Calcutta High Court
A. Bhaskaran vs State Of West Bengal And Ors. on 18 January, 1996
Equivalent citations: (1996)1CALLT385(HC)
JUDGMENT Asish Baran Mukherjee, J.
1. Four revisional applications under section 482 Cr.P.C. have been heard together. The prayers are the same and facts and question of law involved are exactly the same. As such they have been dealt with analogously and shall be governed by the present judgment. They arise out of 4(four) complaints which have been investigated by the C.B.I, being proceeding No. RC/12/EOW/86, RC/13/EOW/86, RC/14/EOW/86 and RC/15/EOW/86 all dt. 17.12.86 under section 5(1)(d) and section 5(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947 read with section 120B/420/468/471 IPC.
2. The complaints were made by the Deputy General Manager (Advances) of Tamilnadu Mercantile Bank Ltd. a private Bank controlled by the family of late A.M.M.S. Ganesha Nadar. The petitioner was an employee of the said Bank from 1983 to the middle part of 1985 when he resigned from the services following difference with higher officials and consequent harassment. It is the case of petitioner that in the body of the FIR the same allegations have been made against one Mr. Charles Soloman and one Mr. P.K. Ruia and there is practically no allegation against the petitioner excepting that some consideration amount has allegedly gone to a firm at Virudhu Nagar in which the present petitioner was an ex employee and his family members are partners. It is alleged that at the relevant time the petitioner was not a public servant and that the FIR does not disclose any cognizable offence against him. It is his further case that he has been included in the complaint out of spite and in order to harass. It is also in this case that if there be any claim to the Bank that is with regard to the brokerage which is a civil claim. It has also been alleged that the Bank is persuing civil claim in a Civil Court. And as such for alleges non-payment of brokerage no criminal case can lie. The right of C.B.I, to investigate the case has also been challenged, for want of alleged consent on the part of Government of West Bengal. The Tamilnadu Mercantile Bank Ltd., is not a Nationalised Bank and hence C.B.I, cannot investigate. It is alleged that Institution of criminal case against the petitioner and their continuance is abuse of process of Court. The anxiety and agony of the petitioner by Institution of the four(4) criminal cases and their pendency for over 9(nine) years without there being any significant progress by the authorities in the matter of investigation of those cases has seriously prejudiced the petitioner on account of mental torture and anxiety suffered by him for these long period. It is also his case that one of the accused applied and obtained anticipatory bail in the aforesaid cases. In 1987 there was a search on the house of one of the accused. On 25.4.88 one of the accused appearing before the learned C.M.M., Calcutta and made an application for certified copy of the FIR and of some other papers when a report was called for from the I.O. On the dates so fixed on 6.5.88 the matter was heard by the learned C.M.M., in the presence of the I.O. and some of the accused persons represented by their Advocates and by order dated 21.5.88 the learned Magistrate allowed the prayer for having certified copy of the FIR. It is his positive case that on 25.4.88 one of the accused entered appearance, it is also his case that two other accused namely Jagdish Chandra Sureka and Ramchandra Nangalia also appeared before the learned C.M.M. on 15.1.88 and 18.2.88 respectively and applied for return of the cash.
3. One of the accused filed a revisional application under section 482 Cr.P.C. in this Court sometime in December, 1989, when the proceeding was stayed for about two weeks. Subsequently, however, the stay order was not extended. The matter was ultimately referred to the Special Bench and the Revisional Application was dismissed on 22.11.94. It is the contention of the petitioner that the said accused has filed a special leave petition in the Supreme Court of India and by order dt. 11.8.95 the said Court was pleased to issue a notice upon the C.B.I. The petitioner was not made a party in the aforesaid proceeding and also was not aware of continuance of the said case. It is alleged that investigation of the cases have not been completed except in one case and that also not within the period of three years from the date of appearance of one accused, namely, 25,4.88 and as such in accordance with section 167(5) Cr.P.C. as amended by West Bengal Act 24 of 1988 continuance of investigation is bad. In the absence of any specific prayer by the investigating machinery regarding reasonableness of continuing investigation beyond the period of three years made at the appropriate time, investigation should have been stopped and accused persons should have been discharged. It is also his case that out of the four cases investigated by the C.B.I, charge-sheet was submitted in case No. RC/12/EOW/86 on 11.7.95 and the learned Court below entertained the said charge-sheet by way of taking cognizance without, applying his mind to the provisions of section 167(5) Cr.P.C. as applicable to West Bengal. It has been alleged that this non-compliance of mandatory provision of law has caused serious miscarriage of justice and prejudice to the petitioner. Accordingly, the four revisional applications have been made with the prayer of quashing the four proceedings.
