Bangalore District Court
Herein Was vs Company on 25 October, 2021
IN THE COURT OF LXXXV ADDL. CITY CIVIL &
SESSIONS JUDGE, AT BENGALURU (CCH-86)
THIS THE 25TH DAY OF OCTOBER 2021
PRESENT:
SMT. M. LATHAKUMARI. M.A., LL. M.,
LXXXV ADDL. CITY CIVIL & SESSIONS JUDGE,
BENGALURU.
Com. A.S. No. 57/2019
BETWEEN:
Department of Women and
Child Development
Through Director,
Government of Karnataka
M.S. Building,
Dr. Ambedkar Veedhi
Bangalore - 560 003.
: PLAINTIFF
(Represented by Sri. Sidharth
B. Muchandi - Advocate)
AND
M/s Christy Friedgram Industry
A-2 & A-3, SIDCO Industrial
Estate, Andipalyam,
Tiruchengode - 637 214,
Namakkal District,
Tamil Nadu .
: DEFENDANT
(Represented by M/s. B.M.
Associates - Advocate).
Date of Institution of the 01.04.2019
suit
Nature of the suit (suit on
2
Com.A.S.No.57/2019
pronote, suit for Arbitration Suit under 34 of
declaration & Possession, the Arbitration Act
Suit for injunction etc.)
Date of commencement of
recording of evidence ---
Date on which judgment 25.10.2021
was pronounced
Total Duration Year/s Month/s Day/s
02 06 24
(M.LATHAKUMARI)
LXXXV Addl. City Civil & Sessions Judge,
Bengaluru.
JUDGMENT
This application is filed under Section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 R/w Rule 4 of the High Court of Karnataka Arbitration (Proceedings before the Courts Rules 2001) by the respondent before Arbitral Tribunal by representing itself as plaintiff in this suit against claimant Proprietor/defendant against an award dated 30.12.2018 delivered by the learned Arbitrator Hon'ble Sri. Justice Abhay Gohil (Rtd), who had been appointed as a Sole Arbitrator by the Indian Counsel of Arbitration vide its order dated 21.5.2013 to decide the dispute between the parties arising out of 3 Com.A.S.No.57/2019 termination notice dated 31.05.2012 issued by plaintiff herein to the defendant herein terminating the agreements dated 28.02.2007, 07.07.2008, 02.04.2009.
2. Before considering the contentions raised by the parties and a question canvassed by plaintiff before me it is necessary and appropriate to take note of the facts resulting in the dispute between the parties. The plaintiff herein was respondent before Arbitral Tribunal and the defendant herein was represented and made claim as a claimant before Arbitral Tribunal and rank of the parties are considered as 'plaintiff/respondent' and 'defendant/claimant' accordingly for the sake of convenience.
3. The claimant/defendant is the sole proprietrix concern of Christy Friedgram Industry. The Government of Karnataka through plaintiff/respondent floated a tender for establishment of centers called Mahila Supplementary Nutrition Production and Training Centers (MSPTC for short) which was initially for setting up of 27 MSPTCs in the State and later it was revised to
137. The claimant/defendant being the highest bidder was awarded with the said project. In this regard, the claimant/defendant and plaintiff/ respondent entered into three various contract agreements on 28.09.2007, 07.07.2008 and 02.04.2009. The plaintiff herein by its 4 Com.A.S.No.57/2019 notice dated 31.05.2012 terminated the said agreements with effect from 31.05.2012 contending that as per the agreement dated 02.04.2009 opportunity was given to claimant/ defendant up to 31.05.2012 to build the capacity i.e., formation of MSPTCs, installed machinery and imparted training to members in terms of the technical and administration matter so as to make them independent in their work. Whereas the claimant/defendant is still having control over the functioning of MSPTC, the MSPTC project facilitators are all their employees and salaries are being paid by them and raw materials are procured through claimant/defendant industry. Further, as per the reports it is observed that the machineries in the MSPTC are maintained by the staff of the claimant/ defendant company, the MSPTC instead of purchasing the required raw material from the local market are procuring small mix, ragi malt, mix etc., from the units established by claimant/defendant of his industry at Nelamangala, Davanagere and Gulbarga. Establishment of these units has not been brought to the notice of the department. The MSPTCs have been indirectly controlled and they have not been allowed to function independently. The claimant/ defendant has done all these things with an ulterior motive. It is also mentioned that in the evaluation report by NIPCCD it is 5 Com.A.S.No.57/2019 stated that the SNP food items manufactured by MSPCs has not been prescribed protection and also contains banned colour has been used and confirms presence of coliform and presence of worms in rice and dal. There is no cleanliness at the stage of preparation of plant and packing itself. In this regard, an explanation from claimant/defendant company was sought vide letter dated 13.7.2012 and the explanation submitted by claimant on 27.03.2012 was not satisfactory. It is also noticed that some of the MSPTC functioning in is the responsibility of the capacity builder i.e., claimant/ defendant herein but many MSPTCs are running under loss. The MSPTCs having supplied the food items as per the indents of the CDPOs. Many complaints have been received from the public and also the medias being published bad quality of food supplied by MSPTCs. In this regard many NGOs public representatives, Anganawadi workers association have submitted complaint and thereafter the agreement entered by the plaintiff/respondent with the claimant/defendant company has been terminated. In this regard, dispute arose between the parties which lead to the appointment of Arbitrator.
