Madras High Court
J.Delibarn vs The Bar Council Of India on 21 February, 2019
Author: S.Manikumar
Bench: S.Manikumar, Subramonium Prasad
1
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT MADRAS
DATED: 21.02.2019
CORAM:
THE HONOURABLE MR.JUSTICE S.MANIKUMAR
and
THE HONOURABLE MR.JUSTICE SUBRAMONIUM PRASAD
W.P.No.4894 of 2019
and W.M.P.No.5576 & 5577 of 2019
J.Delibarn .. Petitioner
Vs.
1. The Bar Council of India,
Rep by its Secretary,
21, Rouse Avenue, Institutional Area,
Near Bal Bhawan, New Delhi - 110 002.
2. The Bar Council of Tamil Nadu & Puducherry,
Rep by its Secretary,
Madras High Court Campus,
Chennai - 600 104.
3. The Director General of Police,
Government of Tamil Nadu,
Dr.Radhakrishnan Salai,
Mylapore, Chennai - 600 004. .. Respondents
Prayer: Petition filed under Article 226 of the Constitution of
India seeking a Writ of Mandamus directing the respondents 1 & 2
to restrain and regulate the Centres for Legal Education in the
State of Tamil Nadu in consonance with the Rule 14 of the Rules
of Legal Education, 2008.
http://www.judis.nic.in
2
For Petitioner : Mr.N.Senthil Kumar
For Respondent 1 : Mr.S.R.Raghunathan
For Respondent 2 : Mr.N.Rajan
For Respondent 3 : Mr.Akhil Akbar Ali,
Government Advocate
-----
ORDER
(Order of the Court was made by S.MANIKUMAR, J.) Mr.J.Deliban, a practicing Advocate of this Court and claiming himself to be a Public Interest Litigant, has filed the instant writ petition for a Mandamus seeking a direction to the respondents 1 & 2 to restrain and regulate the Centres for Legal Education in the State of Tamil Nadu in consonance with Rule 14 of the Rules of Legal Education, 2008.
2. Petitioner has impleaded the Bar Council of India, New Delhi, Bar Council of Tamil Nadu & Puducherry, Chennai and surprisingly, the Director General of Police, Government of Tamil Nadu, Chennai, as party respondents.
http://www.judis.nic.in 3
3. Quoting that there are ten law colleges affiliated to the Tamil Nadu Dr.Ambedkar Law University with an object to promote legal education, the petitioner has contended that there are many Centres for legal education in the State of Tamil Nadu, without affiliation to the University and inviting the attention of this Court to an advertisement stated to have been made by "Karthick Law Acadamy" that coaching would be offered for studying L.L.B. course and admission, petitioner has further contended that coaching centre of the said Academy has to be restrained and that Bar Council of India, represented by its Secretary, New Delhi should regulate the Centres for Legal Education in the State of Tamil Nadu in consonance with Rule 14 of the Rules of Legal Education, 2008.
4. Mr.S.R.Raghunathan, learned Standing Counsel for the Bar Council of India, New Delhi, present in Court, submitted that coaching centres for admission to law degree courses would not come within the purview of Centres of Legal Education.
5. Mr.Akhil Akbar Ali, learned Government Advocate takes notice for respondent No.3.
http://www.judis.nic.in 4
6. Heard the learned counsel for the parties and perused the materials available on record.
7. Rule 14 of the Legal Education Rules, 2008 reads thus:
"Rule 14. Centres for Legal Education not to impart education without approval of Bar Council of India (1) No Centres of Legal Education shall admit any student and impart instruction in a course of study in law for enrolment as an advocate unless the recognition of the degree of the University or the affiliation of the Centres of Legal Education, as the case may be, has been approved by the Bar Council of India after inspection of the University or Centres of Legal Education institution concerned as the case may be.
(2) An existing Centre of Legal Education shall not be competent to impart instruction in a course of study in law for enrolment as an advocate if the continuance of its affiliation is disapproved or revoked by the Bar Council of India.
