Madras High Court
T. Thothathri And T.S. Venkatesan vs The Management, Sundaram Textiles ... on 17 September, 2007
Author: F.M. Ibrahim Kalifulla
Bench: F.M. Ibrahim Kalifulla, R. Banumathi
JUDGMENT F.M. Ibrahim Kalifulla, J.
1. These two writ appeals arise out of a common award of the second respondent, Labour Court, Tirunelveli, in I.D. Nos. 250 and 248 of 1988, dated 5.1.1993 and the confirmation of the same by the learned Single Judge of this Court, again, by a common order dated 4.9.2007, passed in W.P. Nos. 17739 and 17740 of 1994.
2. The appellants were employed in the first respondent Textile Mills. By invoking Clause 14(1) of the Certified Standing orders of the first respondent, both the appellants were issued with the orders of termination, dated 4.3.1987. The termination orders stated that based on reliable information, as the continuation of both the appellants in the services of the first respondent were found to be detrimental to the safety of the first respondent as well as the majority of the workmen employed with it, their services have been terminated.
3. The order also stated that since the termination was being resorted to based on reasonable cause, the same would not amount to retrenchment but by way of abundant caution, they were being paid three months' notice pay instead of one month notice pay as prescribed under Standing Order 14(1) as well as the compensation calculated as payable by way of retrenchment compensation and a sum of Rs. 10,026.15 in the case of the appellant in W.A. No. 227 of 2003 and Rs. 16,352.43 in respect of the appellant in W.A. No. 228 of 2003 were being offered in the form of cheques, dated 4.3.1997, drawn on the State Bank of India, Nanguneri.
4. It is stated that along with the appellants, 9 other workmen were issued with similar orders of 'termination simpliciter' and that 8 of them settled their accounts with the first respondent, Management without raising any dispute.
5. It is also stated that along with the appellants one other workman, by name, M.Johnson also raised an industrial dispute, challenging the termination in I.D. No. 245/88, whose non-employment was also held to be justified by the impugned common award, dated 5.1.1993.
6. It is stated that, subsequently, the appellants alone continue to agitate for their rights by filing the writ petitions, challenging the impugned common award and by filing these writ appeals challenging the common order of the learned single Judge.
7. The learned Single Judge, by the common order dated 4.9.2001 passed in W.P.Nos.17739 and 17740 of 1994, having affirmed the common award of the Labour Court, the appellants have come forward with these appeals.
8. Ms. Vaigai, learned Counsel appearing for the appellants, after referring to Clause 14(1) of the Certified Standing Orders and the orders of discharge issued to the appellants, took us through the common award of the Second respondent, Labour Court, and the common order of the learned single Judge.
9. In respect of the very same allegations, a criminal complaint was also preferred against four workmen and in Crl.M.P. No. 3197 of 1987, the case registered against the said four workmen in C.C. No. 32 of 1987 on the file of the Second Class Judicial Magistrate, Nanguneri, was quashed by this Court by order dated 14.7.1987.
10. Apart from the above, reliance was placed by the learned Counsel for the appellants upon the decisions of the Hon'ble Supreme Court (Indra Pal Gupta v. Managing Committee, Model Inter College, Thora), 1984 Supplement SCC 554 (Workmen of Hindustan Steel Ltd and Anr. v. Hindustan Steel Ltd. and Ors.), (Ajit Kumar Nag v. General Manager (PJ), Indian Oil Corporation Ltd., Haldia and Others) and 2006(1) SCC 67 (Indian Airlines Ltd. v. Prabha D. Kanan) and contended that the factors referred to by the first respondent, Management, as against the appellants would constitute acts of misconduct which ought to have been proved by giving due opportunity to the workmen before resorting to dismiss them from service.
11. According to the learned Counsel, invocation of Standing Order 14(1) can be resorted to only under extraordinarily exceptional circumstances and not in a situation referred to by the first respondent, Management.
12. It is contended that it was not the case of the first respondent, Management, that the appellants were engaged in the positions of trust and as the confidence of the first respondent, Management, was shaken in order to invoke Clause 14(1) of the Standing Orders.
