCord's case, (1896) AC 57 (supra), relied upon on behalf of the appellants, the words "a train" have been construed. This case was relied upon by Mr. Hussuin in support of his contention that a very wide scope should be given to the use of the word ''steamer" and that if it so widely construed, although the jetty, here, was not attached to the steamer carrying the passengers, which met with the accident, still as a "jetty" is part of a "steamer'', and, it could be attached to a steamer and carried along with it, the jetty in question, in the instant case, although it was stationary and not attached to the said steamer, must be deemed to be a part of it and as such the deceased must be deemed to be a passenger on the said steamer, although actually he was on the jetty, which was stationary, and not On the steamer carrying the passengers.
24. In the above case, decided by the House of Lords, Their Lordships were construing Subsection (5) of Section 1 of the Employers' Liability Act 1880, (43 and 44-G Vict c 42), which enacts that where personal injury is caused to a workman by reason of the negligence of any person in the service of the employer "who has the charge or control of any ....... locomotive engine or train upon a railway," there shall be the same right of compensation against the employer as if the workman had not been in his service. The Facts of that case are these : An engine driver, employed with his fireman in the discharge of loaded wagons on a railway, took a locomotive engine and several wagons to a point on an incline, and there proceeded with the engine and one of the wagons to the place of, discharge, intending to return for the other wagons in due course. The fireman uncoupled the remaining wagons and scotched them to prevent their running down the incline. One of the wagons broke away, ran down the incline, and killed a workman in the service of the same employers. There was evidence that the method of scotching adopted was unsafe and was known to and approved by the engine driver. The representative of the deceased therefore, brought an action for compensation against the employers under the Employers' Liability Act, 1880.
The only point of contention, therefore, in that case, was whether either the driver or the fireman was a person who had the charge or control of the train within the meaning of the said Act. It was argued, on behalf of the appellant, in that case, that the driver was certainly in the beginning in charge of the train, and. he did not cease to be so merely because he took the engine and one wagon away for the purpose of in loading, and, as such, he was still in charge of the whole train, having the duty of direction and superintendence with respect to the wagons on the incline, On behalf of the respondents, however, it was argued that as the train was broken up, it ceased to be a train when it was uncoupled, and, the engine driver was no longer in charge of anything but the locomotive and one wagon, as there was no "train"' within the meaning of the Act.
25. The distinguished Lord Chancellor, Lord Halsbury, in rejecting the interpretation sought to he put on the words "a train", on behalf of the respondents, at page 64, said:
"I should think speaking in a general way, that the Legislature meant that a locomotive engine by itself, or anything that was drawn along a railway, or was in course of being drawn along a railway by that locomative engine, should be included in 'a train'. I doubt very much whether it would depend upon the number of carriages or the number of vehicles going upon wheels which the locomotive was taking along the railway. I should think the Legislature intended a very wide scope to be given to the use of these words."
26. In Pulling's case, (1882) 9 QBD 106 (supra), relied upon by Mr. Hussain in support of his contention that the fact that the jetty here, was fixed and stationary, made no difference, and as such, it would be considered to be a part of the steamer, which met with the accident. Their Lordships, Mathew and Cave, JJ., of the Queen's Bench Division, were considering the meaning of the expression "a train upon a railway" within the meaning of Sub-section (5) of section 1 of the Employers' Liability Act, 1880, quoted above. The facts of that case are these:
27. One Hopker, who was in the employ of a railway company as a "capstan-man", without giving the usual warning, propelled a series of trucks along a line of rails in a goods station, and injured the plaintiff, who was engaged in similar work at the other end of the line about 100 yards off. The capstan was set in motion by hydraulic power communicated to it by Hopker from a stationary engine at a distance.
28. One of the questions, which arose for consideration before their Lordships, in that case, was whether Hopker was a person who had the charge or control of "a train upon a railway" within the meaning of Sub-section 5 of section 1 of the said Employers' Liability Act. On the argument before their Lordships, a doubt was suggested as to whether the line of trucks, there was "a train". In answering this question raised in the affirmative. Mathew, J., at page 109, said:
"Did the twelve trucks constitute a train? It seems to me that they did. A train is a train, whether consisting of trucks laden with goods or of carriages filled with passengers. The character of the load makes no difference. Nor do I think that locomotive engine is essential to the making of a train. The place where the accident occurred was clearly a part of the line of railway."
