Himachal Pradesh High Court
Dagu Ram vs State Of H.P. And Another on 20 December, 2017
Author: Tarlok Singh Chauhan
Bench: Tarlok Singh Chauhan
IN THE HIGH COURT OF HIMACHAL PRADESH, SHIMLA.
.
Cr. MMO No. 470 of 2017 Date of decision : 20.12.2017.
____________________________________________________________ Dagu Ram .....Petitioner.
Versus
State of H.P. and another ...Respondents.
Coram
The Hon'ble Mr. Justice Tarlok Singh Chauhan, Judge.
Whether approved for reporting? No For the Petitioner : Mr. K.D.Sood, Senior Advocate, with Mr. Ankit Aggarwal, Advocate.
For the Respondents : Mr. J.S. Guleria, Asstt. A.G. for respondent No.1.
Mr. Dhananjay Sharma, Advocate, for respondent No.2 with respondent No. 2 in person.
Tarlok Singh Chauhan, Judge (Oral).
By way of present petition, the petitioner seeks quashing of FIR No. 147 of 2016 dated 19.10.2016 registered at Police Station, Karsog, District Mandi, H.P. under Sections 279, 337 IPC and Section 181 of the Motor Vehicles Act and consequential proceedings /criminal case titled State of H.P. vs. Dagu Ram pending before the Court of learned Judicial Magistrate 1st Class, Karsog, District Mandi, H.P.
2. It is not necessary to go into the details of the allegations made in the aforesaid FIR, which has been registered at the behest of the complainant/respondent No.2 against the petitioner in view of the fact that a compromise has been arrived at between the parties.
____________________ 1 Whether reporters of Local Papers may be allowed to see the Judgment ? yes ::: Downloaded on - 20/12/2017 23:13:49 :::HCHP 2
3. Today, the petitioner as well as respondent No. 2 are present .
in the Court and are identified as such. Learned counsel for the petitioner has stated that the parties have compromised the matter outside the Court and a compromise deed dated 8.12.2017, Annexure P-2, has been placed on record to this effect. The complainant/respondent 2 has stated that he does not want to pursue the matter any further against the petitioner and they want to live peacefully and amicably with each other.
4. Though the State has expressed its slight reservation regarding compounding of the offence but I find that this is not such wherein the offence for which the petitioner has been charged can be stricto sensu held to be the offence against the State. Even otherwise, once respondent No.2 has compromised the matter, the possibility of conviction is remote and bleak and the continuation of the criminal case against the petitioner would put the petitioner to great oppression and prejudice and therefore, extreme injustice would be caused to him by not quashing the criminal case.
5. The moot question is whether the Court in such like cases can quash the proceedings. The law on this subject has been summed up in a recent judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Narinder Singh & Ors.
V. State of Punjab & Anr. JT 2014 (4) SC 573, wherein it was held as under:
"(I) Power conferred under Section 482 of the Code is to be distinguished from the power which lies in the Court to compound the offences under Section 320 of the Code. No doubt, under Section 482 of the Code, the High Court has inherent power to quash the criminal proceedings even in those cases which are not compoundable, where the parties have settled the matter between themselves. However, this power is t to be exercised sparingly and with caution.
(II) When the parties have reached the settlement and on that basis petition for quashing the criminal proceedings is filed, the guiding factor in such cases would be to secure:::: Downloaded on - 20/12/2017 23:13:49 :::HCHP 3
(i) ends of justice, or
(ii) to prevent abuse of the process of any Court.
.
While exercising the power the High Court is to form an opinion on either of the aforesaid two objectives.
(III) Such a power is not be exercised in those prosecutions which involve heinous and serious offences of mental depravity or offences like murder, rape, dacoity, etc. Such offences are not private in nature and have a serious impact on society. Similarly, for offences alleged to have been committed under special statute like the Prevention of Corruption Act or the of offences committed by Public Servants while working in that capacity are not to be quashed merely on the basis of compromise between the victim and the offender.
(IV) On the other, those criminal cases having overwhelmingly and pre--dominantly civil character, particularly those arising out of commercial transactions or arising out of matrimonial relationship or family disputes should be quashed when the parties have resolved their entire disputes among themselves.
(V) While exercising its powers, the High Court is to examine as to whether the possibility of conviction is remote and bleak and continuation of criminal cases would put the accused to great oppression and prejudice and extreme injustice would be caused to him by not quashing the criminal cases.
