Central Information Commission
Mr.Subhash Chandra Agrawal vs Prime Minister Office on 28 April, 2010
CENTRAL INFORMATION COMMISSION
Appeal No. CIC/WB/A/2009/000103 dated 17.2.2009
Right to Information Act 2005 - Section 19
Appellant - Shri Subhash Chandra Agrawal
Respondent - Prime Minister's Office (PMO)
Decision announced: 28.4.2010
Facts:
By an application of 8.12.2008 Shri Subhash Chandra Agrawal of Kucha Lattu Shah, Dariba, Delhi, applied to CPIO Shri Amit Agrawal, Director, PMO seeking the following information:
"1. Authenticity of two enclosed newspaper reports with reference to PMO only
2. Copy of letter dated 22.1.2004 addressed to the then Prime Minister by the then President on the subject of Padma Awards.
3. Action taken by PMO on said letter dated 22.1.2004 with relevant documents.
4. Copy of correspondence on the subject between PMO and Presidents' Secretariat.
5. Field of eminence of non-official members of Awards Committee 2004 appointed by Prime Minister (High Level KR Narayan Committee on Padma Awards recommended nomination of eminent personalities other than some Secretary level officers in the Award Committee).
6. Copy of complete file relating to Padma Awards 2004 as available at PMO.
7. Any other related information.
8. File notings on movement of this RTI petition also."
To this, received in the PMO on 10.12.08, Shri Subhash Chandra Agrawal received a pointwise response from CPIO Shri Amit Agrawal dated 9.2.09, informing him as follows:
"1. This office does not maintain record on the authenticity of newspaper reports.
2&4 Communication between the President of India and the Prime Minister is a privileged communication under the provisions of article 74 (2) of the Constitution of India and is not to be disclosed. This constitutional stand point has been 1 upheld by the Hon'ble Supreme Court of India in the matter of S. R. Bommai vs. Union of India- 1994 (3) SCC 1. In view of the aforementioned constitutional provisions, the information sought is not being provided.
5. No information is available on record.
6. Information related to Padma Awards 2004 is held in the following files
1. 800/5/C/6/2003-Pol. Vol. 1 to 3
2. 800/5/C/7/2003-Pol. Vol. 1 to 4
3. 800/5/C/8/2003-Pol. 1 & 2
4. 800/5/C/12/2003-Pol.
5. 800/5/C/13/2003-Pol.
6. 800/5/C/1/2003-Pol. Vol. 1 and 2
7. 800/5/C/3/2003-Pol The total number of pages in these files, which are proposed to be disclosed excluding the above-mentioned privileged communications, is 1,725. Copies of the documents may be obtained on payment of Rs. 3,450/- which may be deposited either in cash with the 'Cashier, Prime Minister's Office' or by demand draft/ Indian Postal Order, drawn in favour of the 'Section Officer, Prime Minister's Office' and payable at New Delhi.
As per the provisions of section 2 (f) of the Right to Information Act, 2005 information would mean any material in existence and it cannot mean and include something that is not in existence or has to be created. The information sought on the current right to information petition amounts to creation of the information as distinct from the available information."
Aggrieved Shri Subhash Chandra Agrawal moved an appeal before Ms. Vini Mahajan, JS, PMO with the following plea:
"As regards point numbers (2), (3) and (4), the learned CPIO could not mention any exemption clause from section 8 of Right to Information Act, 2005. RTI Act being passed in the year 2005 overrides all other rules prevailing before this date. In nutshell, there seems to be an attempt on part of the CPIO to hide some irregularities in respect of Padma Award 2004. No file notings as also requested in my RTI petition were also provided. There is no use of receiving copies of offered documents without so-termed 'privileged communications'. Rather copies of these 'privileged communications' are only required towards fulfillment of my queries (aimed in public interest also) at exposure of much talked about irregularities in Padma Awards 2004 as also reported in media.2
I therefore, appeal that the learned CPIO may kindly be directed to furnish proper and true replies (Without hiding any aspect or irregularity) on query numbers 1, 2, 3 and 4 carefully scrutinizing papers/ files at PMO.
High level review committee for Padma Awards set up on directions of the Apex Court, and chaired by the then Vice President of India Shri K. R. Narainan had specifically required eminent personalities apart from some ex-officio members to be members of Awards Committee. If PMO does not have information about field of eminence of members of Awards Committee, the CPIO may kindly be directed to seek the same from the then Prime Minister. Or otherwise, it may be made clear that guidelines in respect of having eminent personalities in Awards Committee were violated.