4. The opposite party entered appearance pursuance to a notice received from the petitioner and on consent of the learned Advocates of both the sides the matter was heard at length.
5. The point for determination in all the four cases is whether the inherent power of this Court is to be exercised for alleged violation of the mandatory provisions of section 167(5) of the Cr.P.C. as amended by the West Bengal Amendment Act of 24 of 1988 which came into force on and from 2.5.89.
6. The learned Advocate appearing for the petitioner in course of his lengthy argument confined the same practically to one aspect namely the proper appreciation of the provisions of section 167(5) Cr.P.C. as amended by West Bengal Act 24 of 1988. The said Sub-section In view of the amendment reads as follows:
"(5) If, in respect of-
(i) any case triable by a Magistrate as a summons case, the investigation is not concluded within a period of six months, or
(ii) any case exclusively triable by a Court of Session or a case under Chapter XVIII of the Indian Penal Code, (45 of 1860) the investigation is not concluded within a period of three years, or
(iii)any case other than those mentioned in clauses (i) and (ii), the investigation is not concluded within a period of two years from the date on which the accused was arrested or made his appearance, the Magistrate shall make an order stopping further investigation into the offence and shall discharge the accused unless the officer making the investigation satisfies the Magistrate that for special reasons and in the interest of justice the continuation of the investigation beyond the periods mentioned in this Sub-section is necessary".;
7. The learned Advocate has taken me through different provisions of the Criminal Procedure Code in order to bring home his argument that the two propositions in the Sub-section 5 of section 167 Cr.P.C. as amended in West Bengal namely "arrest" and "made appearance" are dis-junctive and not copulative. In support of this contention he has referred to different provisions of the Criminal Procedure Code namely 204(1) read with section 205 Cr.P.C. He has also referred to the provision contained in some other sections like section 206, section 305 and some other provisions of the Criminal Procedure Code. It is also his contention that the two propositions as stated above cannot be taken together simply because a person arrested by Police is bound to be produced before a Magistrate within a period of 24 hours in accordance with section 57 of the Cr.P.C. What he wants to say is that the mode of appearance as suggested by the words "made his appearance" in the aforesaid Sub-section is completely different from the first mode of appearance namely arrest, as stated in the said Sub-section. It is also his argument that different provisions of Criminal Procedure Code allows a person accused of an offence to be represented by an Advocate without there being any initial physical appearance on the part of the accused. It is his contention that in order to claim the benefit of the section 167(5) Cr.P.C, physical surrender of the accused and seeking a bail from the Court is not essential but their appearance can be made without any such physical appearance in the shape of surrendering before the Court and obtaining an order of bail. He specifically drew my attention of section 205, section 206 and section 305(2) to substantiate his point. It is also his argument that regarding the section 205 Cr.P.C. initial surrender of the accused is not essential in order to get the benefit of the said section. So far as section 206 Cr.P.C. is concerned, it is contended that the Magistrate at the time of issuing Summons is at liberty to give an option either it appear in person or by a pleader. It is submitted that nevertheless such appearance by pleader is appearance of the accused. It has been argued on the basis of section 305(2) Cr.P.C. that in the case of an incorporated Company or, other body corporate figuring as accused in any enquiry or trial, it may appoint representative for the period of such enquiry and trial and such appointment need not to be made under the seal of the corporation. It is argued that such representative appearance of a corporation satisfies the requirements of appearance in the said enquiry or trial.
8. He has also relied on a number of decisions of different Courts in order to make his position clear with regard to the meaning of the words "made his appearance" appearing in the section 167(5) Cr.P.C. It is contended that the appearance of one of the accused on 25.4.88 before the learned C.M.M., Calcutta when he made an application for certified copy of the F.I.R. and other documents satisfies the test of the appearance as required under the said section. It may be recalled that on 25.4.88 one of the accused of this case namely P.K. Ruia appeared through his lawyer and filed a petition before the learned C.M.M., Calcutta for a certified copy of F.I.R. and other papers. The learned C.M.M., called for a report from the I.O, and the matter was heard in presence of the I.O. on 6.5.88. Subsequently, on 21.5.88 the learned C.M.M., granted the prayer of the petitioner regarding the supply of copy of the F.I.R. The factual position is not disputed but the real dispute is that such application made through the lawyer does not satisfy the requirements of section 167(5) Cr.P.C., in other words a person cannot get the benefit of this mandatory provisions of the said Act as it cannot be treated as appearance within the meaning of the section.