(3) Bar Council of India may suspend a http://www.judis.nic.in Centre of Legal Education for such violation 5 for a period of not more than two academic years which shall be notified."
8. Judicial notice can be taken that for employment in Civil Services State / Central and admission to professional courses, there are coaching centres all over the country. For instance, for entering into Central / State Civil Service, there are coaching centres like Rau Institute, New Delhi; Sayam Sunder Gupta Institute, New Delhi; Shankar IAS Academy, Chennai; Manidha Naeyam IAS Academy, Chennai; Aram IAS Academy and so on and so forth.
9. In the case of admission to professional colleges, for instance, medicine, there are coaching centres like Best NEET Coaching Centre, Chennai; VVT Coaching Centre, Chennai;
Aakash Educational Service Limited, Chennai, etc.,
10. Again, for admission to IIT and Engineering subjects, there are coaching Centres like BJYU's classes, Chennai; Brilliant Tutorials, Chennai; FIIT JEE, Chennai, etc., http://www.judis.nic.in 6
11. In view of the fact that law is also a profession and there are many CLAT coaching Centres to give coaching to the aspirants for admission to law colleges.
12. Common entrance examination is being conducted on all India basis for admission to various recognised law colleges in India, National Law Schools, Schools of Excellence and Government Law Colleges.
13. Conducting coaching classes for admission to various institutions cannot be said to be per se illegal and more so when such centres do not come within the purview of the Bar Council of India, New Delhi.
14. In addition to the above, when the petitioner has made an averment that 'Karthick Law Acadamy' is conducting the coaching centre without any recognition from Bar Council of India, New Delhi, said academy has not been impleaded as a party respondent in this writ petition. Writ petition filed seeking action against, "Karthick Law Acadamy", without impleading the said Academy is impermissible. Reference can be made to few http://www.judis.nic.in 7 decisions :
(i) In Ranbir Singh, HFS-II v. State of Haryana and Anr. reported in 1996(1) SCR 157, the dismissal of a writ petition, challenging the inter se seniority, without impleading the other persons was confirmed by the Hon'ble Apex Court.
(ii) In Baskaran v. The Commissioner of College Education and 2 Ors. reported in 1996 (I) MLJ 32, a Hon'ble Division Bench of this Court following the judgment of Prabodh Verma's case [1985(1) SCR 216], held that the remedy under Article 226 of Constitution of India is equitable and discretionary and the persons who would be vitally affected by the decision are necessary parties. The Court should dismiss the writ petition, if necessary parties are not impleaded in the writ petition.
(iii) In yet another decision in Ramarao and Ors. v. All India Backward Class Bank Employees Welfare Association and Ors. reported in 2004 (I) LLJ 1061SC, the Hon'ble Apex Court reiterated the legal position and held that ".... An order against the person without impleading him as a party and http://www.judis.nic.in without giving an opportunity of hearing 8 must be held to be bad in law. The appellants herein, keeping in view of the fact that by reason of the impugned direction, the orders of promotion effected in their favour had been directed to be withdrawn, indisputably, were necessary parties. In their absence, therefore, the writ petition could not have been effectively adjudicated upon. In the absence of the 'promotees' as parties, therefore, it was not permissible for the High Court to issue the directions by reason of the impugned judgment."
(iv) In Prabodh Verma v. State of U.P. reported in 1984 4 SCC 251 the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held as follows:
50.To summarize our conclusions:
(1) A High Court ought not to hear and dispose of a writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution without the persons who would be vitally affected by its judgment being before it as respondents or at least some of them being before it as respondents in a representative capacity if their number is too large to join them as respondents individually, and, if the petitioners refuse to so join them, the High Court ought to dismiss the petition for non-
joinder of necessary parties.
http://www.judis.nic.in 9 (2) The Allahabad High Court ought not to have proceeded to hear and dispose of Civil Miscellaneous Writ No. 9174 of 1978 — Uttar Pradesh Madhyamik Shikshak Sangh v. State of Uttar Pradesh [1979 All LJ 178] — without insisting upon the reserve pool teachers being made respondents to that writ petition or at least some of them being made respondents thereto in a representative capacity as the number of the reserve pool teachers was too large and, had the petitioners refused to do so, to dismiss that writ petition for non-joinder of necessary parties."
