Madhya Pradesh High Court
National Mineral Development ... vs Bindi Bai (Smt.) And Anr. on 12 February, 1997
Equivalent citations: (1998)ILLJ85MP
ORDER S.C. Pandey, J.
1. This appeal under Section 30 of the Workmen's Compensation Act, 1923 (hereinafter referred to as, the Act) is directed against the order, dated April 21, 1995, passed by the Commissioner for Workmen Compensation-cum-Labour Court, Jagdalpur in Claim Case. No 40/93 (AC).
2. The relevant facts for disposal of this ap- peal are as follows. The respondent is the : widow of Sukhru Ram Nagesh. She filed an application for compensation under the provisions of the Act, claiming that her husband died on July 19, 1992 during the course of employment with the appellant as a result of an accident. Sukhru Ram Nagesh was in the employment of the appellant and he was posted on his duty of helper. He was working in the second shift when he complained of chest pain. Thereafter he suffered a heart attack and fell down from about 150 feet above the ground. He was declared dead. His post morteum examination revealed that he suffered a cardiac respiratory arrest. The respondent claimed compensation worth Rs.78.000 together with interest.
3. The appellant in his reply inter alia took the following stand. It was not disputed that Sukhru Ram Nagesh was working as helper and, therefore, he was covered by the definition of workman under the 'Act'. However, it was denied that Sukhru Ram Nagesh was working at the time he suffered the heart attack on July 19, 1992. It was claimed that Sukhru Ram Nagesh was feeling uneasy and, therefore, he did not join the duty. He was sent for medical help at about 3.45p.m. to the hospital. He died in the Hospital. It was claimed that there was no causal connection with the death of Sukhru Ram Nagesh and, therefore, the appellant was not liable to pay any compensation. The appellant claimed that cardiac respiratory arrest was on account of the fact that the deceased was an old patient of heart ailment. He died due to natural causes and not on account of any work allotted to him by the appellant.
4. The Commissioner for Workmen Compensation has found that Sukhru Ram Nagesh died during the course of his employment as a result of an accident. Therefore, he awarded compensation to the tune of Rs. 71,096 to be paid to the respondent within 60 days of the order failing which the appellant was required to pay interest at the rate of 6% per annum on the amount awarded.
5. In this appeal, Shri Vivek Rugia, learned counsel appearing for the appellant has argued that Sukhru Ram Nagesh could not be said to have suffered personal injury by an accident arising out of and in the course of his employment. According to the learned counsel for the appellant, death of Sukhru Ram Nagesh was due to natural causes. It was submitted that, in order to come to the conclusion that the personal injury, which resulted in the death of the workman, was caused by an accident arising out of and in the course of employment there must be causal connection between the injury and the work done by the workman. There was no such connection and, therefore, the order of the Commissioner for Workmen Compensation was bad in law.
6. The counsel for the respondent, on the other hand, asserted that there was intimate connection of the personal injury of heart failure with the work of Sukhru Ram Nagesh. On account of the stress of the work Sukhru Ram Nagesh suffered the accident of his heart failure. Sukhru Ram Nagesh did not die in ordinary course of nature. He suffered a heart attack due to strain caused by the work he was performing about 150 feet above the ground- He, therefore, tell down and died.
7. Before we begin to examine the rival points of view, it is necessary to refer to findings of fact recorded by the Commissioner for Workmen Compensation. The Tribunal has given a finding that Sukhru Ram Nagesh started tor second shift of duty at about 1.35p.m. in the vehicle provided by the appellant. It is further recorded by the Commissioner for Workmen Compensation that the deceased did not complain about any pain or stress when he started for work. Thereafter the deceased was required to work on conveyor at the height of 150 feet above the ground at about 2.00 p.m. At about 4.00 P.M. it was announced that Sukhru Ram Nagesh had fallen down. Then only workmen came to the spot where the deceased was found lying at the time of his death. This was unrebut-ted testimony of Ayutram. Thus the learned Commissioner came to the conclusion that Sukhru Ram Nagesh must have suffered an injury to his heart during the period he was working on the conveyor. As a consequence thereof, he fell down and died. The postmortem report also confirmed that death was due to cardiac respira tory arrest.
8. It is, therefore, established from the finding recorded by the Commissioner that Sukhru Ram was amidst his work when he suffered the personal injury of heart attack or cardiac respiratory arrest. Thereafter, he died. It is thus prima facie established that Sukhru Ram Nagesh suffered an internal injury during the course of his duty resulting in heart attack, and ultimately his death. No evidence was led in rebuttal.
9. The question is if the event can be called an accident. An 'accident' is an event which be- longs to the relam of the unforeseen and the unexpected. It dons the colours of mishap, when the consequences are untoward. Therefore, anything which happens out of the ordinary would amount to accident. A person suffering from heart ailment may suffer cardiac arrest apparently without any physical stress or strain on his part. Such an event may not be called an accident because cardiac arrest may be assigned to natural causes resulting in illness, especially, when there is lack of any datum as to the case-which accelerated the cardiac arrest. However, when there is data before the Court to the effect that a person was put to stress and strain just before he suffered the cardiac arrest, in a situation in which, there was no prior complaint of pain-in chest or uneasiness or any other symptom signifying an onset of heart attack, it can be held on the basis of preponderance of probabilities that the stress and strain might have accelerated the heart disease . So in this case, deceased was found to be apparently hale and hearty, without any complaint about his heart condition, when he joined the duty at 2.00 p.m. He worked upto 4.00 p.m. Something must have transpired between this period which caused the heart attack. It is reasonable to hold that the cause of heart attack was physical stress and strain sustained by the deceased while working at the height of 150 feet on the conveyor. Thus the 'causal' link is provided for the event of death. The death of Sukhru Ram Nagesh was contingent though unforeseen.