4. The question sought to be canvassed before me by the plaintiff/respondent is that the impugned award 6 Com.A.S.No.57/2019 passed by the learned arbitrator referred to herein above is not supported by any cogent reasons, the impugned award is patently illegal, unjust and in conflict with the public policy, the arbitral tribunal has erred in concluding that the contract entered into between the parties is statutory in nature. The order passed by the arbitral tribunal in respect of plaintiff's application filed u/s 16 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, inter alia holding that it has the requisite jurisdiction to adjudicate the defendant's claims is erroneous. The learned tribunal's finding that the plaintiff department has awarded the contract under the provisions of Karnataka Transparency Public Procurement Act, 1999 (KTPP Act) and that the Notification dated 14.08.2007 issued by the Under Secretary of the Government of Karnataka nominating the Director of the Plaintiff Department to be the tender invitee and tender accepting authority under the KTPP Act tantamount to the Governor directing the contract to be executed by the competent authority in exercise of statutory power are misconceived and incorrect. The said findings do not consider the fact that the KTPP Act merely governs the form of execution not the substantive manner of execution of contacts between the Government and a Private Party. The finding of the learned arbitrator that the agreements were validly 7 Com.A.S.No.57/2019 executed stand proved from the termination order dated 31.05.2012 where various provisions of the Agreement were referred to and further by accepting the work of the defendant for three years is legally unsound as it is settled law that contract themselves being ex-facie invalid, no subsequent ratification by any amount of documentation would cure the invalidity of the contracts. Further, the arbitral tribunal has travelled beyond the terms of contractual agreement and the impugned award has been rendered in violation of Section 28 (3) of the Act and is liable to be set aside. The learned Tribunal has erred in holding that the termination order dated 31.05.2012 was illegal and invalid for non-issuance of notice prior to to termination, without considering that the termination clauses in the general conditions of contract are the special conditions of contract, do not contemplate issue of a notice prior to termination. The impugned award fails to take into consideration that the defendant was in flagrant breach of its obligation under the agreements which resulted in the termination of the contract. The contract entered into between the parties is of non-statutory in nature and the parties are both bound by the terms and conditions of the contract alone. Even if the contract was a statutory contract as held by the learned Tribunal, the plaintiff had placed on 8 Com.A.S.No.57/2019 record several notices issued to the defendant regarding its failure of performance prior to passing of the termination order. Thus in any event, the finding of the arbitral tribunal that the termination has been effected without prior notice or without adherence to principles of natural justice is incorrect on the face of record. The defendant has failed to show performance and full discharge of its obligation under the contract, he has failed to complete capacity building of MSPTCs within the stipulated period, supplied contaminated food products, failed to make the MSPTCs function independently. By ignoring these crucial aspects the learned Tribunal has passed the award which is against the public policy of India and in conflict with the basic notions of public morality and justice, the impugned award ignores settled principles of law that provisions of the Contract Act, 1872 more particularly Sec. 39 which provides for termination of the contract on the failure of a party to perform its promise. Further, the award ignores materials on the face of the record and also ignored the defendant's own communication dated 14.03.2012. The learned Tribunal's finding that all machineries were installed and said MSPTCs were fully independent to make supplies, is erroneous and contrary to the record. Further, the finding of the learned Tribunal that the physical presence of the 9 Com.A.S.No.57/2019 defendant's staff at the MSPTC was in compliance of its obligations under the provisions of the Agreement and it was not possible to ensure performance of contractual obligation without the physical presence of the staff of the defendant is a misreading of the terms of the agreement. Ex.R8 