(v) In Ramrao v. All India Backward Class Bank Employees Welfare Assn., reported in 2004 2 SCC 76 the Hon'ble Apex Court held as follows:
"27. It is true that the order of promotion was in question in Writ Petition No. 1551 of 1990 at the instance of one Ashok but even in the said writ petition the promotees were not impleaded as parties. As in the case of the Association, even in the writ petition filed by Ashok, the order of dereservation passed by the Union of India or NABARD or the sponsor Bank had not been http://www.judis.nic.in questioned. Admittedly, the Union of India or 10 NABARD were not parties in the said writ petitions. An order issued against a person without impleading him as a party and, thus, without giving him an opportunity of hearing must be held to be bad in law. The appellants herein, keeping in view the fact that by reason of the impugned direction, the orders of promotion effected in their favour had been directed to be withdrawn, indisputably, were necessary parties. In their absence, therefore, the writ petition could not have been effectively adjudicated upon. In absence of the “promotees” as parties, therefore, it was not permissible for the High Court to issue the directions by reason of the impugned judgment.
(vi) In Dattatreya v. Mahaveer reported in 2004 2 SCC 796, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held as follows:
"10. ....The appellants cannot be allowed to claim any bona fides in not impleading the respondents as parties in that writ petition or about non-disclosure of the earlier order dated 3-7-1979 in respect of the same land and within their knowledge on the ground that it was not necessary to disclose it. As observed earlier, they knew well that if any http://www.judis.nic.in 11 order is passed in their favour the respondents would be the affected persons. The respondents were deprived from raising this point before the learned Single Judge regarding a pre-existing order relating to the same land and non-disclosure of the same. The conduct of the appellants had been far from being fair if not fraudulent. It was a deliberate suppression of material fact which caused prejudice to the respondents. Fair play is the basic rule to seek relief under Article 226 of the Constitution.
(vii) In Avtar Singh Hit v. Delhi Sikh Gurdwara Management Committee reported in 2006 8 SCC 487, the Hon'ble Apex Court held as follows:
"31. In our view no relief could have been granted to the writ petitioners on account of the fact that the newly elected office- bearers of the Executive Board, who would have been affected by the decision of the writ petitions, were not impleaded as party to the writ petitions. In Udit Narain Singh Malpaharia v. Addl. Member, Board of Revenue [1963 Supp (1) SCR 676 : AIR 1963 SC 786] it was observed that where in a petition for a writ of http://www.judis.nic.in certiorari made to the High Court, only the 12 tribunal whose order was sought to be quashed was made a party but the persons who were parties before the lower tribunal and in whose favour the impugned order was passed were not joined as parties; the writ petition was incompetent and had been rightly rejected by the High Court. In Prabodh Verma v. State of U.P. [(1984) 4 SCC 251 : 1984 SCC (L&S) 704 : AIR 1985 SC 167] it was held:
(SCC p. 256) “A High Court ought not to hear and dispose of a writ petition under Article 226 without the persons who would be vitally affected by its judgment being before it as respondents or at least some of them being before it as respondents in a representative capacity if their number is too large to join them as respondents individually, and, if the petitioners refuse to so join them, the High Court ought to dismiss the petition for non-joinder of necessary parties.”
32. In Ishwar Singh v. Kuldip Singh [1995 Supp (1) SCC 179 : 1995 SCC (L&S) 373 : (1995) 29 ATC 144] it was held that a http://www.judis.nic.in writ petition challenging selection and 13 appointment to some posts without impleading the selected candidates was not maintainable.
This view has been reiterated in Arun Tewari v. Zila Mansavi Shikshak Sangh [(1998) 2 SCC 332 : 1998 SCC (L&S) 541 : AIR 1998 SC 331].
