Madras High Court
A.Syed Kadhar vs The Inspector General Of Registration on 6 February, 2018
Author: S.M.Subramaniam
Bench: S.M.Subramaniam
BEFORE THE MADURAI BENCH OF MADRAS HIGH COURT
DATED: 06.02.2018
CORAM
THE HONOURABLE MR.JUSTICE S.M.SUBRAMANIAM
W.P.(MD)No.1035 of 2011
A.Syed Kadhar ... Petitioner
Vs.
The Inspector General of Registration,
Santhome High Road,
Chennai-28.
... Respondent
PRAYER: Writ Petition is filed under Article 226 of the Constitution of
India, to issue a Writ of Certiorarified Mandamus to call for the records
relating to the impugned charge memo dated 23.03.2010 read with supplementary
charge memo, dated 26.04.2010 read with supplementary charge memo dated
21.05.2010 and quash the same and consequently, direct the respondent to
permit the petitioner to retire from service with all consequential benefits.
!For Petitioner : Mr.I.Irulappan
For Respondent : Mr.R.Sethuraman
Special Government Pleader
:ORDER
The charge memos issued by the respondents in proceedings dated 23.03.2010, 26.04.2010 and 21.05.2010 are under challenge in this writ petition.
2. The writ petitioner was an employee of the Registration Department. The writ petitioner retired from service as the Sub-Registrar on 30.04.2010, on attaining the age of superannuation. However, he was not allowed to retire and placed under suspension, on account of the initiation of disciplinary proceedings. On the eve of his retirement, the first charge memo was issued on 16.04.2010 and on 23.03.2010, the last charge memo was issued, after his retirement on 21.05.2010. Challenging the three set of charge memos, the present writ petition is filed.
3. The learned counsel for the writ petitioner states that the charge memos are untenable, on the ground that the same was issued on the eve of his retirement and the third charge memo was issued after the date of retirement. Consequently, the writ petitioner was exercising his powers as the Sub- Registrar under the provisions of the Registration Act. Thus, it is a quasi- judicial function. The learned counsel for the petitioner is of the opinion that the quasi - judicial powers exercised under the provisions of the Act cannot be a ground for framing of charge memo so also the initiation of disciplinary proceedings. The learned counsel for the petitioner states that the interpretation of the quasi - judicial authority in respect of the statute cannot be a ground for framing of the charges under the Discipline and Appeal Rules. Substantiating the grounds raised, the learned counsel for the writ petitioner cited the judgment of this Court passed in the case of B.K.Gunasekaran v. State of Tamil Nadu, represented by the Secretary to Government, Commercial Tax and Registration Department, Secretariat, Chennai
- 9, reported in (2010) 7 MLJ 32. The learned counsel for the petitioner referred paras - 15 and 16, which reads as under:
?15. Therefore, I am of the clear view that the power, which the respondents state that the petitioner ought to have exercised is a quasi judicial power. If such power has not been exercised whether it could form the basis for a disciplinary action. This question is no longer res integra and having been settled by various decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court and this Court and it would be useful to refer the recent decision of this Court in S.Muthuramu V. State of Tamil Nadu, rep. by its Chief Secretary to Government, Public(Special-A) Department, Chennai-9, in which, the earlier decisions have been considered by the learned Judge and wherein it has been held as follows at p.768 of M.L.J: ..?
?16. Thus, the only conclusion, which could be arrived at after placing reliance on all the above decisions is that the charges framed against the petitioner is not maintainable. That apart, I am also convinced that the entire disciplinary action has been grossly delayed and the petitioner has been put to irreparable hardship and mental agony. In reply to the allegation regarding the valuation of the buildings, it is common knowledge that any re- evaluation has to be done within a reasonable period. In the instant case, the Inspector General of Registration has issued circular dated 14.06.2004 stating that re-inspection should be done within a period of three months. In the instant case, the re-inspection was conducted without notice to the petitioner by an officer, who subordinate to the petitioner, after nearly a period of four years. Inspection and valuation are technical matters to be done based on the amenities provided in the concerned building and the schedule of rates prescribed in this regard. ?
