P. Sundara Bhat vs Duggamma

[Cites 14, Cited by 0]

Kerala High Court

P. Sundara Bhat vs Duggamma

The plaintiff in O.S.No.157/1994 on the file of the Principal Munsiff Court, Kasaragod is the appellant herein. The suit was one filed by the plaintiff/ appellant herein for permanent prohibitory injunction restraining the sole defendant, his men and his agents from trespassing into any portion of the plaint A schedule property or forming a new road or widening the existing road or otherwise interfere with the plaintiff's peaceful possession and enjoyment thereof. During the pendency of the suit, the original defendant died and additional defendants 2 to 7 were impleaded as his legal heirs as per order in I.A. No.1813/1994. Thereafter, additional 8th defendant was also impleaded as one of the sons of the original deceased defendant as per order in I.A. No.488/1995.

2. The original defendant entered appearance and filed written statement denying the allegations and also S.A.No.514 of 2002 2 contended that the plaintiff had no cause of action to file this suit and he had constructed the road in the land covered by exchange deed dated 02.11.1992 and he had got the right to widen the same as well. Plaintiff had no cause of action to file the suit against the defendants and prayed for dismissal of the suit with cost and also compensatory cost under Section 35 (A) of Code of Civil Procedure.

3. A commission was taken and commissioner filed reports and plans. The defendant also filed application for injunction against the plaintiff and injunction was granted against him and since that was violated, the defendant filed a petition for prosecution for violation of injunction under order 39 Rule 2(A) of Code of Civil Procedure and that was tried and he was found guilty of violation of injunction and he was directed to be detained in civil prison and also his property was attached. The appellant herein filed CMA No.27/97 before the District Court and the District Court allowed the appeal in part, confirming the finding on the question of violation of injunction but S.A.No.514 of 2002 3 set aside the order detaining the appellant in civil prison but confirmed the order of attachment passed. In the meantime, the plaintiff filed memo dated 12.2.1998 not pressing the suit, as he had mentioned that at present there was no threat of any trespass. Supplemental defendants filed objection to the same stating that the memo was frivolous, vexatious and the suit filed itself was frivolous one and plaintiff by prosecuting the case caused lot of loss for the defendants and they pressed for heavy loss on the plaintiff in case the suit has to be dismissed, on the basis of the memo.

4. It is on that basis, the court below dismissed the suit as not pressed by judgment dated 31.07.1998 stating that since the prosecution for violation was a matter to be considered separately, the memo was accepted and suit was dismissed as not pressed. There was nothing mentioned about the order as to costs, but in the decree it was mentioned that " there is no order as to cost". Dissatisfied with this portion of the decree, defendants filed appeal before the District Court and it S.A.No.514 of 2002 4 was made over to Sub Court, Kasaragod, where it was numbered as A.S.87/98 and the learned Sub Judge analysed the circumstance of the case in detail and allowed the appeal allowing cost of the defendants throughout and also awarded Rs.1000/- as compensatory cost. Aggrieved by the same, the present second appeal has been filed by the plaintiff before this Court.

5. While admitting the appeal, this Court has accepted the substantial questions of law raised in the appeal memorandum for consideration, which read as follows:-

"A. Whether a "decree" drawn up pursuant to a judgment of court dismissing a suit as "not pressed" is a decree as defined in Section 2(2) of C.P.C.? As if not will an appeal under Section 96 of C.P.C. lie against such decree.

B. As not the Lower Appellate Court committed an error of law in entertaining the appeal; when the subject matter of the challenge in the appeal is not supported by payment of Court Fee.

C. Will an appeal lie against a decree not granting costs or compensatory costs in veiw of the provisions contained in Section 2(2), Section 96, Section 35, Section 35A, Order 20, rule 5 and Order 41, Rule 33 of C.P.C. and if not is not the decision of S.A.No.514 of 2002 5 the Lower Appellate Court per se illegal.

D. In the facts and circumstances of the case is the decision of the Lower Appellate Court sustainable."

6. Heard Sri.Gowri Shankar Rai counsel appearing for the appellant and Sri.V.V. Asokan Senior Counsel appearing for the respondents.

7. Counsel for the appellant submitted that awarding of cost is always the discretion of the court and no appeal will lie normally against the order relating to cost. The appellate court had wrongly entertained the appeal. Further, the appellate court should not have ordered compensatory cost conducting a enquiry afresh going to the merit of the case, as there was no finding on that aspect by the court below invoking order XLI Rule 33 of Code of Civil Procedure.