33. This being the settled legal position, the non-impleadment of the newly elected office-bearers of the Executive Board was fatal and no relief could have been granted to the writ petitioners. The result of granting any relief in the writ petitions, as was done by the learned Single Judge, was that the members of the newly elected Executive Board lost the office which they were holding without affording them an opportunity to present their case which is clearly impermissible in law. The writ petitions were liable to be dismissed on this count as well."
(viii) In Sadhu Bhagwandas Durlabhram v. Udaykumar H. Dave reported in 2006 9 SCC 599, the Hon'ble Supreme Court held as follows:
"6. The learned counsel appearing on http://www.judis.nic.in behalf of the appellants has submitted that 14 the entire issue was decided without the appellants being made a party to the proceedings. This is not disputed. Various other questions as to the maintainability of the proceedings before the High Court were also raised by the appellants. It was also argued that the High Court was entirely wrong in passing the order it did. We do not wish to go into the merits of the High Court's decision. We set aside the decision of the High Court solely on the ground that the appellants were not party thereto. The matter is remanded back to the High Court for rehearing of the matter after notice to the parties hereto including the Gujarat Maritime Board and the Joint Charity Commissioner. All issues raised are left open."
(ix) In Public Service Commission v. Mamta Bisht reported in 2010 12 SCC 204 the Hon'ble Apex Court held as follows:
"9. In case Respondent 1 wanted her selection against the reserved category vacancy, the last selected candidate in that category was a necessary party and without impleading her, the writ petition could not have been entertained by the High Court in http://www.judis.nic.in view of the law laid down by nearly a 15 Constitution Bench of this Court in Udit Narain Singh Malpaharia v. Board of Revenue [AIR 1963 SC 786] , wherein the Court has explained the distinction between necessary party, proper party and pro forma party and further held that if a person who is likely to suffer from the order of the court and has not been impleaded as a party has a right to ignore the said order as it has been passed in violation of the principles of natural justice. More so, proviso to Order 1, Rule 9 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (hereinafter called “CPC”) provides that non-joinder of necessary party be fatal. Undoubtedly, provisions of CPC are not applicable in writ jurisdiction by virtue of the provision of Section 141 CPC but the principles enshrined therein are applicable. (Vide Gulabchand Chhotalal Parikh v. State of Gujarat [AIR 1965 SC 1153] ,Babubhai Muljibhai Patel v. Nandlal Khodidas Barot [(1974) 2 SCC 706 :
AIR 1974 SC 2105] and Sarguja Transport Service v. STAT[(1987) 1 SCC 5 : 1987 SCC (Cri) 19 : AIR 1987 SC 88].)
(x) In Vijay Kumar Kaul v. Union of India reported in 2012 7 SCC 610 the Hon'ble Supreme Court held as follows:
http://www.judis.nic.in 16 "36. Another aspect needs to be highlighted. Neither before the Tribunal nor before the High Court, Parveen Kumar and others were arrayed as parties. There is no dispute over the factum that they are senior to the appellants and have been conferred the benefit of promotion to the higher posts. In their absence, if any direction is issued for fixation of seniority, that is likely to jeopardise their interest. When they have not been impleaded as parties such a relief is difficult to grant.
37. In his context we may refer with profit to the decision in Indu Shekhar Singh v.
State of U.P. [(2006) 8 SCC 129 : 2006 SCC (L&S) 1916 : AIR 2006 SC 2432] wherein it has been held thus: (SCC p. 151, para 56) “56. There is another aspect of the matter. The appellants herein were not joined as parties in the writ petition filed by the respondents. In their absence, the High Court could not have determined the question of inter se seniority.”
38. In Public Service Commission v. Mamta Bisht [(2010) 12 SCC 204 : (2011) 1 http://www.judis.nic.in SCC (L&S) 208 : AIR 2010 SC 2613] this Court 17 while dealing with the concept of necessary parties and the effect of non-impleadment of such a party in the matter when the selection process is assailed observed thus: (SCC pp.
