Central Administrative Tribunal - Delhi
Shri S.Ramesh vs Union Of India on 1 August, 2014
CENTRAL ADMINISTRATIVE TRIBUNAL
PRINCIPAL BENCH
O.A.NO.124 OF 2013
New Delhi, this the 1st day of August, 2014
CORAM:
HONBLE SHRI ASHOK KUMAR, ADMINISTRATIVE MEMBER
AND
HONBLE SHRI RAJ VIR SHARMA, JUDICIAL MEMBER
..
1. Shri S.Ramesh,
s/o late Shri S.Sambasivan,
working as Junior Hindi Translator,
INS Satvahana, Naval Base,
Vizag 530014.
2. Shri D.Singh Chauhan,
working as Junior Hindi Translator,
INS Valsura, Gujrat.
3. Shri N.V.Krishnan,
s/o late Shri SV Iyer,
working as Junior Hindi Translator,
HQ Southern Naval Command,
Kochi 682004
4. Smt. Nimmy John,
D/o Shri P.K.John,
Working as Junior Hindi Translator,
INS Garuda, Kochi 682004
5. Smt. Renuka Harish,
W/o Shri PM Harish,
Working as Junior Hindi Translator,
HQ Southern Naval Command,
Kochi 682004
6. Smt. Eva Paul,
W/o Shri Johnny KJ,
working as Junior Hindi Translator,
INS Venduruthy, Kochi 682004
7. Smt. Jayanthi Gopinathan,
w/o Jyothish Kumar K
working as Junior Hindi Translator,
INS Dronacharya, Fort Kochi 682001
8. Smt. Jayashree Rajeev,
W/o Shri Rajeev C,
working as Junior Hindi Translator,
INS Zamorin,
INA Ezhimala, Ezhimala 670310
9. Shri G.B.Dinkar,
s/o Shri Bangur Chaturthi,
working as Junior Hindi Translator,
INS Chilka,
Orissa.
10. Shri S.L.Katke,
s/o Shri Laxman Shankar Katke,
working as Junior Hindi Translator,
INS Shivaji, Lonavala
11. Shri Sridhar Tiwari,
s/o Shri Girija Shankar Tiwari,
working as Junior Hindi Translator,
Naval Dockyard (Mumbai),
Mumbai 400023 Applicants
(By Advocate: Shri Rajiv Manglik)
Vs.
1. Union of India,
Through Secretary (Defence),
Ministry of Defence,
South Block, New Delhi
2. Chief of Naval Staff,
Integrated Headquarters of Ministry of Defence (Navy),
(for DCP),
Sena Bhavan, DHQ Post,
New Delhi 110011 . Respondents
(By Advocate: Shri Satish Kumar)
ORDER
Shri Raj Vir Sharma, Member(J):
In this Original Application, the applicants have prayed for the following relief:
i) Declare the action of the respondents illegal and arbitrary in not granting the similar benefit of revision of pay scale to the applicants as granted to staff of other subordinate offices; and Direct the respondents to revise the pay scales of the applicant in the post of Junior Translator as Rs.5500-9000, up to 31.12.2005, i.e., prior to implementation of 6 CPC; and Direct the respondents to grant the arrears of such re-fixation along with the interest of 18% and all consequential benefits; and Direct the respondents to re-fix the pay of the applicants as per 6 CPC pay scales subsequent to such revision of pay as directed by this Honble Tribunal; and To award exemplary costs; and To pass any other order as this Honble Tribunal deem fit in the interest of justice.
2. Brief facts: The applicants were appointed as Junior Hindi Translators in subordinate offices of the Indian Navy under the control of the respondents on various dates during 1994 to 2002. Prior to implementation of the 6th CPC recommendations, the applicants were being paid in the pre-revised pay scale of Rs.5000-8000/-.
2.1 Senior Translators and Junior Translators working in various offices including Armed Forces Headquarters (AFHQ) and Inter Service Organizations (ISO) were granted 4th CPC pay scale of Rs.1600-2660/- and pay scale of Rs.1400-2300/- respectively whereas their counterparts in the Central Secretariat Official Language Service (CSOLS) were granted pay scale of Rs.1640-2900/- and Rs.1400-2600/- respectively.