8. On the other hand, counsel for the respondents submitted that when the defendants had contested the case and also spent money for taking out commission and initiated proceedings for violation of injunction which ended in his favour against which an appeal had been preferred by the appellant and that was confirmed by the S.A.No.514 of 2002 6 appellate court except to the extent of setting aside the order directing the detention in civil prison, the trial court ought to have while dismissing the suit ordered the cost in favour of the defendants. When this was opposed by the counsel for the respondents before the court below by filing a counter, the court below ought to have given reasons for denying cost. Under such circumstances, denial of cost will become appealable one and the appellant court order XLI Rule 33 is entitled to award cost and compensatory cost. So there is no substantial question of law arises for consideration.

9. It is an admitted fact that the appellant filed suit for injunction. The respondents entered appearance and filed written statement denying the allegations and also contending that the suit itself was a frivolous one and prayed for dismissal of the suit with heavy compensatory cost under Section 35(A) of Code of Civil Procedure. It is also an admitted fact that the defendants also filed an application for injunction against the plaintiff and injunction was granted. When that was violated, an S.A.No.514 of 2002 7 application was filed for taking action and after enquiry the trial court found that the plaintiff had violated the injunction and found him guilty and directed to detain him in civil prison and also ordered attachment of his property. In the appeal filed by him, the order regarding violation of injunction and attachment of property were confirmed, but the order directing to detain him in civil prison was set aside. These are all the facts influenced by the appellate court to order costs as well as compensatory costs in favour of the respondents herein and the supplemental defendants in the court below.

10. It is also not in dispute that the appellant later filed a not press memo before the court below not pressing the suit and an objection was filed to the same by the respondents herein, but the trial court recorded the not press memo and dismissed the suit as not pressed and in the decree, it was noted that the parties were directed to bear their costs. This part of the decree of the court below was challenged by the respondents herein and the appellate court allowed the appeal and S.A.No.514 of 2002 8 directed the appellant herein to pay costs in the trial court, appellate court and also compensatory cost of Rs.1,000/- to the respondents.

11. The short question that arises for consideration in this second appeal is whether the appeal is maintainable against the discretion exercised by the court disallowing cost and if so, whether the appellate court is entitled to award cost as well as compensatory costs?

12. In the decision reported in Radhakrishna Punchithaya v. Sanjeeva Rao (1963 KLT 656), it has been held that:

"An appeal from a direction as to costs will lie only (a) where the court has not exercised any real discretion in making the direction or (b) where the exercise of discretion is not judicial, that is, based on sound and well established legal principles; in other words, where the direction as to costs involves a matter of principle or (c ) where the direction as to costs is based on misapprehension of fact or law".

13. In the decision reported in KSEB v.

Sebastian (1985 KHC 280), it has been held that:

"Award of costs is in the discretion of the court. S.A.No.514 of 2002 9 An appeal against an order as to costs is the exception, not the rule. An appeal lies for costs only when the costs are awarded by a "decree" if the order as to costs involves a question of principle".

14. In the same decision it has been further held that:

"It is well settled principle that, by virtue of the provisions contained in Section 35 of the Code of Civil Procedure, the award of costs is in the discretion of the court; and that broadly speaking, an appeal against an order as to costs is the exception, not the rule. Mulla, on Code Civil Procedure, 14th edition, Volume 1 at page 270 state as follows:

"It is settled that an appeal lies for costs when costs are awarded by a "decree " if the order as to costs involves a question of principle; but it is not settled whether such an appeal lies if no question of principle is involved".

15. In the decision reported in Ponnani P.C.C. Marketing Society Ltd. v. Kunhikali and others (1977 KLT 933) while considering the power of the appellate court to interfere with the order of costs passed by the court below under Section 35 of the Code of Civil Procedure, this Court observed as follows:

"Though normally an appellate court does not interfere with the decree for costs, that is on the S.A.No.514 of 2002 10 premises that award of costs being in the discretion of a court unless it is shown that such discretion has been exercised in a patently erroneous manner no interference would be called for. They very concept of discretion involves an element of subjective approach and therefore an appellate court will be slow to interfere with the conclusion reached by a court in the exercise of its discretion. Even so, the discretion calls for judicial exercise of discretion does not appear to be rational, and cannot be sustained on any logical process of reasoning or if the discretion is seen to have been exercised in an unreasonable or perverse manner, the appellate court is not without power to interfere. Within the limited sphere wherein the discretion can have its play, the appellate court leaves it to the court which passes the decree to make its own direction in the matter. But where the appellate court finds that the decree for costs could not have followed the decision on the main case, the court would certainly be justified in interfering."

