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[Cites 6, Cited by 2]

Madras High Court

Ramu (Deceased) vs Samuel Nadar on 18 August, 2007

        

 
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT MADRAS
Delivered On:  24.03.2017
Reserved On: 16.03.2017
CORAM

THE HONOURABLE MR.JUSTICE M.SUNDAR

S.A.No.1460 of 1999


1.Ramu (deceased)
2.Gengabai
3.Sivasankar
4.Nirmala
5.Sowtha

(Appellants 2 to 5 are brought on record 
as LRs of the deceased sole appellant vide 
order of Court dated 18.08.2007 made in 
CMP Nos.2609 to 2611/07 in 
SA.No.1460/99)						... Appellants
 
Vs.

Samuel Nadar						...  Respondent	

Prayer:
	 Second Appeal filed under Section 100 of C.P.C. against the Judgment and decree of the Court of the Sub Judge, Cuddalore in A.S.No.107 of 1995 dated 7.2.97 in confirming the Judgment and decree in O.S.No.837 of 1994 dated 31.7.95.

		For Appellants 	: M/s.M.Muruganantham
					   for Mr.V.Raghavachari
		For Respondent	: Mr.R.Muralidharan


J U D G M E N T

(Delivered by M.SUNDAR,J.)

1.This second appeal turns on a very short point and a narrow compass.

2.For appreciating the judgment which this Court proposes to deliver in this second appeal, a thumb nail sketch of the facts needs to be stated and I do so under the caption 'Factual Matrix' infra.

3.Factual Matrix:

(i)The dispute is between one D.Ramu and one Samuel Nadar, who own adjacent properties. D.Ramu is the sole plaintiff in the Trial Court and Samuel Nadar is the sole defendant in the Trial Court. Therefore, besides referring to them by name, this Court also refers to them as plaintiff and defendant (based on their respective ranks in the Trial Court) for the sake of convenience and clarity.
(ii)Adjacent properties which now belong to the plaintiff and defendant were originally owned by one Durairangam Pillai. While the plaintiff had purchased his property from one son and two daughters of Durairangam Pillai vide Sale Deed dated 26.04.1994 (Ex.A1), the defendant had purchased his property from Durairangam Pillai, his wife Krishnaveni and son Jagadheesan in and by a sale deed dated 04.09.1976 (Ex.A2).
(iii)An extent of vacant land admeasuring 608 sq.ft. lying in between the abovesaid adjacent properties is the subject matter of dispute and it is the 'suit land'.
(iv)The sketch annexed to the plaint, is extracted herein below for a better and ready appreciation of the suit land in dispute. The sketch is as follows:
(v)That portion of the above sketch that is shown with lines running across the property is the land admeasuring 608 sq.ft. lying between the plaintiff and defendant's properties, which is the subject matter of dispute herein. To be noted, 'plaintiff' is written in the sketch in the suit, plaintiff's property is not shown and most importantly it is not to scale.
(vi)It is the admitted case of the defendant that in the above said Sale Deed dated 04.09.1976 (Ex.A2) under which he purchased his property, the measurement of the boundaries in terms of length and breadth are incorrect and that an error has crept in.
(vii)The plaintiff, would canvass that whenever the boundaries alone will prevail.
(viii)Broadly interalia on the above issue, parties went for trial.
(ix)Plaintiff filed the suit being O.S.No.837 of 1994 on the file of the Additional District Munsiff Court, Cuddalore with a prayer for declaration and for consequential permanent injunction qua, the suit land (608 sq.ft. of land lying between the plaintiff's and defendant's properties as referred to supra)
(x)On behalf of the plaintiff, plaintiff examined himself as P.W.1 and one Mr.Kumar, a Photographer was examined as P.W.2. The defendant (Samuel Nadar) examined himself as D.W.1. Exhibits A1 to A16 were marked on behalf of the plaintiff and Exhibits B1 and B2 were marked on behalf of the defendant. Besides this, an Advocate Commissioner was appointed and his report and sketch were marked as Exhibits C1 and C2. The Trial Court after full fledged contest and trial, dismissed the suit, primarily on the ground that a conjoint reading of Ex.A2 Sale Deed (Sale Deed dated 04.09.1976 being defendant's Title Deed) and Ex.B2 being a sketch of the suit property filed by the defendant shows that the vendors of the plaintiff did not have any right whatsoever to convey the suit property being 608 sq.ft. of land. The main reason for the Trial Court to say so is that in Ex.A1 Sale Deed being Sale Deed dated 26.04.1994 which is the plaintiff's Title Deed, there is a reference to a registered Will dated 24.09.1978 said to have been executed by Durairangam Pillai but the said Will never saw the light of the day as it was not filed or exhibited before the Court.
(xi)Aggrieved, plaintiff carried the matter in appeal by way of a Regular First Appeal under Section 96 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (CPC, for brevity). The appeal is A.S.No.107 of 1995 on the file of the Sub Court, Cuddalore.
(xii)The First Appellate Court, after a detailed hearing, dismissed the first appeal confirming the non suiting of the plaintiff by the Trial Court.
(xiii)The First Appellate Court dismissed the first appeal primarily on the ground that Durairangam Pillai's son Jagadheesan who is the plaintiff's vendor (along with his two sisters) vide Ex.A1 Sale Deed dated 26.04.1994 was not examined. The First Appellate Court also came to the conclusion that the recitals in Ex.A2 Sale Deed being Sale Deed dated 04.09.1976 which is the Title Deed of defendant clearly reveal that the entire extent of property including the disputed 608 sq.ft. has been conveyed to the defendant and therefore much later, 608 sq.ft. could not have been conveyed to the plaintiff in 1994 in and by Ex.A1 Sale Deed dated 26.04.1994.
(xiv)Not satisfied and feeling aggrieved, plaintiff has filed the instant second appeal in this Court.
(xv)The substantial question of law on which the second appeal was admitted by this Court on 14.10.1999 reads as follows:
Whether the Courts below was justified in disregarding the well settled principle of law that boundary recital will prevail over the extent? (xvi)The second appeal is now taken up for final disposal.