13. It was further contended that the second respondent, Labour Court, as well as the learned Single Judge proceeded on the footing that mere availability of power under Standing Order 14(1) would be sufficient to invoke the said power by referring to certain suspicious circumstances.
14. It was then contended that when there is no provision for appeal against any order issued under Standing Order 14(1), the first respondent should have been extremely circumspect in its actions for invoking the said Clause. According to the learned Counsel since there was no proper judicial review by the second respondent, Labour Court, as well as by the learned Single Judge, as against the illegal actions of the first respondent, Management, the appellants were obliged to file these writ appeals.
15. The submissions of the learned Counsel for the appellants can be formulated as under:
a. That this is not a case of discharge simpliciter since the allegations cast a stigma on the appellants workmen though the first respondent, Management, invoked Clause 14(1) of the Standing Orders.
b. The Standing Order 14(1) itself does not provide sufficient safeguards and therefore, the invocation of the same cannot be permitted, and c. When this was a case of no enquiry, the first respondent, Management, ought to have let in evidence in the first instance and then called upon the workmen to let in rebuttal evidence.
16. As against the above submissions, Mr.S.Rama subramaniam, learned Senior Counsel appearing for the first respondent, after taking us through some of the documents relied upon by the first respondent, Management, before the Labour Court, which were all dated between 2.2.1987 and 4.3.1987, as well as the oral evidence let in before the second respondent, Labour Court, contended that action was taken with a sense of responsibility, and that action was taken against the appellants only to safeguard the interest of the men and materials and to avert any calamity in the factory premises based on valid information gathered by the first respondent, Management, during the relevant period.
17. The learned Senior Counsel would submit that this was an appropriate case where the invocation of the Standing Order 14(1) was called for. It was also contended that the said Standing Order cannot be attacked as it is a certified one under the provisions of Industries Employment Standing Orders Act and so long as the provision is available, the first respondent, Management, was entitled to invoke the same in such appropriate cases.
18. In support of his submissions, the learned Senior Counsel relied upon the decisions of the Hon'ble Supreme Court reported in 1975(1) Supreme Court Cases 754 (L. Michael and Anr. v. Johnson Pumps Ltd.), and (Dipti Prakash Banerjee v. Sathyendra Nath Bose National Centre for Basic Sciences, Calcutta and Ors).
19. We heard the learned Counsel for the respective parties. We also perused the impugned award of the second respondent, Labour Court, and the order of the learned Single Judge. We also took pains to peruse the documents filed in support of the stand of the first respondent, Management, as well as the oral evidence let in before the second respondent, Labour Court.
20. In the above said background, when we considered the award of the second respondent, Labour Court, we find that the labour Court had considered the issue in detail in paragraph 16 of its award. In our considered opinion, in the said analysis, the second respondent, Labour Court, has not left out any material evidence based on which the termination order came to be issued to the appellants.
21. Admittedly, this is a case of 'termination simpliciter' of the services of the appellants by invoking Clause 14(1) of the Standing Orders. Clause 14(1) empowers the first respondent, Management, to resort to such an order of simple termination for a reasonable cause by giving one month's notice or payment of one month wages in lieu of such notice of termination.
22. The only other requirement was to give reasons for resorting to such an order of simple termination and communicate the same to the employee concerned. Of course, Clause 14(1) states that the reasons for termination should be recorded in writing and should be communicated to the employee if he so desires at the time of discharge. Nevertheless, in the orders of discharge, dated 4.3.1987, issued to the appellants, in the very opening paragraph, the first respondent, Management, has stated that based on reliable information it came to the conclusion that it was not conducive to continue to retain the appellants in its services as that would be detrimental to the interest of the workmen as well as the Management. It was, however, stated that the details of such information would be placed before the appropriate forum and at the appropriate time, if so warranted.