207-08, paras 9-10)
“9. … in Udit Narain Singh
Malpaharia v. Board of Revenue [AIR 1963 SC 786] , wherein the Court has explained the distinction between necessary party, proper party and pro forma party and further held that if a person who is likely to suffer from the order of the court and has not been impleaded as a party has a right to ignore the said order as it has been passed in violation of the principles of natural justice. More so, proviso to Order 1 Rule 9 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (hereinafter called ‘CPC’) provides that non-joinder of necessary party be fatal.
Undoubtedly, provisions of CPC are not applicable in writ jurisdiction by virtue of the provision of Section 141 CPC but the principles enshrined therein are applicable. (Vide http://www.judis.nic.in Gulabchand Chhotalal Parikh v. State 18 of Gujarat [AIR 1965 SC 1153], Babubhai Muljibhai Patel v. Nandlal Khodidas Barot [(1974) 2 SCC 706 :
AIR 1974 SC 2105] and Sarguja Transport Service v. STAT [(1987) 1 SCC 5 : 1987 SCC (Cri) 19 : AIR 1987 SC 88] .)
10. In Prabodh Verma v. State of U.P.[(1984) 4 SCC 251 : 1984 SCC (L&S) 704 : AIR 1985 SC 167] and Tridip Kumar Dingal v. State of W.B.[(2009) 1 SCC 768 : (2009) 2 SCC (L&S) 119 : AIR 2008 SC Supp 824] , it has been held that if a person challenges the selection process, successful candidates or at least some of them are necessary parties.”
39. From the aforesaid enunciation of law there cannot be any trace of doubt that an affected party has to be impleaded so that the doctrine of audi alteram partem is not put into any hazard."
(xi) In Ranjan Kumar v. State of Bihar reported in 2014 16 SCC 187, the Hon'ble Supreme Court held as follows:
http://www.judis.nic.in "4. On a perusal of the orders impugned, we 19 find that only 40 persons were made respondents before the High Court and hardly a few appointees filed applications for intervention. It is well settled in law that no adverse order can be passed against persons who were not made parties to the litigation. In this context, we may refer with profit to the authority in Prabodh Verma v. State of U.P. [Prabodh Verma v. State of U.P., (1984) 4 SCC 251 : 1984 SCC (L&S) 704] , wherein a three-
Judge Bench was dealing with the constitutional validity of two Uttar Pradesh Ordinances which had been struck down by the Division Bench of the Allahabad High Court on the ground that the provisions therein were violative of Articles 14 and 16(1) of the Constitution of India. In that context, a question arose whether the termination of the services of the appellants and the petitioners therein as secondary school teachers and intermediate college lecturers following upon the High Court judgment was valid without making the said appointees as parties. The learned Judges observed that the writ petition filed by the Sangh suffered from two serious, though not incurable, defects; the core defect was that of non-joinder of necessary parties, for respondents to the Sangh's petition were the State of Uttar Pradesh and its officers concerned and those who were vitally http://www.judis.nic.in concerned, namely, the reserve pool teachers, 20 were not made parties — not even by joining some of them in a representative capacity, considering that their number was too large for all of them to be joined individually as respondents. Thereafter the Court ruled thus: (Prabodh Verma case [Prabodh Verma v. State of U.P., (1984) 4 SCC 251 : 1984 SCC (L&S) 704] , SCC pp. 273- 74, para 28) “28. … The matter, therefore, came to be decided in their absence. A High Court ought not to decide a writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution without the persons who would be vitally affected by its judgment being before it as respondents or at least by some of them being before it as respondents in a representative capacity if their number is too large, and, therefore, the Allahabad High Court ought not to have proceeded to hear and dispose of the Sangh's writ petition without insisting upon the reserve pool teachers being made respondents to that writ petition, or at least some of them being made respondents in a representative capacity, and had the petitioners refused to do so, ought to have dismissed that petition for http://www.judis.nic.in non-joinder of necessary parties.” 21
5. In the case at hand neither was any rule nor any regulation challenged. In fact, we have been apprised that at the time of selection and appointment there was no rule or regulation. A procedure used to be adopted by the administrative instructions. That apart, it was not a large body of appointees but only 182 appointees. Quite apart from that the persons who were impleaded, were not treated to be in the representative capacity. In this regard, it is profitable to refer to some authorities.
