Jharkhand High Court
Munesh Yadav Aged About 40 Years vs The State Of Jharkhand on 4 December, 2025
Author: Sujit Narayan Prasad
Bench: Sujit Narayan Prasad
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JHARKHAND AT RANCHI
Cr. Appeal (DB) No.1474 of 2024
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1. Munesh Yadav aged about 40 years, son of Natho Yadav,
2. Pawan Kumar Yadav aged about 29 years, son of Natho Yadav, Both resident of Village-Bhatbigha, P.O. & P.S.-Chauparan, District-Hazaribagh;
3. Naresh Yadav aged about 26 years, son of Mahaveer Yadav resident of village-Urwan, P.O. & P.S.-Chandwara, District-
Koderma. .... .... Appellants
Versus
The State of Jharkhand ..... .... Respondent
CORAM : HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE SUJIT NARAYAN PRASAD HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE ARUN KUMAR RAI
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For Appellant No.1 : Mr. Anil Kumar, Sr. Advocate Mr. Randhir Kumar, Advocate For the State : Mr. Subodh Kr. Dubey, A.P.P. For O.P. No.2 : Mr. Nilesh Kumar, Advocate Mr. Kumar Amit, Advocate
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C.A.V. on 17.11.2025 Pronounced on 04/12/2025 I.A. No.5732 of 2025 Prayer
1. The instant interlocutory application has been filed on behalf of appellant no.1, namely, Munesh Yadav under Section 430(1) of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 for suspension of sentence dated 30.09.2024 passed by the learned Additional Sessions Judge-I, Koderma, in connection with S.T. No.76 of 2018, arising out of Chandwara P.S. Case No.16 of 2018, whereby and whereunder, the appellant has been convicted and sentenced and all the sentences have been directed to concurrently as follows: -
1
sl Offences Sentence (R.I.) Fine Sentence
under (Rs.) in default
Sections of payment
of fine
(S.I.)
1 302/34 IPC R.I. for whole 50,0 S.I. for 2
natural life (i.e. till 00/- years
last breath)
2 120B IPC R.I. for whole 50,0 S.I. for 2
natural life (i.e. till 00/- years
last breath)
3 307/34 IPC R.I. for 10 years 5,00 S.I. for 6
0/- months
4 03 of R.I. for 12 years 5,00 S.I. for 6
Explosive 0/- months
Substance
Act
5 04 of R.I. for 10 years 5,00 S.I. for 6
Explosive 0/- months
Substance
Act
Factual Matrix
2. The case of the prosecution in brief, as per the written report dated 13.02.2018 of the informant Hemlata Devi that on 13.02.2018 at about 2:30 O' Clock in the day, her husband Shankar Yadav along with his private bodyguard Krishna Yadav (now deceased) and driver Dharmendra Yadav, from his Scorpio Vehicle, had gone at his mines and crusher unit situated at village-Bhatbigha, P.S.-Chauparan, District- 2 Hazaribagh. Meanwhile, at about 4:25 O' Clock in the evening, she got information that while running to his home from there, near Pradeep Singh's mines on the road, by causing a bomb explosion, the said Scorpio vehicle of her husband was blown out, in which her husband died on the spot and his private bodyguard also died at Sadar Hospital, Koderma, and the driver Dharmendra Yadav (PW12) was referred to RIMS, Ranchi, for treatment in a serious condition.
3. It has been alleged therein that for the last 4-5 years, a dispute and a case in the court regarding mines and other money transactions, was going on with her villagers, namely, Jivlal Yadav, Ashok Yadav (A-5), Vijay Yadav and Shankar Yadav, all sons of Late Gulli Yadav.
4. It has also been alleged that a dispute regarding stone mines was also going on between her husband and the accused Munesh Yadav (A-1) (present applicant/appellant), who is a resident of Village Bhatbhigha, under Chauparan P.S., District- Hazaribagh.
5. It has been further alleged that before this occurrence, the said persons, in order to grab the mines of the informant and her husband, in conspiracy with each other and in order to commit murder of her husband (Shankar Yadav) had inflicted gun-shot injury to her husband on 24.10.2017, regarding which 3 Chauparan P.S. Case No. 246/2017 (Ext.-5) had been lodged. But for want of proper investigation in that case and 'due to no arrest of the accused in that case on time, the accused of that case, connived with extremists' association.
6. She has stated that she had also came to know that the said accused persons were conspiring to commit murder of her husband in connivance with the extremist associations. It has further been alleged that the said persons have committed murder of her husband in a well-planned manner, in conspiracy with each other and also with the help of extremists.
7. On the basis of the above written report, Chandwara P.S. Case No.16/2018 dated 13.02.2018 under Sections 147/148/149/302/120-B of the I.P.C. and Sections 3/4/5 of Explosive Substance Act, was registered against the accused persons, namely, Jivlal Yadav, Ashok Yadav, Vijay Yadav, Shankar Yadav and Munesh Yadav (present applicant/appellant).
8. During investigation of the case, accused persons were arrested and their confessional statements were recorded and recovery of mobile phones sets and others incriminating materials were recovered from them. The statement of some of the witnesses were also recorded under Section 164 Cr.P.C. 4
9. On conclusion of investigation of the case, Charge Sheet No. 28/2018 dated 17.05.2018 for the offences under Sections 302/307/326/120-B/34 of I.P.C and Sections 3/4/5 of Explosive Substance Act was submitted against the accused persons, namely, Munesh Yadav (present applicant/appellant), Ashok Yadav, Pawan Yadav, Sudeep Yadav (already produced before J.J.B. as a juvenile), Naresh Yadav and Ramdeo Yadav, keeping further investigation pending against other accused persons, namely, Jivlal Yadav, Vijay Yadav and Shankar Yadav.
10. On the basis of the said Charge Sheet, vide order dated 18.05.2018 cognizance of said offence was taken against the said accused persons and thereafter, vide order dated 25.07.2018, the case against the accused persons was committed before the Sessions Judge, Koderma. On the basis aforesaid thereof, this case, i.e., S.T. No. 76 /2018 was registered in the Court of the Sessions Judge.
