Telangana High Court
M/S. Vaishnaoi Infratech And ... vs The State Of Telangana on 24 March, 2026
IN THE HIGH COURT FOR THE STATE OF TELANGANA
AT HYDERABAD
THE HON'BLE SRI JUSTICE E.V.VENUGOPAL
WRIT PETITION Nos.18624, 21315, 21316, 21318,
21319, 21328, 21329, 21335, 21338, 21339, 21341, 21344,
21348, 21360, 21363 & 19957 of 2024, 20192, 20284,
20286, 20978, 20980, 20981, 21157, 21159 & 21399 of 2025
DATED : 24-03-2026
WP No.18624 of 2024.
Between :
M/s.Vaishnaoi Infratech and Developers
Private Limited.
... Petitioner.
And
The State of Telangana, represented by its
Principal Secretary, Revenue Department,
Secretariat, Hyderabad and others.
... Respondents.
COMMON ORDER :
W.P.Nos.18624, 21315, 21316, 21318, 21319, 21328, 21329, 21335, 21338, 21339, 21341, 21344, 21348, 21360 & 21363 of 2024 are filed seeking to call for the records relating to proceedings initiated by the 5th respondent before the 3rd respondent pertaining to File Nos.F2/701/2024, F2/702/2024, F2/703/2024, F2/704/2024 and F2/705/2024, challenging the respective review orders dated 11.06.2020, 19.06.2020 and 29.06.2020 passed in Review File Nos.L/794/2020, L/795/2020, L/796/2020, L/797/2020 and :2: L/884/2020 in C.C.Nos.3373/I/75, 3374/1/75 and 3396/1/75, concerning lands situated at Kongarakalan Village, Ibrahimpatnam Mandal, Ranga Reddy District. Further, to declare the said proceedings and consequential orders as illegal, arbitrary, without jurisdiction and in violation of the principles of natural justice, contrary to the provisions of the Andhra Pradesh Land Reforms (Ceiling on Agricultural Holdings) Act, 1973 and Article 14 of the Constitution of India and consequently quash the same.
W.P.Nos.19957 of 2024, 20192, 20284, 20286, 20978, 20980, 20981, 21157, 21159 & 21399 of 2025 are filed seeking to declare the Impugned Letter No.E4/2866/2024 dated 12.07.2024 issued by the 2nd respondent concerning various extents of land situated at Kongarakalan Village, Ibrahimpatnam Mandal, Ranga Reddy District, as illegal, arbitrary and violative of principles of natural justice, being contrary to Section 13 of the Andhra Pradesh Land Reforms (Ceiling on Agricultural Holdings) Act, 1973, Section 22-A(1)(d) of the Registration Act, 1908, and Articles 14 and 300-A of the Constitution of India and set aside the same. Further, to declare all consequential actions taken pursuant to the said letter as illegal and to direct the 2nd respondent to comply with Letter Nos.E4/998/2020, E4/1681/2020 and E4/1683/2020 dated 07.11.2020 in respect of the petitioner lands. :3:
2. Heard Sri Resu Mahender Reddy, learned senior counsel for Sri Rohit Pogula, Sri Srikanth Hariharan, learned counsel for the petitioners and Sri K.Muralidhar, learned Government Pleader for Revenue and also Stamps and Registration, Sri DV Chalapathi Rao, learned Government Pleader for Assignment, Sri T.Prasanna Kumar, Sri T.Kishan Rao Maturi, Sri Malleswara Rao Kallu, Sri J.Azad Chandra Shekar, Sri A.Keshava Reddy and Sri Royyala Thirupathaiah, Sri A.Srinivas, learned counsel for the unofficial respondents.
3. Since the grievance of the petitioners in all these writ petitions is identical, this Court disposes of the same by way of the present common order. For the sake of convenience and for better appreciation of the facts, this Court deems it appropriate to deal with the facts pertaining to WP No.18624 of 2024 as the leading case.
4. The case of the petitioner, in brief, is that the petitioner company claims to be a bona fide purchaser and absolute owner in possession of the subject lands bearing Sy.Nos.274 (Part), 275 (Part), 277 (Part), 278 (Part), 279 (Part), 280 (Part), 281 (Part), 282 (Part) and 283 (Part) admeasuring Ac.5-38 Gts., Ac.5-20 Gts., Ac.6-06 Gts., Ac.6- 13 Gts., Ac.1-39 Gts., Ac.7-32 Gts., Ac.0-19 Gts., Ac.1-22 Gts., and Ac.5-16 Gts., respectively, totally admeasuring Ac.41-05 Gts., situated in Kongarakalan Village, Ibrahimpatnam Mandal, Ranga Reddy District, having purchased the same through registered sale deeds viz. :4: 1565/2021, dated 28.09.2021, 9054/2021, dated 29.07.2020, 9058/2021, dated 28.04.2021, 9056/2021, dated 24.08.2020, 9057/2021, dated 24.08.2020, 9061/2021, dated 01.09.2020, 1564/2021, dated 30.09.2021, 9062/2021, dated 07.09.2020, 1297/2022, dated 05.05.2022, 1294/2022, dated 05.05.2022, 1293/2022, dated 05.05.2022, 1292/2022, dated 05.05.2022, 1298/2022, dated 11.05.2022, 1360/2022, dated 21.05.2022, 1361/2022, dated 21.05.2022, 1364/2022, dated 21.05.2022, 1378/2022, dated 21.05.2022, 1379/2022, dated 23.05.2022, 1382/2022, dated 23.05.2022, 1145/2022, dated 26.04.2022, 1146/2022, dated 26.04.2022, 1442/2022, dated 21.05.222, 1441/2022, dated 01.06.2022, 1440/2022, dated 21.05.2022 and 4831/2023, dated 06.04.2023 from the legal heirs of the protected tenant, who were granted ownership rights under Section 38-E of the A.P. (Telangana Area) Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act, 1950.