2.2 Some Senior Translators and Junior Translators working in AFHQ & ISO had filed OA No.1310 of 1989 (V.K.Sharma & ors vs. UOI and ors) before the Tribunal claiming pay parity with CSOLS. The Tribunal, vide order dated 24.8.1991, allowed the said OA and directed the respondents to grant pay scales of Rs.1640-2900/- and Rs.1400-2600/- to the Senior and Junior Translators respectively working in the AFHQ and ISO of the Ministry of Defence with effect from 1.1.1986 with all consequential benefits of pay fixation, arrears plus ancillary allowances, etc. 2.3 Similarly situated persons working in the Indian Air Force had filed OA No.928 of 1994 (Suman Lata Bhatia & ors vs. UOI & ors) claiming similar relief. The Tribunal had also granted the same relief, vide order dated 18.9.1997 (Annexure A/2).
2.4 As per the recommendation of the 5th CPC, Senior Translators, Junior Translators and Translation Officers were granted pay scales of Rs.5000-8000/-, Rs.5500-9000/- and Rs.6500-10,500/- respectively.
2.5 The pay scales of Junior Translators and Senior Translators in the CSOLS were upgraded from Rs.5000-8000/- and Rs.5500-9000/- to Rs.5500-9000/- and Rs.6500-10500/- respectively from 1.1.1996 on notional basis and from 11.2.2003 on actual basis, vide order dated 2.4.2004 (Annexure A/5). The pay scales of Junior Translators and Senior Translators were also similarly upgraded in the AFHQ and Department of Atomic Energy, vide Annexures A/6 and A/7 respectively.
2.6 Some Junior and Senior Translators working in the subordinate offices of the Indian Air Force, being aggrieved by the decision of the respondent no.1 denying upgradation of their pay scales, had filed OA No.402 of 2006 (Suman Lata Bhatia and others Vs. UOI). The Tribunal, vide order dated 17.10.2008 (Annexure A/9) directed the respondents to extend the benefit of upgradation of pay scales notionally from 1.1.1996 and actually from 11.2.2003. Some other Junior and Senior Translators working in subordinate offices of Indian Air Force had also filed OA No.2600 of 2009 claiming upgradation of their pay scales at par with their counterparts in CSOL, and the Tribunal, vide order dated 18.9.2009 (Annexure A/10), had also issued direction similar to that contained in the order dated 17.10.2008 (ibid) passed in OA No.402 of 2006.
2.7 The applicants, who are Junior Translators working in subordinate offices of the Indian Navy and are similarly placed as Junior Translators working in AFHQ and Indian Air Force, made representations dated 16.4.2012 (Annexures A/1 collectively) claiming upgradation of their pay scale from Rs.5000-8000/- to Rs.5500-9000/- and extension of the benefit of the orders passed by the Tribunal in OA No.402 of 2006 and OA No.2600/2009. As there was no response from the respondents, the applicants filed the present OA on 4.1.2013.
3. Opposing the Original Application, the respondents have filed a counter reply. It is stated by the respondents that the cadre structure in the CSOLS is different from that in Indian Air Force. The Calcutta Bench had allowed OA No.615 of 2006 filed by some official language staff working in Army for grant of higher structure at par with that granted to similar posts in CSOLS. Based on the above decision of the Calcutta Bench, the Principal Bench had allowed OA No.402 of 2006. WP ( C ) No.8624 of 2009 filed against the Principal Benchs order passed in OA No.402 of 2006 was also dismissed by the Honble High Court of Delhi, vide order dated 24.7.2009. The SLP filed against the order of the Honble High Court was dismissed for non-prosecution. The Civil Appeal No.1119 of 2013 arising out of SLP (C ) No.3380 of 2009 (Union of India & others v. Dhananjay Singh) filed against similar order passed by Calcutta Bench was also dismissed by the Honble Supreme Court, vide order dated 25.7.2013. The respondents have also contended that the O.A. filed by the applicants is liable to be dismissed as being barred by limitation.
4. We have perused the pleadings and heard the learned counsel appearing for the parties.
5. As the respondents have raised the question of limitation, we deem it just and proper to first deal with the same before proceeding further. It is the contention of the respondents that as the applicants are claiming benefits from the date of implementation of 5th CPC recommendation, i.e., 1.1.1996, the present OA filed by them in 2013 is barred by limitation. In support of their contention, the respondents have relied upon the following decisions of the Honble Supreme Court:
(i) S.S.Rathore v. State of MP, AIR 1990 SC 10;
(ii) State of Haryana & others v. Miss Ajay Walia, JT 1997(6) SC 592;
(iii) State of Punjab v. Gurdev Singh, (1991) 4 SCC 1;
(iv) Union of India v. Ratan Cahndra Samanta, JT 1993(3) SC 418;
(v) Ex-Captain Harish Uppal v. UOI, JT 1994 (3) 126; and
(vi) D.C.S.Negi v. UOI, SLP ( C ) CC No.3709/2011.