11. From the record, it is evident that one of the accused, namely, Sudeep Yadav, was found to be a juvenile at the time of his arrest by the police and his production before the learned Judicial Magistrate, and accordingly, his split-up case record was sent to learned J.J. Board, Koderma, for inquiry/trial. Charges, as stated above, were framed against the remaining 5 accused persons on 02.02.2019, to which, they pleaded not guilty and claimed trial.
12. In order to substantiate the prosecution case, prosecution has examined altogether 32 witnesses and the learned trial court after appreciation of evidence has found the charges levelled against the present applicant/appellant along with other accused persons, have been proved beyond all reasonable doubts and accordingly, the present applicant/appellant has been convicted and sentenced, as aforesaid.
13. The instant interlocutory application has been preferred by the applicant/appellant no.1, namely, Munesh Yadav with the prayer for the suspension of sentence during pendency of the instant appeal.
Submission of the learned Senior Counsel for the appellant
14. It has been contended on behalf of the appellant that the learned trial court has miserably failed to take into consideration the fact that the entire case is based upon the circumstantial evidence and there is no eye witness to show the culpability of the present appellant in the alleged offence.
15. The learned trial court has also failed to appreciate the fact that the alleged tempo bearing registration no. JH-10AH-5219 from which the explosion was made, was in possession of the 6 appellant/applicant.
16. It has further been submitted that the entire case of the prosecution rests on the confessional statement of the convicts, though, the Investigating Officer who has been examined as P.W-32, has made statement specifically that in the CCTV footage, the number of the alleged Tempo was not visible.
17. It has also been submitted that the Investigating Officer has made categorical statement that in course of investigation, he came to know that the present appellant, namely, Munesh Yadav, has purchased one Tempo from co-convict, Ramdev Yadav, however, the source of such information has not been disclosed by the Investigating Officer nor any witness has supported the factum of purchase of alleged tempo by the present appellant.
18. It has been submitted that none of the witnesses have seen the explosion in the tempo nor any witnesses have stated that explosives were loaded on the tempo.
19. It has further been submitted that in the cases of the circumstantial evidence, the Court is required to be more circumspect to see and ensure that there is no missing link in the chain of circumstances to come to a conclusion of guilt of the accused but in the facts of the present case, there is no chain of the circumstance, to point out the guilt of the 7 appellant/applicant, rather, there is not a single circumstance to point out the guilt of the appellant/applicant.
20. Moreover, the present appellant, namely, Munesh Yadav is languishing in judicial custody since 19.02.2018.
21. Lastly, the learned senior counsel has raised the issue of parity and contended that since the other accused persons Ramdeo Yadav, Pawan Kumar Yadav and Naresh Yadav have been allowed to be released from judicial custody after suspension of sentence by the Coordinate Bench of this Court vide orders dated 23.04.2025, 21.07.2025 and 23.04.2025 passed in Cr. Appeal (DB) No.1369 of 2024 and Cr. Appeal (DB) No.1474 of 2024 respectively, therefore, present applicant/appellant is also entitled for suspension of sentence during pendency of the instant appeal.
22. Learned counsel, based upon the aforesaid grounds, has submitted that it is a fit case for suspension of sentence during pendency of the appeal.
Submission of the learned A.P.P for the respondent-State and learned counsel for the Informant
23. While on the other hand, learned A.P.P. appearing for the respondent-State assisted by learned counsel for the Informant have vehemently opposed the prayer for suspension of sentence.
24. It has been contended that the plan was well devised by 8 Munesh Yadav, the present appellant, who was provided shelter by Ramdeo Yadav at his in-laws house after the incident.
25. Further, it has been contended that P.W-25, who was an officer of the recovery agency engaged by UCO Bank had managed to purchase a Tempo which was subsequently handed over to Munesh Yadav, who had executed his plan of eliminating Shankar Yadav and from the aforesaid, it is apparent that chain of circumstances has been completed which are sufficient to prove the guilt of present appellant.
26. It has further been contended that the culpability and role of the present applicant/appellant in the alleged commission of crime is different to that of role of the other co-accused who have been granted bail by the co-ordinate Bench of this Court, as such, law of parity will not be applicable herein and further, it is settled connotation of law that Court cannot exercise its power in a capricious manner and has to consider the totality of circumstances before granting bail and by only simply saying that another accused has been granted bail is not sufficient to determine whether a case for grant of bail on the basis of parity has been established.
27. It has been contended that there was previous enmity of the present applicant with the deceased and this fact has been substantiated by the informant who had stated that a dispute 9 regarding stone mines was also going on between her husband and the accused Munesh Yadav (A-1) (present applicant/appellant), who is a resident of Village Bhatbhigha, under Chauparan P.S., District - Hazaribagh.
28. Learned State Counsel as also the learned counsel for the Informant, based upon the aforesaid grounds, has submitted that there is material available on record, based upon which, the learned trial Court has found the charge proved beyond all reasonable doubts and hence, it is not a fit case for suspension of sentence during pendency of the instant appeal. Analysis
29. We have heard the learned counsel for the parties and gone across the finding recorded by the learned trial court in the impugned judgment, as also, the testimony of the witnesses along with other exhibits, as available in the Trial Court Records.
30. Since, it is case under Section 302 IPC and present appellant/applicant has been convicted for offence of murder therefore, at this juncture, it requires to refer herein the settled position of law that in cases involving conviction under Section 302 IPC, it is only in exceptional cases that the benefit of suspension of sentence can be granted, reference in this regard may be made to the judgment rendered by the Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Omprakash Sahni v. Jai Shankar 10 Chaudhary, (2023) 6 SCC 123, for ready reference, the relevant paragraphs of the aforesaid Judgment are being quoted as under:
"31. In Vijay Kumar v. Narendra [Vijay Kumar v. Narendra, (2002) 9 SCC 364 : 2003 SCC (Cri) 1195] and Ramji Prasad v. Rattan Kumar Jaiswal [Ramji Prasad v. Rattan Kumar Jaiswal, (2002) 9 SCC 366 : 2003 SCC (Cri) 1197] , it was held by this Court that in cases involving conviction under Section 302IPC, it is only in exceptional cases that the benefit of suspension of sentence can be granted. In Vijay Kumar [Vijay Kumar v.