(a) Originally, one Giridhar Das, S/o.Govind Das, along with his sons Ganesh Rai and Lajpathi Rai, were the pattadars and holders of extensive agricultural lands, including those comprised in Sy.Nos.274, 275, 276, 277, 278, 279, 280, 282 and 283 situated at Kongarakalan Village, Ibrahimpatnam Mandal. The said pattadars filed declarations on 31.01.1976 under Section 8(1) of the A.P. Land Reforms (Ceiling on Agricultural Holdings) Act, 1973. The Land Reforms :5: Tribunal, Hyderabad East Division, upon consideration of the declarations, by its orders in CC Nos.3373/I/75, 3374/I/75 and 3396/I/75 dated 31.01.1976, declared the declarants as surplus landholders and provisionally determined the surplus lands liable for surrender.
(b) It is submitted that one Godasu Jangaiah, Kaki Ramulu, Kaki Narasimha and Godasu Veeraiah were recorded as protected tenants in respect of lands in Sy.Nos.274, 275, 276, 277, 279, 280, 282 and 283 of Kongarakalan Village. Upon their demise, their respective legal heirs succeeded to the protected tenancy rights in accordance with law and have continued in uninterrupted possession and cultivation of the said lands.
(c) The Land Reforms Tribunal, Hyderabad East Division, by its aforementioned proceedings dated 31.01.1976, included the lands in Sy.Nos.274, 275, 276, 277, 279, 280, 282 and 283 as part of the surplus holdings of Giridhar Das and his family members. However, the said inclusion was erroneous and contrary to law, inasmuch as an extent of approximately Ac.280-13 guntas was, as on the relevant date, under the lawful possession and cultivation of protected tenants. The Tribunal ought to have excluded such lands from the holding of the declarants while determining surplus land.:6:
(d) The legal heirs of the protected tenants subsequently submitted applications before the Revenue Divisional Officer (RDO) seeking issuance of ownership certificates under Section 38-E of the A.P. (Telangana Area) Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act, 1950.
However, the RDO, by proceedings No.L/4621/2014 dated 04.01.2016, rejected the said applications. The said rejection was confirmed by the appellate authority, namely the Joint Collector, Ranga Reddy District, by order dated 19.10.2019 in Case No.F2/5412/2017. Aggrieved thereby, the legal heirs approached this Court by filing W.P. No.1013 of 2020, wherein this Court, by order dated 22.01.2020, granted liberty to file applications under Section 9-A of the Act, 1973 before the competent authority, with a direction to consider the same in accordance with law within a stipulated time. Similar orders were passed in W.P.Nos.3245 of 2020 and 6884 of 2020 filed by other similarly situated legal heirs.
(e) Pursuant to the liberty granted by this Court, the legal heirs of the protected tenants filed revision petitions bearing File Nos.L/794/2020, L/795/2020, L/796/2020, L/797/2020 and L/884/2020 before the RDO-cum-Land Reforms Tribunal, Ibrahimpatnam Division, under Section 9 of the A.P. Land Reforms (Ceiling on Agricultural Holdings) Act, 1973. Upon conducting a detailed enquiry, the RDO allowed the revisions and excluded the lands :7: under the possession of protected tenants from the holdings of the declarants, namely Giridhar Das and his family members. Thereafter, the legal heirs applied for issuance of ownership certificates under Section 38-E of the Tenancy Act, 1950 and the RDO, by proceedings dated 11.06.2020 in the above file numbers, granted ownership certificates and issued 38-E certificates accordingly.
(f) Consequent upon the grant of ownership certificates, the protected tenants/legal heirs submitted applications to the competent authority seeking deletion of the subject lands from the prohibitory list maintained under Section 22-A of the Registration Act, 1908. The 2nd respondent forwarded proposals to the District Level Sub-Committee, which, in its meeting held on 09.09.2020, resolved to recommend de- notification of the subject lands. Accordingly, the 2nd respondent, vide letters bearing Nos.E4/998/2020, E4/1681/2020 and E4/1683/2020 dated 07.11.2020, addressed the Inspector General, Stamps and Registration Department, requesting necessary action for deletion of the lands from the prohibitory list, affirming that the lands stood converted from ceiling surplus lands into private patta lands.