6. In Indu Shekhar Singh v. State of U.P. [Indu Shekhar Singh v. State of U.P., (2006) 8 SCC 129 : 2006 SCC (L&S) 1916] it has been held thus: (SCC p. 151, para 56) “56. There is another aspect of the matter. The appellants herein were not joined as parties in the writ petition filed by the respondents. In their absence, the High Court could not have determined the question of inter se seniority.”
7. In Rashmi Mishra v. M.P. Public Service Commission [Rashmi Mishra v. M.P. Public Service Commission, (2006) 12 SCC 724 : (2007) 2 SCC http://www.judis.nic.in (L&S) 345] , after referring to Prabodh Verma 22 [Prabodh Verma v. State of U.P., (1984) 4 SCC 251 : 1984 SCC (L&S) 704] and Indu Shekhar Singh [Indu Shekhar Singh v. State of U.P., (2006) 8 SCC 129 : 2006 SCC (L&S) 1916] , the Court took note of the fact that when no steps had been taken in terms of Order 1 Rule 8 of the Code of Civil Procedure or the principles analogous thereto all the seventeen selected candidates were necessary parties in the writ petition. It was further observed that the number of selected candidates was not many and there was no difficulty for the appellant to implead them as parties in the proceeding. Ultimately, the Court held that when all the selected candidates were not impleaded as parties to the writ petition, no relief could be granted to the appellant therein.
8. In Tridip Kumar Dingal v. State of W.B.[Tridip Kumar Dingal v. State of W.B., (2009) 1 SCC 768 : (2009) 2 SCC (L&S) 119] , this Court approved the view expressed by the tribunal which had opined that for absence of selected and appointed candidates and without affording an opportunity of hearing to them, the selection could not be set aside.
9. In Public Service Commission v. Mamta http://www.judis.nic.in Bisht [Public Service Commission v. Mamta Bisht, 23 (2010) 12 SCC 204 : (2011) 1 SCC (L&S) 208] this Court, while dealing with the concept of necessary parties and the effect of non- implementation of such a party in the matter when the selection process is assailed, observed thus: (SCC pp. 207-08, para 9) “9. … in Udit Narain Singh Malpaharia v. Board of Revenue [Udit Narain Singh Malpaharia v.Board of Revenue, AIR 1963 SC 786] , wherein the Court has explained the distinction between necessary party, proper party and pro forma party and further held that if a person who is likely to suffer from the order of the court and has not been impleaded as a party has a right to ignore the said order as it has been passed in violation of the principles of natural justice. More so, proviso to Order 1 Rule 9 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (hereinafter called ‘Code of Civil Procedure’) provides that non-joinder of necessary party be fatal. Undoubtedly, provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure are not applicable in writ jurisdiction by virtue of the provision of Section 141 of the Code of Civil Procedure but the http://www.judis.nic.in principles enshrined therein are 24 applicable. (Vide Gulabchand Chhotalal Parikh v. State of Gujarat [Gulabchand Chhotalal Parikh v. State of Gujarat, AIR 1965 SC 1153], Babubhai Muljibhai Patel v. Nandlal Khodidas Barot [Babubhai Muljibhai Patel v. Nandlal Khodidas Barot, (1974) 2 SCC 706] and Sarguja Transport Service v. STAT [Sarguja Transport Service v. STAT, (1987) 1 SCC 5 : 1987 SCC (Cri) 19] .)”
10. In J.S. Yadav v. State of U.P. [J.S. Yadav v. State of U.P., (2011) 6 SCC 570 : (2011) 2 SCC (L&S) 140] , it has been held that: (SCC p. 583, para 31) “31. No order can be passed behind the back of a person adversely affecting him and such an order, if passed, is liable to be ignored being not binding on such a party as the same has been passed in violation of the principles of natural justice.” It was further held that: (SCC p. 583, para 31) “31. … The litigant has to ensure that the necessary party is before the court, be it a plaintiff or a defendant, otherwise the proceedings will have to fail. In http://www.judis.nic.in service jurisprudence if an unsuccessful 25 candidate challenges the selection process, he is bound to implead at least some of the successful candidates in representative capacity.”