report establishes that the members of MSPTCs were not technically and administratively capable of functioning independently and instead of the MSPTCs purchasing the raw materials from the local market, the MSPTCs were procuring raw materials from units established by the defendant. The learned Tribunal has failed to appreciate this report Ex.R8. Even finding of learned Arbitrator in this regard that the defendant had no knowledge of the same is not acceptable. The finding of the learned Tribunal that since MSPTCs were free to procure raw material from any source and there MOU with the defendant was approved by the plaintiff, the same could not be grounds for termination is liable to be set aside as being opposed to fundamental policy of Indian Law. Further, the plaintiff was not party to supplementary MOU entered into between the plaintiff and defendant and the MSPTCs. The learned Tribunal ignores the fact that the defendant has failed to adhere to clauses 5, 6 and 7 of the tender and the agreements entered therein as the defendant failed to produce the certificate from the 10 Com.A.S.No.57/2019 reputed institutions regarding the machineries and quality of production process as per the HACCP standards accepted strategy the Tribunal has not even considered the fact that the taste and quality of food supplied by the defendant was of poor quality and unsatisfactory. The learned Tribunal has failed to take into consideration the reports of the Special Commissioner appointed by the Hon'ble Apex Court, the High Court Committee, NIPCCD and the Lokayuktha have all indicated the defendant of wrong doing and breach of its contractual obligations without considering the material on record, the learned Tribunal held that the order of termination is not only arbitrary but has been passed without application of mind. The plaintiff Department has no obligation to make direct payment to the defendant. Thus, no payment can be claimed by the defendant from the plaintiff for payments due to it from MSPTCs and hence the defendant has to claim its dues directly from MSPTCs if any which are independent agencies. The MSPTCs are registered societies and are separate legal entities. Further, the agreement do not provide for payment of any interest much less penal interest sought to be claimed by the defendant. Accordingly, no interest is payable to the defendant. Even the award of claim (b) in favour of defendant is erroneous. The findings of the Arbitral Tribunal in this 11 Com.A.S.No.57/2019 regard is outside the scope of the agreement and thereby resulted in failure of justice. The invoices allegedly scrutinized and verified by the Chartered Accountant admittedly are raised on the MSPTCs by the defendant and there is no privity between the plaintiff and defendant in this regard . The award of claim (c) in favour of the defendant is also erroneous, remote, indirect and barred by Section 73 of the Indian Contract Act, 1872 and is liable to be set aside. The defendant is eligible for consideration only if it makes supplies. Once the contract is terminated and no supplies have been made and no training given to MSPTCs, then no consideration is payable. Even with regard to claim (d) in favour of the defendant, the plaintiff was not a party to the agreements between the defendants and the MSPTCs. The claim awarded by the Arbitral Tribunal under claim (e) is hit by Section 73 of the Indian Contract Act, 1872. The impugned award with regard to this claim (e) is also hit by the doctrine of mitigation. Even the award under claim (i) of an amount of Rs. Ten crores towards alleged loss of reputation is arbitrary, speculative, remote and barred by Section 73 of the Indian Contract Act and devoid of any reasoning. The impugned award with regard claim (I) to the defendant is hit by the doctrine of quantification. Further, the defendant has failed to lead any evidence in this regard 12 Com.A.S.No.57/2019 to justify it. The impugned award arbitrarily grants interest in favour of defendant against the claim awarded even though there is no scope for the same in the agreement. The learned Tribunal has erroneously held that Issue No.5 in favour of the defendant that the claims are arbitrable. Even the cost of Rs. Five crores awarded towards cost of arbitration proceedings is without any evidentiary basis. The learned Arbitrator has proceeded very summarily without considering the proper prospective of the nature of dispute, without considering the contentions of the plaintiff and hence it is necessary to set aside the award dated 30.12.2018 passed by the learned Arbitrator with costs.
