Karnataka High Court
Karnataka Rajya Rashtreeya Grameena ... vs Dr Sri K Radhakrishna Reddy on 2 December, 2016
Equivalent citations: 2017 (1) AKR 257
Author: S. Abdul Nazeer
Bench: S. Abdul Nazeer
®
IN THE HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA AT BENGALURU
DATED THIS THE 2ND DAY OF DECEMBER 2016
PRESENT
THE HON'BLE MR.JUSTICE S. ABDUL NAZEER
AND
THE HON'BLE MRS.JUSTICE K.S. MUDAGAL
CCC (CIVIL) NOS.172 TO 184/2014
Between :
1 Karnataka Rajya Rashtreeya Grameena Udyoga
Khatri Yojane Naukarara Sangha (R),
Reptd. by its present General Secretary,
Sri N.Rangachari, having its office at No.20/2,
V.G.Gopal Building, Lalbagh Fort Road,
Bangalore - 560 004.
2 Sri T.Sidda Reddy,
S/o Krista Reddy,
Aged about 47 years,
Data Entry Operator,
Kenchana Gudda Grama Panchayat,
Siruguppa Taluk,
Bellary District 583 121.
3 Sri Panduranga,
S/o Dyavanna,
Aged about 29 years,
Data Entry Operator,
Nadavi Grama Panchayat,
Siruguppa Taluk,
Bellary District 583 122.
2
4 Sri Chand Basha,
S/o Shekshavali,
Aged about 25 years,
Data Entry Operator,
Halekote Grama Panchayat,
Siruguppa Taluk,
Bellary District 583 122.
5 Sri Devendra Barikar,
S/o Veeresh Barikar,
Aged about 28 years,
Data Entry Operator,
K.Belagal Grama Panchayat,
Siruguppa Taluk,
Bellary District 583 121.
6 Sri D.Lachumayya,
S/o Dodda Adeppa,
Aged about 26 years,
Data Entry Operator,
Kuruvalli Grama Panchayat,
Siruguppa Taluk,
Bellary District 583 121.
7 Sri S.M.Basavaraja,
S/o Sithikanta,
Aged about 39 years,
Data Entry Operator,
M.Suguru Grama Panchayat,
Siruguppa Taluk,
Bellary District 583 120.
8 Sri K.Fhayaz,
S/o Nazar Sab,
Data Entry Operator,
Sirigeri Grama Panchayat,
Siruguppa Taluk,
Bellary District 583 120.
3
9 Sri Basavaraj K.B.S/o Hampanna,
Aged about 33 years,
Data Entry Operator,
Karur Grama Panchayat,
Siruguppa Taluk,
Bellary District 583 120.
10 Sri Bellary Shekshavali S/o Shek Sab,
Aged about 28 years,
Data Entry Operator,
Balakundi Grama Panchayat,
Siruguppa Taluk,
Bellary District 583 122.
11 Sri B.Rajashekar S/o Siddanagouda,
Aged about 29 years,
Data Entry Operator,
Bagguaru Grama Panchayat,
Siruguppa Taluk,
Bellary District 583 121.
12 Sri H.Narasappa S/o H.Nagappa,
Aged about 35 years,
Data Entry Operator,
B.M.Suguru Grama Panchayat,
Siruguppa Taluk,
Bellary District 583 114.
13 Sri T.Gangadhar Nayak,
S/o T.Veereshappa,
Aged about 25 years,
Data Entry Operator,
Uttanur Grama Panchayat,
Siruguppa Taluk,
Bellary District 583 121. .... Complainants.
(By Sri Subba Rao, Sr. Adv. For Sri K.N.Satheesh, Adv.
Complainant Nos.4 and 8 deleted V/O dated 16.9.2014)
4
And :
1 Dr.Sri K.Radhakrishna Reddy,
Executive Officer,
Taluk Panchayat,
Siraguppa Taluk,
Bellary District.
2 Sri H.Shivarama Reddy,
Secretary/Panchayat Development Officer,
Grama Panchayat,
Kenchanagudda,
Siraguppa Taluk,
Bellary District.
3 Sri C.Choudappa,
Secretary/Panchayat Development Officer,
Nadavi Grama Panchayat, Nadavi,
Siraguppa Taluk,
Bellary District.
4 Smt.B.Rajeswari,
Secretary/Panchayat Development Officer,
Halekote Grama Panchayat,
Siraguppa Taluk,
Bellary District.
5 Sri Rajahanumanthappa,
Secretary/Panchayat Development Officer,
K.Belagal Grama Panchayat,
Siraguppa Taluk,
Bellary District.