(VI) Offences under Section 307 IPC would fall in the category of heinous and serious offences and therefore is to be generally treated as crime against the society and not against the individual alone. However, the High Court would not rest its decision merely because there is a mention of Section 307 IPC in the FIR or the charge is framed under this provision. It would be open to the High Court to examine as to whether incorporation of Section 307 IPC is there for the sake of it or the prosecution has collected sufficient evidence, which if proved, would lead to proving the charge under Section 307 IPC. For this purpose, it would be open to the High Court to go by the nature of injury sustained, whether such injury is inflicted on the vital/delegate parts of the body, nature of weapons used etc. Medical report in respect of injuries suffered by the victim can generally be the guiding factor. On the basis of this prima facie analysis, the High Court can examine as to whether there is a strong possibility of conviction or the chances of conviction are remote and bleak. In the former case it can refuse to accept the settlement and quash the criminal proceedings whereas in the later case it would be permissible for the High Court to accept the plea compounding the offence based on complete settlement between the parties. At this ::: Downloaded on - 20/12/2017 23:13:49 :::HCHP 4 stage, the Court can also be swayed by the fact that the settlement between the parties is going to result in harmony between them .
which may improve their future relationship.
(VII) While deciding whether to exercise its power under Section 482 of the Code or not, timings of settlement play a crucial role.
Those cases where the settlement is arrived at immediately after the alleged commission of offence and the matter is still under investigation, the High Court may be liberal in accepting the settlement to quash the criminal proceedings/investigation. It is because of the reason that at this stage the investigation is still on and even the charge sheet has not been filed. Likewise, those cases where the charge is framed but the evidence is yet to start or the evidence is still at infancy stage, the High Court can show benevolence in exercising its powers favourably, but after prima facie assessment of the circumstances/material mentioned above. On the other hand, where the prosecution evidence is almost complete or after the conclusion of the evidence the matter is at the stage of argument, normally the High Court should refrain from exercising its power under Section 482 of the Code, as in such cases the trial court would be in a position to decide the case finally on merits and to come a conclusion as to whether the offence under Section 307 IPC is committed or not. Similarly, in those cases where the conviction is already recorded by the trial court and the matter is at the appellate stage before the High Court, mere compromise between the parties would not be a ground to accept the same resulting in acquittal of the offender who has already been convicted by the trial court. Here charge is proved under Section 307 IPC and conviction is already recorded of a heinous crime and, therefore, there is no question of sparing a convict found guilty of such a crime."
6. It would be seen that prior to Narinder Singh's case (supra), a three Hon'ble Judges Bench had considered the relevant scope of Sections 482 and 320 Cr.P.C. in Gian Singh versus State of Punjab and another (2012) 10 SCC 303 wherein it was held that power of the High Court in quashing of the criminal proceedings or FIR or complaint in exercise of its inherent power is distinct and different from the power of a Criminal Court for compounding offences under Section 320 Cr.P.C. While exercising inherent power of quashment under Section 482 Cr.P.C., the ::: Downloaded on - 20/12/2017 23:13:49 :::HCHP 5 Court must have due regard to the nature and gravity of the crime and its .
social impact. It warned the Courts, the High Court for quashing proceedings in heinous and serious offences of mental depravity, murder, rape, dacoity etc. which principles have been reported and reaffirmed in Narinder Singh's case (supra).
7. Now, the further question remains whether this Court can quash the proceedings where petitioner has been charged under Sections 279, 337 IPC and Section 181 of the Motor Vehicles Act. This question need not detain this Court any longer in view of the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Dimpey Gujral, W/o Vivek Gujral and others versus Union Territory through Administrator, UT, Chandigarh and others (2013) 11 SCC 497 where the Hon'ble Supreme Court in a case seeking quashment of FIR and its consequential proceedings involving Sections 147, 148, 149, 323, 307, 452 and 506 IPC after relying upon the judgment of Gian Singh's case (supra) held as follows:-
"7. In certain decisions of this court in view of the settlement arrived at by the parties, this court quashed the FIRs though some of the offences were non-compoundable. A two Judges' Bench of this court doubted the correctness of those decisions. Learned Judges felt that in those decisions, this court had permitted compounding of non- compoundable offences. The said issue was, therefore, referred to a larger bench.