23. It is stated that such orders were issued to as many as 11 workmen. Out of 11 workmen, only 3 workmen raised industrial disputes, while others settled their claims with the first respondent, Management. Even in respect of three workmen though impugned common award came to be passed, only these two appellants have pursued their challenge, while one other workman by name, Johnson, appeared to have withdrawn from the scene. The sum and substance of the reasons which weighed with the first respondent, Management, to dispense with the services of the appellants and the nine other workmen, was stated to be that in the months of January and February 1987, the appellants and the nine other workmen were found to have been meeting in several places such as Canteen area, Cycle Shed and near the Gate, as well as while returning back home appeared to have made certain specific statements to the effect that they should indulge in certain activities which would sabotage the operation of the machineries and that by resorting to voluntary infliction of injuries to themselves to create a panicky situation inside the factory premises and that if any of the co- workmen attempted to interfere with their activities bodily injuries should be caused by removing their hand or leg.
24. The evidence also discloses that the purpose for planning such an action was that the Union to which they belong was not duly recognised by the Management and that by resorting to such activities they would be in a position to gather more strength for their Union and that such actions would teach a lesson to the Management to give due respect to the Union to which they belong. That apart, those concerned workmen also had a grievance over the implementation of a settlement with the Regular Union which was approved by the Special Tribunal and which settlement provided for introduction of new workload. The details of such informations are found in some of the letters which were submitted by some of the workmen with the first respondent, Management, which were marked as Exs.M.11, M.13, M.15, M.19 and M.20.
25. In fact, the authors of those documents were examined as M.W.1 to M.W.4. In those exhibits, as well as, in the oral version of M.W.1 to M.W.4, there were specific reference to the names of the appellants as well as other similarly placed employees, who were also terminated and the exact version spoken to by them in the course of their conversation either with the witnesses or with the other co-employees were also stated. With reference to those statements and with reference to the damaging part of such statements there was nothing brought out either in the cross examination of those witnesses or in the oral evidence of the appellants themselves or in the form of any other acceptable material evidence to brush aside or ignore the veracity of such damaging statements stated to have uttered by the appellants and the other delinquents. One such statement referred to in some of the exhibits was that the appellants had planned to put either stones or iron particles in the running machines and thereby, cause severe damage to the machineries which would bring the whole operation of the Mills to a grinding halt.
26. It is one thing to say that such statements might have been made in a flippant manner with a view to cause a mild tremor to the first respondent, Management, without any intention to really indulge in such activities. But the question for consideration is whether as a responsible Management, the first respondent can take such an attitude and wait for the real outcome of the alleged statements uttered by such workmen or should take a firm decision to rule out the possibility of anyone from indulging in such damaging activities by way of precautionary method without giving any scope or possibility for anyone from resorting to such sabotage to safeguard the interest of the Management as well as its workmen.
27. Viewed in that respect though the learned Counsel for the appellants would contend that based on mere suspicion, a substantial right of the workmen to remain in service ought not to have been snapped by resorting to such a shortcut method of issuance of an order of 'termination simpliciter', we are of the view that the conclusion of the second respondent, Labour Court, based on the analysis of the evidence let in before it was sufficient enough for the second respondent, Labour Court, to form the basis that the decision of the first respondent, Management, issuing the orders of termination by invoking Clause 14(1) of the Standing Orders was on a sound basis and such a conclusion of the second respondent, Labour Court, cannot be lightly interfered with merely because a different conclusion was possible.
28. In other words, though one can say that with the available materials on record, both oral as well as documentary, the first respondent, Management, instead of resorting to an order of simple termination by invoking Clause 14(1) of the Standing Orders, could have resorted to a regular disciplinary action by issuing a show cause notice, charge sheet, holding of enquiry, etc., in as much as, the second respondent, Labour Court, which was vested with necessary power and jurisdiction to re-appreciate the whole of the evidence placed before it in order to find out whether the action of the first respondent, Management, was justified in resorting to the issuance of an order of simple termination and when such exercise carried out by the second respondent, Labour Court, is found flawless in every respects and such exercise is also found to have been done with an extreme care and caution as has been detailed by the learned Single Judge in the orders impugned in these Writ Appeals, in our considered opinion, such a conclusion of the second respondent, Labour Court, as well as that of the learned Single Judge, does not call for any interference in these writ appeals.