Copies of so-termed privileged communications as also sought in query numbers 2, 3 and 4 may kindly be directed to be provided also because no exemption clause from section 8 of RTI Act is cited by the learned CPIO."
This appeal was allowed in part by Ms. Vini Mahajan, JS to PM in her order of 13.2.09, as follows:
"I am of the view that the duty of the CPIO under the RTI Act is limited to providing information already available and he is not to provide comments on the authenticity of a report unless such analysis has already been carried out and is available in the office. As regards the replies to point nos. 2, 3 and 4, you have stated that the information should have been provided, as the exemption has not been sought under section 8 of the Act. However, the CPIO has clearly stated in reply that the information on these points is not being provided as it is privileged communication under Article 74 (2) of the Constitution of India and is not, therefore, to be disclosed.
I am of the view that there is no need to cite exemption under the RTI Act in this case, and the information has been rightly withheld. As regards the response to point no. 5, you have asked that the CPIO should be directed to seek the information from the then Prime Minister. I am of the view that the RTI Act does not cast such an obligation on the CPIO and his reply is correct and justified. Your last request relates to provision of file notings on movement of the RTI petition in question. I am of the view that the CPIO has rightly stated that you sought information which was not in existence at that time. Nevertheless, as the file notings in question now exist, the CPIO is directed to provide a copy of the same upon your applying with the requisite fee."
3This has brought Shri Agrawal in his second appeal before us, submitting the following prayer:
"On basis of arguments made in my first appeal, I pray that the learned CPIO may kindly be directed to furnish proper and true replies (without hiding any aspect or irregularity) on query numbers 1, 2, 3 and 4 after carefully scrutinizing paper/ files at PMO.
High Level review committee for Padma Award set up on directions of the Apex Court, and chaired by the then Vice President of India Shri K. R. Narainan had specifically required eminent personalities apart from some ex-officio members to be members of Awards Committee. If PMO does not have information about field of eminence of members of Awards Committee, the CPIO may kindly be directed to seek the same from the then Prime Minister. Or otherwise, it may be made clear that guidelines in respect of having eminent personalities in Awards committee were violated.
Copies of so-termed 'privileged communications' as also sought in query numbers 2, 3 and 4 may kindly be directed to be provided also because no exemption clause from section 8 of RTI Act is cited by the learned CPIO."
In response to our appeal notice, CPIO Ms. Sanjukta Ray, DS in her letter of 7.4.10, has submitted as follows:
"(i) Parliament's powers to amend the Constitution and the procedure therefore have been specified in article 368 of the Constitution. Only an enactment in accordance with that article can amend the Constitution. Right to Information Act is not such an enactment.
(ii) The non-obstante clause contained in section 22 of the Right to Information Act stipulates only that the Act would have overriding effect in respect of any other law. However, the Constitution is the basic law and such a non-obstante clause does not override the Constitution.
(iii) Copy of legal opinion (11 pages) regarding the privileged nature of commu7nication between the President and the Prime Minister, which takes into account various relevant Supreme Court decisions, obtained in a different context, but pertinent in the instant case, is annexed and the full contents thereof may kindly be referred to.4
(iv) In light of the foregoing, the appellant's contention regarding exemption claimed not being valid for want of reference to the exemption clauses contained in the Right to Information Act is not the correct reading of law.
(v) Under section 18 (3) of the Right to Information Act, the Central Information Commission has been vested with powers of a Civil Court."
In his rejoinder, however, Shri Subhash Chandra Agrawal, after quoting the contents of article 74 of the Constitution of India, has cited in his support the decision of the Supreme Court of India in S.R. Bommai vs. Union of India AIR 1994 SC 1918, and in this context has submitted as follows:
"1.2 ....It is settled law that the President is a constitutional and titular head, who is not personally responsible to the law for any of his acts. (Refer Shamsher Singh vs. State of Punjab, AIR 1975 SC 2192: Para 26, Keshav Nanda Bharati vs. State of Kerala, AIR 1973 SC 1461: Para 584) The Court, in Bommai's case, however, went on to state that even in a case where some advice is tendered to the President by the Council of Ministers, the material relied upon for arriving at such advice can be examined by the court.
1.3 In this regard it is pertinent to mention the observations made by Justice Sawant and Justice Kuldeep Singh in the case of S. R. Bommai regarding the scope and ambit of article 74 (2) in which their lordship stated that.