9. The learned Advocate relied on a case reported in 1986 CWN 242 in support of his contention that the Magistrate is bound to stop investigation even though the accused does not raise any objection to the continuance of investigation beyond the period as mentioned under section 167(5). He also relies on a case reported in 88 CWN, page 205 in order to bring home the same point. Reliance has been placed on a Special Bench decision reported in 1993 Volume 2, CHN 154 in support of the contention that cases in which investigation started before the introduction of the amended version of section 167(5) Cr.P.C. shall also be hit by the said section in case the investigation could not be completed within the statutory period but continues after coming into effect of the West Bengal Amendment Act. It is also laid down therein that apart from stoppage of investigation the Magistrate shall also discharge the accused in such an eventuality. Reliance has been placed on a case reported in 1992, Volume 2, CHN 25 in support of the contention that in cases where there are more accused than one, the period is to be reckoned from the date of appearance or arrest of such accused who appeared or was arrested, first on the point of time. In other words the statutory period as laid down in section 167(5) Cr.P.C. is to be computed from the date when one accused was arrested or appeared out of many but first in point of time. The reason behind placing reliance on this decision is that the petitioner wants to take advantage of the appearance of his co-accused in the instant case on 25.4.86. The learned Judge in giving his decision has beautifully stated the reason for such interpretation of section 167(5) Cr.P.C, the purpose of the amendment being to put pressure on the investigating machinery for completing investigation without undue prolongation and also for protecting the accused from undue harassment of facing a lethargic investigation of indefinite duration. The learned Judge has further stated that section 167(5) Cr.P.C. does not admit of any individualised approach but its application where it applies, is total and composite, what it provides for is stopping of investigation not in respect of any particular accused but in respect of the offence itself, the benefit of which enures to all the accused whether in custody or on bail, whether recently arrested or arrested long back, whether identified or unidentified, whether known or un-known, whether apprehended or absconded. 1 respectfully agree with the said interpretation of the learned Judge. Reliance has also been placed on a decision reported in 1995, Volume 2, CHN 183. This is a Single Bench decision of this Court when Sidheswar Narayan-J. had an occasion to give an interpretation with regard to the word "appearance" in the context of an application under section 167(5) Cr.P.C. In the case under reference the accused obtained anticipatory bail order in his favour from the High Court and at a specific point of time appeared before the learned SDJM, with a view of surrender and obtain a bail order. The learned Magistrate in view of the anticipatory bail order did not think it just and proper to accept the surrender of the accused in the Court before the receipt of the charge-sheet. Subsequently, he resorted to an application under section 167(5) Cr.P.C. when the investigating machinary failed to file a charge-sheet after completion of investigation within specified time. Simultaneously,` there was a prayer from the I.O. for issuing a notice under section 91, Cr.P.C. for production of certain documents in order to complete investigation. The prayer of the accused was negetived by the Lower Court and the Hon'ble Judge after discussing the various aspects of the matter and the object and purpose of the West Bengal Amendment allowed the prayer of the petitioner after setting aside the order of the Lower Court treating the date of attempt to surrender as the date of appearance, as the I.O. could not complete investigation within the statutory period. Reliance has also been placed on a case reported in 1995, Volume (2), CHN 183 when cognizance was taken on the basis of investigation which continued beyond the period as mentioned under section 167(5) Cr.P.C. was quashed. This is a judgment given by Nisith Kumar Batabyal-J., wherein the learned Judge considered the necessity of proper interpretation of the said subsection in order to upheld the fundamental right of speedy trial as guaranteed under the Constitution. He has observed that a restrictive interpretation put on the amended Act will only take away what is sought to be given under the liberalised view. He is of opinion that the expression "personal liberty" would not mean merely the liberty of the body, that is freedom from physical restraint or freedom from confinement within the bounds of a prison. In other words it means not only freedom from arrest and detention, false imprisonment or wrongful confinement, but means more than that. The term has not been used in a narrow sense but has been used in Article 21 of the Constitution as a compendious term to include within it all those varieties of rights of a person which to make up the personal liberty of a man. I respectfully agree with the view of the learned Judge. The investigation of a case cannot continue for an indefinite period, so as to defeat the very purpose of Article 21 of the Constitution. Reliance has also been placed on a case for the purpose of proper interpretation of section 167(5) Cr.P.C. It has been observed in the said decision "every law is designed to further the ends of justice but not to frustrate on the mere technicalities. Though the function of the courts is only to expound the law and not to legislate nonetheless the legislature cannot be asked to sit to resolve the difficulties in the implementation of its intention and the spirit of the law. In such circumstances, it is the duty of the court to mould or creatively interpret the legislation by liberally interpreting the statute." It has also been observed that the "bare mechanical interpretation of the words and application of the lagislative intent devoid of concept of purpose and object will render the lagislature inane". It has been held that it is permissible for the Courts to take into account to the austentible purpose and object and the real legislative intend.