10. The contention of the learned counsel for the appellant is that the word 'accident' in Section 3 of the Workmen's Compensation Act, 1923, should be confined to external causes only for the reason that they can be known. So far as internal injuries are concerned, it cannot be said with any certainty that a particular reason prompted the result. The learned counsel for the appellant would have everything cut, measured and dried. The aforesaid may be true in the realm of scientific world, specially Newtonian Physicals, but in the world of every day affairs, with which the Courts deal, it is not possible to be so accurate. The rule of preponderance of probabilities in the law of evidence speaks volumes about the forensic method. It is usually applied by the Courts of law in civil proceedings . The Court is entitled to draw its inference looking to the common, cause of events. The Court cannot do otherwise in the present stage of scientific knowledge about human mechanism.
11. These are numerous instances, when the Court preferred to be guided by common cause of human experience rather than by dry logic. In Sungarbai v. General Manager, Ordnance Factory, Jabalpur 1976 M.P.L.J. 356 a Division Bench of this Court comprising Shri G.P. Singh and Shri S.M.N. Raina, JJ., was required to construe Section 3(1) of the Act. The leading judgment was delivered by Shri G.P. Singh, J., (as he then was). It was held that 'an accident' means an untoward mishap which is not expected and designed by the workman and an injury would mean any physiological injury, external or internal. The words 'arising out of an employment' mean the injury suffered during the course of employment, from risk incidental to duties of service, which unless so engaged the workman would not have otherwise suffered. It was held that there should be 'causal relationship between accident and employment'. A number of cases were considered by their Lordships including that of the Supreme Court and the High Courts of Bombay and Gujarat and the English Authorities. Their Lordships overruled the case of Parwatibai v. Rajkumar Mills (1959-II-LLJ- 65) and held that it was necessary to prove exceptional strain of work causing the heart attack. Itwas held thus:
"In view of the authorities to which refer- ence has already been made, if the workman is suffering from advance heart disease ordinary strain of ordinary work in which he is employed at the relevant time may be too great for him and may furnish the connection between his death and employment. I may recall here again the words of Lord Lore-burn L.C., in Huges case "I do not think we should attach any importance to the fact that there was no strain or exertion out of the ordinary." 1910 A.C.242. P. 246.
Shri G.P. Singh J. summarised his conclusions as follows in paragraph 10 at page 362 :
"10. On a review of the authorities, the principles in so far as relevant for our purposes may be stated as follows:-
(A) "Accident" means an untoward mishap which is not expected or designed by the workman. 'Injury' means Physiological injury.
(B) "Accident" and "injury" are distinct in cases where accident is an event happening externally to a man; e.g. when a workman falls from a ladder and suffers injury. But accident may be an event happening internally to a man and in such cases "accident" and "injury" coincide. Such cases are illustrated by bursting of an aneurism, failure of heart and the like while the workman is doing his normal work.
(C) Physiological injury suffered by a workman due mainly to the progress of a disease unconnected with employment, may amount to an injury arising out of and in the course of employment if the work which the workmen was doing at the time of the occurrence of the injury contributed to its occurrence.
(D) The connection between the injury and employment may be furnished by ordinary strain of ordinary work if the strain did in fact contribute to or accelerate or hasten the injury.
(E) The burden to prove the connection of employment with the injury is on the applicant, but he is entitled to succeed if on a balance of probabilities a reasonable man might hold that the more probable a conclusion is that there was a connection."
12. The decision of the Division Bench of this Court was followed in Hindustan Steel Construction Ltd. v. Nuraisha Khatoon 1993 ACJ 501 by a learned single Judge of the Patna High Court. A similar view was taken by the Kerala High Court in Devshi Bhaniji Khopa v. Mary Burno and Anr. (1985-II-LL3-70), by the Orissa High Court in Sambhu Singh v. Kamrum Nissa and Anr. 1992 ACJ 516, by the High Court of Gujarat in Amubibi v. The Nagri Mills Co. Ltd. (1977-II-LLJ-510), by the Rajasthan High Court in Divisional Personnel Officer, Western Railways, Jaipur and Anr. v. Ashiya Begum (1994-II-LLJ-795) and in State of Rajasthan v,. Man Kanwar and Ors. 1991 ACJ'446. A learned single Judge of this Court came to the same conclusion relying on (1997-II-LLJ- 510) (Guj) (supra). It appears that the majority of the High Courts have taken the same view as was taken by the Division Bench of this Court in similar circumstances. In Kikukbhai v. The Mafatlal Fine Spinning and Manufacturing Co. Ltd. 1981 LAB I.C. 1648, a Division Bench of Gujarat H igh Court has taken the view that even a heart attack by itself reducing the capacity of the workman in respect of his employment would amount to an injury.
13. For all these reasons, this Court comes to the conclusion that there is no merit in the submission of the counsel for the appellant that the death of Sukhru Ram Nagesh was due to 'natural causes' and it could not be an.accident covered by Section 3(1) of the Act.
14. The result is that appeal fails and it is accordingly dismissed with costs. Counsel's fee is Rs. 500 if certified.