Cave, J., in a concurring judgment, while holding that Hopker was a person having the charge or control of a ''train upon a railway'' within the Act at pages 109-110, observed:
"There is some little nicely whether a number of trucks in a goods station (as here) can properly be said to constitute a train. The trucks. twelve in number, were coupled together in the usual way. There was no locomotive engine attached to them; but the motive power was communicated to them through a capstan which was worked by a stationary hydraulic engine. If this had been a train on the line of railway with a locomotive, and Hopker had been the driver of the engine, he clearly would have been a person having the charge or control of the train within the meaning of the Act. Does it make any difference. that there was no locomotive engine; but a stationary hydraulic engine and a capstan under his control, and that the place was a goods station into which the line of rails extends for the purpose of effecting the delivery of the contents of the trucks? Looking at the danger of putting these things in motion without proper warning, it seems to me to be immaterial whether the motive power was fixed or movable, or upon which portion of the line the accident happened."
29. In my opinion, none of the above two decisions are of any assistance to the appellants. In the first case, the wagon, which broke away, ran clown the incline and killed the workman, was coupled before with the other wagons and was a part of the train, which consisted of the several wagons (including the wagon which met with the accident) and the engine.
In the second case the twelve trucks which caused the injury, were coupled together, but there wag no locomotive attached to them, and the motive power was communicated to them through a capstan which was worked by a stationary hydraulic engine. Here, the above conditions do no exist. Admittedly, the jetty in question was never coupled with or attached to the steamer which met with the accident. The jetty was never a part of the said steamer nor was the latter provided with any motive power from any engine on the jetty. Fort these reasons, these decisions are of no guidance here, unless a jetty is coupled with a steamer carrying passengers and is attached to it, the jetty cannot be considered to be a part of such a steamer. It is not the case of any party that the jetty, in the present case, was coupled with the steamer which met with the accident, but it was uncoupled and detached from it, and, therefore, at the material time, it was stationary. If the jetty here, would have been coupled with or attached to the steamer, which met with the accident, and, the deceased would have been on the jetty attached to the said steamer, when he met with his death, then certainly, the jetty would have been considered to be a part of the said steamer carrying passengers, and in such a situation a claim under Section 82-A of the Act would have been maintainable. But that is not so.
30. A jetty may be a part of a steamer, but a jetty, which is stationary and not coupled with or attached to a steamer carrying passengers, can-not be considered to be a part of it, unless such a jetty is a Part of such a steamer, which met with the accident. No claim can be laid under Section 82-A of the Act, by the dependants of the deceased, obviously because he was not a passenger on such a steamer, but he was waiting on the stationary jetty, when he met with his death. A jetty is meant as a waiting-shed for passengers, who intend to board a steamer, and, also for those, who disembark from a steamer arriving with passengers. It serves the purpose of an approach to and a landing place for passengers of such steamer. It also serves the purpose of a goods station, where goods intended to be carried by a steamer carrying goods can be kept and later lifted and loaded into the steamer or where the delivery of such goods from such a steamer can be effected. When a steamer carrying passengers arrives and stops and touches such a jetty, which is stationary, it is connected with the steamer by a wood and/or iron work landing stage, which is thrown out and pushed into the steamer to enable the passengers to embark and disembark. Such a jetty, therefore, is meant for passengers going on board a steamer and for taking passengers of a steamer. It is nothing but a landing place for passengers travelling on a steamer and waiting shed for in-coming and Out-going passengers. Unless, therefore, such a jetty, which is stationary, is attached to a steamer carrying passengers for the purpose of carrying passengers or goods or for any other purpose, it cannot, by any stretch of imagination, even if a very wide scope be given, to the word 'jetty', be considered to be a part of such a steamer carrying passengers."
31. I, therefore, hold that the jetty, in the instant case, being stationary and admittedly not attached to or coupled with the steamer, which met with the accident, cannot be deemed to be a part of it, so as to entitle the appellants to claim compensation from the Railway Administration in terms of Section 82-A (1) of the Act.