(g) Pursuant thereto, the revenue records were duly mutated in favour of the protected tenants/legal heirs and ownership certificates were recognized. The petitioner herein subsequently acquired the subject lands for valuable consideration and obtained conversion of the :8: land use from agricultural to non-agricultural purposes in accordance with law. While matters stood thus, the 5th respondent/Special Tahsildar preferred appeal bearing File Nos.F2/701/2024 to F2/706/2024 before the 3rd respondent/Additional Collector (Revenue) under Section 90 of the A.P. (Telangana Area) Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act, 1950, challenging the proceedings dated 11.06.2020. The 3rd respondent, without issuing notice to the petitioner and in gross violation of principles of natural justice, granted an interim stay on 15.06.2024. The said proceedings are ex facie without jurisdiction, barred by limitation and legally unsustainable. Aggrieved thereby, the petitioner has approached this Court seeking to quash the impugned orders and all consequential proceedings.
5. Learned counsel for the petitioner submits that the entire proceedings initiated by the 5th respondent before the 3rd respondent are ex facie without jurisdiction, contrary to the statutory framework and liable to be set aside at the threshold. At the outset, it is contended that the order dated 11.06.2020 was passed by the competent authority under Section 9-A of the Andhra Pradesh Land Reforms (Ceiling on Agricultural Holdings) Act, 1973. Under the scheme of the said Act, any challenge to such an order lies only by way of an appeal under Section 20 before the duly constituted Appellate Tribunal. However, the 5th respondent, instead of availing the statutory remedy :9: under the Land Reforms Act, erroneously invoked Section 90 of the A.P. (Telangana Area) Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act, 1950 before the 3rd respondent. The said provision is wholly inapplicable to orders passed under the Land Reforms Act and therefore, the 3rd respondent lacks inherent jurisdiction to entertain such proceedings. Consequently, the entire proceedings are vitiated for want of jurisdiction.
(a) It is further submitted that even assuming, without admitting, that such an appeal was maintainable, the same is hopelessly barred by limitation. The order sought to be challenged is dated 11.06.2020, whereas the appeal was preferred only in the year 2024, after an inordinate delay of nearly four years. No application for condonation of delay has been filed, nor is any explanation forthcoming for such delay. In the absence of sufficient cause, the 3rd respondent ought not to have entertained the appeal, much less granted any interim relief.
(b) The learned counsel further submits that the 5th respondent lacks locus standi to maintain the proceedings. Under Section 20(5) of the Land Reforms Act, it is only the State Government or an authorized authority that is competent to prefer an appeal. In the absence of any delegation or authorization, the 5th respondent has no legal right to question the order dated 11.06.2020. Further under : 10 : Section 20(3) of the said Act, an appeal shall lie against an order passed by the Tribunal or the Revenue Divisional Officer to the Appellate Tribunal within thirty days of the date of communication of the order and the Appellate Tribunal shall pass such orders on the appeal as it deems fit and such order shall, subject to revision under Section 21 of the Act.
(c) The Tahsildar has sought to challenge the orders of the Revenue Divisional Officer by way of a review application, despite not being hierarchically superior to the said authority and lacking jurisdiction to prefer an appeal before the Joint Collector, particularly after an inordinate delay of four years.
(d) It is also contended that the impugned interim order dated 15.06.2024 was passed in gross violation of the principles of natural justice. No notice whatsoever was issued to the petitioner or to other affected parties, including subsequent purchasers, despite the 5th respondent being fully aware of the alienations. The deliberate non- impleadment of necessary parties and securing of an interim order behind their back renders the impugned order null and void.
(e) Further, the impugned order suffers from complete non- application of mind. No reasons have been assigned for granting interim stay or for restraining transactions in respect of the subject : 11 : lands. The order has been passed mechanically, without considering the issues of jurisdiction, limitation or maintainability, thereby vitiating the same.
(f) The learned counsel also submits that the subsequent action of the 2nd respondent in directing inclusion of the subject lands in the prohibitory list under Section 22-A(1)(d) of the Registration Act, 1908 is wholly arbitrary and unsustainable. This Court, in earlier proceedings, had already taken note of the jurisdictional defect and suspended the operation of similar orders passed by the 3rd respondent. Despite the same, the 2nd respondent, acting with mala fide intent, proceeded to issue the impugned communication.
(g) The subsequent conduct of respondent No.5 in setting the administrative machinery in motion to secure inclusion of the subject lands in the prohibitory list under Section 22-A of the Registration Act, 1908, despite the subsisting judicial order passed by this Court in W.P. No.18624 of 2024, is wholly untenable and indicative of a deliberate attempt to frustrate the judicial process. When this Court had already suspended the operation of the interim order dated 15.06.2024 passed by the 3rd respondent any reliance placed on such interim order to justify further administrative action is ex facie illegal. : 12 :
(h) It is emphatically contended that mere grant of an interim stay by the 3rd respondent in proceedings under the Tenancy Act does not amount to a declaration that the lands are surplus under the Land Reforms Act. In the absence of any final adjudication declaring the lands as surplus, invocation of Section 22-A of the Registration Act is wholly misconceived. The inclusion of the subject lands in the prohibitory list, despite subsisting orders and representations made by the petitioner, is arbitrary, illegal and constitutes an abuse of power.