10. On the other hand the learned Advocate appearing for the O.Ps. have relied on the Special Bench decision of this Court reported in 1995(1) CLJ 155 in support of his contention that one of the co-accused of the petitioner approached this Court by way of revisional application for an order of quashing the proceeding and stopping investigation for various grounds which ultimately required the creation of the Special Bench and by order dated. 22.11.94 the criminal revisional application was dismissed. It has been argued that in the said case the application of section 167(5) Cr.P.C. was also discussed and as such the present application by the petitioner who happens to be co-accused is not maintainable. We also submits that in the facts and circumstances the present petitioner is estopped from raising the same point again. He has also relied on a case in support of his contention that appearance within the meaning of section 167(5) Cr.P.C. means physical surrender of the accused in the concerned Court. He of course submits that the said decision is one under the Criminal Procedure Code of 1898 and conceeds that the same is not in the same line as the West Bengal Amendment to section 167(5) Cr.P.C. Nevertheless, he argues that on the analogy of the said decision there has not been any appearance on the part of any of the co-accused in the present case at a point of time so as to bring it within the mischief of section 167(5) Cr.P.C.
11. The point which has been raised by the learned Advocate for the O.P. on the basis of the Special Bench decision reported in 1995(1) CLJ 155 in my opinion requires to be taken at the very outset for the obvious reason that in case the said point namely, application of 167(5) was raised and disposed of by the Special Bench at the instance of a co-accused the same point cannot be agitated here. On the other hand the learned Advocate appearing for the petitioner strongly contended that the issue was never raised before the Special Bench. It has also been argued that the present petitioner was not a party to the said Special Bench decision and as such he cannot be bound by the said decision. It has also been argued for the petitioner that there cannot be any estoppled on the point of law. The petitioner not being a party to the said Special Bench decision and being completely unaware of the said revisional application cannot be estopped to argue on this point when it touches him vitally affecting his interest. In order to understand the view point of the learned Advocate on this point it is necessary to quote the relevant portion of the judgment delivered by the Special Bench. On a careful scrutiny of the said judgment it appears to me that reference to section 167(5) Cr.P.C. has been made in the last para of the judgment and it has been stated as follows:
"Section 167(5) Cr.P.C. as amended by that West Bengal Act is, however, not yet attracted in this case because as submitted, there has not been any arrest or appearance of any accused as contemplated under the same Sub-section 5 of section 167".
If we analyse the solitary sentence appearing in the said judgment on this point it appears to me that it was submitted on behalf of the petitioner in the said revisional application that there was neither any arrest nor appearance of any accused within the meaning of section 167(5) Cr.P.C. Consequently, the learned Special Court naturally did not consider this aspect of the matter since it was not pressed at the time of argument by the learned Advocate for the petitioner of the said revisional application. The natural conclusion will be that the learned Special Bench had no occasion to deal with the interpretation of section 167(5) Cr.P.C. and to see whether in the present case there was any appearance within the meaning of section 167(5) Cr.P.C, so much so that the benefit given by the said amendment would be reaped by the petitioner of the said case. Therefore, the question will be whether in the circumstance of the case the present petitioner who was not a party in the said revisional application can raise the point in this revisional application.