6 Sri Veeresha,
Secretary/Panchayat Development Officer,
Kuruvalli Grama Panchayat,
Siraguppa Taluk,
Bellary District.
5
7 Sri B.Basavaraja,
Secretary/Panchayat Development Officer,
M.Suguru Grama Panchayat,
Siraguppa Taluk,
Bellary District.
8 Sri M.Basappa,
Secretary/Panchayat Development Officer,
Sirigeri Grama Panchayat,
Siraguppa Taluk,
Bellary District.
9 M.Veerana Gowda,
Secretary/Panchayat Development Officer,
Karur Grama Panchayat,
Siraguppa Taluk,
Bellary District.
10 Sri V.Adeppa,
Secretary/Panchayat Development Officer,
Balakundi Grama Panchayat,
Siraguppa Taluk,
Bellary District.
11 Sri B.Mahesha Reddy,
Secretary/Panchayat Development Officer,
Bagguru Grama Panchayat,
Siraguppa Taluk,
Bellary District.
12 Sri B.Virupaksha Gouda,
Secretary/Panchayat Development Officer,
B.M.Suguru Grama Panchayat,
Siraguppa Taluk,
Bellary District.
6
13 Sri B.M.Basavaraja,
Secretary/Panchayat Development Officer,
Uttanur Grama Panchayat,
Siraguppa Taluk,
Bellary District. .... Accused.
(By Sri Madhusudhan R. Naik, Advocate General for
Smt.S.Susheela, AGA for proposed accused in
I.A.No.5/2014
Sri Ajoy Kumar Patil, Adv. For A1-A3, A5-A7 and A9-A13
Accused Nos.4 and 8 deleted V/O dated 16.9.2014)
---
These CCCs (Civil) are filed under Sections 11 and 12 of
the Contempt of Courts Act, to take appropriate proceedings
against the accused and punish them according to law for the
deliberate disobedience of the order dated 25.9.2013 passed by
this Court in W.P.Nos.9654-9666/2013, etc.
These CCCs (Civil) having been heard and reserved for
Orders, this day S.ABDUL NAZEER. J., pronounced the
following:
ORDER
In these cases filed under Sections 11 and 12 of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971, the complainants have sought for punishing the accused on the ground of disobedience of the order in W.P.Nos.9654 to 9666/2013 dated 25.9.2013. 7
2. The complainants have filed the aforesaid writ petitions seeking a direction to quash the circular dated 20.7.2012 and for certain other reliefs. On 1.3.2013, this Court while issuing emergent notice to the respondents directed them not to terminate the services of the petitioners/complainants, if they are not yet terminated. On 25.9.2013, learned Government Advocate was directed to take notice on behalf of the State of Karnataka-respondent No.2 therein and the respondents were directed to pay the wages of the petitioners/complainants in continuation of the interim order dated 1.3.2013. The said order is as under:
"Counsel for respondent Nos.
3 to 16 absent.
Government Advocate takes notice for
respondent No.2.
Heard Sri Subbarao, learned Senior Counsel for the petitioners.
Learned Counsel for the petitioners contends that even though this Court has granted an interim order directing the respondents not to terminate the services of the petitioners, the 8 respective Grama Panchayaths are not paying them their wages.
When an interim order has been granted not to terminate the services of the petitioners, it is apparent that the concerned respondents are required to continue to pay their wages. If they have failed to do so, they are hereby directed to pay the wages of the petitioners in continuation of the interim order granted on 1.3.2013 until further orders.
Issue rule nisi."
3. Since the said order was not complied with, the complainants have filed the above cases on 12.1.2014.
4. On 13.6.2014, charges have been framed against the accused.
5. However, on 17.12.2015, learned Single Judge has modified the aforesaid interim orders in the writ petitions as under:
9"6. On hearing the learned Advocates, I deem it necessary and just to modify the earlier interim orders, dated 1.3.2013 and 25.9.2013 by making the following interim arrangement till the final disposal of these cases:
(i) The petitioner Nos.2 to 10 are directed to report themselves at their respective work place and discharge their allotted duties. They shall work under the guidelines, supervision and directions of the agency employed by the State Government.
(ii) The respective Panchayath Development Officers are directed to permit the petitioner Nos.2 to 10 to discharge their allotted duties.
(iii) The concerned functionary shall disburse the salary to the petitioner Nos.2 to 10 for the periods for which they work.