5.1 In S.S.Rathores case (supra), the plaintiff-appellant was dismissed from service by the Collector on 13.1.1966. His departmental appeal was dismissed by the Divisional Commissioner on 31.8.1966. Thereupon the appellant instituted a suit on 30.1.1969 asking for a declaration that the order of dismissal was inoperative and that he continued to be in service. The suit was dismissed by the trial court and that order was upheld by the appellate courts. In dismissing the suit the courts below accepted the defence plea that it had been filed beyond the period of limitation prescribed therefor under Article 58 of the first Schedule of the Limitation Act. The question that fell for determination by the Court was 'When was the right to sue first accrued' to the appellant i.e. whether from the date when the original adverse order of dismissal was passed against him or when the departmental/statutory appeal was finally disposed of. The appellant's contention is that the original order having merged in the final order whereby his departmental appeal was disposed of, the right to sue accrued from that date and on this reckoning, the suit filed by him was within time. The Honble Apex Court held as follows:
We are of the view that the cause of action shall be taken to arise not from the date of the original adverse order but on the date when the order of the higher authority where a statutory remedy is provided entertaining the appeal or representation is made and where no such order is made, though the remedy has been availed of, a six months' period from the date of preferring of the appeal or making of the representation shall be taken to be the date when cause of action shall be taken to have first arisen. We, however, make it clear that this principle may not be applicable when the remedy availed of has not been provided by law. Repeated unsuccessful representations not provided by law are not governed by this principle. It is appropriate to notice the provision regarding limitation under s. 21 of the Administrative Tribunals Act. Sub-section (1) has prescribed a period of one year for making of the application and power of condonation of delay of a total period of six months has been vested under sub- section (3). The Civil Court's jurisdiction has been taken away by the Act and, therefore, as far as Government servants are concerned, Article 58 may not be invocable in view of the special limitation. Yet, suits outside the purview of the Administrative Tribunals Act shall continue to be governed by Article 58. It is proper that the position in such cases should be uniform. Therefore, in every such case only when the appeal or representation provided by law is disposed of, cause of action shall first accrue and where such order is not made, on the expiry of six months from the date when the appeal was filed or representation was made, the right to sue shall first accrue. Submission of just a memorial or representation to the Head of the establishment shall not be taken into consideration in the matter of fixing limitation. .. 5.2 In Gurdev Singhs case (supra), CA Nos.1852 of 1989 and 4772 of 1989 were filed by the State of Punjab and others. The respondent in CA No.1852 of 1989 was appointed as an ad hoc Sub Inspector in the District Food and Supply Department of Punjab State. He absented himself from duty with effect from September 29,1975. On January 27,1977, his services were terminated. On April 18, 1984, he instituted the suit for declaration that the termination order was against the principles of natural justice, terms and conditions of employment, void and inoperative and he continues to be in service. The question was whether the suit was barred by limitation. The Honble High Court of Punjab & Haryana held that the suit for such relief was not governed by the Limitation Act and allowed the appeal. The said Civil Appeal was filed against the judgment of the Honble High Court. The Honble Supreme Court held that if an act is void or ultra vires, it is enough for the court to declare it so and it collapses automatically. It need not be set aside. The aggrieved party can simply seek a declaration that it is void and not binding upon him. A declaration merely declares the existing state of affairs and does not quash so as to produce a new state of affairs. Therefore, the party aggrieved by the invalidity of the order has to approach the court for relief of declaration that the order against him is inoperative and not binding upon him. He must approach the court within the prescribed period of limitation. If the statutory time limit expires, the court cannot give the declaration sought for. The view that if the dismissal, discharge or termination of services of an employee is illegal, unconstitutional or against the principles of natural justice, the employee can approach the court at any time seeking declaration that he remains in service, cannot be accepted.