Narendra, (2002) 9 SCC 364 : 2003 SCC (Cri) 1195] , it was held that in considering the prayer for bail in a case involving a serious offence like murder punishable under Section 302IPC, the court should consider the relevant factors like the nature of accusation made against the accused, the manner in which the crime is alleged to have been committed, the gravity of the offence, and the desirability of releasing the accused on bail after they have been convicted for committing the serious offence of murder.
33. Bearing in mind the aforesaid principles of law, the endeavour on the part of the court, therefore, should be to see as to whether the case presented by the prosecution and accepted by the trial court can be said to be a case in which, ultimately the convict stands for fair chances of acquittal. If the answer to the abovesaid question is to be in the affirmative, as a necessary corollary, we shall have to say that, if ultimately the convict appears to be entitled to have an acquittal at the hands of this Court, he should not be kept behind the bars for a pretty long time till the conclusion of the appeal, which usually takes very long for decision and disposal. However, while undertaking the exercise to ascertain whether the convict has fair chances of acquittal, what is to be looked into is something palpable. To put it in other words, something which is very apparent or gross on the face of the record, on the basis of which, the court can arrive at a prima facie satisfaction that the conviction may not 11 be sustainable. The appellate court should not reappreciate the evidence at the stage of Section 389 CrPC and try to pick up a few lacunae or loopholes here or there in the case of the prosecution. Such would not be a correct approach."
31. The Hon'ble Supreme Court recently on 09th April, 2025, in the case of Janardan Ray Vs. The State of Bihar & Anr. ETC. (Cr. Appeal Nos. 1892-1893 of 2025 arising out of SLP (Crl.) Nos. 18326-18327 of 2024) while placing reliance upon decision rendered in the case of Om Prakash Sahni Vs. Jai Shankar Chaudhary and Anr., (supra) has observed at paragraphs-6 and 7 as under:
"6. In our opinion, the decision of this Court in the case of Om Prakash Sahni Vs. Jai Shankar Chaudhary and Anr. (2023) 6 SCC 123 clinches the issue involved in the present appeals. It has been observed while considering the scope of Section 389 of Cr.P.C as under.:-
"30. In Kishori Lal v. Rupa [Kishori Lal v. Rupa, (2004) 7 SCC 638], this Court has indicated the factors that require to be considered by the courts while granting benefit under Section 389 CrPC in cases involving serious offences like murder, etc. Thus, it is useful to refer to the observations made therein, which are as follows : (SCC pp. 639-40, paras 4-6)
4. Section 389 of the Code deals with suspension of execution of sentence pending the appeal and release of the appellant on bail. There is a distinction between bail and suspension of sentence. One of the essential ingredients of Section 389 is the requirement for the appellate court to record reasons in writing for ordering suspension of execution of the sentence or order appealed against. If he is in confinement, the said court can direct that he be released on bail or on his own bond. The requirement of recording reasons in writing clearly indicates that 12 there has to be careful consideration of the relevant aspects and the order directing suspension of sentence and grant of bail should not be passed as a matter of routine.
5. The appellate court is duty-bound to objectively assess the matter and to record reasons for the conclusion that the case warrants suspension of execution of sentence and grant of bail. In the instant case, the only factor which seems to have weighed with the High Court for directing suspension of sentence and grant of bail is the absence of allegation of misuse of liberty during the earlier period when the accused- respondents were on bail.
6. The mere fact that during the trial, they were granted bail and there was no allegation of misuse of liberty, is really not of much significance. The effect of bail granted during trial loses significance when on completion of trial, the accused persons have been found guilty. The mere fact that during the period when the accused persons were on bail during trial there was no misuse of liberties, does not per se warrant suspension of execution of sentence and grant of bail. What really was necessary to be considered by the High Court is whether reasons existed to suspend the execution of sentence and thereafter grant bail. The High Court does not seem to have kept the in view.
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7. Having regard to the afore stated settled legal position, we are of the opinion that the High Court has committed gross error in appreciating the evidence already appreciated by the Trial Court at the time of considering the applications seeking suspension of sentence pending the appeal. Since this was a case of conviction under Section 302 IPC, the initial presumption available to the accused before conviction, would not be available to him. The High Court could not have suspended the sentence, reappreciating the evidence at the stage of Section 389 and trying to pick up a few lacunae or loopholes here or there 13 in the case of prosecution. The consideration of High Court to the submission made on behalf of the accused that he had not misused the liberty during the trial or that the appeal was not likely to be heard in near future, could not be said to be the proper consideration for suspending the sentence of the accused, who have been convicted for the serious offence under Section 302, IPC. It is only in rare and exceptional circumstances, the benefit of suspension of sentence should be granted by the appellate court to the accused convicted for the serious offence under Section 302, IPC."
32. Thus, it is evident from perusal of the relevant paragraphs of the aforesaid judgment, is it is apparent that while considering the prayer for bail, in a case involving a serious offence like murder punishable under Section 302 IPC, the Court should consider the relevant factors like the nature of accusation made against the accused, the manner, in which, the crime is alleged to have been committed, the gravity of the offence, and the desirability of releasing the accused on bail after they have been convicted for committing the serious offence of murder.