32. A doubt was suggested by Mr, Bose as to whether the deceased was at all a "passenger'', within the meaning of Section 82-A (1) of the Act, inasmuch as, he was not travelling in the steamer itself, and, was not a passenger on it. Section 66(1) of the Act provides that every person desirous of travelling on a railway shall, upon payment of his fare, he supplied with a ticket, specifying the class of carriage for which, and the place from and the place to which, the fare has been paid and the amount of the fare. Section 68 contains prohibition against travelling without pass or ticket and therefore, by Sub-section (1), it provides that no person shall, without the permission of a railway servant, enter or remain in any carriage on a railway for the purpose of travelling therein as a passenger unless he has with him a proper pass or ticket. Sub-section (2) of section 68 further lays down that a railway servant when granting the permission referred to in Sub-section (1) shall ordi-narily, if empowered in this behalf by the railway administration, grant to the passenger a certificate that the passenger has been permitted to travel in such carriage upon condition that he subsequently pays the fare payable for the distance to be travelled.
Reading together Sections 66 and 68 of the Act, therefore, it is manifest that a person desirous of travelling on a railway has to obtain a ticket under Section 60 of the Act or can travel, if he has with him proper pass or ticket, with the permission of the railway servant under Section 68 of the Act; and, therefore, so long as he has not been sup-plied with a ticket under Section 66 or given per-mission under Section 68, he is not a ''passenger''.
The above view is supported by two Bench decisions, one of this Court and the other of the Punjab High Court, referred to before, and relied upon by Mr. Bose. In order to be a "passenger", however, it is not at all necessary that he should be actually in the steamer carrying passengers. It he has obtained a railway ticket as postulated by Section 66, or, has with him a proper pass or ticket, as envisaged by Section 68 and is waiting on the jetty to board the steamer carrying passengers on its arrival, he would be deemed to be a "passenger" under the Act, but he cannot be deemed to be a passenger of the steamer carrying passengers which in the meaning of Section 82-A of the Act. Unless he is a passenger of the steamer, which met the accident, his dependants are not entitled, on his death, by reason of such accident, to claim compensation under Section 82-A of the Act.
33. I, therefore, hold that the deceased was, no doubt, a passenger within the meaning of the Act, and that, because at the material time he was not travelling on the steamer, but, was standing on the jetty, which was stationary, he did not cease to be a "passenger" within the meaning of the Act, but be was not a passenger of the steamer which met with the accident so as to entitle the appellants to claim compensation under Section 82-A of the Act.
34. From Sub-section (1) of Section 82-A, read before, however, it will appear that the expression "a train carrying passengers" occurs at two material places in the said section and this in my opinion, supplies the key to the solution of the controversy. In order to attract the application of the provisions of Section 82-A (1) of the Act, the condition precedent is that the "passenger", who died as a result of either the collision or derailment or other accident, spoken of in Section 82-A (1) of the Act, must be a passenger in the tram carrying passengers, which met with the accident. Unless the deceased was actually travelling in the train or on the steamer, as the case may be, carrying passengers and while so travelling his death was occasioned in any of the manners postulated by Section 82-A (1) of the Act, his dependants are not entitled to claim any compensation from the Railway Administration in terms of Section 82-A (1) of the Act.
35. The above is the meaning and Correct interpretation and true scope and effect of Section 82A(1) of the Act is further supported by the fact that Section 82-A (1) makes the railway administration liable not only for the death of such a passenger in the train carrying passengers, but also inter alia for the loss, etc., of animals or goods Owned by the passenger and "accompanying the passenger in his compartment Or on the train,'' sustained as a result of such accident.
These words are clear indications of the intention of the Legislature that the Railway Administration shall be liable to pay compensation for the death of a passenger in a train carrying passengers as a result of such accident, as mentioned therein, only, and not otherwise, when the death of such a passenger was caused while he was in the train which was carrying passengers and which met with such accident.