"the object of article 74(2) was not to exclude any material or documents from the scrutiny of the courts but to provide that an order issued by all in the name of the President could not be questioned on the ground that it was either contrary to the advice tendered by the ministers or issued without gaining any advice from the ministers. Its object was only to make the question whether the President had followed the advice of the ministers or acted contrary thereto, non-justiciable."
1.4 Upholding the aforementioned observations made by the court in S. R. Bommai, Justice Ahmadi observed in the case of Rameshwar Prasad vs. Union of India, AIR 2006 SC 980 that:
"By a plain reading of article 74(2) stating that the question whether any, and if so, what, advice was tendered by ministers to the President, shall not be enquired into in any court, we seem to convey that the court is debarred from enquiry into such advice but Bommai has held that article 74(2) is not a bar against scrutiny of the material" (Para 96) 5 1.5 Hence what Art 74 (2) provides is that an order issued in the name of the President cannot be questioned on the ground that it was either contrary to the advice tendered by the Ministers or was issued without the advice of the Ministers (S. R. Bommai vs. Union of India, Para 90) It does not bar the Court from calling upon the Union of India to disclose to the Court the material upon which the President has formed the requisite satisfaction. Even if the material is looked into by the President, it does not partake the character of advice. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Rameshwar Prasad vs. Union of India (AIR 2006 SC 980) observed categorically that 'the Respondents cannot say that whatever the President sees or whatever is placed before the President becomes published material and cannot be seen or summoned by the Court."
Shri Agrawal has then gone on to discuss alleged irregularities in awarding of Padma Awards-2004 and pleaded that "Public interest calls for disclosing all information/ documents relating to Padma Awards as sought under RTI Act to clear the air, as irregularities in selection of Padma Awardees are being regularly appearing in media only due to resistance shown by concerned public authorities in disclosing the information."
The appeal was heard on 12.4.2010 by videoconference. The following are present:
Appellant Shri Subhash Chandra Agrawal Respondents Ms. Vini Mahajan, JS / AA Ms. Sanjukta Ray, DS / CPIO Mr. Ashish Gupta, Director.
Appellant Shri Subhash Chandra Agrawal submitted that apart from the legal/constitutional position with regard to applicability of Article 74(2) in the present case, although Appellate Authority Ms. Vini Mahajan has agreed that file noting be disclosed, yet the fee was being sought in violation of sub sec. (6) of Sec. 7.
DECISION NOTICE 6 On the question of application of sub sec. (6) of Sec. 7, it is not disputed in the hearing by appellant that as found by Appellate Authority Ms. Vini Mahajan, file noting of the matter sought by appellant in his RTI application did not exist in the PMO at the time that the original application of 8.12.08 was moved. Appellate Authority's decision came only because by the time of her taking a decision in appeal, such information had become available. Her consideration in, therefore, ordering its disclosure if an application is received, surely merits commendation, not challenge in appeal. To obtain the same now, appellant Shri Subhash Chandra Agrawal might move a fresh application before CPIO PMO, as advised by Appellate authority Ms. Vini Mahajan, and gain the access desired.
The larger question, however, is the applicability of Article 74(2) of the Constitution of India to the information sought in the present case. Respondents do not need to labour the point as to whether in applying sec. 22 of the RTI Act, the RTI Act can be deemed to override the Constitution itself. This is obviously an absurd supposition. The question then is whether Art. 74(2) of the Constitution within itself debars disclosure of any information including the information sought in the present case. On this issue this Commission has ruled on 22.2.'10 in appeal no CIC/WB/A/2009/000094; FC Thomas vs. President's Secretariat as follows:
"On the question of constitutional privilege, however, Article 74 of the Constitution of India reads as follows: Art. 74. - Council of Ministers
74. Council of Ministers to aid and advise President.-
54[(1) There shall be a Council of Ministers with the Prime Minister at the head to aid and advise the President who shall, in the exercise of his functions, act in accordance with such advice:
55. Provided that the President may require the Council of Ministers to reconsider such advice, either generally or otherwise, and the President shall act in accordance with the advice tendered after such reconsideration.7
(2) The question whether any, and if so what, advice was tendered by Ministers to the President shall not be inquired into in any court."