33. It is further evident from perusal of the relevant paragraphs of the aforesaid judgment that the appellate court should not reappreciate the evidence at the stage of consideration of suspension of sentence and try to pick up a few lacunae or loopholes here or there in the case of the prosecution. Such would not be a correct approach and at this stage Court is only to see the prima facie case for its satisfaction. 14
34. Further, the Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Preet Pal Singh vs. State of U.P., (2020) 8 SCC 645 has observed that there is difference between grant of bail in case of pre-trial arrest and suspension of sentence, post- conviction. In the earlier case, there may be presumption of innocence, which is a fundamental postulate of criminal jurisprudence, and the courts may be liberal, depending on the facts and circumstances of the case, however, in case of post- conviction bail, by suspension of operation of the sentence, there is a finding of guilt and the question of presumption of innocence does not arise. For ready reference the relevant paragraph of the aforesaid judgment is being quoted as under:
"35. There is a difference between grant of bail under Section 439 CrPC in case of pre-trial arrest and suspension of sentence under Section 389 CrPC and grant of bail, post conviction. In the earlier case, there may be presumption of innocence, which is a fundamental postulate of criminal jurisprudence, and the courts may be liberal, depending on the facts and circumstances of the case, on the principle that bail is the rule and jail is an exception, as held by this Court in Dataram Singh v. State of U.P. [Dataram Singh v. State of U.P., (2018) 3 SCC 22 : (2018) 1 SCC (Cri) 675] However, in case of post- conviction bail, by suspension of operation of the sentence, there is a finding of guilt and the question of presumption of innocence does not arise. Nor is the principle of bail being the rule and jail an exception attracted, once there is conviction upon trial. Rather, the court considering an application for suspension of sentence and grant of bail, is to consider the prima facie merits of the appeal, coupled with other factors. There should be strong compelling reasons for grant of bail, notwithstanding an order of conviction, by suspension of 15 sentence, and this strong and compelling reason must be recorded in the order granting bail, as mandated in Section 389(1) CrPC."
35. Thus, it is evident from the aforesaid judgment, that during considering suspension of sentence which is the post-conviction stage, the presumption of innocence in favour of the accused cannot be available and at this stage, the Court's only duty is to see that the prima-facie case is made out or not and as such the detailed appreciation of evidence is not required at this stage.
36. Thus, from the aforesaid, it is evident that the Hon'ble Apex Court has categorically observed that since after conviction, the initial presumption available to the accused before conviction, would not be available to him, therefore the High Court could not have suspended the sentence, reappreciating the evidence at the stage of Section 389 and trying to pick up a few lacunae or loopholes here or there in the case of prosecution.
37. It has further been observed by the Hon'ble Apex Court that the consideration of High Court to the submission made on behalf of the accused that he had not misused the liberty during the trial or that the appeal was not likely to be heard in near future, could not be said to be the proper consideration for suspending the sentence of the accused, who have been convicted for the serious offence under Section 302, IPC and it is only in rare and exceptional circumstances, the benefit of suspension of 16 sentence should be granted by the appellate court to the accused convicted for the serious offence under Section 302, IPC.
38. In the backdrop of the aforesaid settled proposition of law this Court is now adverting to the factual aspect of the case as well as the contention of the learned counsel for the appellant and State as also the informant, in order to find out that whether the prayer of the applicant/appellant for suspension of sentence is fit to be allowed or not.
39. Learned counsel for the applicant/appellant has contended that there is no eyewitness to the occurrence and the entire case is based on circumstantial evidence wherein chain of the circumstances has not been completed and the prosecution has proceeded on imaginary theory and this fact has not been appreciated by the learned Trial Court in the right perspective.
40. In the aforesaid context it needs to refer herein that there is no dispute about the settled position of law that the conviction on the basis of circumstantial evidences, the proper consideration is to be there by the learned trial court on the basis of principle of completion of chain and the moment, the chain will break, there cannot be conviction on the basis of the said circumstances.
41. It requires to refer herein that the Hon'ble Apex Court in the year 1952, in the judgment rendered in Hanumant Son of 17 Govind Nargundkar vs. State of Madhya Pradesh [AIR 1952 SC 343] has laid down the parameters under which, the case of circumstantial evidence is to be evaluated, which suggests that - "It is well to remember that in cases where the evidence is of a circumstantial nature, the circumstances from which the conclusion of guilt is to be drawn should in the first instance be fully established, and all the facts so established should be consistent only with the hypothesis of the guilt of the accused. Again, the circumstances should be of a conclusive nature and tendency and they should be such as to exclude every hypothesis but the one proposed to be proved. In other words, there must be a chain of evidence so far complete as not to leave any reasonable ground for a conclusion consistent with the innocence of the accused and it must be such as to show that within all human probability the act must have been done by the accused. ......"
42. The judgment referred in Hanumant (supra) has been consistently followed by Hon'ble Apex Court in the judgment rendered in Tufail (Alias) Simmi Vs. State of Uttar Pradesh [(1969) 3 SCC 198]; Ram Gopal Vs. State of Maharashtra [(1972) 4 SCC 625] and Sharad Birdhichand Sarda Vs. State of Maharashtra [(1984) 4 SCC 116] and also in Musheer Khan alias Badshah Khan & Anr. Vs. State of Madhya Pradesh [(2010) 2 SCC 748].
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43. Thus, it is evident that for proving the charge on the basis of circumstantial evidence, it would be necessary that evidence so available must induce a reasonable man to come to a definite conclusion of proving of guilt; meaning thereby there must be a chain of evidence so far it is complete as not to leave any reasonable ground for a conclusion consistent with the innocence of the accused and it must be such as to show that within all human probability the act must have been done by the accused.
44. This Court, on the basis aforesaid settled position of law has gone through the testimony of the witnesses as well as material available on record in order to find out that the prayer of the applicant/appellant for suspension of sentence is fit to be allowed or not.
45. Admittedly, from impugned judgment of conviction, it is evident that the instant case is based upon the circumstantial evidences and further, there is no eye-witnesses of the alleged occurrence.