(i) In view of the above, learned counsel submits that the proceedings initiated by the 5th respondent before the 3rd respondent, as well as the impugned interim order dated 15.06.2024 and all consequential actions, are illegal, without jurisdiction, barred by limitation and violative of principles of natural justice and therefore liable to be quashed.
6. The learned Government Pleaders for Revenue, Stamps and Registrations as well as the learned counsel for the unofficial respondents have vehemently contended that the writ petition is misconceived and liable to be dismissed as the petitioner is not entitled to the relief sought. It is contended that the lands in question originally formed part of the holdings of one Giridhar Das and his family, who was declared a surplus holder under the provisions of the Andhra Pradesh Land Reforms (Ceiling on Agricultural Holdings) Act, 1973 and : 13 : the surplus lands, including the subject property, were surrendered to the Government and subsequently assigned to several beneficiaries under ceiling surplus patta certificates, with their names duly recorded in the revenue records. It is further submitted that the proceedings initiated by the Revenue Divisional Officer granting ownership certificates under Section 38-E of the Telangana Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act, 1950 were passed without proper verification of records, without issuing notice to the necessary parties and without following the prescribed procedure. Therefore, respondent No.5 rightly preferred an appeal under Section 90 of the Tenancy Act before the Additional Collector, challenging the said orders on the grounds of lack of jurisdiction and procedural irregularities. It is also contended that the rights of protected tenants are statutory and vested in nature and cannot be defeated except in accordance with law. In these circumstances, the writ petitions are liable to be dismissed. Learned Government Pleader relied upon the decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Chief Conservator of Forests, Government of Andhra Pradesh Vs. Collector and others 1. He also relied upon the decision of this Court in WP No.31226 of 2014 contending that basing on the orders dated 07.11.2014 in the said writ petition, the Revenue Divisional Officer, Saroornagar passed orders dated 04.01.2016 in File 1 (2003) 3 Supreme Court Cases 472 : 14 : No.L/4621/2014, rejecting issuance of ownership certificates under Section 38-E.
7. Having regard to the rival submissions advanced by the respective learned counsel, this Court is of the considered view that the core controversy revolves around two key issues i.e. (1) The legality and maintainability of the proceedings initiated before the appellate authority and (2) The validity and effect of the orders granting ownership certificates under Section 38-E of the A.P. (Telangana Area) Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act, 1950.
(a) The present batch of writ petitions arises out of proceedings initiated by the 5th respondent, seeking to question the effect of orders passed by the Revenue Divisional Officer (RDO) under Section 9-A of the Andhra Pradesh Land Reforms (Ceiling on Agricultural Holdings) Act, 1973. It is undisputed that these proceedings were undertaken pursuant to directions issued by this Court in earlier writ petitions.
(b) The records disclose that the subject lands originally belonged to Giridhar Das and his family members, who were pattadars of extensive lands, including Sy.Nos.274 to 283 of Kongarakalan Village, Ibrahimpatnam Mandal. Declarations filed under Section 8(1) of : 15 : the Ceiling Act were accepted by the Land Reforms Tribunal, which determined certain lands as surplus.
(c) Protected tenants, including late Godasu Jangaiah, were in possession and cultivation of the subject lands. Upon his demise, his legal heirs succeeded to the protected tenancy rights, which were recognized through proceedings under Section 40 of the Tenancy Act and confirmed by competent civil Courts. Subsequently, these legal heirs alienated the lands in favour of the petitioner.
(d) The petitioner contends that the orders passed under Section 9-A of the Ceiling Act attained finality, as the respondents failed to avail themselves of the statutory remedy of appeal under Section 20 within the prescribed time. Having allowed the foundational order to attain finality, the respondents cannot indirectly assail it by challenging the consequential action taken under the Tenancy Act.
(e) Conversely, the learned Government Pleaders submit that the grant of ownership certificates under Section 38-E constitutes an operative order affecting rights and therefore, the respondents were justified in invoking appellate remedy under Section 90 of the Tenancy Act.
8. The learned Government Pleaders contend that in the earlier round of litigation the petitioners having failed to succeed the : 16 : appeal under Section 20 of Land Reforms Ceiling Surplus Act and after lapse of so long years have discretely filed a review petition before the RDO after obtaining the relief granted by this Court in WP No.3257 of 2020. Thereafter, the review orders have been passed by the said authority basing on the strength of the orders passed by this Court in WP No.3257 of 2020 and the operative portion of the said order is being extracted here under :
"..this writ petition is also disposed of granting liberty to the petitioners to make an application under Section 9A of the Telangana Land Reforms (Ceiling on Agricultural Holdings) Act, 1973 to the Competent Authority and on such application being made, the Competent Authority to consider the claims of the petitioners on merits, in accordance with law, within a period of four months from the date of making application by the petitioner."