The question then arises whether this is a Constitutional issue, which in that case will clearly place it well outside any jurisdiction of this Commission. On this matter this Commission in full Bench has had occasion to examine the issue in some detail in light of decisions of the apex court in Appeal No. CIC/MA/A/2006/00121-C Ramesh vs. Ministry of Personnel, Public Grievances & Pensions announced on 8.8.'06. In that case appellant Shri C Ramesh had contended that Article 74(2), 78 and 361 nowhere states that the information/ correspondence between the President and the Prime Minister should not be disclosed. In support of his contention that his request was not covered by Article 74(2), appellant Shri C Ramesh had relied upon the observations of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in R.K. Jain Vs. Union of India. (AIR 1993 SC 1769) 24. Before deciding the issue of applicability of Article 74(2) to the instant case, therefore, it is pertinent to refer again to the provisions of Article 74(2), which as highlighted by us in the quote above, clearly stipulates that a court shall not inquire into whether any advice was at all tendered and even if there was any such advice, the court shall not inquire as to what advice was tendered. In this connection the following observations of Justice Sawant and Justice Kuldip Singh in S. R. Bommai vs. Union of India (AIR 1994 SC 1918) regarding the scope and ambit of Article 74(2) are quite relevant:
"The object of Article 74(2) was not to exclude any material or documents from the scrutiny of the Courts but to provide that an order issued by or in the name of the President could not be questioned on the ground that it was either contrary to the advice tendered by the Ministers or was issued without obtaining any advice from the Ministers. Its object was only to make the question whether the President had followed the advice of the Ministers or acted contrary thereto, non- justiciable.1"
Put simply, this will imply that such advice cannot be inquired into by any court. It does not mean that the nature of this advice cannot be disclosed. For this reason, and in light of the Right to Information Act, 2005, CPIO Shri Faiz Ahmed Kidwai is directed to allow inspection of the relevant file by appellant Shri Franklin Caesar Thomas on a date and time convenient to both."
1Underlined by bus for emphasis both in the original and in the present decision notice 8 The legal opinion submitted together with her response of 7.4.10, to our appeal notice by CPIO Ms. Sanjukta Ray, DS is summed up as follows:
11. "The President of India symbolizes democratic republican sovereign power under the Constitution. His functioning as President cannot be made the subject matter of any inquiry before the Court either. The President cannot be made a party or a witness to a proceeding. It not only derogates from the constitutional status attached to the high office of President, but will directly contravene Art. 74(2) and 361 of the Constitution. In Doypack Systems Pvt. Ltd. vs. Union of India and others - 1988(2) SCC 299, even with regard to cabinet papers, the Supreme Court referring to S.P. Gupta's case, held at page 326 (Para 44) as under:
"In this case these documents as we see are part of the preparation of the documents leading to the formation of the advice tendered to the President of India and as such these are privileged under Art. 74(2) of the Constitution which provides that the question whether any, and if so what, advice as tendered by Ministers to the President shall not be enquired into in any Court. This Court is precluded from asking for production of these documents. In S. P. Gupta's case the question was not actually what advice was tendered to the President on the appointment of Judges. The question was whether there was the factum of effective consultation between the relevant constitutional authorities. In our opinion that is not the problem here. We are conscious that there is no sacrosanct rule about the immunity from production of documents and the privilege should not be allowed in respect of each and every document. We reiterate that the claim of immunity and privilege has to be based on public interest. Learned Attorney General relied on the decision of this Court in the case of State of U.P. vs. Raj Narain. The principle or ratio of the same is applicable here. We may however, reiterate that the real damage with which we are concerned would be caused by the publication of the actual documents of the Cabinet for consideration and the minutes recorded in its discussion and its conclusions. It is well settled that the privilege cannot be waived. In this connection, learned Attorney General drew our attention to an unreported decision in Elphinstone Spinning and Weaving Mills Co. Ltd. vs. Union of India. This resulted ultimately in Sitaram Mills case. The Bombay High Court held that the Task Force Report was withheld deliberately as it would support the petitioner's case. It is well to remember that in Sitaram Mills, 9 this Court reversed the judgment of the Bombay High Court and upheld the take over. Learned Attorney General submitted that the documents there were not tendered voluntarily. It is well to remember that it is the duty of this Court to prevent disclosure where Art. 74(2) is applicable. We are convinced that the notings of the officials which lead to the Cabinet note leading to the Cabinet decision formed part of the advice tendered to the President as the Act was preceded by an ordinance promulgated by the President."
(emphasis supplied).
