Delhi High Court
Braham Parkash vs Govt. Of Nct Of Delhi And Anr. on 27 August, 2007
Equivalent citations: 2008(2)SLJ96(DELHI)
Author: Hima Kohli
Bench: Hima Kohli
JUDGMENT Hima Kohli, J.
1. In the present writ petition, the petitioner workman has challenged an award dated 7th April, 2007 passed by the Labour Court in ID No. 203/06 wherein the reference as to whether the services of the petitioner workman were terminated illegally or unjustifiably by the respondent management and if so, to what sum of money as monetary relief and consequential benefits is he entitled to, has been answered against the petitioner workman by holding that the courts in Delhi have no jurisdiction to entertain the disputes between the parties as the petitioner workman was lastly posted with the respondent management at Neemrana, Alwar, Rajasthan.
2. Briefly stated, facts of the case are that the petitioner workman filed a statement of claim stating inter alia that he was appointed as a Typist by the respondent management on 10th May, 1983 in the head office of the respondent management. Due to the directions issued by the Supreme Court in the case of M.C. Mehta v. Union of India, one of the factories of the respondent management being a highly polluting industry was directed to be closed down and the respondent management started its unit in Neemrana, Alwar, Rajasthan on 1st July, 1999. The petitioner workman was directed to report for duty at the aforesaid unit vide order dated 25th June, 1999. It is averred that a false and frivolous complaint was lodged against the petitioner workman for stealing 15 MT iron scrap pursuant to which an FIR was registered against him at Alwar and when the petitioner workman was released on bail by the Trial Court and reached the office to resume his duty on 24th July, 2001, the respondent management refused to allow him to join duty. It is further averred that the services of the petitioner workman were terminated by the respondent management on 17th July, 2001 and the petitioner workman was entitled to reinstatement with full backwages and continuity of service.
3. The aforesaid claim was opposed by the respondent management. One of the preliminary objections taken in the written statement was that the Labour Court did not have the territorial jurisdiction to try and entertain the dispute as the petitioner workman was employed at Neemrana, Alwar, Rajasthan. The respondent management also opposed the claim petition of the petitioner workman on merits. Issues were framed on 3rd September, 2003. One of the issues framed was as to whether the Labour Court had no jurisdiction to decide the reference. The said issue was taken at the first instance and was decided against the petitioner workman by holding that he was transferred from Delhi to Neemrana, Alwar, Rajasthan by the respondent management and at the time of his alleged termination of services, he was posted at Neemrana and getting his wages from the management situated at Rajasthan. Thus it was held that the Labour Courts situated in Delhi will have no jurisdiction to entertain the dispute between the parties.
4. Counsel for the petitioner workman submitted that the conclusions arrived at in the impugned award are misconceived and are based on wrong appreciation of facts. It was contended that the petitioner workman was appointed as a Typist in the head office at Delhi, he got his ESI, PF contributions in Delhi and was promoted in the year 1995 in Delhi. The petitioner workman resided at Delhi and the residence of the Managing Director and Executive Director of the respondent management were also situated in Delhi and thus it was stated that the Labour Court at Delhi has the territorial jurisdiction to answer the reference. It was also contended that the Labour Court wrongly placed reliance on a decision of this Court in the case of Lohia Starlinger Limited and Anr. v. Government of NCT of Delhi and Ors. reported as 2006 LLR 905.
5. A perusal of the impugned award shows that the Labour Court took into consideration the deposition of the petitioner workman as also the evidence tendered by him by way of an affidavit wherein he had stated that when he reached the office at Neemrana on 24th July, 2001 for resuming his duty, the respondent management refused to allow him to join duty. Hence, it was concluded that the petitioner workman had himself admitted that his services were terminated by the respondent management at Neemrana, Rajasthan. Further, the cross-examination of the petitioner workman was also taken note of wherein he stated that the plant at Neemrana was closed in the year 1997 and even thereafter he had been reporting for duty at Neemrana and was paid his regular monthly wages. Further, reference was made to another witness of the petitioner workman (WW-2) who had also stated in his cross-examination that the petitioner workman was posted at Neemrana, Rajasthan. On the basis of the aforesaid material placed on the record as also on the basis of the deposition of the parties, the Labour Court arrived at the conclusion that at the time of the alleged termination of the services, the petitioner workman was posted at Neemrana, Rajasthan and was getting his salary from the respondent management at the said unit.