(iv) Liberty is also reserved to the petitioner Nos.2 to 10 to take part in the regular recruitment process initiated for filling up the newly sanctioned posts.10
(v) This arrangement shall be without prejudice to the rival contentions being raised by the parties in these petitions and subject to the outcome of the writ petitions."
6. An application-I.A.No.5/2014 was filed by the complainants to implead the Secretary, Government of Karnataka, Rural Development Panchayt Raj Department as well as the Chief Executive Officer, Zilla Panchayat, Bellary. The said application was opposed by the proposed accused by filing objections.
7. Appearing for the proposed accused in I.A.No.5/2014, learned Advocate General submits that the order dated 1.3.2013 and 25.9.2013 has been modified by the learned Single Judge on 17.12.2015. Therefore, the complaints do not survive as of now.
8 However, Sri Subba Rao, learned Senior Counsel appearing for the complainants submits that the order dated 25.9.2013 was in force till it was modified on 17.12.2015. The accused have not complied with the said order. The accused are 11 liable to be punished for deliberate violation of the said order. In this connection, he has relied on the following decisions:
(i) TAYABBHAI M. BAGASARWALLA AND ANOTHER VS. HIND RUBBER INDUSTRIES PVT.
LTD. AND OTHERS - (1997) 3 SCC 443;
(ii) PRITHAWI NATH RAM VS. STATE OF JHARKHAND AND OTHERS - (2004) 7 SCC 261;
(iii) PATEL RAJNIKANT DHULABHAI ANDANOTHER VS. PATEL CHANDRAKANT DHULABHAI AND OTHERS - (2008) 14 SCC 561.
(iv) STATE OF BIHAR AND OTHERS. VS.
RAJENDRA SINGH AND ANOTHER - AIR 2004 SC 4419, and
(v) DIRECTOR OF EDUCATION, UTTARANCHAL AND OTHERS VS. VED PRAKASH JOSHI AND OTHERS - (2005) 6 SCC 98.
9. Per contra, learned Advocate General submits that the order dated 1.3.2013 was an ex-parte interim order. When the matter came up for orders on 25.9.2013, the Court directed the 12 Government Advocate to take notice on behalf of State of Karnataka and directed the respondents therein to pay wages to the complainants in continuation of the interim order dated 1.3.2013. On 17.12.2015, after hearing the learned Counsel for the parties, the Court has modified the earlier order. The parties are bound by the order dated 17.12.2015. It is submitted that the Hon'ble Supreme Court in STATE OF J AND K VS. MOHD. YAQOOB KHAN AND OTHERS - (1992) 4 SCC 167 and a Division Bench of this Court in P.E.NARAYANA SWAMY VS. THE CHAIRMAN AND THE MANAGING DIRECTOR, KARNATAKA STATE ROAD TRANSPORT CORPORATION - CCC (CIVIL) NO.81/1993 dated 1.6.1993 have held that even in a case where an application for vacating the ex-parte interim order is filed, the contempt of court proceedings cannot be taken up. In the instant case, the earlier orders have been modified. Therefore, these proceedings cannot be continued.
10. At this stage, learned Senior Counsel appearing for the complainants submits that once the charge has been framed, 13 there is no question of dropping the proceedings, having regard to Rule 10 of the High Court of Karnataka (Contempt of Court Proceedings) Rules, 1981 ('Rules' for short). Trial has to go on and final order has to be passed. In this connection, he has relied on the decision of this Court in THE STATE OF MYSORE VS. KALILULLA AHMED SHARIFF AND ANOTHER -
AIR 1971 MYSORE 60.
11. In response to the said submission, learned Advocate General submits that the procedure prescribed for summary trials has to be followed in trial of cases of contempt. Therefore, there is no bar to drop the proceedings after framing the charge.
12. We have carefully considered the arguments of the learned Counsel made at the Bar and perused the materials placed on record.
13. A learned Single Judge of this Court in W.P.Nos.9654 to 9666/2013 while issuing emergent notice to the respondents on 1.3.2013 passed an ex-parte interim order directing the 14 respondents therein not to terminate the services of the petitioners/complainants if they are not yet terminated. The matter was posted again on 25.9.2013. On that day, learned Government Advocate was directed to take notice for respondent No.2. The Court directed the respondents to pay wages of the petitioners/complainants in continuation of the interim order granted on 1.3.2013. For the failure to comply with this order, the above cases have been filed on 12.1.2014. On 17.12.2015, after hearing the learned Counsel for the parties, learned Single Judge in W.P.Nos.9654 to 9666/2013 has modified the interim orders granted earlier. It is not the case of the complainants that the accused have failed to obey the order dated 17.12.2015. It is their case that the order dated 25.9.2013 ought to have been complied with by the accused.