12. I am of the view that it is unthinkable that a Court or a Tribunal or a Commission could mandate the President to produce as to what he wrote to the Prime Minister in the discharge of his functions. This will have the effect of reducing the President of India to a position of a witness before the enquiry Commission. 13 With regard to the position of the Supreme Court Judges, the Supreme Court observed in the case of M/s Associated Tubewells Ltd. vs. R. B. Gujarmal Modi, AIR 1957 SC 742 at 743.
"Judges cannot be drawn into controversy over such matters. It is not consistent with the dignity of the Court and the decorum of the Bar that any course should be permitted which may lead to controversy as to what a Judge stated in Court and what view he held."
Though it was in different context, it has some relevance in the present context. Similarly here, the President cannot be drawn into controversy as to what warning he gave in the exercise of his constitutional powers in the process of consultation. It is the duty of the Commission of Inquiry to exercise self-restraint even in situations where it has jurisdiction. The present is a case when it has not even a jurisdiction to require to produce the correspondence. This is clearly a case where the Commission has exceeded its jurisdiction. Correspondence was not made by the officers of the President. The infrastructure / staff of the high office of the President was utilized to communicate the President's views which had been expressed by correspondence in the process of discussion and consultation between the President and the Prime Minister leading ultimately to advise or not to advise a particular course by the Council of Ministers.
14 The President is protected under the Constitution and has to take a firm stand. He is not amenable to the process of the Court. He is not answerable for the performance of his powers and duties of the office of the President and for any act done or purporting to be done by him in the exercise and performance of these powers and duties. The correspondence, if any which emanated in the context of any incident including that of Godhra incident is fully 10 privileged and fully covered by the immunity under Art. 361 and privilege under Art. 74(2) of the Constitution of India. It will be a perverse view to interpret the principle of S. P. Gupta's case as applicable to the facts of the present case. That was not a case in which the President's correspondence with the Prime Minister or a Minister was involved. There is no precedent of a Court, Tribunal or Commission requiring the President or the officers of the President Secretariat requiring him or them to produce the correspondence which took place between the President and the Prime Minister/a Minister and more particularly when it is part of the process of consultation and advice between the President and Minister/Ministers.
15. To require the President to produce the correspondence which he had with the Prime Minister is to enter a territory which is exclusively his viz to "warn and encourage" to "Imprint his personality and chasten" and "to pay a role which is pervasive and persuasive". He cannot be asked by a court or tribunal or commission to disclose how he played his pervasive and persuasive role in the process of chastening to make for good government keeping himself above politics. The commission owes a constitutional duty to the President not to require the production of the letters and ensure that by such act of the Commission it does not drag the President into an unnecessary political controversy which motivated elements may try to precipitate or seek to sensationtise (sic) the matter for such elements own publicity of itself or for other reasons.
16. The Immunity of the President under Article 361(2) and 361(3) is only "during his term of office". Art. 361(4) deals with civil proceedings in which relief is claimed against the President during his term of office in respect of any act done or purported to be done by him in his personal capacity whether before or after he entered up to his office as President.
17 Art. 361(1) confers an immunity from being answerable to any court for the exercise and performance of the powers and duties of the office or for any act done or purported to have done by him in the exercise and performance of those powers and duties. It is evident that the President is not answerable to court even after he demits the office, he will be made answerable even in relation to performance of powers and duties, while he was holding office and for any act done or purported to have been done in the exercise and performance of those powers and duties while in office. To make him answerable after he demits office would be distorting Art. 361(1) and defeat the mischief sought to be suppressed and the remedy sought to be advanced by Art. 361(1). Such a question as it is too obvious has not arisen before courts till now. I am of the view that the protection under Art. 361(1) would continue to apply 11 even after a President demits office. Art. 361(1) is in contrast to Art. 361(2) and 361(3). The privilege under Art. 361(1) is not restricted in its operation and is not confined only till the President holds office.
18. In any event independent of Article 361, the correspondence required to be produced in the present case falls squarely within the ambit of Article 74(2) of the Constitution and are privileged and consequently cannot be directed to be produced or be disclosed in any manner whatsoever."