6. Having gone through the impugned award, this Court finds no irregularity, perversity or infirmity therein. The Labour Court cannot be faulted for taking into consideration the deposition of the petitioner workman himself that he was lastly posted with the respondent management at Neemrana, Rajasthan. On the question of situs of employment, the Labour Court relied on the judgment of this Court in the case of Lohia Starlinger Limited (supra). In the said judgment, the court referred to a decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Kusum Ingots Alloys Ltd. v. Union of India reported as wherein it was observed that it is a bundle of facts which, taken together with the applicable law, entitles the plaintiff to relief against the defendants and it is not every fact pleaded by a litigant that gives rise to a cause of action. Thus only such facts which are necessary to adjudicate upon the lis would constitute cause of action conferring territorial jurisdiction upon a court.
7. The Supreme Court in a recent judgment in the case of Bikash Bhushan Ghosh and Ors. v. Novartis India Ltd. and Anr. reported as , while deciding the question with regard to the maintainability of a reference made by the State of West Bengal in respect of the appellant workmen therein who were transferred to the States of Bihar, UP and Assam, took note of the following judgments to hold that since the orders of termination were served on appellants therein at Calcutta and since the said orders were passed against them for not obeying the orders of transfer, therefore their transfer had some nexus with the order of their termination from services, thus entitling the State of West Bengal to make a reference of the industrial dispute as an appropriate Government:
(i) Indian Cable Co. Ltd. v. Workmen 1962 Supp (3) SCR 589.
(ii) Workmen v. Shri Rangavilas Motors (P) Ltd. .
(iii) Paritosh Kumar Pal v. State of Bihar 1984 Lab IC 1254 (Patna) (FB).
(iv) Indian Express Newspaper (Bombay) (P) Ltd. v. State of West Bengal (2005) 2 LLJ 333.
(v) Om Prakash Srivastava v. Union of India .
8. In the case of Shri Rangavilas Motors (supra), the concerned workman was transferred from Bangalore to Krishnagiri, where the head office of the management was situated. When he questioned the validity of the order of transfer, the management initiated disciplinary proceedings against him and he was removed from service. The State of Mysore made a reference, the validity of which was questioned and the same was answered by the Supreme Court in the following manner:
This takes us to the other points. Mr. O.P. Malhotra strongly urges that the State Government of Mysore was not the appropriate Government to make the reference. He says that although the dispute started at Bangalore, the resolution sponsoring this dispute was passed in Krishnagiri, and, that the proper test to be applied in the case of individual disputes is where the dispute has been sponsored. It seems to us that on the facts of this case it is clear that there was a separate establishment at Bangalore and Mahalingam was working there. There were a number of other workmen working in this place. The order of transfer, it is true, was made in Krishnagiri at the head office, but the order was to operate on a workman working in Bangalore. In our view the High Court was right in holding that the proper question to raise is: where did the dispute arise? Ordinarily, if there is a separate establishment and the workman is working in that establishment, the dispute would arise at that place. As the High Court observed, there should clearly be some nexus between the dispute and the territory of the State and not necessarily between the territory of the State and the industry concerning which the dispute arose.
9. In the aforesaid judgment, the Supreme Court also referred to an earlier decision in the case of Indian Cable Co. Ltd. (supra) where it was held that the Industrial Disputes Act does not deal with the cause of action, nor does it indicate the factors which confer jurisdiction upon the Labour Court, but applying the well known tests of jurisdiction, a court or tribunal would have jurisdiction if the subject matter of the dispute substantially arose within the jurisdiction. Applying the aforesaid principles, it was held by the Supreme Court in Shri Rangavilas Motors (supra) that the dispute substantially arose within the jurisdiction of Mysore.
10. In the case of Paritosh Kumar Pal (supra), a Full Bench of the Patna High Court held as below:
13. Now an incisive analysis of the aforesaid authoritative enunciation of law would indicate that three clearcut principles or tests for determining jurisdiction emerge, there from. For clarity these may be first separately enumerated as under:
(i) Where does the order of the termination of services operate?
(ii) Is there some nexus between the industrial dispute arising from termination of the services of the workman and the territory of the State?
(iii) That the well-known test of jurisdiction of a civil Court including the residence of the parties and the subject matter of the dispute substantially arising therein would be applicable.