14. Therefore, the first question for consideration is, whether the accused persons are liable for contempt for disobedience of the interim orders, which have been subsequently modified?
15
15. As noticed above, the first interim order was an ex- parte order. However, on 25.9.2013, Government Advocate was directed to take notice for the State Government and there was an interim order directing the respondents in the writ petitions to pay the wages. This order has been modified and it is not the case of the complainants that the modified order has been violated by the accused. The meaning of the expression 'modified' is 'to change' or 'to vary'. In our view, the modification relates back to the date of the earlier order unless the modified order is made prospective by the Court.
16. As rightly submitted by the learned Advocate General, even when an application for modification of ex-parte interim order is made, contempt of court proceedings cannot be taken up till the application is disposed of. In MOHD. YAQOOB KHAN (supra), the Supreme Court has pointed that it will not be fair to proceed against the respondents in contempt for the violation of an ex-parte interim order without finally disposing of the stay matter itself. Respondents will be at a disadvantage if they are called upon to meet the merits of the claim in a 16 contempt proceedings at the risk of being punished without their say against the interim order is not considered.
17. In P.E.NARAYANA SWAMY (supra), a Division Bench of this Court has held that until the stay matters is finally decided in the writ petition, the contempt of court proceedings cannot be taken up on the ground of non-compliance with the ex-parte interim order and it will be futile exercise of the jurisdiction if the Court proceeds to consider the alleged violation of the ex-parte interim order.
18. In the instant cast, during the pendency of the contempt proceedings, learned Single Judge has modified the interim order. In the circumstances, there is no question of proceeding with these complaints against the accused.
19. It is relevant to notice here that the aforesaid complaints were filed against the respondents in the writ petitions except the Secretary to the Government, Rural Development and Panchayatraj and the Chief Executive Officer, 17 Zilla Panchayat, Bellary. Therefore, an application I.A.No.5/2014 was filed for impleading them as accused Nos.12 and 13. The complainants have assigned the reasons for not making them as parties to the complaint at the first instance in paragraph 7 of the complaint and also in second paragraph of the application. The complainants have stated that after the grant of interim order dated 25.9.2013, representations at Annexures 'Z' and 'AA' have been filed for payment of salary. The Principal Secretary, Rural Development and Panchayatraj directed the Chief Executive Officer, Zilla Panchayath, Bellary, to take action for payment of salary to the complainants as per the order of the learned Single Judge dated 25.9.2013. In pursuance of the said order, the Chief Executive Officer, Zilla Panchayath, Bellary, has informed the concerned Taluka Panchayath to take action for disbursement of the salary to the complainants as per Annexure 'BB' dated 9.12.2013. After passing this order, the order dated 25.9.2013 has been modified by the learned Single Judge. Therefore, it cannot be said that 18 there was disobedience of the order of the learned Single Judge dated 25.9.2013.
20. Let us now consider the decisions relied on by the learned Senior Counsel appearing for the complainants.
In PATEL RAJNIKANT DHULABHAI (supra), the Supreme Court was considering the case where defendant committed breach of injunction. A defence was set up that the suit filed by the plaintiff was without jurisdiction. Hon'ble Supreme Court held that until the question of jurisdiction had been decided, the City Civil Court possessed power to make interim orders. The Court could also enforce them. A subsequent decision that the Court had no jurisdiction to entertain the suit did not render interim orders passed earlier non est or without jurisdiction. A party committing breach of such orders could not escape the consequences of such disobedience and violation thereof.
In the present cases, the interim order granted by the Court was modified subsequently. Therefore, this decision has no application to the facts of the present case. 19
21. In TAYABBAI M. BAGASARWALLA (supra), the question decided is similar to the decision in PATEL RAJNIKANT DHULABHAI (supra).
22. In RAJENDRA SINGH (supra) and VED PRAKASH JOSHI (supra), the Supreme Court has held that while dealing with an application for contempt, the Court is really concerned with the question whether the earlier decision which has received its finality had been complied with or not. It would not be permissible for a Court to examine the correctness of the earlier decision, which had not been assailed and to take a view different than what was taken in the earlier decision. It cannot test correctness or otherwise of the order traversed beyond it or give additional directions or delete any direction contained therein. Right or wrong the order has to be obeyed.
The question in the present cases is whether the contempt lies in view of the modification of the earlier order? Therefore, these decisions have no application to the facts of the present case.