36. The above view is supported by another circumstance also. Section 82-J of the Act empowers the Central Government by notification in the Official Gazette to make rules to carry out the objects of Sections 82-A to 82-H inclusive. Subsection (2) of Section 82-J, lays down that in particular, and without prejudice to the generality of the foregoing power, such rules may provide for the different matters Specified in Clauses (i) to (vi) therein. One such item, provided in Clause (d) of Section 82-J (2), is with regard to the manner in which claims for compensation may be inquired into and determined by the claims Commissioner. By virtue of the powers vested by Section 82-J of the Act, the Central Government have framed rules in 1950, which are called 'Railway Accidents (Compensation) Rules, 1950', as will appear from Appendix D, at page 1416, of Sanjiwa Row's The Indian Railways Act, Volume II, Third Edition in 1955. Rule 11 provides the different particulars which every application under Section 82-C for payment of compensation under Section 82-A of the Act shall contain. Rule 11 (1) (i) is material for our purpose, and, it is in these terms;
"11. Applications.--(1) Every application under Section 82-C for payment of compensation under Section 82-A shall contain the following particulars:-
(i) whether the person in respect of whom compensation is claimed was a passenger in the train which met with the accident. x x x x x"
It will thus be seen that Rule 11 (i) also provides that the person, in respect of whom compensation is claimed must have been a passenger in the train which met with the accident.
37. An attempt, however, was made to argue by Mr. Hussain that R. 11 (1) (i) was ultra vires, because it went beyond the rule making power as it was inconsistent with Section 82-A (1) of the Act. I am afraid there is no substance in this contention.
38. These Rules were made under the Act consistent with its provisions and as such they are statutory rules. Rules made under a statute must be treated for all purposes of construction or obligation exactly as if they were in the Act and are to be of the same effect as if contained in the Act, and are to be judicially noticed for all purposes of construction or obligation: State of Uttar Pradesh v. Babu Ram Upadhya, AIR 1981 SC 751.
39. It is manifest from Section 82-A (1) that the person in respect of whom compensation is claimed and whose death was occasioned by such accident must have been a passenger in the train and unless he was such a passenger in the train which met with the accident, his dependant is not entitled to claim any compensation, and, therefore he has no right to make the application for compensation as provided by Section 82-C of the Act. The above view was also taken by Krishnan, J C., In AIR 1954 Vindh Pra 17, relied upon by Mr. Bose. Rule 11 (1) (i), therefore, is not at all inconsistent with Section 82-A of the Act; on the other hand, it gives effect to it and provides the manner in which an application for compensation can be made.
40. It may be mentioned that Section 82-A was inserted in the Act by Act 3 of 1943, and, sa far, except the just mentioned Case, no other decision o£ any High Court has been called to my attention by any of the two parties on the question of interpretation of Section 82-A of the Act.
41. For these considerations, therefore, I hold, in agreement with the learned District Judge, that as Jalilur Rahman whose death was caused by the collision of the steamer against the jetty was not a passenger on the said steamer, which met with the accident, his dependants, namely, the appellants, were not entitled to make an application for compensation in respect of his death, under Section 82-A of the Act. I would, therefore, hold that there is no merit in the appeal, and, accordingly, it is dismissed; but in the circumstances of the present case I would direct that the parties do bear their own costs of this Court.
42. Before, however, I part with the case, I have to make one observation. No doubt, in view of my interpretation of Section 82-A of the Act, the appellants, here, are not entitled to claim any compensation in terms of Section 82-A of the Act in respect of the death of Jalilur Rahman, but I feel strongly that the appellants, of whom the father, appellant 1, is an old man of Over 55 years and his two minor brothers, appellants 2 and 3 who were all dependants on the earning of the deceased, should get some compensation and the Railway Administration, out of humanitarian considerations and out of sympathy for the family of the deceased, will see their way to pay some compensation to the appellants.
The accident was very tragic and Unfortunate but more unfortunate is the fact that the dead body of the deceased was not recovered. The shock and grief and the irreparable loss of his dependants--the appellants--can better be realised than described. The facts of this case are so coercive that it is impossible for anyone not to have sympathy with the bereaved family. That the collision was very terrific is obvious from the fact that even the thick iron chains, with which the jetty was tied, broke down, with the result that the jetty was detached and unchained and it reeled round with a strong jerk throwing off the deceased from its deck into the river not to be seen or heard of any more. It may be that if the chains had been very thick and strong, they might not have been broken by reason of the collision of the steamer against the jetty. But, be that as it may, the grim fact, however, remains that the death of the deceased was indeed very tragic, and, he died for no fault of his and the appellants, his dependants, lost all future hopes and sources of their support. For these considerations, I strongly recommend payment of a compensation of at least Rs. 1,000/- (Rupees one thousand only) by the respondent--the Railway Administration--to the appellants. Let a copy of this order be sent to the authority concerned.