4. In the case of Zunjarrao Bhikaji Nagarkar vs. Union of India and others reported in (1999) 7 SCC 409, the learned counsel for the petitioner referred paras - 41 and 44, which is extracted hereunder:
?41. When penalty is not levied, the assessee certainly benefits. But it cannot be said that by not levying the penalty the officer has favoured the assessee or shown undue favour to him. There has to be some basis of the disciplinary authority to reach such a conclusion even prima facie. The record in the present case does not show if the disciplinary authority had any information within its possession from where it could form an opinion that the appellant showed ?favour? to the assessee by not imposing the penalty. He may have wrongly exercised his jurisdiction. But that wrong can be corrected in appeal. That cannot always form a basis for initiating disciplinary proceedings against an officer while he is acting as a quasi- judicial authority. It must be kept in mind that being a quasi-judicial authority, he is always subject to judicial supervision in appeal.?
? 44. Considering whole aspects of the matter, we are of the view that it was not a case of initiation of any disciplinary proceedings against the appellant. The charge of misconduct against him was not proper. It has to be quashed.?
5. The learned counsel for the petitioner referred to a judgment of the Division Bench of the High Court of Madras in the case of the Special Commissioner and Commissioner of Commercial Taxes, Chepauk vs. N.Sivasamy reported in 2005 (5) CTC 451. The relevant portion is extracted hereunder:
?..As rightly pointed out by the applicant, all the charges relate to the exercise of the powers by the applicant as a quasi-judicial authority. We have already referred to the view of the Supreme Court that action taken by a judicial authority should not form the basis for disciplinary action. It is also brought to our notice that the enquiry officer was appointed after a lapse of 32 months from the date of issue of charge memo. Even after the appointment of the enquiry officer, the department has not taken steps to complete the enquiry. Even though there is no stay order by the Tribunal, the enquiry was not proceeded with. We are satisfied that the applicant had been exercising quasi-judicial power as Commercial Tax Officer and assuming that there was any error, the remedy would be by way of appeal or revision as provided in the C.S.T Act and TNGST Act and hence they could not be the subject matter of the disciplinary proceedings. Further, there was inordinate delay in issuing the charge memo and the same was issued just 7 days before the date of superannuation. Though the alleged lapse occurred in the year 1995 and certain charges related to the period 1993-94, the charge memo was issued on 15.07.1997 and served on 23.07.1997, just 7 days before the date of retirement. The contention of the applicant that only with a view to cause hardship, agony and anguish, the charge memo was issued cannot be ignored. As rightly stated, if every error of law were to constitute a charge of misconduct, it would impinge upon the independent functioning of quasi- judicial officers and that misconduct is not coming within the purview of mere error in judgment, carelessness or negligence in performance of the duty. Likewise, wrong interpretation of law cannot be ground for misconduct. ..?
6. Finally, the learned counsel for the petitioner referred to an unreported judgment of the Division Bench of the High Court of Madras, dated 08.07.2010, in Writ Appeal(MD).No.93 of 2010 and para 7(A) is extracted hereunder:
?7. A perusal of the charge memo, which has been extracted above, reveals that by the action of the respondent, a loss to the tune of Rs.3,98,822/- has been caused to the Department. As rightly pointed out by the learned counsel for the respondent, there is no whisper either with regard to the wrongful gain or any wrongful motive. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in Zunjarrao Bhikaji Nagarkar v Union of India reported in 1999 (7) SCC 409, relying on the earlier Judgment, has held that even while exercising quasi- judicial power under certain circumstances, if any wrong has been committed, disciplinary action can be initiated. But, as per the above said Judgment, under following circumstances, disciplinary proceedings can be initiated as against an officer in a wrong exercise of quasi-judicial power.
"(i) Where the Officer had acted in a manner as would reflect on his reputation for integrity or good faith or devotion to duty;
(ii) if there is prima facie material to show recklessness or misconduct in the discharge of his duty;
(iii) if he has acted in a manner which is unbecoming of a government servant;
(iv) if he had acted negligently or that he omitted the prescribed conditions which are essential for the exercise of the statutory powers;
(v) if he had acted in order to unduly favour a party;
(vi)if he had been actuated by corrupt motive, however small the bribe may be because Lord Coke said long ago 'though the bribe may be small, yet the fault is great'."
7. The learned Special Government Pleader appearing on behalf of the respondents opposed the contention by stating that the writ petitioner, by virtue of his conduct, caused huge financial loss to the State Exchequer. The writ petitioner has committed an act of misconduct by not following the guidelines issued by the Inspector General of Registration for the purpose of fixing the market value and stamp duty.