5. The defendant/claimant resisted this suit filed by the plaintiff by filing its objections contending that the termination of the agreement dated 28.07.2007, 07.07.2008 and 02.04.2009 vide letter dated 31.05.2012 was for the reasons that the respondent failed to install the required machinery and train the MSPTC members as per the agreements within the stipulated period. The learned sole arbitrator after adjudication answering the different issues raised therein has held that the termination of contract was illegal and as such the respondent has been partly awarded different sums made in the claim petition 13 Com.A.S.No.57/2019 towards the various damages suffered by the respondent on account of the respondent's illegal termination of the agreement, the appellant has contended that the learned sole arbitrator has failed in concluding that the agreements in question were statutory in nature. Whereas the learned arbitrator held that tender was floated under the Karnataka Transparency in Public Procurement Act 1999 and was in pursuance of the different orders of the Hon'ble Supreme Court and as such all agreements under the KTPP Act being statutory in nature, the agreements in question was also of the same nature. The learned Arbitrator while considering the validity of the agreement in question has considered all the relevant documents and held that the allegation made against the respondent termination notice is one that ensures several consequences and as such non following of the principles of natural justice renders termination letter bad in law. Since the respondent claims were considered partially by the learned arbitrator, the respondent has challenged the same vide AS No. 62/2019 before this court itself. During the pendency of this proceedings, respondent got amended its objection statement and further contended that the Govt., of Karnataka vide order dated 05.10.2015 set up a high level committee under the Chairmanship of Law 14 Com.A.S.No.57/2019 Minister Govt., of Karnataka to monitor and make all necessary decisions in respect of the proceedings pending before learned arbitrator in Case No. ICA/BAN/1/13. Said committee was established specifically to monitor and opine on the proceedings pending as stated above. The learned sole arbitrator passed the award directing the appellant herein to pay to the respondent a total sum of Rs.1,66,47,31,962/- with future interest from the date of 01.11.2018 till its payment within 90 days at 12% p.a., and further directed that if the appellant is not made within 90 days then 14% interest would be payable. The petitioner has filed this appeal without approval of the said high level committee as stated above and the date of filing of the appeal under the Arbitration and Conciliation Act petitioner authority has not taken decision to file appeal or not. In view of the same, it is clear that concerned authority has not taken any decision to file this appeal within the time limit prescribed under the Act. Hence, appeal is without any authority and does not have any legal sanctity. Under these circumstances, the appeal filed without obtaining sanction from high level committee is thus not maintainable and as such prays to dismiss the same with costs.
15Com.A.S.No.57/2019
6. I have carefully scrutinized the entire records placed before me. Heard the arguments.
7. Now the points that arise for my consideration are: -
(1) Whether the plaintiff has made out any of the grounds mentioned in Section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act so as to enable this court to interfere with the impugned award?
(2) What Order?
8. My answer to the above points are: -
Point No.1 : In the Negative Point No.2 : As per final order for the following REASONS
9. POINT No.1: - The learned counsel for the plaintiff by narrating the grounds mentioned in his petition relied upon citation of Hon'ble Apex Court reported in 2021 SCC Online SC 473 between Project Director, National Highways No. 45E and 220 National Highways Authority of India vs. M. Hakeem and another and contended that in view of the principles laid down by Hon'ble Apex Court in this citation this court while considering the application u/s 34 of the Arbitration & Conciliation Act cannot consider the same as an appeal 16 Com.A.S.No.57/2019 and consider the same as per the restriction laid down u/s 34 of the Act, court may extremely cautious and slow to disturb the findings of the learned arbitrator and also asserted that this court cannot sit as an appellate judge while considering the petition filed u/s 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act. It is not in dispute that the plaintiff herein being the respondent before the learned arbitrator has filed this petition challenging the award dated 30.12.2018 passed in Case No. ICA/BAN 1 OF 2013 and the defendant herein being the claimant before learned arbitrator has also filed similar petition u/s 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act and challenged the award with regard to certain claims rejected by concerned learned arbitrator and sought for enhancement of the amount with regard to partially considered claim. In the petition plaintiff/respondent contended that the arbitral tribunal has failed to consider that the respondent though was supposed to train the MSPTCs members and make them to work independently, instead of training them, respondent himself was supplying the food through MSPTCs and this conduct on the part of the respondent was contrary to the terms of agreement and this aspect has not been considered by the learned arbitrator. In the award, the learned arbitrator has specifically mentioned that on filing of the objection by the plaintiff herein who was 17 Com.A.S.No.57/2019 respondent before arbitral tribunal framed issues with consent of the parties. Hence, the issues available in the award at page No. 34 are all framed with consent of the parties. The contention raised by plaintiff herein in this petition were also raised before learned arbitrator and he has discussed about the various documents produced by both parties, oral evidence lead by them and also assigned