(a) It is further submitted that the conduct and the manner in which the proceedings have been initiated by the respondents are themselves doubtful, particularly when the petitioners failed to challenge the earlier orders passed under Section 20 before this Court and have now approached this Court with unclean hands, pursuant to which this Court had passed certain orders. Based on such review orders, whereby the review has been allowed and certificates under Section 38E have been issued, the same is wholly perverse, arbitrary, and contrary to law.
: 17 :
(b) It is further submitted that an appeal has been rightly and appropriately preferred under Section 9, which is presently pending adjudication before the appellate authority. The appellate authority, at the initial stage, having prima facie considered the material on record, has granted interim stay. The petitioners have every right to pursue the said remedy before the competent authority for proper adjudication. In the absence of the same, filing of the present writ petition is nothing but an attempt to prolong the litigation, thereby affecting the rights of the Government. Adjudication of the matter by this Court in the present form is not warranted.
9. In light of the submissions, the following issues arise:
(i) Whether a consequential order granting a certificate under Section 38-E of the Tenancy Act can be challenged independently without assailing the foundational order passed under Section 9-A of the Ceiling Act;
(ii) Whether the statutory power under Section 9-A can be invoked to reopen rights already crystallized through issuance of 38-E certificates;
(iii) Whether a subordinate authority can maintain an appeal against the order of a superior authority in the absence of statutory authorization;
(iv) Whether the proceedings are liable to be rejected on the ground of delay and laches; and : 18 :
(v) Whether the invocation of appellate jurisdiction under Section 90 of the Tenancy Act is legally sustainable in the facts of the present case.
10. It is a settled principle of law that a consequential or ministerial order cannot be independently challenged without assailing the foundational order from which it derives its authority. The primary adjudication of rights constitutes the very basis upon which subsequent actions rest and unless such foundational determination is set aside, any challenge to its mere implementation is legally untenable. In the present context, the determination under Section 9-A of the Ceiling Act represents the substantive adjudication of rights, whereas the issuance of ownership certificates under Section 38-E is purely consequential and ministerial in nature, effectuating the earlier decision. Accordingly, in the absence of a challenge to the Section 9-A determination, any independent challenge to the issuance of certificates under Section 38-E is liable to be rejected.
11. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in Asharfi Devi (D) through LRs., Vs. State of U.P. and others 2, TK David Vs. Kuruppampady Service Co-operative Bank Ltd., and others 3 and Satheesh V.K. Vs. The Federal Bank Ltd., 4 has categorically held that legality of main 2 AIR Supreme Court 832 3 SLP (C) No.10482 of 2020 4 Civil Appeal nos.11752-11753/2025 : 19 : order cannot be challenged in an appeal filed only against the review order.
12. The respondents did not challenge the Section 9-A order within the statutory time. The order attained finality and the present challenge is after a considerable and unexplained delay. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in Mrinmoy Maity Vs.Chhanda Koley 5 has reiterated that unexplained delay in invoking writ jurisdiction is sufficient to non- suit a party, particularly where third-party rights have intervened. Relief under Article 226 is discretionary and Courts ordinarily decline to entertain stale claims, especially where rights have crystallized and administrative actions have been implemented.
For brevity and clear understanding relevant paragraph is extracted hereunder :
"9. xxxxx An applicant who approaches the court belatedly or in other words sleeps over his rights for a considerable period of time, wakes up from his deep slumber ought not to be granted the extraordinary relief by the writ courts. This Court time and again has held that delay defeats equity. Delay or latches is one of the factors which should be born in mind by the High Court while exercising discretionary powers Under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. In a given case, the High Court may refuse to invoke its extraordinary powers if laxity on the part of the applicant to assert his right has allowed the cause of action to drift away and attempts are made subsequently to rekindle the lapsed cause of action."5
2024 INSC 314 : 20 :
13. The power under Section 9-A is a statutory review power and cannot be exercised as an appellate power to reopen concluded matters. Once rights have crystallized through statutory determination and consequential issuance of 38-E certificates, such rights cannot be reopened unless expressly permitted by statute. The doctrine of finality of litigation prohibits reopening concluded matters through indirect or collateral means.
14. Under settled administrative law, a subordinate authority cannot challenge the order of a superior authority unless such right is expressly conferred by statute. In the absence of statutory provision, an appeal by a subordinate authority against the RDO's order is not maintainable.
15. The District Level Sub-Committee constituted for matters pertaining to revenue administration and pattadar rights operates within a defined institutional hierarchy to ensure effective scrutiny and decision-making. At the apex of the Committee is the District Collector, who functions as the Chairperson and exercises overall supervisory control. The Revenue Divisional Officer serves as the Vice-Chairperson, assisting in coordination and implementation of decisions. The Tahsildar of the concerned jurisdiction acts as the Member-Convener, responsible for placing records, maintaining proceedings and ensuring compliance with directions. The Committee further comprises members : 21 : including the Deputy Tahsildar, Mandal Revenue Inspector and such other revenue officials as may be notified, each contributing to the verification of land records, field-level inquiry and adjudication of pattadar rights. The hierarchical arrangement ensures that decisions are taken with due regard to administrative oversight, factual verification at the grassroots level and adherence to applicable revenue laws and procedures.