By referring to the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure, the Patna High Court concluded that the suits of the employment would be a relevant factor for determining the jurisdiction of the concerned court.
11. In the case of Om Prakash Srivastava (supra), while determining as to what would constitute cause of action, the Supreme Court held as under:
12. The expression "cause of action" has acquired a judicially settled meaning. In the restricted sense "cause of action" means the circumstances forming the infraction of the right or the immediate occasion for the reaction. In the wider sense, it means the necessary conditions for the maintenance of the suit, including not only the infraction of the right, but also the infraction coupled with the right itself. Compendiously, as noted above, the expression means every fact, which it would be necessary for the plaintiff to prove, if traversed, in order to support his right to the judgment of the court. Every fact, which is necessary to be proved, as distinguished from every piece of evidence, which is necessary to prove each fact, comprises in "cause of action". See Rajasthan High Court Advocates' Assn. v. Union of India (2001) 2 SCC 294.
13. The expression "cause of action" has sometimes been employed to convey the restricted idea of facts or circumstances which constitute either the infringement or the basis of a right and no more. In a wider and more comprehensive sense, it has been used to denote the whole bundle of material facts, which a plaintiff must prove in order to succeed. These are all those essential facts without the proof of which the plaintiff must fail in his suit See Gurdit Singh v. Munsha Singh .
14. The expression "cause of action" is generally understood to mean a situation or state of facts that entitles a party to maintain an action in a court or a tribunal; a group of operative facts giving rise to one or more bases of suing; a factual situation that entitles one person to obtain a remedy in court from another person (see Black's Law Dictionary). In Stroud's Judicial Dictionary a "cause of action" is stated to be the entire set of facts that gives rise to an enforceable claim; the phrase comprises every fact, which if traversed, the plaintiff must prove in order to obtain judgment. In Words and Phrases (4th Edn.) the meaning attributed to the phrase "cause of action" in common legal parlance is existence of those facts, which give a party a right to judicial interference on his behalf. See Navinchandra N. Majithia v. State of Maharashtra .
12. In the case of Bikash Bhushan Ghosh (supra), the Supreme Court disagreed with the judgment of the Calcutta High Court in the case of Indian Express Newspaper (supra), wherein it was held that though the workman who was stationed at Calcutta office, and was rendering services in Calcutta at the relevant time was served with an order of termination of his services at Calcutta, as his services had been transferred to Bombay, it was the establishment at Bombay which had control over his services and therefore notwithstanding the fact that he had been served with an order at Calcutta, the situs of employment was in Bombay therefore he ought to have raised an industrial dispute relating to the termination of his services in Bombay as the Government of Maharashtra was the appropriate Government to make a reference of the dispute under Section 10 of the Industrial Disputes Act.
13. While taking note of the aforesaid judgment, the Supreme Court in the case of Bikash Bhushan Ghosh (supra), held as below:
Para 15 : With respect to the Division Bench, we do not think that it has posed unto itself a correct question of law. It is not in dispute that the appellants did not join their duties at the transferred places. According to them, as the orders of transfer were illegal, their services were terminated for not complying therewith. The assertion of the respondent that the appellant were relieved from job was unilateral. If the orders of transfer were to be set aside, they would be deemed to be continuing to be posted in Calcutta. The legality of the orders of transfer, thus, had a direct nexus with the orders of termination....
14. Taking note of the facts and circumstances of the present case, undoubtedly, the situs of the employment of the petitioner workman at the time of termination of his services was at Neemrana, Rajasthan. Thus the subject matter of the dispute substantially arose in the State of Rajasthan. Consequently, it has to be held that as the immediate occasion which resulted in the alleged infraction of the rights of the petitioner workman occurred in the State of Rajasthan, the courts in Delhi cannot be vested with territorial jurisdiction on the allegation that the head office of the respondent management is in Delhi or that the PF etc. was being deposited in Delhi or even that the Directors of the respondent management are residing in Delhi. In other words, by sifting out the extraneous factors on which the petitioner workman sought to place emphasis, there is only one conclusion that can be arrived at, which is that in the facts and circumstances of the present case, the cause of action which constituted an infringement of the rights of the petitioner workman arose at Rajasthan where he was lastly employed.
15. For the reasons stated above, it is held that there is no illegality, perversity or infirmity in the impugned award so as to warrant any interference with it by this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. The petition is therefore dismissed in liming.