reasons for considering some of the claims of defendant/claimant and also for rejecting the contention raised by respondent/plaintiff herein. The plaintiff apart from raising his contentions with regard to establishment of MSPTCs by defendant herein mainly raised an issue with regard to jurisdiction by filing an application u/s 16 of the Arbitration & Conciliation Act, 1996 ('Act' in short) contending that the Department of Government of Karnataka is governed by the Constitution of Indian in matters of entering into contracts and the provisions of Article 299 of the Constitution of India are applicable in the matter, since the contract has not been executed by or in the name of Governor, therefore such contract is void, invalid and enforceable. The learned arbitrator vide its order dated 02.8.2014 dismissed the said application and held that the agreements in question are all governed by the statutory provisions of the KTPP Act. Though plaintiff had an opportunity to challenge the said preliminary 18 Com.A.S.No.57/2019 order passed by the learned arbitrator u/s 16 as per the provisions Section 34 of the Act, plaintiff has not preferred any recourse against such order. That apart, the learned arbitrator while considering the said application heard respective parties and passed detailed order by assigning valid reasons. Admittedly, as per the arbitral clause available in the agreements, the claimant/defendant herein approached Arbitration Center and the learned arbitrator Hon'ble Justice Abhay Gohil (Retd) was appointed as arbitrator by order dated 21.5.2013. First hearing was fixed on 30.7.2013. As per the hearing dates mentioned in para-1 of the award, parties conducted the proceedings before learned Arbitrator almost for a period of 5 years. In between the defendant herein on 07.04.2016 filed an application u/s 30 of the Act stating that there is a possibility of settlement through mediation and conciliation and said application was not at all objected by the plaintiff State Government herein and thereby matter was pending for settlement between the parties till 03.06.2017. Later, the learned Arbitrator observed that parties could not arrived at settlement and thereby proceeded to record the oral and documentary evidence. The contentions raised by respective parties before this court were raised before learned Arbitrator and the learned Arbitrator in detail consider the oral and documentary 19 Com.A.S.No.57/2019 evidence produced by respective parties heard learned counsels appearing for both parties and passed the impugned award. Since matter was pending before learned arbitrator for all along 5 years there was no difficulty for the plaintiff to get the issues framed with regard to independent operation of MSPTCs by its members without the interference of defendant herein. Whereas, plaintiff has not made any such effort before learned Arbitrator. Having consented before learned arbitrator with regard to framing of issues and by conducting the matter based on such issues, now the plaintiff cannot canvas before this court that some of the evidence available on behalf of State Government was not considered by the learned Arbitrator. Even if the evidence on record is not considered by the Arbitral Tribunal, this court cannot re appreciate the said evidence so as to come to different conclusion. Further, learned Arbitrator asked both the parties to suggest name of Chartered Accountant to verify the voluminous vouchers produced by the claimant/defendant herein in support of its claim. Whereas neither the plaintiff herein nor defendant suggested any such name and thereby the learned arbitrator got appointed Chartered Account of its choice and directed him to verify the voluminous vouchers produced by defendant herein and to submit his report. While come to the conclusion, the learned 20 Com.A.S.No.57/2019 arbitrator has relied upon the report of the concerned Chartered Accountant. It was further canvased before this court by learned plaintiff's counsel that learned arbitrator considered the document obtained by defendant herein under Right to Information Act with regard to formation of MSPTCs and passed the award. Whereas said document received by the defendant herein under Right to Information Act and the information in the same was furnished by none other than the Director of Plaintiff Department itself. From the records, it appears that concerned Directors of plaintiff department allowed the defendant herein to manage manufacture of food items by himself, though their exists clause 7.1 to 7.3 of the General Conditions of Contract, to periodically inspect the 137 MSPTCs and its activities, established by defendant herein. The parties at length conducted the matter all along for five years before Arbitral Tribunal and raised their contentions, which was considered and adjudicated by Arbitral Tribunal. There is no scope for this court to re- appreciate oral and documentary evidence. Under such circumstances, this court opines that there is absolutely no ground made out by the plaintiff herein for any interference by this court. As I have already stated, the learned plaintiff counsel himself relied upon the citation of Hon'ble Apex Court reported in 2021 SCC Online SC 21 Com.A.S.No.57/2019
473. As per the principles laid down by Apex Court in this citation, this court cannot sit as an appellate judge while considering the petition u/s 34 and at para-47 Hon'ble Apex Court held as follows: -
"47. Quite obviously if one were to include the power to modify an award in Section 34, one would be crossing the Lakshman Rekha and doing what, according to the justice of a case, ought to be done. In interpreting a statutory provision a Judge must put himself in the shoes of Parliament and then ask whether Parliament intended this result. Parliament very clearly intended that no power of modification of an award exists in Section 34 of the Arbitration Act, 1996. It is only for Parliament to amend the aforesaid provision in the light of the experience of the courts in the working of the Arbitration Act, 1996, and bring it in line with other legislations the world over."