16. Upon consideration of the material placed on record, this Court finds that the status of the subject lands has already undergone due scrutiny at the highest level of the district revenue administration. The proposals forwarded by the 2nd respondent were placed before the District Level Sub-Committee, a body headed by the District Collector and comprising senior revenue officials entrusted with examining issues relating to pattadar rights and land classification. The said Committee, upon due consideration in its meeting dated 09.09.2020, consciously resolved to recommend deletion of the subject lands from the prohibitory list maintained under Section 22-A of the Registration Act, 1908, recognizing their conversion into private patta lands. Such a recommendation, emanating from a multi-tiered and hierarchically superior body, carries significant administrative and legal weight and cannot be disregarded.
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17. Pursuant thereto, the competent authorities acted upon the said recommendation, resulting in mutation of revenue records and recognition of ownership rights in favour of the protected tenants/legal heirs. The petitioner, being a bona fide purchaser for valuable consideration, has derived valid title through such recognized transactions and has further altered his position by obtaining lawful conversion of land use. In this backdrop, the subsequent action of the 5th respondent in seeking to reopen settled issues, that too by invoking appellate jurisdiction after an inordinate lapse of time and the grant of an interim stay by the 3rd respondent without notice to the petitioner, is prima facie arbitrary and unsustainable. The impugned proceedings, apart from being vitiated by violation of principles of natural justice, effectively undermine the considered decision of the District Level Sub- Committee and the finality attached to the consequential administrative actions, thereby warranting interference by this Court.
18. More significantly, the record discloses that the impugned letter dated 12.07.2024 was communicated to the registering authority through e-mail on 15.07.2024 at about 5:47 PM, and, with unusual alacrity, the subject lands were included in the prohibitory list by 6:15 PM on the very same day. The immediacy with which the said communication was acted upon through electronic means clearly evidences a premeditated and hurried exercise undertaken to give effect : 23 : to an otherwise unsustainable proceeding. Notwithstanding the intervention of this Court on the very same day, such exercise appears to have been undertaken by the official respondents to defeat the orders of this Court. Such action, taken in the teeth of a binding judicial pronouncement, not only lacks legal sanctity but also amounts to an attempt to overreach and circumvent the orders of this Court. It is well settled that once a competent Court has intervened, the executive authorities are duty-bound to act in aid of the judicial process and not in derogation thereof. The impugned action, therefore, reflects a desperate and arbitrary exercise of power by respondent No.5, warranting strict judicial scrutiny and interference.
19. Section 90 provides appeal against orders passed under the Tenancy Act only. It cannot be invoked to indirectly challenge or change a determination under a different enactment, namely the Ceiling Act. The 38-E certificates were issued as a consequential act implementing the prior determination under Section 9-A and the respondents cannot attack such certificates without first challenging the foundational order.
20. A statutory remedy of appeal is confined strictly to the scope of the enactment under which it is provided and cannot be employed to indirectly assail orders passed under a different statute. The Hon'ble Supreme Court has repeatedly held that where a foundational or primary order is not challenged in the manner known : 24 : to law, any consequential or derivative action flowing therefrom cannot be independently questioned. In that view of the matter, an appeal provision, such as Section 90 under the Tenancy Act, cannot be invoked to unsettle or reopen a determination made under a distinct enactment like the Ceiling Act and where certificates (such as those under Section 38-E) are issued as a consequence of an earlier unchallenged determination, the same cannot be impeached without first setting aside the foundational order in appropriate proceeding.
21. The proposition of law is very well settled with regard to the rights of the protected tenants and that upon issuance of a 38-E certificate, the protected tenant becomes the absolute owner and all competing claims stand extinguished. Such statutory vesting cannot be defeated by subsequent or collateral proceedings. Any surrender or divestment of tenancy rights must strictly comply with the statutory procedure. The Tenancy Act, being a beneficial legislation, must be interpreted in favour of protected tenants. The said proposition of law is supported by the below mentioned decisions :
i. Thota Sridhar Reddy and others v. Mandala Ramulamma and others 6 . ii. Sada Vs. The Tahsildar 7. iii. A.Kondal Yadav and others Vs. B.Chittamma and others 8. 6 Civil Appeal No.2506 of 2021 / (2021) 16 SCC 1 7 (1987) 2 APLJ 397 : 25 : iv. B.Bal Reddy Vs. Teegala Narayana Reddy and others 9. v. Kotaiah and another Vs. Property Association of the Baptist Churches (PVT) Ltd. 10.
22. In Thota Sridhar Reddy's case the Hon'ble Apex Court held as under :
"30. This Court in Bal Reddy quoted with approval the Full Bench judgment in Sada as well as the earlier judgment of this Court in Kotaiah to hold that protected tenancy could be terminated only in a manner known to law. In the absence of such valid termination of 'protected tenancy', the interest of such protected tenant continues to be operative and subsisting in law and could devolve on his legal heirs and representatives who could then claim restoration of possession. As laid down in Sada, even if the protected tenant had lost possession, without there being valid termination of his status as a protected tenant, he would still be entitled to all incidents of protection under the Act."