8. The writ petitioner performing his duties and responsibilities as a Sub-Registrar has to be cautious, while fixing the market value of the property and the stamp duty. Thus, there is no irregularity in respect of framing of the charges. It is for the writ petitioner to submit his explanation and prove his innocence before the disciplinary authority. Contrarily, the petitioner has moved the writ petition in order to escape from the clutches of the disciplinary proceedings.
9. Considering the arguments advanced by the learned counsel for the petitioner and the respondent, this Court is of an opinion that the nature of the charges framed against the writ petitioner are to be considered at first instance. The charges in proceedings, dated 23.03.2010 are as under:
?jpU.m.iraj;fhjh;> rhh;gjpthsh; Mfpa jhq;fs; gl;Lf;Nfhl;il gjpT khtl;lk;> 2eP ,izrhh;gjpthsuhf gzpahw;wpaNghJ gjpT nra;j ,izg;gpy; Fwpg;gplg;gl;l 23 Mtzq;fs; njhlh;ghd nrhj;J kidg;gphpthf khw;wk; nra;ag;gl;ljpy; gjpTj;Jiwj;jiyth; vz;.51280/vy;.1/01 ehs; 23.08.02d;gb cah;e;jgl;r kjpg;gpid eph;zak; nra;J gjpT nra;jpUf;f Ntz;Lk;. mt;thwpy;yhky; FiwT kjpg;gpy; gjpT nra;jjd; %yk; Nkw;gb gjpTj;Jiwj; jiyth; Mizf;F Kuzhf nray;gl;L muRf;F &.21>09>375/- ,og;G Vw;gLj;jpAs;sPh;fs;.
10. The charge memo contains the statement of allegations. Annexure - III to the charge memo provides list of documents. The second charge memo, dated 26.04.2010, is relating to the following charges.
Fw;wr;rhl;L -2 jpU.m.iraj;fhjh;> rhh;gjpthsh; Mfpa jhq;fs; gl;Lf;Nfhl;il gjpT khtl;lk;> 2eP ,izrhh;gjpthsuhf gzpahw;wpaNghJ Kj;jpiuj;jPh;it & gjpTf;fl;lzk; thapyhf muRf;F &.1>96>26>151/- ,og;G Vw;gLj;jpAs;sJ. rpwg;Gj; jzpf;if kw;Wk; Mz;lha;tpy; Fwpg;Giu nra;ag;gl;L ,og;G cWjp nra;ag;gl;Ls;sJ. ,e;epiyapy; muRf;F Vw;gl;l ,og;G &.1>96>26>151/-I <L nra;jpl nghWg;ghfpAs;sjd; %yk; muRg; gzpahsh; elj;ij tpjp 20(1)f;F Kuzhf nray;gl;Ls;sPh;fs;.
and the charge memo, dated 21.05.2010, narrates the charges as hereunder:
Fw;wr;rhl;L -3 jpU.m.iraj;fhjh;> rhh;gjpthsh; Mfpa jhq;fs; gl;Lf;Nfhl;il gjpT khtl;lk;> 2eP ,izrhh;gjpthsuhf gzpahw;wpaNghJ Kj;jpiuj;jPh;it & gjpTf;fl;lzk; thapyhf muRf;F &.6>44>856/- ,og;G Vw;gLj;jpAs;sJ. cs;jzpf;if kw;Wk; khepy fzf;fhah; jzpf;ifapy; Fwpg;Giu nra;ag;gl;L ,og;G cWjp nra;ag;gl;Ls;sJ. ,e;epiyapy; muRf;F Vw;gl;l ,og;G &.6>44>856/-I <L nra;jpl nghWg;ghfpAs;sjd; %yk; muRg; gzpahsh; elj;ij tpjp 20(1)f;F Kuzhf nray;gl;Ls;sPh;fs;.
11. On a perusal of the charge memos, this Court is of an opinion that there is no infirmity as such. However, the writ petitioner, instead of submitting his explanation / objection, moved the present writ petition mainly on the ground that he was performing his duties and responsibilities as a quasi-judicial authority and therefore, the charge memo is untenable. Further, the fixing of the market value is the discretionary power and the writ petitioner had exercised the power based on the facts and circumstances, which cannot be faulted with. Thus, the charges are to be set aside, is the contention raised in this writ petition.