The larger Bench in Gian Singh v. State of Punjab (2012) 10 SCC 303 considered the relevant provisions of the Code and the judgments of this court and concluded as under: (SCC pp.342-43, para 61) "61. The position that emerges from the above discussion can be summarised thus: the power of the High Court in quashing a criminal proceeding or FIR or complaint in exercise of its inherent jurisdiction is distinct and different from the power given to a criminal court for compounding the offences under ::: Downloaded on - 20/12/2017 23:13:49 :::HCHP 6 Section 320 of the Code. Inherent power is of wide plenitude with no statutory limitation but it has to be exercised in accord .
with the guideline engrafted in such power viz; (i) to secure the ends of justice or (ii) to prevent abuse of the process of any Court. In what cases power to quash the criminal proceeding or complaint or F.I.R may be exercised where the offender and victim have settled their dispute would depend on the facts and circumstances of each case and no category can be prescribed. However, before exercise of such power, the High Court must have due regard to the nature and gravity of the crime. Heinous and serious offences of mental depravity or offences like murder, rape, dacoity, etc. cannot be fittingly quashed even though the victim or victim's family and the offender have settled the dispute. Such offences are not private in nature and have serious impact on society. Similarly, any compromise between the victim and offender in relation to the offences under special statutes like Prevention of Corruption Act or the offences committed by public servants while working in that capacity etc; cannot provide for any basis for quashing criminal proceedings involving such offences. But the criminal cases having overwhelmingly and pre-dominatingly civil flavour stand on different footing for the purposes of quashing, particularly the offences arising from commercial, financial, mercantile, civil, partnership or such like transactions or the offences arising out of matrimony relating to dowry, etc. or the family disputes where the wrong is basically private or personal in nature and the parties have resolved their entire dispute. In this category of cases, the High Court may quash criminal proceedings if in its view, because of the compromise between the offender and victim, the possibility of conviction is remote and bleak and continuation of criminal case would put accused to great oppression and prejudice and extreme injustice would be caused to him by not quashing the criminal case despite full and complete settlement and compromise with the victim. In other words, the High Court must consider whether it would be unfair or contrary to the interest of justice to continue with the criminal proceeding or continuation of the criminal proceeding would tantamount to abuse of process of law despite settlement and compromise between the victim and wrongdoer and whether to secure the ends of justice, it is appropriate that criminal case is put to an end and if the ::: Downloaded on - 20/12/2017 23:13:49 :::HCHP 7 answer to the above question(s) is in affirmative, the High Court shall be well within its jurisdiction to quash the criminal .
proceeding." (emphasis supplied)
8. In the light of the above observations of this court in Gian Singh, we feel that this is a case where the continuation of criminal proceedings would tantamount to abuse of process of law because the alleged offences are not heinous offences showing extreme depravity nor are they against the society. They are offences of a personal nature and burying them would bring about peace and amity between the two sides. In the circumstances of the case, FIR No.163 dated 26/10/2006 registered under Section 147, 148,149, 323, 307, 452 and 506 of the IPC at Police Station Sector 3,Chandigarh and all consequential proceedings arising there from including the final report presented under Section 173 of the Code and charges framed by the trial court are hereby quashed."
8. Keeping in view the aforesaid guidelines, it is not disputed that the parties have reached a settlement and on that basis have preferred the present proceedings seeking quashment of the FIR. Once respondent No.2 /complainant does not want to hold the petitioner responsible, the quashing of such FIR would definitely be to secure the ends of justice and to prevent the abuse of process of the Court.
9. The facts of this case otherwise do not in any manner fall within the exceptions laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court where compromise cannot be entered into or the proceedings cannot be quashed.
10. Thus, taking holistic view of the matter and looking into all attending facts and circumstances, I find this to be a fit case to exercise powers under Section 482 of the Code and accordingly, FIR No. 147 of 2016 dated 19.10.2016 registered at Police Station, Karsog, District Mandi, H.P. under Sections 279, 337 IPC and Section 181 of the Motor Vehicles Act and consequential proceedings /criminal case titled State of H.P. vs. Dagu Ram pending before the Court of learned Judicial ::: Downloaded on - 20/12/2017 23:13:49 :::HCHP 8 Magistrate 1st Class, Karsog, District Mandi, against the petitioner, are .
quashed.
11. The petition is disposed of in the aforesaid terms.
Copy dasti.
December 20, 2017. (Tarlok Singh Chauhan),
(GR) Judge
r to
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