23. In Sada's case (7th supra) the Full Bench of the High Court for the erstwhile State of Andhra Pradesh held as under :
"29. It is clear from Section 38-E that it is for these 'Protected tenants' who are finally declared to be 'protected tenants' and included in the Register prepared for that purpose and for whom protected tenancy certificates have been issued, that ownership rights are envisaged in S. 38-E(1), subject of course, to the limitation with regard to extent of holdings as specified in S.38(7) and to the proviso to S.38-E(1). Once persons who held land on the dates or for the periods mentioned in Ss. 34, 37 and 37-A and the requirement of physical possession on the dates required in those sections is satisfied, such persons have become 'protected tenants'. Once a person becomes a protected tenant, he earns a qualification to become an owner by 8 2024(4) ALT 200 (TS) 9 (2016) 15 SCC 102/AIR 2016 Supreme Court 3810 10 (1989) 3 Supreme Court Cases 424 : 26 : force of statute, subject of course to the qualification regarding extent in S. 38(7) and to the proviso to S.38-E(1). There is no requirement in the Act that he should also be in possession on the date specified in the notification issued in S. 38-E(1). The words 'all lands held by protected tenants' is more a description or the lands with regard to which the right as .protected tenant has been declared and there are no words requiring physical possession on the date specified in the notification."
24. In A.Kondal Yadav's case (8th supra) a coordinate Bench of this Court held as under :
"14.xxx. Merely because the protected tenants have lost their possession over the property, it cannot be said that the protected tenancy was terminated. Since the revision petitioners failed to establish that the protected tenancy was validly terminated, the protected tenants have every right to resume their possession by filing petition under Section 32 of the Act".
25. In B.Bal Reddy's case (9th supra) the Hon'ble Apex court held as under :
"10. Section 38-D of the Act prescribes the procedure to be followed when land holder intends to sell the land held by a Protected Tenant. Accordingly the land must first be offered by issuing a notice in writing to the Protected Tenant and it is only when the Protected Tenant does not exercise the right of purchase in accordance with the procedure, that the land holder can sell such land to any other person. The effect of this provision and non-compliance thereof was considered by this Court in Kotaiah v. Property Assn of Baptist Churches (PVT.) LTD and it was laid down:-
"(iv) Section 38-D prohibits the landholder from alienating the tenanted land to third parties. If the landholder intends to sell the land, he must give notice in writing of his intention to the protected tenant. The first offer must be (1989) 3 SCC 424 given to the protected tenant. It is only when the protected tenant does not exercise the right to purchase, the landholder could sell the land to third parties. The alienation made in contravention of these provisions has no legal effect.: 27 :
12. It is well settled that the interest of a Protected Tenant continues to be operative and subsisting so long as 'protected tenancy' is not validly terminated. Even if such Protected Tenant has lost possession of the land in question, that by itself does not terminate the 'protected tenancy'. The observations of the Full Bench of Andhra Pradesh High Court in Sada's case (supra) which were quoted with approval by this Court in Boddam Narsimha v. Hasan Ali Khan are quite eloquent."
26. In Kotaiah's case (10th supra), the Hon'ble Apex Court held as under :
"22. In sum.,
(i) The protected tenant has a right to become full owner of the lands in his possession. He becomes the owner when the Government issues a notification under Section 38-E. We are told that the Government had issued such a notification on 1-10-
1973, relating to the district where the lands in question are situated. It was about three years earlier to termination of the appellants' tenancy by the Association. If the appellants had a right to become owners of the tenanted lands, the question of terminating their tenancy would not arise.
(ii) The protected tenant cannot be dispossessed illegally by the landlord or anybody else. If so dispossessed, the Tehsildar either suo motu or on application must hold a summary enquiry, and direct that the land be restored to the protected tenant. That is the mandate of Section 38-E and the Explanation thereof.
(iii) The landholder by himself cannot dispossess the protected tenant even if the tenancy is terminated in accordance with the law. The landlord will have to take recourse to Section 32. He must approach the Tehsildar to hold an enquiry and pass such order as he deems fit.
(iv) Section 38-D prohibits the landholder from alienating the tenanted land to third parties. If the landholder intends to sell the land, he must give notice in writing of his intention to the protected tenant. The first offer must be given to the protected tenant. It is only when the protected tenant does not exercise the right to purchase, the landholder could sell the land to third parties. The alienation made in contravention of these provisions has no legal effect."
: 28 :
27. From the above law laid down by this Court as well as the Hon'ble Apex Court, it is clear that the rights of protected tenants are statutory, heritable and possess a high degree of protection against arbitrary interference. The Courts have held that once a person is recognized as a protected tenant under the relevant tenancy laws, such status cannot be divested except in accordance with the procedure established by law and not by unilateral acts of the landholder or by mere administrative entries. It has been further affirmed that protected tenants enjoy security of tenure, including the right to continue in possession and in appropriate cases, to seek ownership or occupancy rights and such rights cannot be defeated by subsequent transactions or claims of third parties. Any attempt to dispossess a protected tenant or to nullify such status without due process is illegal and void and the authorities are duty-bound to safeguard these statutory protections.