29. In fact, in one of the decisions relied upon by the first respondent, Management , (Dipti Prakash Banerjee v. Satyendra Nath Bose National Centre For Basic Sciences, Calcutta and Ors.), in paragraph 20, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has referred to its earlier decision (Gujarat Steel Tubes Ltd. v. Gujarat Steel Tubes Mazdoor Sabha), and the passage referred to therein in paragraph 20 of the decision , is apposite to the case on hand which is to the following effect:
20. This Court in that connection referred to the principles laid down by Krishna Iyer, J. in Gujarat Steel Tubes Ltd. v. Gujarat Steel Tubes Mazdoor Sabha. As to "foundation", it was said by Krishna Iyer, J. as follows: (SCC p.617, para 53) (A) termination effected because the master is satisfied of the misconduct and of the consequent desirability of terminating the service of the delinquent servant, is a dismissal, even if he had the right in law to terminate with an innocent order under the standing order or otherwise. Whether, in such a case, the grounds are recorded in different proceedings from the formal order, does not detract from its nature. Nor the fact that, after being satisfied of the guilt, the master abandons the enquiry and proceeds to terminate. Given an alleged misconduct and a live nexus between it and the termination of service, the conclusion is dismissal, even if full benefits as on simple termination, are given and non-injurious terminology is used.
and as to motive: (SCC pp.617-18, para 54)
54. On the contrary, even if there is suspicion of misconduct, the master may say that he does not wish to bother about it and may not go into his guilt but may feel like not keeping a man he is not happy with. He may not like to investigate nor take the risk of continuing a dubious servant. Then it is not dismissal but termination simpliciter, if no injurious record of reasons or punitive cut-back on his full terminal benefits is found. For, in fact, misconduct is not then the moving factor in the discharge.
As to motive, one other example is the case of State of Punjab v. Sukh Raj Bahadur where a charge-memo for a regular enquiry was served, reply given and at that stage itself, the proceedings were dropped and a simple termination order was issued. It was held, the order of simple termination was not founded on any findings as to misconduct. In that case, this Court referred to A.G. Benjamin v. Union of India where a charge-memo was issued, explanation was received, an enquiry officer was also appointed but before the enquiry could be completed, the proceedings were dropped and a simple order of termination was passed. The reason for dropping the proceedings was that "departmental proceedings will take a much longer time and we are not sure whether after going through all the foundation, we will be able to deal with the accused in the way he deserves." The termination was upheld.
30. When the above principles set out in the said paragraphs are applied to the facts of this case, we are convinced that the available information with the first respondent, Management, which were relied upon to a very large extent created weighty suspicion as against the appellants and other co-accomplices.
31. In the light of our discussions narrated above, we are convinced that the course of simple termination resorted to by invoking Clause 14(1) of the Standing Orders by the first respondent, Management, was well justified and the upholding of the same by the second respondent, Labour Court, as well as by the learned Single Judge cannot be interfered with.
32. In this context, it will be worthwhile to refer to one other decision relied upon by the learned Counsel for the first respondent, (L. Michael and Anr. v. Johnson Pumps Ltd.), and in paragraph 22, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has stated the proposition as under:
Before we conclude we would like to add that an employer who believes or suspects that his employee, particularly one holding a position of confidence, has betrayed that confidence, can, if the conditions and terms of the employment permit, terminate his employment and discharge with him without any stigma attaching to the discharge. But such belief or suspicion of the employer should not be a mere whim or fancy. It should be bona fide and reasonable. It must rest on some tangible basis and the power has to be exercised by the employer objectively, in good faith, which means honestly with due care and prudence. If the exercise of such power is challenged on the ground of being colourable or mala fide or an act of victimisation or unfair labour practice, the employer must disclose to the Court the grounds of his impugned action so that the same may be tested judicially. In the instant case this has not been done. There is only the ipse dixit of the employer that he was suspecting since 1968 that the appellant was divulging secrets relating to his business. The employer has not disclosed the grounds on which this suspicion arose in 1968. Further, after 1968, the appellant was given two extra increments, in addition to his normal increments, as stated already, in appreciation of his hard work. This circumstance completely demolishes even the whimsical and tenuous stand taken by the employer. It was manifest therefore that the impugned action was not bona fide.