12. The law is clear on this point as there cannot be any estoppel on a point of law. Besides admissions of the matter of law or any ignorance of legal right does not constitute any basis for estoppel. As I have said earlier that the point regarding application of section 167(5) Cr.P.C. was not argued by the learned Advocate appearing for the petitioner in the said revisional application before the Special Court. On the other hand it appears that the learned Advocate appearing for the petitioner was under the impression that the said amendment would not give any benefit to the petitioner of that revisional application at that point of time. In an extreme case if the learned Advocate appearing for the petitioner of that revisional application could not visualise the impact of the said amendment on the petitioner of the said case and failed to a mention of the same, the question will be whether the same will estop the present petitioner who was not a party to the said proceeding from invoking the said section in order to get the benefit which according to his contention he was entitled to get under the West Bengal Amendment. After giving my careful consideration, I am of opinion that as this point was not canvassed before the learned Special Bench this Court is not precluded from entertaining the said point in course of this revisional application. Accordingly, the initial point raised by the learned Advocate for the O.Ps. cannot stand.
13. The next point which falls for consideration is whether the petitioner in the present case is entitled to get the benefit of section 167(5) Cr.P.C. as amended by West Bengal Act of XIV of 1988. The offences with which the accused has prima facie being charged are under section 420, section 468, section 471 read with section 120(B) I.P.C. In accordance with the aforesaid amendment some of the offences being under Chapter XVIII of the I.P.C, the investigation is to be concluded within a period of three years from the date on which the accused was arrested or he made his appearance. While discussing the different cases cited on the point I have shown that the benefit of this amendment is applicable to an accused even if one of his co-accused was arrested or made his appearance at such a point of time from which the conclusion of investigation is beyond the period of three years. In other words the period of three years shall start to run with effect from the date when in the event of there being more than one accused at least one was arrested or made his appearance. In the present case the petitioner has neither been arrested nor be made his appearance but his specific case is that one of the co-accused namely, P.K. Ruia made his appearance on 25.4.88. It is also his case that the investigation of one of the four cases was completed on 10.7.95 and the remaining cases are still under investigation. It is further submitted that even in Case No. 12 where chargsheet was submitted on 10.7.95, the I.O. did not satisfy the Magistrate by resorting to an application giving the special reasons for which the continuation of investigation beyond the period mentioned in the aforesaid amendment is necessary.
14. It is not disputed that in Case No. 12 chargesheet was submitted on 10.7.95 and cognizance was taken by the learned Magistrate on the same. It is also admitted position that at no point of time there was a prayer from the I.O. giving special reasons for enlargement of period of investigation and obviously there was no order of the Magistrate to that effect. It is also the admitted position that so far as the other three cases are concerned, investigation is still pending and no prayer was made at any point of time for enlargement of the data of investigation. The factual aspect of the case is that one of the co-accused filed an application for getting certified copy of the F.I.R. of the impugned case on 24.5.88, before the learned C.M.M., Calcutta. The learned C.M.M. entertained to same and called for a report from the I.O. when the matter was heard in presence of the I.O. and a date was fixed for pronouncing order. Accordingly, the learned C.M.M. passed an order subsequently allowing the prayer for getting certified copy on payment. The argument advanced on behalf of the petitioner is that 25.4.88 should be taken to be the date of appearance of one of the co-accused of the petitioner and in that view of the matter the investigating machinery did not conclude the investigation within three years from the said date and there being no prayer asserting special reason for continuance of investigation beyond the period as mentioned in the West Bengal Amendment, the subsequent investigation and all steps taken thereafter towards the same being illegal cannot stand. Not only that it was incumbent for the learned Magistrate to stop further proceedings on the expiry of the said period of three years which will be calculated from 25.4.88. The argument advanced on behalf of the P. as I have said earlier" is that nothing sort of surrender can fit in with the meaning of the words "made his appearance" as appearing in the West Bengal Amendment.