16. In the decision reported in Subramonia Iyer v. Kurian (1990 KHC 558) it has been held that:

"It is a discretion of the court to award costs under section 35 of the Code of Civil Procedure and exercise of the discretion depends upon the circumstances of each particular case. Length of trial, the complicated questions involved and the conduct of parties before Court are some of the circumstances to be taken into account while awarding costs. When defence is frivolous and the plaintiff is not guilty of misconduct, succeeds, costs on the contested scale should normally be allowed'. S.A.No.514 of 2002 11

17. It is further held in the same decision that:

"Even though no hard and fast rule could be laid down, the exercise of the discretion must be depending on circumstances of each particular case based on sound legal principles and not by caprice or chance or humour. The length of trial, the complicated questions involved and the conduct of the parties before court are some of the circumstances to be taken into account. The Grounds irrelevant to the action should not be taken into account. The discretion is very wide and it extends to disallowing costs of the successful party and even to make him pay the costs of the losing party. In cases of partial success and failure, court can apportion costs. When both parties are guilty of bad faith, an order to suffer costs may be & proper exercise of discretion. When the law is settled for the first time also, such a course will be justified; so also in test cases. When the defence is frivolous and the plaintiff who is not guilty of misconduct, succeeds, costs on the contested scale should normally be allowed".

18. In the decision reported in Augusti v. Joseph [1986 KLT 278] this court has considered the question under what circumstances compensatory cost under section 35 A of Code of Civil Procedure can be granted as follows:-

"Three conditions are to be satisfied before the court proposes to award compensatory costs in a suit. They are (1) The claim or defence must be false or S.A.No.514 of 2002 12 vexatious. (2) Objection must be taken that the claim or defence is false or vexatious to the knowledge of the party raising it. (3) Such claims or defence must have been disallowed or withdrawn or abandoned in whole or in part. In this case, the learned Munsiff has taken into account an extraneous fact that "the conduct of the plaintiff subsequent to the suit reveals that the plaintiff has been getting adjournments of the suit on one pretext or the other". The said conduct of the plaintiff while conducting or prosecuting a suit is not a germane ground to act under S.35 A of the Civil Procedure Code."

19. Further the decision reported in Kochouseph v. Kunju Vareed [1963 KLT 558] it has been held, while considering the question of awarding compensatory cost under Section 35 A, that the award of compensatory cost under Section 35 A is intended to deal with exceptional cases in which exercise of the ordinary discretion under Section 35 would not afford a sufficient compensation. So before awarding compensatory cost, the court should satisfy itself "the claim was false or vexatious to the knowledge of the plaintiff and that the interest of justice require compensatory costs to be awarded".

S.A.No.514 of 2002 13

20. In the decision reported in in N.S.S. Medical Mission Hospital v. Sulbeth Beevi [2009 (2) KLT 779] this court has considered the scope of Order XLI Rule 33 of interfering with the order of the trial court as follows:-

"(i) What are the circumstances in which the Appellate Court can interfere with the order passed by the Trial Court under its discretionary power?

(ii) When can the Court direct a successful party in a litigation to pay the costs of unsuccessful party ?

Suit filed as in forma pauperis, was for damages alleging medical negligence on the part of a Doctor. Hospital was also alleged to have vicarious liability. Suit was dismissed. But the Court directed the defendants to pay costs including court fee to the plaintiff. Appeal was allowed by the court with the following.

Findings and observations:

(i) when there is arbitrary, capricious exercise of discretion by the Trial Court, Appellate Court can interfere.

(ii) If the discretion of Trial Court was exercised reasonably or in a judicious manner no interference is possible even if another view could be taken.

(iii) O.XXXIII R11 does not fetter the discretionary power of court to direct successful party to pay costs to unsuccessful party including his court fee.

(iv) " Judicial Discretion" is one which is regulated by law and is not one controlled by the mere whims or caprice of person in whom it is vested.