33. When we apply the test laid down therein, on a perusal of the order of termination, dated 4.3.1987, discloses that it does not attach any serious stigma to the concerned workmen. The supporting materials which were relied upon by the first respondent, Management, in the form of reports received and the oral evidence let in before the Labour Court sufficiently disclose that there were tangible basis for the Management to take an extreme decision to dispense with the services of the appellants and the other accomplices and therefore, it cannot also be stated that the power exercised by the first respondent, Management, lacked in good faith or was there any dishonest motive or did it lack in prudence or was it by way of victimisation.
34. In fact, the appellants have not demonstrated before the Labour Court that the first respondent, Management, resorted to this order of simple termination by way of victimisation. It is well settled that victimisation is an anti- thesis for misconduct and if the workman alleges that he was victimised, the burden would be heavily on the workman concerned to establish the allegation of victimisation.
35. From the evidence available on record, there was no scope to hold that victimisation was the main ground for the first respondent, Management, to resort to an order of simple termination as against these appellants and other workmen. Therefore, when the action of the first respondent, Management, was put to judicial test, as rightly held by the second respondent, Labour Court, and as confirmed by the learned Single Judge, we are convinced that the issuance of order of simple termination to the appellants in the facts and circumstances of the case was fully justified and therefore, the same did not call for any interference.
36. In the decision reported in (1984) 3 Supreme Court Cases 384, the Hon'ble Supreme Court, in the facts and circumstances of that case, reached a conclusion that the order of termination carried a stigma and on that sole ground the order had to fall to the ground unless it was preceded by an enquiry as contemplated by law.
37. At the outset, it will have to be stated that, that was not a case, where there was any provision like Clause 14(1) of the Certified Standing Orders which was available for the first respondent, Management, to resort to such an innocuous order of termination. Therefore, as a general proposition of law, in the absence of any power available with the Management when such an order of termination is resorted to without holding an enquiry while at the same time the order disclosed that the same attached stigma to the career of an employee, it was held that such stigmatised order cannot be issued unless it is preceded by an enquiry as contemplated by law. Therefore, the facts involved in that case differ in all respects and therefore, the principles set out therein cannot be applied to the facts of this case.
38. In the decision reported in 1984 (Supp) Supreme Court Cases 554 (Workmen of Hindustan Steel Ltd. and Anr. v. Hindustan Steel Ltd. and Ors.) the Hon'ble Supreme Court dealt with the power available under Standing Order 32 of the Management therein which more or less provided for similar power as has been engrafted in Standing Order 14(1) of the first respondent's Certified Standing Orders for removal of the services of the workmen without following the procedure of holding an enquiry. In that context, the Hon'ble Supreme Court, after referring to the decision cited by the respondent reported in (1975) 1 Supreme Court Cases 574, has stated in paragraph 6 of the decision reported in 1984 (Supp) Supreme Court Cases 554, which is as under:
6. The view we are taking gets some support from a decision of this Court. In a slightly different situation, this Court in L. Michael v. Johnston Pumps India Ltd. observed that discharge simpliciter on the ground of loss of confidence when questioned before a court of law on the ground that it was a colourable exercise of power or it is a mala fide action, the employer must disclose that he has acted in good faith and for good and objective reasons. Mere ipse dixit of the employer in such a situation is of no significance. Where a disciplinary inquiry is dispensed with on the specious plea that it was not reasonably practicable to hold one and a penalty of dismissal or removal from service is imposed, if the same is challenged on the ground that it was a colourable exercise of power or mala fide action, the same situation would emerge and the employer must satisfy the court the good and objective reasons showing both proof of misconduct and valid and objective reasons for dispensing with the inquiry. In our opinion, when the decision of the employer to dispense with inquiry is questioned, the employer must be in a position to satisfy the court that holding of the inquiry will be either counter-productive or may cause such irreparable and irreversible damage which in the facts and circumstances of the case need not be suffered. This minimum requirement cannot and should not be dispensed with to control wide discretionary power and to guard against the drastic power to inflict such a heavy punishment as denial of livelihood and casting a stigma without giving the slightest opportunity to the employee to controvert the allegation and even without letting him know what is his misconduct.