5.3 In Ratan Chandra Sammantas case, the Honble Supreme Court held thus:
6. Two questions arise, one, if the petitioners are entitled as a matter of law for re-employment and other if they have lost their right, if any, due to delay. Right of casual labourer employed in projects to be re-employed in railways has become recognized both by the Railways and this Court. But unfortunately the petitioners did not take any step to enforce their claim before the Railways except sending vague representation nor did they even care to produce any material to satisfy this Court that they were covered in the scheme framed by the Railways. It was urged by the learned Counsel for the petitioners that they may be permitted to produce their identity cards etc., before the opposite parties who may accept or reject the same after verification. We are afraid it would be too dangerous to permit this exercise. A writ is issued by this Court in favour a person who has some right and for sake of roving enquiry leaving scope for manoeuvring. Delay itself deprives a person of his remedy available in law. In absence of any fresh cause of action or any legislation a person who has lost his remedy by lapse of time loses his right as well. From the date of retrenchment, if it is assumed to be correct a period of more than 15 years has expired and in case we accept the prayer of petitioner we would be depriving a host of others who in the meantime have become eligible and are entitled to claim to be employed. We would have been persuaded to take a sympathetic view but in absence of any positive material to establish that these petitioners were in fact appointed and working as alleged by them it would not be proper exercise of discretion to direct opposite parties to verify the correctness of the statement made by the petitioners that they were employed between 1964 and 1969 and retrenched between 1975 to 1979. 5.4 In Miss Ajay Wallas case(supra), the Civil Appeal was filed by the State of Haryana and others against the judgment passed by the Honble High Court of Punjab directing the appellants to appoint the respondent forthwith on the post of Sub Divisional Clerk in any Department of the State of Haryana. The Honble Apex Court in paragraph 6 of the judgment held as follows:
6. The facts reveal that requisition was made for recruitment only four candidates. The service election Board had no power and jurisdiction to select as many as 28 candidates and to recommend their names to various Departments for appointment. In the circumstances, when the Superintending Engineer, Hathnikund Circle had not requisitioned appointment of 8 candidates including the respondent, he rightly not acceded to and returned the list to the Board stating that he could not make any appointment as the ad hoc Sub Divisional Clerks already working had obtained stay from the High Court against their termination. In these circumstances, the direction asking the Superintending Engineer to appoint the respondent, issued by the High Court is obviously illegal. Moreover, the selection was made in 1982 i.e. after an inordinate delay. Representation repeatedly given to various authorities do not furnish her fresh cause of action to file writ petition. The High Court is wholly unjustified to have entertained and allowed the writ application. 5.5 In Harish Uppals case (supra), the petitioner was commissioned in the Indian Army (Artillery Regiment) in June 1965. He was in the unit which was sent to Bangladesh in connection with Military operations there in December 1971. In respect of certain irregularities committed by the petitioner, a court-martial was held against him at which he was found guilty and he was awarded the punishment of (a) dismissal and (b) two years rigorous imprisonment. This punishment was imposed after giving the petitioner an opportunity of pre-confirmation hearing as provided by Section 164(1) of the Army Act, 1950. The final orders imposing the said punishment were passed on 14.8.1972 and communicated to the petitioner on 3.9.1972. While the petitioner was in prison, his advocate sent a post-confirmation petition under Section 164(2) of the Army Act to the Government of India. The petitioner said that he received the Government of Indias reply on the said representation only on 11.11.1983 (i.e. about 11 years later), whereas respondents case is that the order rejecting the said post-confirmation petition was duly communicated to his advocate on 18.9.1973. The petitioners elder brother had filed Writ Petition No.456 of 1972 for issuance of a writ of habeas corpus in the Honble Supreme Court seeking the release of the petitioner. The said writ petition was dismissed by the Honble Supreme Court on 27.11.1972. In 1983 the petitioner had approached the Honble Supreme Court by way of another writ petition being W.P.No.12590 of 1983 which was dismissed in limine directing the Government of India to communicate its orders upon the petitioners post-confirmation petition, if not already communicated. The petitioner said that it was only thereafter that he received the orders of the Government upon his post-confirmation petition. He then approached the Honble High Court in C.W.P. No.827 of 1984 challenging the rejection of his pre-confirmation petition. The Honble High Court dismissed the petitioners writ petition summarily on two grounds, viz., (1) that the petitioner had approached the Honble Supreme Court but his petition was dismissed by the Supreme Court on 27.11.1972, and (2) that his petition was highly belated. On the findings that the petitioner was duly communicated the rejection orders on his pre-confirmation petition in 1973 and that the petitioner was guilty of laches, the Honble Supreme Court dismissed the SLP and observed in paragraph 8 of the judgment as follows:
