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[Cites 14, Cited by 2]

Allahabad High Court

Chhetrapal Singh vs State Of U.P. And Ors. on 7 January, 2004

Equivalent citations: 2004(2)AWC1064, (2004)2UPLBEC1332, 2004 LAB. I. C. 1981, (2004) 17 ALLINDCAS 513 (ALL), 2004 ALL. L. J. 993, (2004) 5 SERVLR 732, (2004) 3 SCT 808, (2004) 2 ALL WC 1064, (2004) 1 ALL RENTCAS 335

Author: B.S. Chauhan

Bench: B.S. Chauhan, Arun Tandon

JUDGMENT
 

B.S. Chauhan, J.
 

1. This writ petition has been filed seeking the equity relief by a person who does not know means. He has been a Judicial Officer, retired from the post of Additional District Judge, Moradabad on 31st July, 1998.

2. As per the provisions contained in the Fundamental Rules, a retired Government servant, after the retirement, is entitled to retain the accommodation for a period of one month on usual rent and, subsequently for a period of three months on standard rent. As four months' period expired on 30th November, 1998, petitioner did not vacate the accommodation allotted to him as an Additional District Judge, Moradabad. He was appointed Chairman of the District Consumer Forum, Moradabad in November, 1998. Thus, he moved an application before the District Judge, Moradabad that he should be permitted to retain the said accommodation. His application was referred to the High Court, however, the Court rejected the said application vide letter dated 30th April, 1999 and petitioner was directed to vacate the premises forthwith and to pay penal rent for the period he occupied the accommodation. The said letter was received by the petitioner on 4th May, 1999. However, petitioner did not consider it proper to ensure the compliance of the order passed by this Court and continued to occupy the accommodation and suddenly he sent a telegram on 9th September, 1999 to the District Judge that he had vacated the accommodation. Penal rent is being recovered from him. Hence, this writ petition.

3. Learned counsel for the petitioner could not furnish any explanation as to under what circumstances, after the order of the High Court rejecting his application for continuation in the accommodation on any terms and conditions, served upon him on 4th May, 1999, petitioner continued to occupy the said accommodation up to 9th September, 1999. More so, petitioner, under the statutory provisions as pointed out by his learned counsel Shri Tiwari, was entitled to occupy the accommodation only for a period of one month on usual charges and thereafter for three months on standard rent. Beyond the said period, petitioner is bound to pay the penal rent.

4. The question of paying the penal rent by the employee was also considered by Hon'ble Supreme Court in Grid Corporation of Orissa v. Rasananda Das, 2003 AIR SCW 5390, holding that an employee is bound to pay the rent/penal rent in accordance with the Rules applicable for overstaying in the accommodation after retirement. Thus, the petitioner cannot take the plea that he is not bound to pay the penal rent.

5. We do not find any force in the submissions made on behalf of the petitioners, that, whatever may be the legal position, petitioner is entitled to 'justice' and relief on 'equity'.

6. So far as the concept of 'justice' is concerned, it has always been a deceptive term.

7. In Delhi Administration v. Gurdip Singh Uban and Ors., (2000) 7 SCC 296, the Hon'ble Apex Court observed as under :

"The words 'justice' and 'injustice', in our view, are sometimes loosely used and have different meanings to different persons, particularly to those arrayed on opposite sides...... Justice Cardozo said. The Web is tangled and obscure, shot through with a multitude of shades and colours, the skin irregular and broken. Many hues that seems to be simple, are found, and when analysed, to be complex and uncertain blend. Justice itself, which we are wont to appeal to as a test as well as an ideal, may mean different things to different minds and at different times. Attempts to objectify its standards or even to describe them, have never wholly succeeded." (Selected Writings of Cardozo, pp. 223-24 ; Fallon Publications, 1947)."

8. Therefore, the Court must consider all pros and cons.

9. The concept of equity has also been considered from time to time. In Kumari Madhuri Patil and Anr. v. Addl. Commissioner, Tribal Development and Ors., AIR 1995 SC 94, the Hon'ble Supreme Court held that where the claim of a party is not founded on valid grounds, claiming any right on the ground of equity or promissory estoppel does not arise for the reason that the estoppel does not operate against the law/public policy.

10. In Madamanchi Ramappa and Anr. v. Muthaluru Bojjappas, AIR 1963 SC 1633, the Supreme Court held as under :

"What is administered in courts is justice according to law and consideration of fair play and equity however important they may be, must yield to clear and express provisions of the law."

11. Similarly, in Gauri Shanker Gaur v. State of U.P., AIR 1994 SC 169, it has been held by the Apex Court that "in construing a statute equity will not relieve against a public statute of general policy in cases admitted to fall within the statute and it is the duty of the Court to give effect to the legislative intent."

12. Thus, equity can supplement to but cannot supplant the statutory provisions and if any room is given for equity or sympathy, the recruitment rules would become nugatory and field would be left open for nepotism. Thus, it is not permissible to bend the law for adjusting equity. Vide Ahmedabad Municipal Corporation v. Virendra Kumar Patel, (1997) 7 SCC 650 and Smt. Rampati Jaiswal v. State of U.P. and Ors., 1996 (3) AWC 1375 : AIR 1997 All 170.

13. Human approach does not imply tilting in favour of one party. The Courts and Tribunals, while dealing with the statutory provisions, should not be guided with humanitarian consideration and emotional appeal for the reason that if Courts proceed on these basis, it would amount to altering or amending the statutory provisions or requirements of law.

14. The equity considerations are not applicable in a case of clear statutory provisions nor the Courts are empowered to pass an order contrary to law. More so, well-known maxim of equity that. "He who comes into equity must come with clean hands" has always to be remembered. Vide Public Passenger Service Ltd. v. M. A. Khadar and Anr., AIR 1966 SC 489 ; Council for Indian School Certificate Examinations v. Isha Mittal and Anr., (2000) 7 SCC 521 ; K. Shekar v. V. Indiramma, (2002) 3 SCC 586 ; Lalit Kumar Jain and Anr. v. Jaipur Traders Corporation Pvt. Ltd., (2002) 5 SCC 383 ; E. Palanisamy v. Palanisamy, (2003) 1 SCC 123 and P. M. Latha and Anr. v. State of Kerala and Ors., (2003) 3 SCC 541

15. In Sikkim Subba Associates v. State of Sikkim. (2001) 5 SCC 413, while dealing with the issue of equity, the Hon'ble Apex Court observed as under :

"The equities have to be properly worked out between the parties to ensure that no one is allowed to have their pound of flesh unjustly against others."

16. Thus, a person who seeks equity must do equity and the equity cannot be resorted to give the overriding effects over the statutory provisions.

17. At this juncture, learned counsel for the petitioner has submitted that the respondents may be permitted to deduct the outstanding dues towards rent, standard rent and penal rent and release the balance of all the retiral benefits in favour of the petitioner. Shri K. R. Sirohi, learned counsel appearing for the High Court has submitted that within a period of eight weeks from today, the calculations shall be made and matter will be referred to the State Government for making the payment after deducting the rents, etc.

18. Thus, in view of the above, we dispose of this writ petition directing the respondents to deduct the usual rent for a period of one month, standard rent for a period of three months and penal rent for the remaining period and make the payment of the arrears of the retiral benefits including gratuity, etc. to the petitioner within two months thereafter.

19. No order as to costs.