39. Applying the principles set out in the above judgment as well, we find that the action of the Management cannot be held to have been made based on mere ipse dixit of the employer. On the other hand, the materials disclose that the first respondent, Management, was placed in a piquant situation where it had to safeguard the interests of its workmen even those who came forward with certain information whose personal safety and safety of other family members were also involved which necessitated the first respondent, Management, to resort to an action, where it was forced to invoke Clause 14(1) of the Standing Orders and dispense with the services of the appellants and other accomplices or otherwise, it anticipated certain serious harm being caused to those persons, who reported the activities indulged in by the appellants and the other workmen.
40. In the decision (Ajit Kumar Nag v. General Manager (PJ), Indian Oil Corporation Ltd., Haldia and Ors.) the Hon'ble Supreme Court has set out the principles as to when the normal rule of audi alteram partem can be deviated from in the matter of passing an order of dismissal against an erring workman. In that context, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has stated in paragraphs 27, 30 and 44 which are as under.
27. The appellant in Hari Pada Khan relied upon Hindustan Steel Ltd. (II) and submitted that in that case, this Court struck down a similar provision being violative of natural justice and also violative of Article 14. The Court, however, held that the principles of natural justice had no application when the authority was of the opinion that it would be inexpedient to hold an enquiry and it would be against the interest of security of the Corporation to continue in employment the offender workman when serious acts were likely to affect the foundation of the institution. The court also noted that a similar provision was held valid and intra vires by this Court in Mathura Refinery Mazdoor Sangh v. Dy. Chief Labour Commr.
30. ...The Court, however, observed that in certain circumstances, application of the principles of natural justice could be modified and even excluded. Both in England and in India, it is well established that where a right to a prior notice and an opportunity to be heard before an order is passed would obstruct in the taking of prompt action, such a right could be excluded. It could also be excluded where the nature of the action to be taken, its object and purpose and the scheme of the relevant statutory provisions warrant its exclusion. The maxim audi alteram partem could not be invoked if import of such maxim would have the effect of paralysing the administrative process or where the need for promptitude or the urgency so demands. The Court stated that if legislation and the necessities of a situation can exclude the principles of natural justice including the audi alteram partem rule, a fortiori, so can a provision of the Constitution, for a constitutional provision has a far greater and all-pervading sanctity than a statutory provision.
44. We are aware of the normal rule that a person must have a fair trial and a fair appeal and he cannot be asked to be satisfied with an unfair trial and a fair appeal. We are also conscious of the general principle that pre-decisional hearing is better and should always be preferred to post-decisional hearing. We are further aware that it has been stated that apart from Laws of Men, Laws of God also observe the rule of audi alteram partem. It has been stated that the first hearing in history was given in the Garden of Eden. God did not pass sentence upon Adam and Eve before giving an opportunity to show cause as to why they had eaten the forbidden fruit. (See R. v. University of Cambridge) But we are also aware that the principles of natural justice are not rigid or immutable and hence they cannot be imprisoned in a straitjacket. They must yield to and change with exigencies or situations. They must be confined within their limits and cannot be allowed to run wild. It has been stated: " To do a great right' after all, it is permissible sometimes 'to do a little wrong'" (Per Mukharji, C.J. In Charan Lal Sahu v. Union of India (Bhopal Gas Disaster), SCC p.705 para 124. While interpreting legal provisions, a court of law cannot be unmindful of the hard realities of life. In our opinion, the approach of the Court in dealing with such cases should be pragmatic rather than pedantic, realistic rather than doctrinaire, functional rather than formal and practical rather than "precedential".