Further, the award is not open to challenge on the ground that the arbitral tribunal has reached to a wrong conclusion or has failed to appreciate the facts and evidence. It is well settled that the parties constitute the arbitral tribunal as the sole and final judge of the disputes arising between them and they bind themselves as a rule to accept the arbitral award as final and conclusive. The arbitral award is not liable to be set aside on the ground that either on facts or in law 22 Com.A.S.No.57/2019 it is erroneous. The learned defendant advocate relied upon various citations. It is necessary to discuss the citations of Hon'ble Apex Court in MMTC v. Vedanta. The principles laid down by Hon'ble Supreme Court in this citation is that this court does not sit in appeal over the arbitral award and may interfere on the limited grounds provided under Section 34(2)(b)(ii). Another citation relied upon by the defendant counsel was reported in (2018) 1 SCC 718 Sutlej Construction Limited vs. Union Territory of Chandigarh. In this citation Hon'ble Supreme Court observed that 'the dispute in question had resulted in a reasoned award. The arbitrator has taken a plausible view. When it comes to setting aside of an award under the public policy ground, it would mean that the award should shock the conscience of the court and would not include what the court thinks is unjust on the facts of the case'. It is further mentioned that the court should not get into the act of reappreciate the evidence as a first appellate court from the trial court decree. Even in another citation reported in (2018)9 SCC 49 Emkay Global Financial Services Ltd., v. Girdhar Sondhi the Hon'ble High Court observed that minimal interference by courts in matters relating to arbitration. In almost all the citations relied upon by both the parties herein the Hon'ble Supreme Court held that this court cannot sit in appeal over the establishments of 23 Com.A.S.No.57/2019 the Arbitral Tribunal and by re-examining and re- appreciating the material. When such being the case, this court cannot interfere with the impugned award and reconsider the claims of the parties afresh. Even while rejecting some of the claims made by the defendant herein, the learned arbitrator's award in this regard are based on appraisal of evidence. Since this court cannot act like first appellate court against a decree passed by the trial court, re-appreciation of evidence and the contentions raised by the plaintiff Government does not arise. Further, the learned counsel for defendant contended that plaintiff ha snot taken necessary permission from high level committee constituted by the Government before filing this petition. However, there was only a discussion taken place at the Government level with regard to settlement of dispute in question and same is not bar to the plaintiff herein to prefer this petition. Accordingly this court opines that it is not possible to set aside the award on any of the grounds set out in the petition, the petition is devoid of any substance and same is therefore liable to be dismissed in limine with no order as to cost, since both parties herein admittedly have preferred petition u/s 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act. Accordingly, I answer Point No.1 in the Negative.
24Com.A.S.No.57/2019
10. POINT NO.2: In view of my answer to point No.1 in the Negative, I proceed to pass the following order.
ORDER
The Arbitration Suit filed by the
plaintiff under Section 34 of the
Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 R/w Rule 4 of the High Court of Karnataka Arbitration (Proceedings before the Courts Rules 2001) is dismissed in limine with no order as to cost.
(Dictated to the Judgment Writer, transcribed by him, some paragraphs are directly added on the computer, verified and pronounced in the open court on 25th day of October 2021).
(M.LATHAKUMARI) LXXXV Addl. City Civil & Sessions Judge, Bengaluru.