As can be seen from the face of the above, the legal opinion provided by the DoPT in the present case has not been in fact given by the Ministry of Law to PMO with reference to the present case before us, but concerns a different case altogether namely Appeal No. IC/MA/A/2006/00121; C. Ramesh vs. Ministry of Personnel, Public Grievances and Pensions. Besides, the apex Court, in quoting the opinion from the ruling of the Supreme Court in SP Gupta's case cited by the Law Ministry, in itself lays down that it is the "duty of the Court to prevent disclosure where Art. 74(2) is applicable." What is under discussion in the present case, however, is not whether information falling under Article. 74(2) is privileged but whether Art. 74(2) is applicable at all in the present case, which asks simply for the existence of a document, not a ruling on it, particularly in light of the observations of Justice Sawant and Justice Kuldeep Singh in S.R. Bommai's case.
Besides, Shri K. Parasaran of the Ministry of Law has also been selective in quoting from the decision of the Supreme Court of India in the case of Doypack Systems P. Ltd. vs. Union of India and ors, conveniently avoided quoting from Para 45 of the same judgment, which is as follows:
"45. We respectfully follow the observations in S. P. Gupta and Ors. v. Union of India and Ors. (supra) at pages 607 & 609. We may refer to the following observations at page 608 of the report.
It is settled law and it was so clearly recognized in Raj Narain's case (supra) that there may be classes of documents which public interest requires should not be disclosed, no matter what the individual documents in those classes may contain or in other words, the law recognizes that there may be classes of documents which in the public interest should be immune from disclosure.12
There is one such class of documents which for years has been recognized by the law as entitled in the public interest to be protected against disclosure and that class consists of documents which it is really necessary for the proper functioning of the public service to withhold from disclosure. The documents falling within this class are granted immunity from disclosure not because of their contents but because of the class to which they belong. This class includes cabinet minutes, minutes of discussions between heads of departments, high level interdepartmental communications and despatches from ambassadors abroad (vide Conway v. Rimmer 1968 AC 910 and Rogers v. Lewes J.K. Ex-Parte Home Secretary 1973 A.C. 388, Papers brought into existence to the purpose of preparing a submission to cabinet vide Lanyon Property Ltd. vs. Commonwealth 129 C.LR 650 and indeed any documents which relate to the framing of government policy at a high level (vide re. Grosvenor Hotel, London 1964 3 All E.R. 354.2
46. Cabinet papers are, therefore, protected from disclosure not by reason of their contents but because of the class to which they belong. It appears to us that Cabinet paper also include papers brought into existence for the purpose of preparing submission to the Cabinet."
This, therefore, raises the question of whether the matter requires a Statutory Ruling or a Constitutional one. If the latter, this is clearly outside the jurisdiction of this Commission. Although we have indeed ruled on the Constitutional bearing u/s 74(2) in C. Ramesh vs. Ministry of Personnel, Public Grievances & Pensions (in Appeal No. CIC/MA/A/2006/00121 decision announced on 8.8.2006). In the present case we find that there is in fact no relationship of the information sought with the class of documents specifically defined as protected in the rulings quoted above. Besides we have the very clear orders of the Supreme Court of India in transferred case C. No. 9 of 1994 decided on 15.12.1995 - Balaji Raghvan & S.P. Anand vs. Union of India, which is directly concerned with National Awards including Bharat Ratna, Padma Vibhushan, Padma Bhushan and Padma Shri in which the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held as follows:
2Underlined by us for emphasis 13 "The function of the State Committee may only be to recommend the names of the persons, who in their opinion are deserving of a particular award. The final decision shall have to be taken by the National Committee on Awards. No award should be conferred except on the recommendation of the National Committee. The recommendations must have the approval of the Prime Minister and the President of India.
The number of awards under each category must be curtailed to preserve their prestige and dignity. In any given year the awards, all put together, may not exceed fifty."
From the above, it is clear that at least two of the three questions on which information has been withheld i.e. Q. Nos. 2 & 4 are well outside any application of Constitutional privilege under Art. 74(2). While giving respondents the benefit of the doubt with regard to Q. No. 3, this appeal is allowed with regard to Q. Nos. 2 & 4. The response to these two questions will be provided to appellant Shri Subhash Chandra Agrawal within ten working days of receipt of this Decision Notice. Since, however, the question revolved around a delicate matter where Constitutional privilege had been invoked, there will be no costs.
Reserved in the hearing, this decision is announced in open chambers on this 28th day of April, 2010. Notice of this decision be given free of cost to the parties.
(Wajahat Habibullah) Chief Information Commissioner 28.4.2010 Authenticated true copy. Additional copies of orders shall be supplied against application and payment of the charges, prescribed under the Act, to the CPIO of this Commission.
(Pankaj K.P. Shreyaskar) Joint Registrar 28.4.2010 14 15