S.A.No.514 of 2002 14

(v) Discretion of direct successful party to pay costs to unsuccessful party is on a different pedestal than the contra position.

Held: The court of appeal may interfere with a discretionary order passed by the trial court when the trial court acted arbitrarily, capriciously, without evidence or in a manner which would vitiate the exercise of discretion or would show that the discretion was not exercised at all. If the discretion has been exercised by the trial court reasonably and in a judicial manner, the fact that the court of appeal would have taken a different view may not justify interference with the trial court's exercise of discretion. But, if it appears to the court of appeal that in exercising its discretion the trial court has acted unreasonably or in an erratic manner or has ignored relevant facts, then it would be open to the court of appeal to interfere with the trial court's exercise of the discretion".

21. In the same decision, it has been held that:

"Does the discretionary power of the court extend to directing the successful party to pay the litigation expenses of the unsuccessful party? The discretionary power conferred on the court is so wide and unfettered that even deviating from the normal rule that costs should follow the result of the litigation and notwithstanding the provisions of O.XXXIII R.11 of the Code it is well within the power of the court to direct the successful party to pay the litigation expenses of the unsuccessful party includes the court fee payable. Under which all circumstances could a court direct the successful party to pay the costs of the unsuccessful party? It may not be possible to give an exhaustive list of such circumstances. Broadly speaking, if S.A.No.514 of 2002 15 the conduct of the successful party towards the unsuccessful party before, at the time of or after the institution of the proceeding in relation to the matter in issue is so perverse and obstinate that the court considers it just and equitable to do so, it may direct the successful party to meet the costs of the unsuccessful party. The discretion to direct the successful party to meet the costs of the unsuccessful party stands on a different pedestal from the discretion not to award costs of the successful party against the unsuccessful party".

22. In the decision reported in Aspee (India) Ltd v. M.L. Dahanukar and Co. Ltd [AIR 1954 Bombay 35], it has been held that "it is competent to a party which is aggrieved by a decree passed on the original side with regard to costs to appeal from that decree even though it does not appeal from the whole decree but only a part of it. The maintainability of the appeal has nothing to do with the question as to under what circumstances the appellate court interfere with the discretion exercised by the trial court with regard to costs".

23. Further in the decision reported in Salem Advocate Bar Assn. (II) v. Union of India [(2005) 6 SCC 344] while considering the scope of Section 35 (2), S.A.No.514 of 2002 16 it has been held that "when section 35 (2) provides for costs to follow the event, it is implicit that the costs have to be those which are reasonably incurred by a successful party, except in those cases where court in its discretion may direct otherwise by recording reasons therefor".

24. In the decision reported in Vasudev Ramachandra v. Bhavanjivraj [ ILR 16 Bombay 241], it has been held that "even if the appeal was not pressed in respect of certain aspects, the court is entitled to consider the question of cost independently". That was a case where the trial court had returned the plaint for want of jurisdiction and directed the plaintiff to pay cost to the respondents. The dissatisfied plaintiff filed appeal before the District Court against both the order returning the plaint and also imposing cost and when the appeal came up for hearing, counsel for the appellant in that case abandoned the question of return of plaint on the ground of jurisdiction, but the lower appellate court dismissed the appeal holding that the appeal would not lie on the question of cost alone and confirmed the order of S.A.No.514 of 2002 17 the court below. That was challenged before the Bombay High Court and Bombay High court held that declining the jurisdiction to entertain the question regarding cost by the District Judge was not proper and set aside the order and remanded the case for proper order.

25. In the decision reported in Abdurahiman K.V. v. Cheekilode Premalatha [2014 KHC 717] the Division Bench of this court has held that when a successful party in a suit is deprived of his costs, without there being an exercise of discretion in making the order as to costs, the case can be described as a case involving a question of principle and appeal can be preferred against such decrees for cost only.

26. It is clear from the above dictums that allowing and disallowing of cost is the discretion of the court and normally the appeal will not lie against such discretion exercised by the court regarding cost. But in exceptional cases, appeal will lie against the cost portion alone on principle alone. As regards the compensatory cost is concerned, only if the court is satisfied that the case of S.A.No.514 of 2002 18 the plaintiff or defendants is false and such a contention was raised knowing that it is false and ordinary awarding of cost will not be sufficient to meet the interest of justice, then court can exercise the power under Section 35 A of Code of Civil Procedure to award compensatory cost. Further, subsequent conduct of the party is not relevant for the purpose of awarding compensatory cost. So from the discussions made above, it cannot be said that in all cases appeal will not lie against the cost portion of the decree alone. If cost form part of the decree, then in exceptional cases the appeal will lie. With this principle in mind the present case has to be considered.