.It is a well settled policy of law that the parties should pursue their rights and remedies promptly and not sleep over their rights. That is the whole policy behind the limitation Act and other rules of limitation. If they choose to sleep over their rights and remedies for an inordinately long time, the court may well choose to decline to interfere in its discretionary jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India and that is what precisely the Delhi High Court has done. 5.6 In D.C.S.Negis case (supra), the petitioners case was considered by the DPC, which met on 2.6.2003, for promotion to the Senior Administrative Grade but he was not found suitable. The recommendations of the DPC were approved by ACC some time in December 2003. Thereafter some of the officers junior to the petitioner were promoted to Senior Administrative Grade. After almost two years of his supersession, the petitioner made representation dated 26.10.2005, which was followed by another representation dated 7.12.2005 for reconsideration of his case for promotion to the Senior Administrative Grade, but the same did not appear to have been accepted by the competent authority. His case was considered in the DPC held on 2.3.2006 for promotion against the vacancies of the year 2006 and on being found suitable, he was promoted vide order dated 10.5.2006. Soon after his promotion, the petitioner approached the Tribunal in OA No.1316 of 2006. The Tribunal, after going through the records produced by the respondents, recorded a finding that the ACC had not disapproved the recommendations of the DPC and held that the petitioners grievance in the matter of non-promotion was untenable because he was unfit. The writ petition filed by the petitioner was also dismissed by the High Court. The Honble Supreme Court dismissed the SLP. Before parting with the case, the Honble Supreme Court considered it necessary to note that for quite some time, the Administrative Tribunals established under the Act have been entertaining and deciding the applications filed under section 19 of the Act in complete disregard of the mandate of Section 21 and observe as follows:
A reading of the plain language of the above reproduced section makes it clear that the Tribunal cannot admit an application unless the same is made within the time specified in clauses (a) and (b) of Section 21(1) or Section 21(2) or an order is passed in terms of sub-section (3) for entertaining the application after the prescribed period. Since Section 21(1) is couched in negative form, it is the duty of the Tribunal to first consider whether the application is within limitation. An application can be admitted only if the same is found to have been made within the prescribed period or sufficient cause is shown for not doing so within the prescribed period and an order is passed under Section 21(3).
In the present case, the Tribunal entertained and decided the application without even adverting to the issue of limitation. Learned counsel for the petitioner tried to explain this omission by pointing out that in the reply filed on behalf of the respondents, no such objection was raised but we have not felt impressed. In our view, the Tribunal cannot abdicate its duty to act in accordance with the statute under which it is established and the fact that an objection of limitation is not raised by the respondent/non-applicant is not at all relevant.
6. A careful perusal of the above decisions reveals that the Honble Supreme Court has laid down the law that delay itself deprives a person of his remedy available in law and that in the absence of any fresh cause of action or any legislation a person who has lost his remedy by lapse of time loses his right as well. The facts and circumstances of the said cases before the Honble Apex Court were not akin to that of the case at hand. In the instant case, the applicants are working as Junior Hindi Translators in subordinate offices of Indian Navy under the control of the respondents. Prior to implementation of the 6th CPC recommendations, the applicants were being paid in the pre-revised pay scale of Rs.5000-8000/-. In a number of cases, to which reference has already been made in this order, the Tribunal has been consistently taking the view that Senior Translators and Junior Translators working in AFHQ, ISO, and Indian Air Force are entitled to pay scales as granted to their counterparts in the CSOLS. Though as per the recommendation of the 5th CPC, Senior Translators and Junior Translators in CSOLS and other subordinate offices like the ones where the applicants have been working, were granted same scales of pay, yet by order dated 2.4.2004 (Annexure A/5) the pay scales of Junior and Senior Translators in the CSOLS were