Andhra HC (Pre-Telangana)
T.L. Prakash Rama Rao vs The District Collector And Ors. on 21 June, 1993
Equivalent citations: 1993(3)ALT149
ORDER B. Subhashan Reddy, J.
1. This case which arises under the Land Acquisition Act is an atrocious one for the reason that not that the requisitioning authority wants the land for any public purpose, but wants the water which was struck in the petitioner's land and for that reason requisitioned it and the acquisitioning authority has accepted.
2. Mr. D.V. Seetharam Murthy, the learned counsel appearing for the requisitioning authority i.e. Navodaya School, very vehemently contends that several students are being imparted education in the Navodaya School and the education being a noble public purpose, the acquisition is not bad. But, I am afraid, I cannot accede to his contention as, however, noble the public purpose is, the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (hereinafter referred to 'as the Act') cannot be subverted and distorted for depriving any person of his property in this fashion. What was hitherto a fundamental right to property is now transformed into a constitutional guarantee under Article 300-A of the Constitution of India, which guarantees that no person shall be deprived of his property, save by authority of law. The authority of law' is the invocation of the provisions of the Act. If the properties are capable of being acquired under the Act, it is needless to mention that by invoking the said Act and adhering to the statutory provisions contained thereunder, a person can be deprived of his property by paying compensation in accordance with the said Act. For that purpose, even urgency clause can be invoked as contained under Section 17(4) of the Act by dispensing with the enquiry under Section 5A thereof. The said urgency cause can be invoked only when the acquisition cannot brook any delay and cannot even wait for 30 days within which time, the enquiry under Section 5-A of the Act can be held. But the situation would be entirely different if what is acquired is not a land and is for some other purpose and some other purpose being dominant and the acquisition of land will become only consequential and ancillary. Certainly the Land Acquisition Act does not permit this situation. Under the provisions of the Act, the dominant purpose is acquisition of land and that land may be vacant, may contain structures, may contain trees and may also contain wells. The Act never contemplates of acquisition of a well for the purpose of drawing water as a dominant purpose. To say that in acquiring the water source, land also is involved, and as such the Act is applicable, will be simply misreading the provisions of the Act and particularly the definition of 'land' thereunder. Section 3(a) of the Act defines 'land' as including benefits to arise out of land and things attached to the earth or permanently fastened to anything attached to the earth. The definition of land employed therein is similar to that of the words 'immovable property' in the General Clauses Act, 1897. May be that the definition of land is not exhaustive, but is inclusive definition; but by stretching any far it cannot be deduced that the dominant purpose need not be acquisition of land. Stretching the definition of land to any extent, what is inevitable is the acquisition of land that should be a dominant purpose and consequentially the things attached to the said land, be it buildings, trees, crops or wells, can also be part of acquisition. But, if the dominant purpose is only to acquire a water source and then to notify the land involving the same, the said acquisition does not amount to acquisition of land and the Act is not at all applicable. It is clear from the stand taken by Navodaya School the 3rd respondent herein, which is beneficiary of the acquisition in the affidavit filed by it in support of the implead petition that the land is sought to be acquired for providing water source to the Navodaya School. The public purpose under the Act can be for providing land, be it vacant or with structures, trees or borewells, for certainly not to the extent of grabbing somebody's water source and for that purpose mention the land surrounding the said borewell as a necessary consequence. Indisputably, the requisitioning authority does not require the land for any public purpose; but they need water to cater to the needs 10 of the students, staff and other workers of Navodaya School and as the water did not strike in the premises of the Navodaya School and rich water struck in the land of the petitioner, the said water source is sought to be acquired. As the Land Acquisition Act does not permit this kind of acquisition, the petitioner cannot be deprived of his property and if it is done, the same will be in infraction IS of constitutional guarantee under Article 300A of the Constitution of India.
3. In the above circumstances, I hold that the petitioner's property notified cannot be acquired and he cannot be deprived of the same. In view of this, the other points need no adjudication.
4. The Writ Petition is allowed and consequently the Land Acquisition proceedings are quashed. No costs.