46. P.W-1, informant (wife of the deceased) had testified that she came to know that accused Munesh Yadav (appellant herein), Jivlal Yadav, Vijay Yadav, Ashok Yadav, Shankar Yadav had caused explosion at the place of occurrence and had blown up their Scorpio by keeping / planting bomb in an auto rickshaw (tempo) under conspiracy and thereby, they committed murder 19 of her husband. In para 10, PW 1 has further deposed that on 24.10.2017, the accused Munesh Yadav (A-1) had inflicted gunshot injury to her husband, regarding which, she had lodged a case at Chauparan Police Station. She had further stated in the cross examination that one Nathu Yadav (father of accused Munesh Yadav, appellant herein) was the khatiyani raiyat, who had sold the land to her husband, but he was still claiming that land and, in this regard, a Civil Suit had also been filed by Natho Yadav, which was decided in their (informant's) favour.
47. Thus, from the testimony of P.W.-1 prima facie, it appears that there was inimical relationship between present applicant and the deceased. Further the aforesaid fact of the inimical relationship between the deceased and present appellant has been substantiated by the testimony of P.W.2-wife of deceased private bodyguard, namely, Krishna Yadav who had also stated that about three months prior to the occurrence also, her husband was working with the deceased Shankar Yadav, when accused Munesh Yadav had caused gunshot injury to Shankar Yadav and after that occurrence, a scuffle had taken place between her husband and accused Munesh Yadav, in which Munesh Yadav had caused injury on the head of her husband with the butt of the gun, due to which, her husband had to be given two stitches on his head.
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48. P.W. - 25, namely, Sachin Kumar Barnwal, is engaged in the business of sale and purchase of second hand four wheelers and he is an employee of "Air Agency and Services Pvt. Ltd.", a private recovery company. He is also dealing in the vehicles seized by banks, who had stated that he handed tempo bearing registration No. JH-10AH-5219 to the accused Ramdeo Yadav at Barhi Chowk. At para-8, he has identified the accused Ramdeo Yadav in the court by saying that he had sold out that tempo to him.
49. P.W. - 32, namely, Inspector Kailash Prasad Yadav, is the Investigating Officer (I.O) of this case. He had also stated that the Scorpio vehicle of deceased Shankar Yadav bearing registration No. JH 12F-0858 was lying badly damaged in the south direction of the road and the road is there in east - west direction and the face of the Scorpio was in east direction. He has further stated that different scattered parts of a tempo, as its remnants, were also found lying on the same road in the same direction in which the said Scorpio was lying.
50. He was informed that the dead body of deceased Shankar Yadav was also found lying near his damaged Scorpio in the south side. He was further told that the Scorpio of Shankar Yadav was going from towards Salhara to Chandwara, and as soon as the Scorpio got slowed down near the said temporary speed breaker, a huge explosion took place in the tempo 21 standing there from before, and due to this explosion, the said Scorpio got damaged and the occupants of the same, namely, Shankar Yadav, his private bodyguard Krishan Yadav and Driver-Dharmendra Yadav got seriously injured, causing death of Shankar Yadav on the spot itself.
51. He had further stated that he again went to the place of occurrence on 14.02.2018 and made a seizure list (Ext. 11/ 2) regarding damaged Scorpio, damaged tempo, a rifle with magazine and 09 cartridges and sent the same for examination at the FSL, Ranchi. At para-33, he has stated that on 13.02.2018, several calls were made between the above- mentioned mobile phone numbers of Pawan Yadav, Ramdeo Yadav, Munesh Yadav and Sudeep Yadav. At para-54, he has stated that another mobile phone number of Ramdeo Yadav was found to be 9931956050 and on the date of occurrence, i.e., 13.02.2018, several calls had been made between Munesh Yadav (appellant herein) and Ramdeo Yadav from 16:48:45 till 21:22:06 hours.
52. At para-60, P.W.-32 (I.O.) has further deposed that on 20.08.2018, confessional statement of accused Munesh Yadav was recorded in which he confessed his guilt. This witness in his testimony had stated that then he proceeded to village - Parhariya, from where electric wire of 1.5 metre length was recovered at the instance of Munesh Yadav (appellant herein), 22 which was seized by making a seizure list in his handwriting and signature. The photocopy of that seizure list has been marked as X / 3 for identification.
53. At para-65, he has stated that on the disclosure made by accused Munesh Yadav, he reached on the banks of Konar River and from there, he recovered splinters of iron, which were seized by making a seizure list (the photocopy whereof is Marked as X / 4 for identification). He had further deposed at para-67 that thereafter, he reached Patratu Basti at "Omkar Accessories" shop of one Chandan Kumar, who disclosed that he had sold the said remote control to accused Munesh Yadav and he also identified Munesh Yadav at that time.
54. He had further stated that on the disclosure made by accused Munesh Yadav, he reached at Vishwakarma Garage at Hurhuru, where, for sampling, iron pipe etc. had been cut. At that shop, statements of witnesses Subhash Vishwakarma and Md. Imran were recorded, who disclosed that in their garage, the work of iron pipe cutting had been got done by accused Munesh Yadav and bolts had also been affixed over the same and they had made setting in the tempo as told by Munesh Yadav. At para-107, he had stated that the said tempo had been purchased by the accused Munesh Yadav from Ramdeo Yadav on the pretext of transporting diesel over the same.
55. Thus, from the aforesaid, it is evident that recovery of 23 incriminating articles has been made on the basis of the confessional statement of the present appellant and further the fact of suitable changes made in the said tempo for purpose of fitting of the explosive has come on the record.
56. Thus, Prima facie, it appears that earlier the accused Munesh Yadav planned and conspired to eliminate Shankar Yadav (deceased) and for this purpose, he also made a murderous attack on him by firing bullet shots on him in which Shankar Yadav got seriously injured and had to be hospitalized and regarding the same, a case under Section 307 of I.P.C. etc. was lodged against Munesh Yadav (present case and other case being Chauparan P.S. Case No. 246 / 2017 (marked as Ext. 5).