27. Admittedly, in this case no evidence was taken and the case was not decided on merit. The counsel for the appellant who is the plaintiff before the court below filed a not pressed memo stating that, since there was no apprehension at present, he was not intended to proceed with the case and he wanted to dismissed the suit as not pressed. The respondents herein filed a detailed objection for the same stating that the memo could be accepted S.A.No.514 of 2002 19 especially when the case itself was false and the plaintiff had violated the injunction order and continuation of the case had caused hardship to the defendants. It is seen from the impugned order of the trial court that the court had accepted the memo and dismissed the suit as not pressed stating that violation proceedings can be independently considered, but in the judgment portion it was not mentioned as to whether the court had decided to grant cost or not. But only in the decree, it was noted that the parties are directed to bear their cost. This part of the judgment and decree disallowing cost was challenged by the respondents herein, by filing an appeal to the District court which was made over to Sub Court for disposal. The Sub Court by the impugned judgment after elaborate discussion and after hearing parties, allowed the appeal granting the relief of cost to the defendants not only in the suit but also in the appeal and considering the conduct of the appellant herein subsequent of the filing of the suit ordered to pay a compensatory cost of Rs.1000/- as well. This is S.A.No.514 of 2002 20 challenged in the second Appeal.

28. Section 35 of the Civil Procedure Code deals with cost which reads as follows:

"35. Costs - (1) Subject to such conditions and limitations as may be prescribed, and to the provisions of any law for the time being in force, the costs of and incident to all suits shall be in the discretion of the Court, and the Court shall have full power to determine by whom or out of what property and to what extent such costs are to be paid, and to give all necessary directions for the purposes aforesaid. The fact that the Court has no jurisdiction to try the suit shall be no bar to the exercise of such powers (2) Where the Court directs that any costs shall not follow the event, the Court shall state its reasons in writing".

29. Section 35(A) of Code of Civil Procedure deals with payment of compensatory cost which reads as follows:-

"35 A Compensatory costs in respect of false or vexatious claims or defences.- (1) If in any suit or other proceedings [including an execution proceeding but [excluding an appeal or a revision]] any party objects to the claim or defence on the ground that the claim or defence or any part of it is, as against the objector, false or vexatious to the knowledge of the party by whom it has been put forward, and if, thereafter, as against the objector, such S.A.No.514 of 2002 21 claim or defence is disallowed, abandoned or withdrawn in whole or in part, the Court, [if it so thinks fit] may, after recording its reasons for holding such claim or defence to be false or vexatious, make an order for the payment to the objector by the party by whom such claim or defence has been put forward, of cost to by way of compensation.

(2) No Court shall make any such order for the payment of an amount exceeding [ three thousand rupees] or exceeding the limits of its pecuniary jurisdiction, whichever amount is less:

Provided that where the pecuniary limits of the jurisdiction of any Court exercising the jurisdiction a Court of Small causes under the Provincial Small Cause Courts Act, 1887, ( 9 of 1887), [or under a corresponding law in force in [any part of India to which the said Act does not extend]] and not being a court constituted [under such Act or law], are less than two hundred and fifty rupees the High Court may empower such Court to award as costs under this Section any amount not exceeding two hundred and fifty rupees and not exceeding those limits by more than one hundred rupees:

Provided, further, that the High Court may limit the amount which any court or class of Courts is empowered to award as costs under this section.

(3) No person against whom an order has been made under this section shall, by reason thereof, be exempted from any criminal liability in respect of any claim or defence made by him.

(4) The amount of any compensation awarded under this section in respect of a false or vexatious claim or defence shall be taken into account in any subsequent suit for damages or compensation in respect of such claim or defence]".