upgraded notionally from 1.1.1996 and actually from 11.2.2003. Subsequently, the said upgraded pay scales were also extended to Junior and Senior Translators working in AFHQ and Department of Atomic Energy. When such upgraded pay scales were denied to Junior and Senior Translators working in the subordinate offices of the Indian Air Force, OA No.402 of 2006 and 2660 of 2009 were filed, and the Tribunal directed the respondents to extend the benefit of upgradation of pay scales notionally from 1.1.1996 and actually from 11.2.2003. The writ petition filed against the order passed in OA No.402 of 2006 was dismissed by the Honble High Court of Delhi. The SLP filed against the Tribunals order and the judgment of the Honble High Court was also dismissed by the Honble Supreme Court for non-prosecution. It is pertinent to note here that the Principal Bench had allowed OA No.402 of 2006 following the order passed by the Calcutta Bench in OA No.615 of 2006. The writ petition filed against the order of the Calcutta Bench was also dismissed by the Honble High Court, and Civil Appeal No. 1119 of 2013 filed against the similar order of the Calcutta Bench was also dismissed by the Honble Supreme Court, vide order dated 25.7.2013. It also transpires from the records that the respondents have granted the upgraded pay scales to Junior and Senior Translators working in subordinate offices of Indian Air Force and AFHQ. The offices in which the applicants have been working are also functioning under the same respondents. Denial of the upgraded pay scale to the Junior and Senior Translators working in the subordinate offices of the Indian Navy by the respondents, while granting the same to their counterparts in the Indian Air Force and AFHQ, infringes the fundamental right of the applicants and other similarly placed employees to get equal pay for equal work. When they came to know about the upgradation of pay scale of their counterparts working in the subordinate offices under the respondent No.1 and the same was denied to them, the applicants claimed the aforesaid pay parity by making representations on 16.4.2012 (Annexure A/1). As the respondents failed to redress their grievance, the applicants filed the present O.A. on 4.1.2013. Considering the totality of the facts and circumstances of the case, we reject the contention of the respondents that the O.A. is barred by limitation.
7. Coming to the merits of the case, it is found that the question of grant of upgraded pay scale of Rs.5500-9000/- to Junior Translators working in subordinate offices at par with their counterparts in CSOLS notionally from 1.1.1996 and actually from 11.2.2003 is no more res integra. As earlier noted, the Calcutta Bench, vide order dated 8.8.2008 passed in OA No.615 of 2006, took the view that the official language staff working in the Army were entitled to the upgraded pay scales as applicable to their counterparts in the CSOLS. Based on the above decision of the Calcutta Bench, the Principal Bench allowed OA No.402 of 2006 and declared that the applicants therein were entitled to the upgraded pay scales as granted to their counterparts in the CSOLS. WP ( C ) No.8624 of 2009 filed against the Principal Benchs order passed in OA No.402 of 2006 was also dismissed by the Honble High Court of Delhi, vide order dated 24.7.2009. The SLP filed against the order of the Honble High Court was dismissed for non-prosecution. The Civil Appeal No.1119 of 2013 arising out of SLP (C) No.3380 of 2009 (Union of India & others v. Dhananjay Singh) filed against the similar order passed by Calcutta Bench was also dismissed by the Honble Supreme Court, vide order dated 25.7.2013 passed in SLP ( C ) No.17419/2009, Civil Appeal No.1119 of 2013, and SLP ( C ) No.37255 of 2012. So far as Civil Appeal No.1119 of 2013 is concerned, the Honble Supreme Court held as follows:
The respondent in this appeal was working as a Junior Hindi Translator in the office of the Commissioner of Central Excise-I, Kolkata. He claimed parity of pay with the Junior Translators who were working in the Central Secretariat. In his case also, what we find is that there is no functional distinction as far as the work of these translators is concerned. Therefore, we do not take a different view. The civil appeal is dismissed. Thus, it is found that the orders passed by this Tribunal granting pay parity to employees like the applicants working in other subordinate offices under the respondent no.1 have attained finality.
8. In view of the above, we hold and declare that the applicants in the present case are entitled to the same relief as granted to the applicants in OA No.402 of 2006. The respondents are directed to take appropriate decision regarding grant of pay scale of Rs.5500-9000/- to the applicants notionally from 1.1.1996 and actually from 11.2.2003. Consequential benefits by way of re-fixation of pay as per the VIth CPC pay scale shall also be granted to the applicants. The respondents shall comply with the direction contained in this order within a period not exceeding three months from the date of receipt of copy of this order.
9. In the result, the Original Application is allowed to the extent indicated above. No costs.
(RAJ VIR SHARMA) (ASHOK KUMAR) JUDICIAL MEMBER ADMINISTRATIVE MEMBER AN