11. In Vijay Kumar Kaul v. Union of India [Vijay Kumar Kaul v. Union of India, (2012) 7 SCC 610 : (2012) 2 SCC (L&S) 491] it has been ruled thus: (SCC p. 619, para 36) “36. Another aspect needs to be highlighted. Neither before the Tribunal nor before the High Court, Parveen Kumar and others were arrayed as parties. There is no dispute over the factum that they are senior to the appellants and have been conferred the benefit of promotion to the higher posts. In their absence, if any direction is issued for fixation of seniority, that is likely to jeopardise their interest. When they have not been impleaded as parties such a relief is difficult to grant.”
12. Recently in State of Rajasthan v. Ucchab Lal Chhanwal [State of Rajasthan v. Ucchab Lal Chhanwal, (2014) 1 SCC 144 : (2014) 1 SCC (L&S) 34] , it has been opined that: (SCC p. 149, http://www.judis.nic.in para 14) 26 “14. … Despite the indefatigable effort, we are not persuaded to accept the aforesaid proponent, for once the respondents are promoted, the juniors who have been promoted earlier would become juniors in the promotional cadre, and they being not arrayed as parties in the lis, an adverse order cannot be passed against them as that would go against the basic tenet of the principles of natural justice.”
13. In view of the aforesaid enunciation of law, we are disposed to think that in such a case when all the appointees were not impleaded, the writ petition was defective and hence, no relief could have been granted to the writ petitioners.
(xii) In Census Commr. v. R. Krishnamurthy reported in 2015 2 SCC 796, the Hon'ble Apex Court held as follows:
"21. As we evince from the sequence of events, the High Court in the earlier judgment had issued the direction relating to carrying of Census in a particular manner by adding certain facets though the lis was absolutely different. The appellant, the real aggrieved party, was not http://www.judis.nic.in arrayed as a party respondent. The issue was 27 squarely raised in the subsequent writ petition where the Census Commissioner was a party and the earlier order was repeated. There can be no shadow of doubt that the earlier order is not binding on the appellant as he was not a party to the said lis. This view of ours gets fortified by the decision in H.C. Kulwant Singh v. H.C. Daya Ram[(2015) 3 SCC 177] wherein this Court, after referring to the judgments in Khetrabasi Biswal v. Ajaya Kumar Baral [(2004) 1 SCC 317 : 2004 SCC (L&S) 182], Udit Narain Singh Malpaharia v. Board of Revenue [AIR 1963 SC 786], Prabodh Verma v. State of U.P. [(1984) 4 SCC 251 : 1984 SCC (L&S) 704] and Tridip Kumar Dingal v. State of W.B. [(2009) 1 SCC 768 : (2009) 2 SCC (L&S) 119] has ruled thus:
“… if a person who is likely to suffer from the order of the court and has not been impleaded as a party has a right to ignore the said order as it has been passed in violation of the principles of natural justice.”
15. For the reasons stated supra, instant writ petition is dismissed. Consequently, connected miscellaneous petitions are closed. No costs.
http://www.judis.nic.in 28 [S.M.K., J.] [S.P., J.] 21.02.2019 Index : Yes Internet : Yes kk To
1. The Secretary, Bar Council of India, 21, Rouse Avenue, Institutional Area, Near Bal Bhawan, New Delhi - 110 002.
2. The Secretary, Bar Council of Tamil Nadu & Puducherry, Madras High Court Campus, Chennai - 600 104.
3. The Director General of Police, Government of Tamil Nadu, Dr.Radhakrishnan Salai, Mylapore, Chennai - 600 004.
http://www.judis.nic.in 29 S.MANIKUMAR, J.
AND SUBRAMONIUM PRASAD, J.
kk W.P.No.4894 of 2019 and W.M.P.No.5576 & 5577 of 2019 21.02.2019 http://www.judis.nic.in