57. Further, from a bare perusal of the photographs (Exts. 62 to 62 /4) of both the vehicles, i.e., tempo and the Scorpio, with FSL report (Exts. 58, 59 & 60) and the postmortem reports (Exts. 19 & 19 / 1), it is evident that explosion took place in the tempo. Prima facie, it has come on record that accused Ramdeo Yadav had admitted that he supplied tempo to accused Munesh Yadav (appellant herein) and this fact has also been supported by P.W. - 25 and P.W. - 26, who had delivered the said tempo to accused Ramdeo Yadav at Barhi Further, the allegation of making special addition and alteration in that vehicle and preparing of iron splinters have been supported by 24 P.W.-8 and P.W.-9 who had stated that P.W. - 8 Md. Altaf and P.W. - 9 Shankar Vishwakarma that several days prior to the occurrence, accused Munesh Yadav had reached on their welding shop with the said blue tempo and got several works done in the same including fixing of plate etc. and cutting of 600 - 700 iron splinters of about 2 -3 inches size.
58. Thus, it is clear that the said blue coloured tempo was sold out by accused Ramdeo Yadav to accused Munesh Yadav and subsequently, Munesh Yadav had got some suitable work / settings done in the said tempo.
59. Further, the Chassis No. of the blown-up tempo was however visible in the scattered parts of the tempo, which was seized from the spot, alongwith other materials, i.e., Scorpio, rifle etc., which is clear from the seizure list (Ext. 11 / 2) dated 14.02.2018. Vide the seizure list (Ext. 11/2), Chassis No. MDGDAGLXICAPO2959 of the said tempo was also seized. The same Chassis Number has been mentioned in the document (Ext. F) which is certified copy of the particular of the tempo issue by the D.T.O. Office, Dhanbad. Further, the same Chassis Number has also been mentioned in the Certificate dated 16.02.2018 (Ext. G) of the UCO Bank, Hirapur Branch, for which that tempo was seized by the recovery agency through P.W. 25 Sachin Barnwal.
60. Thus, prima facie it appears that the finding of the learned trial 25 court that the same tempo with the same Chassis No. which was seized by the Bank and was subsequently transferred to Ramdeo Yadav who later given it to the present appellant, was planted with explosives and it got blown up in the occurrence, after which, its Chassis No. was found lying on the spot and was subsequently seized by I.O. (P.W. 32) by the seizure list (Ext. 11 / 2).
61. On the basis of discussions made hereinabove, prima facie this Court is of the view that that all the chain of the circumstances clearly point out to the guilt of the appellant/accused in the alleged commission of crime.
Issue of parity
62. The learned counsel has raised the issue of parity and contended that since the other accused persons have been granted bail, therefore, present applicant/appellant is also eligible for suspension of sentence during pendency of the instant appeal. The learned counsel further raised the issue of custody as the appellant is in custody since 19.02.2018.
63. In the aforesaid context, it needs to refer herein that this Court is conscious with the settled position of law that the issue of parity, is to be taken into consideration but the same is to be taken into consideration by applying the factual aspect along with the surrounding facts, as has been held by Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Tarun Kumar vs. Assistant Director 26 Directorate of Enforcement, 2023 SCC OnLine SC 1486 wherein, it has held as under:
"18. The submission of learned Counsel Mr. Luthra to grant bail to the appellant on the ground that the other co accused who were similarly situated as the appellant, have been granted bail, also cannot be accepted. It may be noted that parity is not the law. While applying the principle of parity, the Court is required to focus upon the role attached to the accused whose application is under consideration."
64. The Hon'ble Apex Court has further observed in the aforesaid judgment, i.e., Tarun Kumar vs. Assistant Director Directorate of Enforcement (supra) that it is axiomatic that the principle of parity is based on the guarantee of positive equality before law enshrined in Article 14 of the Constitution. However, if any illegality or irregularity has been committed in favour of any individual or a group of individuals, or a wrong order has been passed by a judicial forum, others cannot invoke the jurisdiction of the higher or superior court for repeating or multiplying the same irregularity or illegality or for passing similar wrong order. Article 14 is not meant to perpetuate the illegality or irregularity. If there has been a benefit or advantage conferred on one or a set of people by any authority or by the court, without legal basis or justification, other persons could not claim as a matter of right the benefit on the basis of such wrong decision.
65. It is further settled connotation of law that Court cannot exercise 27 its power in a capricious manner and has to consider the totality of circumstances before granting bail and by only simply saying that another accused has been granted bail is not sufficient to determine whether a case for grant of bail on the basis of parity has been established. Reference in this regard may be made to the judgment rendered by the Hon'ble Apex Court in Ramesh Bhavan Rathod vs. Vishanbhai Hirabhai Makwana, (2021) 6 SCC 230, wherein, it has been held as under:
"25. We are constrained to observe that the orders passed by the High Court granting bail fail to pass muster under the law. They are oblivious to, and innocent of, the nature and gravity of the alleged offences and to the severity of the punishment in the event of conviction. In Neeru Yadav v. State of U.P. [Neeru Yadav v. State of U.P., (2014) 16 SCC 508 : (2015) 3 SCC (Cri) 527], this Court has held that while applying the principle of parity, the High Court cannot exercise its powers in a capricious manner and has to consider the totality of circumstances before granting bail. This Court observed : (SCC p. 515, para 17) "17. Coming to the case at hand, it is found that when a stand was taken that the second respondent was a history sheeter, it was imperative on the part of the High Court to scrutinise every aspect and not capriciously record that the second respondent is entitled to be admitted to bail on the ground of parity. It can be stated with absolute certitude that it was not a case of parity and, therefore, the impugned order [Mitthan Yadav v. State of U.P., 2014 SCC OnLine All 16031] clearly exposes the non-application of mind. That apart, as a matter of fact it has been brought on record that the second respondent has been charge-sheeted in respect of number of other heinous offences. The High Court has failed to take note of the same. Therefore, the order has to pave the path of extinction, for its approval by this Court would tantamount to travesty of justice, and accordingly we set it aside."28
26. Another aspect of the case which needs emphasis is the manner in which the High Court has applied the principle of parity. By its two orders both dated 21-12-2020 [Pravinbhai Hirabhai Koli v. State of Gujarat, 2020 SCC OnLine Guj 2986] , [Khetabhai Parbatbhai Makwana v. State of Gujarat, 2020 SCC OnLine Guj 2988] , the High Court granted bail to Pravin Koli (A-
10) and Kheta Parbat Koli (A-15). Parity was sought with Sidhdhrajsinh Bhagubha Vaghela (A-13) to whom bail was granted on 22-10-2020 [Siddhrajsinh Bhagubha Vaghela v. State of Gujarat, 2020 SCC OnLine Guj 2985] on the ground (as the High Court recorded) that he was "assigned similar role of armed with stick (sic)". Again, bail was granted to Vanraj Koli (A16) on the ground that he was armed with a wooden stick and on the ground that Pravin (A10), Kheta (A-15) and Sidhdhrajsinh (A-13) who were armed with sticks had been granted bail. The High Court has evidently misunderstood the central aspect of what is meant by parity. Parity while granting bail must focus upon the role of the accused. Merely observing that another accused who was granted bail was armed with a similar weapon is not sufficient to determine whether a case for the grant of bail on the basis of parity has been established. In deciding the aspect of parity, the role attached to the accused, their position in relation to the incident and to the victims is of utmost importance. The High Court has proceeded on the basis of parity on a simplistic assessment as noted above, which again cannot pass muster under the law."