12. The learned Special Government Pleader appearing for the respondent states that there is a financial loss to the tune of more than two crores to the State and the writ petitioner has acted directly in violation of the guidelines and terms issued by the Inspector General of Registration and therefore, the writ petitioner cannot plead that he was exercising the quasi- judicial power. Even while exercising the quasi- judicial power, the authorities must be conscious and if any wrong exercise or abuse of power is found, then they are liable for disciplinary proceedings under the Rules in force. Thus, the learned Special Government Pleader is of the opinion that there is no infirmity in respect of framing of the charges against the writ petitioner, in view of the huge financial loss caused at the instance of the writ petitioner to the State Exchequer.
13. Two questions are to be answered in this writ petition?
(i) Whether the writ proceedings can be entertained against the charge memo or not, if so, under what circumstances.
(ii) Whether the Government servant / public servant passing any orders or taking decision, while functioning as a quasi-judicial authority, is amenable to the departmental disciplinary proceedings or not?
14. No writ can be entertained against a charge memo and the writ petition can be entertained only (i) if a charge memo has been issued in violation of the Statutory Rules (ii) if a charge memo was issued by an incompetent authority having no jurisdiction (iii) on the ground of mala fides.
15. If any allegation of mala fides is raised against the authority, then the said authority has to be impleaded as a party respondent in the writ petition in his personal capacity. In the absence of any of these legal grounds, no writ can be entertained against the charge memo. It is left open to the writ petitioner to submit his objection / explanation and to prove his innocence before the enquiry proceedings to be conducted by the disciplinary authority. Contrarily, if a writ petition is moved, at the stage of charge memo, the same cannot be adjudicated on factual merits and the circumstances if any raised by the writ petitioner on merits and demerits are to be adjudicated by the Enquiry Officer, at the first instance and it is for the petitioner to prove his innocence by availing the opportunities provided under the Discipline and Appeal Rules.
16. Intermittent intervention in departmental disciplinary proceedings are not preferable and only on exceptional circumstances, the Courts can interfere in the disciplinary proceedings, during the intermittent period.
17. All the departmental disciplinary proceedings initiated against the delinquent employees shall be allowed to be completed in all respects and a logical conclusion to be arrived at. The very purpose and the object of the Discipline and Appeal Rules are to punish the corrupt officials or the officials, who have committed misconduct, while performing their duties and responsibilities under the Rules.
18. The Hon'ble Supreme Court of India, in the case of Union of India and others Vs. Upendra Singh reported in 1994 (3) SCC 357, held that the charge memo cannot be challenged and para ? 6 of the judgment is extracted hereunder:
?6.In the case of charges framed in a disciplinary inquiry the tribunal or court can interfere only if on the charges framed (read with imputation or particulars of the charges, if any) no misconduct or other irregularity alleged can be said to have been made out or the charges framed are contrary to any law. At this stage, the tribunal has no jurisdiction to go into the correctness or truth of the charges. The tribunal cannot take over the functions of the disciplinary authority. The truth or otherwise of the charges is a matter for the disciplinary authority to go into. Indeed, even after the conclusion of the disciplinary proceedings, if the matter comes to court or tribunal, they have no jurisdiction to look into the truth of the charges or into the correctness of the findings recorded by the disciplinary authority or the appellate authority as the case may be. The function of the court/tribunal is one of judicial review, the parameters of which are repeatedly laid down by this Court. It would be sufficient to quote the decision in H.B. Gandhi, Excise and Taxation Officer- cum- Assessing Authority, Kamal v. Gopi Nath & Sons. The Bench comprising M.N. Venkatachaliah, J. (as he then was) and A.M. Ahmadi, J., affirmed the principle thus : (SCC p. 317, para 8) "Judicial review, it is trite, is not directed against the decision but is confined to the decision-making process. Judicial review cannot extend to the examination of the correctness or reasonableness of a decision as a matter of fact. The purpose of judicial review is to ensure that the individual receives fair treatment and not to ensure that the authority after according fair treatment reaches, on a matter which it is authorized by law to decide, a conclusion which is correct in the eyes of the Court. Judicial review is not an appeal from a decision but a review of the manner in which the decision is made. It will be erroneous to think that the Court sits in judgment not only on the correctness of the decision making process but also on the correctness of the decision itself."
19. Government servants play a significant role in running the administration of this great nation. They are important constituent of the administrative set up of the nation. They are the pillars of the Government Departments an whose shoulders, the responsibility to implement the Government policies lies. They provide public service to the citizens at the gross root level and in the same way, they forward the grievance of the public and their demands to consider for their effective resolution.
