Madhya Pradesh High Court
Sohanlal vs Dindayal Chaudhari on 18 February, 1993
Equivalent citations: AIR1994MP89, 1993(0)MPLJ330, AIR 1994 MADHYA PRADESH 89, (1993) MPLJ 330, (1995) 1 RENCJ 278, (1994) 2 RENCR 109
Author: R.C. Lahoti
Bench: R.C. Lahoti
JUDGMENT R.C. Lahoti, J.
1. The tenant/defendant has come up in second appeal feeling aggrieved by the judgment and decree of the lower appellate court directing a suit for ejectment on the ground of genuine requirement of the plaintiff/respondent to be decreed under Section 12(1)(f) of the M.P. Accommodation Control Act, 1961.
2. Vide order dated 10-2-1993, this Court admitted the appeal for hearing parties on the following substantial question, of law:--
"Whether the lower appellate Court committed a jurisdictional error in decreeing the suit under Section 12(1)(f) of the M.P. Accommodation Control Act, 1961, upholding the requirement of the plaintiff's brother's son, which cannot be a ground for ejectment under the provisions abovesaid?"
3. The facts, in so far as relevant for answering the question on which the appeal has been heard, may briefly be noticed. The suit was filed by late Dindayal, as sole plaintiff, who having expired during the pendency of this second appeal, his legal representatives have been brought on record. This judgment would refer late Dindayal as the plaintiff. Dindayal has three other brothers namely Harcharanlal, Mansharam and Sundarlal, all younger to him. Gopalkrishna is son of Dindayal. Murari is son of Harcharanlal.
4. On 12-3-1975, the suit was filed by the plaintiff Dindayal alleging the need of Gopalkrishna and Murari, both majors, yet unemployed, for starting their own shop of provision goods and general merchandise. The need of both has been found proved. However, Gopralkrishna too has expired during the pendency of this litigation. In this background, the question arises whether decree ejectment upholding the need of Murari in a suit filed by plaintiff Dindayal can be sustained for, in law, it would be the need of plaintiffs brother's son.
5. Section 12(1)(f) reads as under:--
"12. Restriction on eviction of tenants. (1) Notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained in any other law or contract, no suit shall be filed in any Civil Court against a tenant for his eviction from any accommodation except on one or more of the following grounds only, namely:
.....
(f) that the accommodation let for non-residential purposes is required bona fide by the landlord for the purpose of continuing or starting his business or that any of his major sons or unmarried daughter if he is the owner thereof or of any person for whose benefit the accommodation is held and that the landlord or such person has no other reasonably suitable non-residential accommodation of his own in his occupation in the city or town concerned."
6. First, it has to be determined who is or are the landlord or landlords. The plaint alleged Dindayal to be the sole landlord. However, it is the defendant himself who came out with a plea in para 1 of the written statement that not the plaintiff alone but his three brothers too were landlords and the defendant was a tenant of all the four. That is his statement in the Court and that is the fact found proved by the Courts below. It is beyond the pale of controversy at the stage of second appeal that the landlords are four (and not one) namely the plaintiff and his three brothers which would include Harcharanlal, the father of Murari, whose genuine need for starting his own business has been found proved by the Court below and this Murari would be none else but a major son of the co-landlord.
7. Section 12(1)(f) above quoted, on a bare reading, suggests beyond doubt that the legislature has provided for the requirement of a major son of landlord being required to be proved. The provision is not for the requirement of a plaintiff's son. The Legis lature has, thus, contemplated two contingencies: suit may be filed by one of the co-landlords and it may be decreed if the requirement of the son of a landlord has been proved which landlord need not necessarily be the plaintiff.
8. It is well settled with the pronouncement of the Supreme Court in Sri Ram Pasricha v. Jagannath, AIR 1976 SC 2335 and Pal Singh v. Sunder Singh, AIR 1989 SC 758, that one of the co-owner landlords is competent in law to maintain a suit for eviction if son objected to by others. So is the view taken in a Full (Division) Bench decision of this Court in Shivraj v. Smt. Asha Lata, 1989 Jab LJ 336. This very litigation had once travelled upto this Court in a second appeal, ending in an order of remand, wherein placing reliance on Sri Ram Pasricha's case (AIR 1976 SC 2335) (supra), this Court had held that the suit filed by the plaintiff was competent and he was entitled to claim ejectment on the need pleaded in the plaint (see: order dated 6-7-1987 passed in S.A. No. 30/81). That is the end of the matter in so far as this case is concerned. This Court is equally bound, as the two Courts below were, by the order of remand passed at an earlier stage of this very litigation.
9. That Murari is a major son and was unemployed for want of suitable accommodation and hence needed the suit accommo dation for starting his own business of provision and general merchandise goods, is a finding of fact, not shown to be vitiated in any manner whatsoever, hence binding in second appeal.
10. The upshot of the above discussion is outwardly what appears to be not within the ken of Clause (f) abovesaid as being plaintiff's brother's son's requirement, is not so. To be more appropriate, it is the requirement of a major son of one of the co-landlords though that landlord is not the plaintiff. Such a requirement is covered by Clause (f) above-said.
11. No other point was urged.
12. The appeal is dismissed. Judgment and decree of the lower appellate court are affirmed. However, to save the appellant from the peril of sudden ejectment, it is directed that the decree for ejectment shall not be available for execution until 30-6-1993 subject to the appellant filing an undertaking on affidavit before the executing Court within a period of two weeks from today to the following effect :--
(i) That on or before 30-6-1993, he shall hand over vacant and peaceful possession over the suit accommodation to the plaintiff/ respondents and shall not in between induct anyone else in the suit accommodation.
(ii) Within a month, he shall deposit the entire money part of the decree with the executing Court for payment to the landlord, including rent in arrears up-to-date and shall thereafter continue to deposit month by month, by the 15th day of each month, the rent currently falling in arrears.
(iii) Failing the filing of the undertaking or failing compliance with any of the conditions abovesaid, the decree for ejectment shall become available for execution forthwith.
13. Looking to the nature of controversy arising for decision in the appeal, costs before this Court are left to be borne by the parties as incurred. Counsel's fee as per schedule, if certified.