41. In that case, the appellant indulged in an act of assault and abuse of the Chief Medical Officer. The appellant slapped, kicked, pushed around and dragged of the Chief Medical Officer, while he was in the hospital along with other doctors attending to a critical patient. He did the above acts along with his associates. In fact, the appellant did not put forward any explanation or provocation for the unfortunate incident but accepted that he engaged in certain acts which he would not like to remember. In the past also, in that case, the appellant committed such misconduct but a lenient view was taken and the punishment was reduced. In the above stated circumstances, it was held that it was an exceptional circumstance which warranted imposition of the order of removal by applying the relevant Clause in the Standing Orders which provided for imposition of such an order of 'termination simpliciter'. The said clause also provided for a right of appeal to an appellate authority.
42. Citing the above judgment, Ms. R. Vaigai, learned Counsel for the appellants contended that unless such an exceptional circumstance is demonstrated and where there are in built safeguards in the provision itself while resorting to such orders of simple termination, the Courts, in its judicial review should not approve of such actions of the Management in resorting to orders of 'termination simpliciter'.
43. We do find force in the submission of the learned Counsel for the appellants. However, it will have to be stated that the present case will fall under the category of exceptional one, wherein, the assessment of the first respondent, Management, with regard to the conduct of the appellants and the other workmen, which disclosed that there was likelihood of the appellants causing serious damage to the machineries and also endanger the life of the co-workmen and such apprehension was based on the relevant materials, which assessment of the first respondent was found to be a genuine one and bona fide in the judicial review undertaken by the second respondent, Labour Court, with which finding and conclusion of the Labour Court, the learned Single Judge as well as this Court could not find any error apparent on the face of the record.
44. We are constrained to hold that the facts involved in this case would also fall under one such exceptional categories for which the invocation of the power available with the first respondent, Management, under Standing Order 14(1) was validly justified.
45. As far as the safeguard in the provision is concerned, as the appellants had the statutory protection of testing the action of the first respondent, Management, before the second respondent, Labour Court, in the dispute raised by them and before which forum they had every opportunity to assail the order of the termination simpliciter and in our considered opinion, the second respondent, Labour Court, had carried out its judicial exercise with utmost care and caution, we are convinced that on that score also there is no scope to interfere with the orders of the first respondent, Management, and the confirmation of the same by the second respondent, Labour Court, as well as by the learned Single Judge of this Court.
46. As rightly held by the learned single Judge, if the information received by the first respondent, Management, was not taken serious note of and the Management did not act on the same, the damage to the machineries and the injuries that might have been inflicted on the co-workers could not have been prevented and avoided and the purpose of the powers vested with the Management under the Standing Order 14(1) could be otherwise rendered meaningless and futile and in no case it would be possible for the first respondent, Management, to exercise it.
47. In the words of the learned single Judge, it is stated in paragraph 9 of the Order to the following effect:
In the above circumstances, it is to be seen that the first respondent Management, in order to prevent any untoward incident of damage to the machineries and safety of the other workers, had resorted to exercise its discretion under Standing Order 14(1), which would constitute a sufficient reasonable cause to invoke the said power. Such a reasonable cause based on information cannot be called as misconduct and the orders of termination is on the basis of reasonable cause and not on the basis of misconduct. Therefore, in my view the orders of termination dated 4.3.1987 are orders of termination simpliciter and are not by way of punishment.
48. We are satisfied that the said conclusion of the learned Single Judge was perfectly justified in the facts and circumstances of the case and therefore, the same does not call for any interference.
49. Having regard to our above said conclusions, we are not inclined to interfere either with the award of the second respondent, Labour Court, or with the order of the learned Single Judge and that we do not find any merit in these appeals. It is, however, open to the appellants to approach the first respondent, Management, for an out of Court settlement of their claims, if any, as has been settled by the Management in regard to other similarly placed workmen. If the appellants approach the first respondent, Management, for any such settlement, it is for the first respondent to consider the same and settle their claims.
In fine, these Writ Appeals, however, fail and the same are dismissed. No costs. Connected W.A.M.P. is also dismissed.