Bombay High Court
Laxman Jijaba Musmade And Others vs Rahuri Sahakari Sakhar Karkhana Ltd. ... on 7 February, 1997
Equivalent citations: 1997(4)BOMCR452, (1998)ILLJ457BOM, 1997(3)MHLJ145
Author: D.D. Sinha
Bench: D.D. Sinha
JUDGMENT
1. The present Contempt Petition No. 6/97 is filed by one of the members of the original complainant Union in Complaint (ULP) No. 111/91 filed before the learned Member of the Industrial Court at Ahmednagar. The original complaint was for unfair labour practice under Sec. 28(1) read with items 5, 6, 9 and 10 of Schedule IV of the Maharashtra Recognition of Trade Unions and Prevention of Unfair Labour Practices Act, 1971. The said complaint was decided by the learned Member of the Industrial Court vide his order dated November 24, 1995, whereby it was declared that the present respondents had been engaged in unfair labour practice under Items 6 and 9. The respondents were directed to desist from engaging in such unfair labour practice and to make the petitioners permanent as Labourer with effect from the date of passing this order and provide them status, privileges and consequential benefits and shall make the petitioners permanent and were further directed to implement the above mentioned order within a period of three months from the date of passing of the order dated November 24, 1995.
2. Shri A. S. Wable, learned counsel for the petitioners contended that the present respondents did not comply with the directions issued by the Industrial Court vide an order dated November 24, 1995 within a period of three months and, therefore, they have committed the Contempt of the Court by not complying with the impugned order passed by the Industrial Court. In order to substantiate this contention, he has invited my attention to the provisions of S. 48 of the Maharashtra Recognition of Trade Unions and Prevention of Unfair Labour Practices Act, 1971. The learned counsel contended that sub-sec (5) of Section 48 onwards deals with contempts committed by any person in respect of Industrial or Labour Court and, according to him, this Court is therefore, entitled to take cognizance in respect of the same and also has a power to punish a person if found disobeying the orders passed either by the Labour Court or the Industrial Court. The learned counsel for the petitioners placed reliance on the judgment of the Supreme Court .
3. This Court vide order dated January 10, 1997 issued notice before admission to the respondents and in pursuance of the same. Mr. Babu Marlapalle, Advocate contended that the controversy in question is concluded by the Division Bench decision of this Court reported in 1979 MLJ 325 and, therefore the contempt petition preferred by the petitioners is not maintainable and cognizance in respect of the same may not be taken.
4. Heard Mr. A. S. Wable, Advocate for petitioners and Mr. Babu Marlapalle, Advocate for B. B. Yenge for respondents perused the impugned order passed by the Member of the Industrial Court and above mentioned judgment cited by the counsel.
5. It is, however, true that the Division Bench of this Court in para 7, Wazirkhan Sherkhan v. Prop. M/s. Shrikrishna 1979 MLJ 325 held thus :
"7 Thus, a wilful disobsence to an order or direction of the Court constitutes civil contempt under the Contempt of Courts Act. Now it is important to note that sub-section (5) of Section 48 does not seem to contem-plate the concept of civil contempt and the acts or conduct referred to in sub-sec (5) clearly fall within the category of criminal contempt. Disobedience of an order of a Court which amounts to civil contempt is not in terms referred to in sub-section (5), and in our view for good reasons. It must be pointed out that provisions relating to punishment for Contempt of Court are clearly in the nature of penal provisions and such provisions will therefore, have to be strictly construed, especially when punishment for Contempt of Court has been provided by the Legislature by making a deeming provision. Therefore, unless we are satisfied that the act of omission or conduct in respect of which action for Contempt of Court is sought under the provisions of the Act, i.e. Sec. 48, squarely falls within the four corners, of sub-sec. (5) of Section 48, it will not he possible to hold that any act, omission or conduct amounts to Contempt of Court. The reason why disobedience of an order is not fictionally made, Contempt of Court appears to us to be that penalty has already been provided for such disobedience. Any attempt to stretch the wordings of Sec. 48(5) to include disobedience of an order like the one in the instant case, would be defeating the scheme of Sec. 48. We have earlier pointed out that disobedience of an order under Sec. 30, sub-sec. (2) is expressly made an offence, indeed a cognizable offence for which penalty has been provided in the form of imprisonment which may extend to three months or with fine which may extend to five thousand rupees. The provision relating to trial of offences under the Act are made under Chapter VIII where power has been given to Labour Court under Sec. 38 to try offences punishable under the Act. It is difficult to contemplate that having provided for a penalty on conviction for disobedience of an order under Sec. 30(2), the Legislature would again contemplate punishment for the same act by way of action for Contempt of Court. Normally, such an intention should not he inferred unless there are express words to that effect. It is obvious from the report of the Industrial Court that the conduct on the basis of which the Industrial Court was inclined to take the view that prima facie the employee is guilty of Contempt of Court, was his disobedience of the interim Order. We are not required in these proceeding, having regard to the view which we have taken, to go into the question as to whether the disobedience was wilful or not and whether disobedience of such an order in the instant case would amount to an offence under See. 48(1) or not. But it appears to he clear to us that the provisions of Sec. 48(5) must clearly exclude from its purview the orders contemplated by Sec. 48(1) in respect of which a specific penalty has been provided in the form of conviction and sentence or fine."
6. If the ratio of the abovementioned Division Bench is taken into consideration it is amply clear that sub-sec. (5) of Sec. 48 of the Maharashtra Recognition of Trade Unions and Prevention of Unfair Labour Practices Act, 1971 does not contemplate the concept of Civil contempt and the language of sub-sec (5) would clearly fall within the category of criminal contempt. The Division Bench of this Court in the above mentioned judgment has exhaustively considered the pros and cons of Section 48 of the MRTU & PULP Act, 1971 and had held that sub-sec. (5) of Section 48 does not seem to contemplate the concept of civil contempt and the acts and conduct referred to in sub-sec. (5) clearly fall within the category of criminal contempt. The disobedience of an order under sub-see. (2) of Sec. 30 is expressly made an offence for which the penalty has been provided and, therefore, it is difficult to accept that the Legislature would have again intended to provide punishment for the same act by way of action for contempt of Court.
7. In the circumstances of the present case, therefore, it will not be possible for me to hold that the present respondent i.e. employer was guilty of the Contempt of Court as contemplated by See. 48 sub-sec. (5) of the Act. Hence the present Contempt Petition is dismissed and the respondents are discharged from the contempt proceedings.