66. Recently, the Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Sagar Vs. State of UP & Anr., 2025 INSC 1370 has categorically observed that while utilizing parity as a ground for bail, the same must focus on the role of the accused and cannot be utilized solely because another accused person was granted bail in connection with the same offence, and neither can this ground be claimed as a matter of right, the relevant paragraphs 29 are being quoted as under:
12. The High Court appears, plainly, to have erroneously granted bail to the accused-respondent on the sole ground of parity which it has misunderstood as a tool of direct application as opposed to parity being focused on the role played by the accused and not the thread of the same offence being the only common factor between the accused persons. On this count alone we can set aside the impugned judgment and order. However, we propose not to do so and proceed to delve further.
14. What flows from the above judgments, which have been referred to, only to the limited extent indicated above, is that the High Courts speak in one voice that parity is not the sole ground on which bail can be granted. That, undoubtedly, is the correct position in law. The word 'parity' is defined by the Cambridge Dictionary as "equality, especially of pay or position." When weighing an application on parity, it is 'position' that is the clincher. The requirement of 'position' is not met only by involvement in the same offence. Position means what the person whose application is being weighed, his position in crime, i.e., his role etc. There can be different roles played - someone part of a large group, intending to intimidate; an instigator of violence; someone who throws hands at the other side, instigated by such words spoken by another, someone who fired a weapon or swung a machete - parity of these people will be with those who have performed similar acts, and not with someone who was part of the group to intimidate the other by the sheer size of the gathering, with another who attempted to hack away at the opposer's limbs with a weapon.
67. It has been contended herein that other co-accused persons, namely, Ramdeo Yadav, Pawan Kumar Yadav and Naresh Yadav have been granted bail by the Coordinate Bench of this Court, vide orders dated 23.04.2025, 21.07.2025 and 23.04.2025 passed in Cr. Appeal (DB) No.1369 of 2024 and Cr. Appeal (DB) No.1474 of 2024 respectively, therefore, present 30 appellant is also entitled for suspension of sentence even on ground of parity also.
68. This Court is of the view that the aforesaid contention of the learned counsel for appellant needs to be appreciated herein in the backdrop of the settled position of law on the issue of parity as discussed and referred in preceding paragraphs.
69. Since, the suspension of the sentence have been granted to other co-accused persons, namely, Ramdeo Yadav, Pawan Kumar Yadav and Naresh Yadav by the Coordinate Bench of this Court vide orders dated 23.04.2025, 21.07.2025 and 23.04.2025 passed in Cr. Appeal (DB) No.1369 of 2024 (I.A. No. 4856 of 2025) and Cr. Appeal (DB) No.1474 of 2024 (I.A. No. 5393 of 2025, I.A. No. 4852 of 2025) respectively, therefore it would be apt to refer herein the relevant paragraphs of the said order which are being quoted herein as under:
03/ Dated 23.04.2025 I.A. No. 4856 of 2025 (Cr. Appeal (DB) No.1369 of 2024) "-------
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It appears from the submissions advanced by the learned counsel for the respective parties that so far as the present appellant is concerned, the angle of conspiracy as suggested by the prosecution seems to be primarily focused with respect to the shelter given to Munesh Yadav, prior to the incident and at the behest of Munesh Yadav, he had purchased a Tempo from P.W.25 who used to deal in sale and purchase of old vehicles. In fact, it appears that the present appellant was also in the business of sale and purchase of old vehicles and by using his 31 contact at the request of Munesh Yadav, P.W. 25, who was an officer of the recovery agency engaged by UCO Bank had managed to purchase a Tempo which was subsequently handed over to Munesh Yadav, who had executed his plan of eliminating Shankar Yadav. Admittedly, there was no recovery from the conscious possession of the appellant and so far as the recovery of some incriminating materials are concerned, the same was from the in-laws' house of the appellant. The prosecution has been unable to show that the shelter provided by the appellant to Munesh Yadav and the subsequent transfer of the Tempo purchased at the behest of Munesh Yadav was in the knowledge of the appellant that the same would be used as an explosive device to eliminate Shankar Yadav. The angle of conspiracy as propagated by the prosecution appears to be weak in nature and in the circumstances pointed out above, we are inclined to admit the appellant on bail.
70. From the aforesaid order, it is evident that the Co-ordinate Bench while allowing the prayer for suspension of sentence has taken into consideration the factual aspect that there was no recovery from the conscious possession of the appellant and so far as the recovery of some incriminating materials are concerned, the same was from the in-laws' house of the appellant. Further consideration has been made that the prosecution has been unable to show that the shelter provided by the appellant to Munesh Yadav and the subsequent transfer of the Tempo purchased at the behest of Munesh Yadav was in the knowledge of the appellant that the same would be used as an explosive device to eliminate Shankar Yadav.