S.A.No.514 of 2002 22

30. Order XLI Rule 33 of Code of Civil Procedure which reads as follows:

"33. Power of Court of Appeal - The Appellate Court shall have power to pass any decree and make any order which ought to have been passed or made and to pass or make such further or other decree or order as the case may require, and this power may be exercised by the Court notwithstanding that the appeal is as to part only of the decree an may be exercised in favour of all or any of the respondents or parties, although such respondents or parties may not have filed any appeal or objection [and may, where there have been decrees in cross-suits or where two or more decrees are passed in one suit, be exercised in respect of all or any of the decrees, although an appeal may not have been filed against such decrees]."

31. It is clear from the above provision that cost is always the discretion of the court and normally the successful parities are entitled to get cost unless other wise reasons given by the court to disallow costs. As regards the compensatory cost is concerned, finding of the trial court is required as to whether the suit itself is false to the knowledge of the plaintiff at the time he filed the suit and the contention of the defendants is frivolous and vexatious before ordering compensatory cost. S.A.No.514 of 2002 23

32. Since respondents herein had filed objection to not press memo and that was considered by the trial court, and passed the judgment dismissing the suit accepting not press memo, it cannot be said that the respondents herein did not press for the cost, while dismissing the suit as not pressed. Further, the court below did not mention anything as to the cost in the judgment, but only in the decree it was mentioned that parties are directed to bear the respective cost. So there was no application of the mind on the part of the court regarding exercise of discretion either to allow or to disallow cost. The successful party can file appeal against that portion of the judgment of the trial court denying cost though they opposed the accepting of not press memo at that stage and that will be deemed to be decree. So the appeal against disallowing of cost without application of mind will lie.

33. Once the trial court has exercised discretion and stated reasons for disallowing cost in the judgment, then the scope of appellate court will be limited and it cannot S.A.No.514 of 2002 24 be normally interfered, unless it is perverse or it was done without application of mind and misappreciation of law on that aspect. Since the trial court did not mention anything about disallowing the cost, the appellate court was perfectly justified in going to the question as whether the appellant in that case was entitled to get cost or not. The appellate court was right in considering the fact and awarding cost of the proceeding in the trial court in favour of the appellants in that case who are the respondents herein. But the appellate court was not justified in awarding cost of the appeal to the appellants payable by the respondents, who are the appellants herein as they are not responsible for denial of cost by the trial court. So this court feels that the judgment passed by the lower appellate court awarding cost of the appeal also to the appellants in that case is unjustifiable and the same is liable to be set aside.

34. As regards the cost in the trial court also, the appellate court should not have allowed the entire cost as no trial was conducted in the case. There was no S.A.No.514 of 2002 25 occasion for the respondents herein to spend any money for summoning the witness to meet the case on merit. So under such circumstances, the lower appellate court should have fixed the cost in a lower rate than the normal scale of cost that can be payable. So under such circumstances, this Court feels that the cost payable can be reduced to half of the scale of cost payable in the lower court as per the schedule to the respondents in case of such nature and that will meet the interest of justice. To that extent the judgment of the lower court is modified.

35. As regards the compensatory cost is concerned, the lower appellate court was not justified in taking the role of the trial court invoking order XLI Rule 33 Code of Civil Procedure, to grant a relief which has not arisen for consideration before the court below, without proper evidence. The lower appellate court only considered the subsequent conduct of the appellant in not proceeding the case and his conduct of violation of injunction as the reason for granting compensatory cost which is S.A.No.514 of 2002 26 unsustainable in law and irrelevant aspect for this purpose. So under such circumstances, the order passed by the lower appellate court granting compensatory cost to be payable by the appellant to the respondents herein is unsustainable in law and same is set aside.

36. In view of the discussion made above, the appeal is allowed in part as follows:

1. The judgment passed by the appellate court in A.S.87/98 of Sub Court, Kasaragod granting a decree of compensatory cost of Rs.1000/- to the respondents herein payable by the appellant is set aside.

2. As regards cost portion is concerned, the order of the lower appellate court ordering full cost through out is set aside and the same is restricted to half of the scale of cost payable as per the schedule in case of the nature in the lower court alone. The appellant herein is liable to pay that cost alone to the respondents herein.

With the above modification of the judgment and decree of lower appellate court, the second appeal is allowed in part and disposed of accordingly. Considering S.A.No.514 of 2002 27 the circumstances of the case and the nature of question of law involved in this second appeal, parties are directed to bear their respective cost in the second appeal.

Sd/-

K.RAMAKRISHNAN JUDGE rmm/24.06.2017 // True Copy // P.A. to Judge

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