20. The Government employees have different work culture and responsibilities as compared to their counter-parts in private centers. They are morally paid and have some gone to the perquisites given to them. But at the same time, they have heavy responsibilities towards the Government in approaching the public people in general. However, when the Government servants deviated from the established Rules of conduct, the departmental disciplinary proceedings would be initiated.
21. It is the need of the hour to analyze whether conducting departmental proceedings will jeopardise the rights of the quasi-judicial functionaries. However, the departmental authorities are free to exercise such a lethal power as conferred on them under the Departmental Rules or under of any statute. The writ petitioner states that he was functioning as a Sub-Registrar and exercise the power which is quasi-judicial in nature. Therefore, the decision taken in his capacity as a quasi-judicial authority cannot be questioned nor disciplinary proceedings can be initiated. Such a concept or idea mooted by the writ petitioner cannot be accepted by this Court. The writ petitioner is a Government Officer and he is bound by the Rules as well as the service conditions. The writ petitioner, being a Government employee, the Government Servants Conduct Rules and Discipline and Appeal Rules are applicable to the writ petitioner and large number of public servants are exercising the powers under various statutes and rules indicated either by the statute or by the state legislature. While implementing the provisions of the Act or Rules, if they have committed any irregularities, illegalities or misconduct, then they are liable to be prosecuted under the Discipline and Appeal Rules as applicable to the Government servants. The quasi-judicial authority, while exercising the powers, are expected to be prompt and to have a complete devotion to the duty.
22. The public servants are expected to exercise their powers with utmost care and with integrity. If there is any misconduct, they are certainly liable for departmental disciplinary proceedings. The nature of misconducts are very well prescribed in the Government Servants Conduct Rules. Such being the concept, the Government Officials cannot plead that the order passed in their capacity as quasi-judicial authority are exempted from initiation of disciplinary proceedings. Such a plea made by the writ petitioner is unacceptable and the Government servants cannot escape from the provisions of the Disciplinary Rules by merely stating that they have exercised the powers of quasi ? judicial authority. Thus, the grounds raised in this regard by the writ petitioner is neither candid nor convincing and accordingly, this Court is not inclined to consider the case in respect of the merits, as advanced,
23. In respect of the charge against the quasi - judicial order, the Honourable Supreme Court of India held in the case of Union of India and others Vs. A.N.Saxena, reported in AIR 1992 SC 1233 and the relevant paragraphs 6 and 8 are extracted hereunder:
?6.In the first place, we cannot, but confess out astonishment at the impugned order passed by the tribunal. In a case like this the tribunal, we feel, should have been very careful before granting stay in a disciplinary proceeding at an interlocutory stage. The imputations made against the respondent were extremely serious and the facts alleged, if proved, would have established misconduct and misbehaviour. It is surprising that without even a counter being filed, at an interim stage, the tribunal without giving any reasons and without apparently considering whether the memorandum of charges deserved to be enquired into or not, granted a stay of disciplinary proceedings as it has done. If the disciplinary proceedings in such serious matters are stayed so lightly as the tribunal appears to have done, it would be extremely difficult to bring any wrong-doer to book. We have, therefore, no hesitation in setting aside the impugned order of the tribunal and we direct that the disciplinary proceedings against the respondent in terms of the charge-sheet dated March 13, 1989 shall be proceeded with according to law. In fact, we would suggest that disciplinary proceedings should be proceeded with as earlyas possible and with utmost zeal.?
8.In our view, an argument that no disciplinary action can be taken in regard to actions taken or purported to be done in the course of judicial or quasi-judicial proceedings is not correct. It is true that when an officer is performing judicial or quasi-judicial functions disciplinary proceedings regarding any of his actions in the course of such proceedings should be taken only after great caution and a close scrutiny of his actions and only if the circumstances so warrant. The initiation of such proceedings, it is true, is likely to shake the confidence of the public in the officer concerned and also if lightly taken likely to undermine his independence.
Hence the need for extreme care and caution before initiation of disciplinary proceedings against an officer performing judicial or quasi judicial functions in respect of his actions in the discharge or purported to discharge his functions. But it is not as if such action cannot be taken at all. Where the actions of such an officer indicate culpability, namely, a desire to oblige himself or unduly favour one of the parties or an improper motive there is no reason why disciplinary action should not be taken.?