28. At this juncture, it is pertinent to mention that under the provisions of the Andhra Pradesh Land Reforms (Ceiling on Agricultural Holdings) Act, 1973, an appeal under Section 20 is clearly maintainable against any order passed by the competent authority or the Tribunal, as contemplated under the Act. Section 20 expressly provides a statutory right of appeal to an aggrieved party, thereby enabling such party to challenge the legality, correctness or propriety of the order in question before the prescribed appellate authority. The availability of : 29 : this appellate remedy reflects the legislative intent to ensure that errors, if any, committed at the original stage are subject to scrutiny and correction. Therefore, any person aggrieved by an order passed under the Act is entitled to invoke Section 20 and maintain an appeal in accordance with law. For the sake of brevity and clear understanding Section 20 of the Act is extracted hereunder :
"20. Appeal (1) The Government may, by notification, constitute as many Appellate Tribunals as may be necessary for the purposes of this Act, and shall specify in such notification, the jurisdiction of each such Appellate Tribunal.
(2) Each Appellate Tribunal constituted under sub-section (1) shall consist of not more than three members, of whom one shall be a person who holds or has held a civil post under the State, not below the rank of a District Revenue Officer, or a person who holds or has held or is qualified to hold the post of a District Judge, and such person shall be the Chairman of the Tribunal.
(3) An appeal shall lie against an order passed by the Tribunal or the Revenue Divisional Officer to the Appellate Tribunal within thirty days of the date of communication of the order, and the Appellate Tribunal shall pass such orders on the appeal as it deems fit and such order shall, subject to revision under section 21, be final.
(4) The provisions of sub-sections (3), (4) and (5) of section 6 shall apply in relation to an Appellate Tribunal as they apply in relation to the Tribunal with the substitution of references to the Appellate Tribunal for references to the Tribunal.
(5) Where the Government are aggrieved by an order passed by the Tribunal or the Revenue Divisional Officer, they may file an appeal to the Appellate Tribunal against that order.": 30 :
29. In this context, this Court is of the opinion that, pursuant to the orders passed by this Court in the earlier proceedings, fresh proceedings were conducted before the appellate authority. A review petition came to be filed, which was allowed and thereafter certificates under Section 38E were issued. Therefore, it can be inferred that the petitioners approached the said authority on the strength of the orders passed by this Court, which were contested by the respondents. However, the respondents failed to prefer any appeal against the said orders passed by this Court.
30. In such circumstances, raising the aforesaid objection in the present writ petition does not hold good. Moreover, the respondents ought to have availed the remedy of appeal under Section 20 of the relevant Ceiling Act. In the absence of filing such an appeal, the consequential action of questioning the grant of Section 38E certificates in favour of the predecessors-in-title of the petitioners, without any statutory basis and that too by the Tahsildar challenging the decision of the District Level Sub-Committee headed by the District Collector (a higher authority), without any authorization, reflects clear non- application of mind and appears to be an attempt only to protract the litigation.
31. From the above, the principles emerge are that the consequential order cannot be challenged independently without : 31 : assailing the foundational order, statutory review powers cannot be used to reopen concluded matters, a subordinate authority cannot challenge a superior authority's order without statutory authorization, the right of appeal is purely statutory and must be exercised strictly within the statutory framework and the delay and laches disentitle a party from discretionary relief, particularly where rights have crystallized.
32. In view of the foregoing, this Court holds that the respondents, having failed to challenge the order passed under Section 9-A of the Andhra Pradesh Land Reforms (Ceiling on Agricultural Holdings) Act, 1973 before the competent appellate authority within the prescribed time, cannot indirectly assail the same by questioning the consequential issuance of ownership certificates under Section 38-E of the Tenancy Act. The grant of such certificates is only a consequential implementation of the prior determination and is not open to collateral challenge. Further the proceedings initiated by the 5th respondent and the review orders dated 11.06.2020, 19.06.2020 and 29.06.2020 passed in the respective review files are without jurisdiction, contrary to the statutory scheme and in violation of the principles of natural justice, particularly as they seek to reopen concluded matters without legal basis. The Impugned Letter No.E4/2866/2024 dated 12.07.2024 issued by the 2nd respondent is arbitrary, issued without due : 32 : application of mind and violative of Section 13 of the Andhra Pradesh Land Reforms (Ceiling on Agricultural Holdings) Act, 1973, Section 22- A(1)(d) of the Registration Act, 1908 and Articles 14 and 300-A of the Constitution of India, as it affects the petitioners' property rights without authority of law or affording an opportunity of hearing. Accordingly, the impugned proceedings and all consequential actions are unsustainable and liable to be set aside.
33. In the result, these writ petitions are allowed.
34. There shall be no order as to the costs. Miscellaneous applications, if any pending, shall stand closed.
W ____________________ E.V.VENUGOPAL, J Dated :24-03-2026 abb