71. But as discussed in preceding paragraphs, the case of the present appellant/applicant is on different footing because the 32 P.W.32 who is investigating officer of the case had testified that on basis of the confessional statement of the present appellant, he recovered splinters of iron, which were seized by making a seizure list (the photocopy whereof is Marked X / 4 for identification). It requires to refer herein that this piece of evidence is admissible by dint of Section 27 of the Evidence Act. Further, in testimony of P.W.32 it has come at para 67 that he reached Patratu Basti at "Omkar Accessories" shop of one Chandan Kumar, who disclosed that he had sold the said remote control to accused Munesh Yadav(appellant) and he also identified Munesh Yadav at that time. Further from the testimony of the witnesses it is apparent that there was previous enmity between the deceased and appellant and it is no where come on record about the animosity between accused Ramdeo Yadav and the deceased, therefore, the order of 23.04.2025 passed in Cr. Appeal (DB) No. 1369 of 2024, by which, prayer for suspension of co-accused Ramdeo Yadav has been allowed will not provide any aid to the present appellant.
72. Now coming to the order dated 23.04.2025 passed in I.A. No. 4852 of 2025, by which, prayer for suspension of the sentence of the co-appellant, namely, Naresh Yadav has been allowed, for ready reference, the relevant part of the order is being quoted as under:
33
06/ Dated 23.04.2025 I.A. No. 4852 of 2025 (Cr. Appeal (DB) No. 1474 of 2024):
"It appears that there is no direct evidence on record to show that the appellant no. 3 was part of the conspirators or was directly involved in committing murder of Shankar Yadav, as well as his Bodyguard. Admittedly nothing was recovered from the conscious possession of the appellant no. 3 and the only incriminating substance appears to be the evidence of pw3 in which it has been stated that the appellant no. 3 was seen going on a motorcycle towards his village with Pawan Kumar Yadav against whom certain implications have been made though the same has been denied by Mr. Singh while submitting that the remote which was used was basically a type of toy."
73. From the aforesaid order, it is evident that the co-ordinate Bench while allowing the prayer for suspension of sentence has taken into consideration that there is no direct evidence on record to show that the appellant no. 3 was part of the conspirators or was directly involved in committing murder of Shankar Yadav, as well as his Bodyguard and the only incriminating substance appears to be the evidence of P.W.-3, in which, it has been stated that the appellant no.3 was seen going on a motorcycle towards his village with Pawan Kumar Yadav, against whom, certain implications have been made.
74. This Court is adverting to the order dated 21.07.2025 passed in I.A. No. 5393 of 2025 (Cr. Appeal (DB) No. 1474 of 2024), by which, prayer for suspension of the sentence of the co- appellant, namely, Pawan Kumar Yadav has been allowed, for ready reference, the relevant part of the order is being quoted 34 as under:
I.A No. 5393 of 2025. 10/21.07.2025 Cr. Appeal (DB) No. 1474 of 2024:
"On consideration of the fact that the case of the appellant no. 2 seems similar to that of appellant no. 3, who has already been granted bail by this Court in I.A. No. 4852/2025 and the fact that the recovery of the remote on the confessional statement of the appellant no. 2 has not been fully ascertained by the prosecution, we are inclined to admit the appellant no. 2 on bail."
75. Thus, from the aforesaid order, it appears that the co-ordinate Bench of this Court while allowing the prayer for suspension of sentence of the co-accused Pawan Kumar Yadav has taken into consideration the order dated 23.04.2025 by which prayer for suspension of sentence of the co-appellant, namely, Naresh Yadav has been allowed.
76. Herein, the role and culpability of the present applicant is totally different to the co-appellant, namely, Naresh Yadav and Pawan Kumar Yadav because the P.W.-32 who is the Investigating Officer of the case had testified in his testimony at para-67 that he reached Patratu Basti at "Omkar Accessories" shop of one Chandan Kumar, who disclosed that he had sold the said remote control to accused Munesh Yadav (appellant) and he has also identified Munesh Yadav and further angle of enmity with deceased has specifically been alleged against the present appellant, therefore, the benefit of parity cannot be extended to 35 the present appellant.
77. Further, it is settled position of law as discussed and referred in the preceding paragraphs that parity is not the sole ground on which the bail can be granted and when weighing an application on parity, it is 'position' that is the clincher and the requirement of 'position' is not met only by involvement in the same offence but position means what the person whose application is being weighed, his position in crime, his role and particular modus- operandi of the said accused/ petitioner.
78. Thus, this Court, after having discussed the factual and legal issues, is of the view that herein, the benefit of parity cannot be extended in favour of the present applicant/appellant.
79. This Court, on the basis of discussions made hereinabove and taking into consideration the culpability of the present applicant/appellant, is of the view that the case of the present appellant is on different footing in comparison to that of other co-accused, who have been granted bail by the Coordinate Bench of this Court, as referred above.
80. On the basis of discussions made hereinabove and by applying the proposition laid down for the purpose of suspension of sentence in the case of Preet Pal Singh vs. State of U.P., (supra) and Om Prakash Sahni (supra) as also applicability of principle of parity as discussed in the preceding paragraphs, is 36 of the view that it is not a fit case for suspension of sentence during pendency of the instant appeal.
81. This Court, after having discussed the factual and legal issues as per the discussion made hereinabove, is of the view that the present interlocutory application is not fit to be allowed.
82. Accordingly, the interlocutory application being I.A. No.5732 of 2025, is hereby, rejected.
83. It is made clear that any observation made herein will not prejudice the issue on merit as the appeal is lying pending for its consideration.
(Sujit Narayan Prasad, J.)
I Agree
(Arun Kumar Rai, J.) (Arun Kumar Rai, J.)
04/12/2025
Rohit/-N.A.F.R.
Uploaded on 05.12.2025
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