24. In the case of Union of India and Others Vs. K.K.Dhawan, reported in (1993) 2 SCC 56, His Lordship Justice S.Mohan while speaking on behalf of the Hon'ble Three Judges Bench of the Supreme Court of India held as under:
?22.The Tribunal has chosen to rely on Civil Appeal Nos. 4986- 87/90. The order in that case clearly shows the ultimate conclusion was that the charge framed against the delinquent officer had not been established. In support of that conclusion, it was observed as under "We are also of the view that the action taken by the appellant was quasi-judicial and should not have formed the basis of disciplinary action."
23.We do not think where to buttress the ultimate conclusion, this observation was made, that could ever be construed as laying down the law that in no case disciplinary action could be taken if it pertains to exercise of quasi-judicial powers.
27.This dictum fully supports the stand of the appellant. There is a great reason and justice for holding in such cases that the disciplinary action could be taken. It is one of the cardinal principles of administration of justice that it must be free from bias of any kind.
28.Certainly, therefore, the officer who exercises judicial or quasi-judicial powers acts negligently orrecklessly or in order to confer undue favour on a person is not acting as a Judge. Accordingly, the contention of the respondent has to be rejected. It is important to bear in mind that in the present case, we are not concerned with the correctness or legality of the decision of the respondent but the conduct of the respondent in discharge of his duties as an officer. The legality of the orders with reference to the nine assessments may be questioned in appeal or revision under the Act. But we have no doubt in our mind that the Government is not precluded from taking the disciplinary action for violation of the Conduct Rules. Thus, we conclude that the disciplinary action can be taken in the following cases:
(i) Where the officer had acted in a manner as would reflect on his reputation for integrity or good faith or devotion to duty;
(ii)if there is prima facie material to show recklessness or misconduct in the discharge of his duty;
(iii)if he has acted in a manner which is unbecoming of a government servant;
(iv)if he had acted negligently or that he omitted the prescribed conditions which are essential for the exercise of the statutory powers;
(v) if he had acted in order to unduly favour a party-,
(vi) if he had been actuated by corrupt motive however, small the bribe may be because Lord Coke said long ago "though the bribe may be small, yet the fault is great."
25. The Honourable Supreme Court of India in para - 28 cited above categorically enumerated the circumstances under which the disciplinary action can be taken in the cases where the authorities exercise the quasi judicial powers.
26. This Court is of an undoubted opinion that the case on hand falls only under these categories and therefore, there is no error on the part of the respondent in initiating the departmental proceedings against the petitioner. The charge memo categorically states that the writ petitioner, in violation of the guidelines and instructions issued by the Inspector General of Registration had erroneously fixed the market value and the stamp duty as applicable to the particular documents. Such being the factual matrix of the case, it is necessary that a full-fledged enquiry is to be conducted to cull out the truth and genuinely opposed. It is to be investigated whether the writ petitioner has acted to do some favour to the persons, who presented the documents or there is an act of omission or commission, recklessness or culpability in respect of performing his duties and responsibilities.
27. All these issues are to be examined only at the time of conducting en enquiry and at the time of taking a decision based on the materials available on record. Thus, the grounds raised by the writ petitioner in respect of exercising the judicial power cannot be of no avail to him and the contentions in this regard deserves to be rejected at the outset.
28. In respect of the judgments cited by the learned counsel for the petitioner, this Court is of an opinion that the first judgment is of the learned Single Judge of this Court and the second judgment of the Supreme Court is not directly relevant in respect of the facts and circumstances of the case and the third judgment is of the judgment passed by the Honourable Division Bench of the Madras High Court. However, when the Supreme Court of India, more specifically, the Three Judges Bench of the Honourable Supreme Court of India has narrated the circumstances under which the disciplinary proceedings can be initiated, this Court is bound by the judgment.
29. The judgment of the Honourable Three Judges of the Supreme Court is a binding precedent and this Court is of an opinion that the facts and circumstances of the present writ petition falls under the circumstances narrated by the Three Judges Bench of the Supreme Court of India in the case of Union of India and Others Vs. K.K.Dhawan, reported in (1993) 2 SCC 56 as cited supra. Thus, this Court is of an opinion that the writ petitioner has to undergo the departmental enquiry proceedings and to prove his innocence by producing evidences and documents. So also, it is for the respondents to cull out the truth by conducting a full-fledged enquiry by availing of opportunities to the writ petitioner provided under the Rules.
30. This being the findings, this Court is not inclined to consider the writ petition on merits and the writ petitioner is at liberty to pursue the departmental disciplinary proceedings and prove his innocence or otherwise. Accordingly, the writ petition is dismissed. No costs.
To The Inspector General of Registration, Santhome High Road, Chennai-28.
.