20
23. In PRITHAWI NATH RAM (supra), the Hon'ble Supreme Court was considering a case of non-compliance of a direction of the learned Single Judge of Patna High Court dated 30.3.1999, which had become final. In the said case, learned Single Judge while dealing with the application for initiation of contempt proceedings had passed an order holding that it would not be proper to take any action for contempt. Though learned Single Judge noticed that the scope of consideration while dealing with an application for initiation of contempt proceedings was confined to the question whether there was compliance with the order or not, yet proceeded to examine the correctness of the order and called upon the parties to satisfy him that the direction of the kind contained in the order dated 30.3.1999 could be issued. Learned Single Judge came to the conclusion that the direction could not have been given, and therefore, there was no scope for taking any action for contempt. In this background, the Hon'ble Supreme Court held that while dealing with an application for contempt, the Court is really concerned with the question whether the earlier decision, 21 which has attained finality had been complied with or not. It would not be permissible for a Court to examine the correctness of the earlier decision, which had not been assailed and to take a view different than what was taken in the earlier decision. It has been further held thus:
"If any party is aggrieved by the order, which in its opinion is wrong or against rules or its implementation is neither practicable nor feasible, it should always either approach the Court that passed the order or invoke jurisdiction of the appellate Court. Rightness or wrongness of the order cannot be urged in contempt proceedings. Right or wrong, the order has to be obeyed. The Court further observed that in a given case, even if ultimately the interim order is vacated or relief in the main proceeding is not granted to a party, the other side cannot take that as a ground for disobedience of any interim order passed by the Court......."
(emphasis supplied by us)
24. The Court has further held that in a given case, even if ultimately the interim order is vacated or relief in the main 22 proceeding is not granted to a party, the other side cannot take that as a ground for disobedience of any interim order passed by the Court.
25. In the instant case, the respondents/accused have approached the learned Single Judge and after hearing the learned Counsel for the parties, the earlier interim order has been modified. Therefore, it cannot be said that the accused have committed contempt of this Court.
26. The second question for consideration is, whether the proceedings for contempt can be dropped after framing of the charges?
27. Rule 10 of the Rules provides for hearing of cases and trial. Sub-rule (ii) of Rule 10 states that upon consideration of the reply filed by the accused and after hearing the parties, the Court may drop the proceedings and discharge the accused. Sub- rule (iii) of Rule 10 states that if the Court, upon hearing, is satisfied that there is prima facie case, it shall proceed to frame 23 the charge and furnish a copy of the same to the accused. Sub- rule (iv) of Rule 10 states that the charge shall be read over and explained to the accused and the Court shall record his plea, if any. Sub-rule (v) of Rule 10 states that if the accused pleads guilty, the Court may adjudge him guilty and proceed to pass such sentence as it deems fit. The next relevant rule is Rule 10(vi), which states that if the accused pleads not guilty, the case may be taken up for trial on the same day or posted to any subsequent date as directed by the Court.
28. Rule 13 provides for the procedure for trial. It states that except as otherwise provided in the Act and the Rules, the procedure prescribed for summary trials under Chapter XXI of the Code of Criminal Procedure ('Code' for short) shall as far as practicable be followed in the trial of cases of contempt.
29. Chapter XXI of the Code provides for the procedure for summary trials. Section 262 states that in trials under the said Chapter, the procedure specified in the Code for the trial of summons case shall be followed except the procedure 24 mentioned in subsequent Sections. Chapter XX of the Code provides for the procedure prescribed for summons cases. Section 258 of the Code states that in any summons case instituted otherwise than upon complaint, a Magistrate of the first class or with the previous sanction of the Chief Judicial Magistrate, any other Judicial Magistrate, may for reasons to be recorded by him, stop the proceedings at any stage without pronouncing any judgment and where such stoppage of proceedings is made after the evidence of the principal witnesses has been recorded, pronounce a judgment of acquittal, and in any other case, release the accused, and such release shall have the effect of discharge.
30. The procedure prescribed for trial of contempt cases is summary procedure. Therefore, even after framing of charge, there is no bar to stop further proceedings. The decision relied on by the learned Senior Counsel for the complainants in KALILULLA AHMED SHARIFF (supra) is in relation to a warrant case. This decision has no application to the facts of the present case.
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31. Whether the complainants are entitled for wages or not after the modification of the order has to be decided in the writ petitions. Reserving liberty to the complainants to urge all the contentions, these proceedings are dropped and the accused are discharged.
32. In view of the above, I.A.No.5/2014 do not survive for consideration. It is accordingly disposed of. No costs.
Sd/-
JUDGE.
Sd/-
JUDGE.
BMM/-