15. Therefore, what is necessary is to interprete the words "made his appearance" as appearing in the amendment. The learned Advocates of both the sides referred to a number of decisions which I have quoted earlier but none of them is exactly to the point. The decision cited on behalf of the O.P. and , in my opinion cannot have any application in the present case. That case was a peculiar one where the accused though charge-sheeted was at large, there being no process issued against him. His wife applied to the Munsiff Magistrate for enlarging her husband on bail, as he was sick. The said prayer was dis-allowed when a similar application was filed by her before the learned Session Judge. And the learned Session Judge directed his release, thereafter the matter went to the High Court. In that case section 497 Cr.P.C. as it was before the amendment was discussed and the conclusion was drawn that such a prayer for bail could not made unless an accused was arrested or physically surrendered before the competent Court. That case can be distinguished from the present one, as it was in a different context and also under the old Code. It was quite natural that unless liberty of the person is curtailed by taking him into custody, be it by arrest or by surrender which envisages taking one into custody, the question of his enlarging on bail does not arise. In the present case the relevant words which require to be interpreted are "made his appearance". The point is whether this expression is synonymous with the word "surrender". Had it been so then the expression "surrender" would have been used by the lagislature. I have earlier shown that there are different provisions of Cr.P.C. like section 205, section 305, section 206 etc. where the accused can enter appearance through his lawyer without physically appearing before the Court. In the amended provision the words used are not simply appeared but "made his appearance". As I have said earlier there is no specific ruling on the point cited at the Bar. The case law reported in 1995(2) CHN 196 though not exactly similar is to some extent has got some resemblance. In that case the accused on this strength of order of anticipatory bail wanted to surrender but it was not accepted by the Magistrate. The learned Judge in disposing of the revisional application came to the conclusion that the period in accordance with the West Bengal Amendment is to be computed from the dates when an application was made by the accused before the Magistrate for surrender.
16. The purpose behind the West Bengal Amendment have been elucitaded in a number of decisions of this High Court which I have also quoted. In short, it has been done to put a check on the investigating machinery, so as to stop inordinate delay in investigation which at times is not concluded even in a decade, as a result of which the existence of Article 21 of the Constitution of India becomes meaningless.
17. In order to interpret the relevant word in the said amendment reliance may be placed in the case . It has been stated that, "every law is designed to further the ends of justice but not to frustrate on the mere technicalities. It has further been held that normally Court should be slow to pronounce the legislature to have been mistaken in its constantly manifested opinion upon a matter resting wholly within its will and take its plain, ordinary gramatical meaning of the words of the enactment as affording the best guide but to winch up the legislative intent, it is permissible for Courts to take into account of the ostensible purpose and object and the real legislative intent otherwise a bare mechanical interpretation of the words and application of the legislative intent devoid of concept of purpose and object, will render the legislature inane."
18. Keeping into consideration the aforesaid observation of the Hon'ble Supreme Court, let us try to interpret the words "made his appearance". One of the reasons for the delay in investigation is the absence of the accused because the investigating machinery is required to interrogate the suspected accused in order to made a break through in the investigation. Therefore, the presence of the accused is necessary for proper running of the investigation which is not possible if the presence of the accused cannot be enforced by the investigating machinery. The question does not arise in case when the accused is arrested. But there must be cases when the accused is not apprehended by the investigating machinery for some reasons or other. But if in those cases the accused is available to the investigating machinery investigation can proceed in a proper manner. This purpose is served if the accused has made his appearance in the concerned Court. In the present case it is true that the co-accused of the petitioner did not surrender on 25.4.88 but he was very much available to the investigating machinery since he filed a petition before the learned C.M.M. following which a report was called for and in presence of the I.O. Both the sides were heard and on a subsequent date an order was pronounced allowing the said accused to have copy of the F.I.R. Therefore, it cannot be said that the investigating machinery could not hold of the accused at that point of time. In my opinion the basis of taking the date of arrest or appearance of the accused as the starting point of the computation of the period in terms of the West Bengal Amendment is on and from the said date when the accused shall be available to the investigating machinery for investigation. In that view of the matter, in my opinion the co-accused of the petitioner made his appearance on 25.4.88 in the case which was started in 1986 and as such the period is to be calculated from the said date. As I have said earlier the investigation could not be completed within the period of three years from the said date and no special reason was also assigned before the learned C.M.M. or any order was obtained from him for continuation of investigation beyond the statutory period. As such the petitioner in my opinion is entitled to get the benefit of the West Bengal Amendment and as such he must be discharged. Accordingly, it is ordered that the accused petitioner is discharged from case numbers being RC/12/EOW/86, RC/13/EOW/86, RC/14/EOW/86 and RC/15/EOW/86 and the proceeding pendings against him so far as it relates to the present petitioner stand quashed. The revisional applications are accordingly disposed of. This judgment shall govern all the four revisional applications mentioned earlier.