4.Discussion:

(i)As would be evident from the narration under the caption 'Factual Matrix' supra, it would be evident that the lone substantial question of law on which the second appeal has been admitted is whether the well settled principle of law that boundaries will prevail over extent in the event of discrepancy has been disregarded by the Courts below.
(ii)Before proceeding further with the discussion, it is necessary to set out in this judgment that the plaintiff had also set up adverse possession as a plea.
(iii)This Court put a pointed query to the learned counsel for the appellant regarding the adverse possession plea.
(iv)The querry was whether adverse possession can be set up as a plea by the plaintiff in the light of the recent Supreme court judgment in Gurudhwara Sahib's case (2014 1 SCC 669), wherein and whereby, the Supreme Court has laid down the principle of law that adverse possession can be used only as a defence (shield) and not as a sword. In other words, the Supreme Court has held that adverse possession can only be set up as a defence by a defendant against whom the suit has been laid but the same cannot be set up as a plea by the plaintiff who is seeking declaration of Title.
(v)In response to the querry from the Court, the learned counsel for the appellant referred to the judgment of a Single Judge of Kerala High Court in 2016 4 KLT 637 in the case of Thomas Vs. Loanappan. It was pointed out by the learned counsel for the appellant that the Kerala High Court has referred to the Gurudhwara Sahib's case and stated that it cannot be applied universally to all cases particularly in the light of the fact that a earlier Three Judges Bench judgment of the Supreme Court being Sarangadeva's case (AIR 1966 SC 1603) was not brought to the notice of the Hon'ble Supreme Court while rendering the Gurudhwara Sahib's case judgment. However, the learned counsel fairly says that he completely gives up the plea of adverse possession and therefore, I am not discussing this issue any further. That aspect of the matter is treated as closed in the light of the categoric submission made by the learned counsel for the appellant that he is giving up the plea of adverse possession.
(vi)Now that the plea of adverse possession has been given up, only two aspects remain to be decided in this second appeal.
(vii)One aspect is the substantial question of law with regard to boundaries prevailing over extent and the other aspect pertains to the interpretation of the boundaries (description of boundaries) set out in the Title Deeds of the plaintiff and defendant being Exhibits A1 and A2 respectively.
(viii)In this regard, the deposition of the defendant who examined himself as D.W.1 assumes importance. D.W.1 in his cross examination has stated as follows:
F/tp/:
vd; fpuag;gj;jpuj;jpy; ,Ug;gJ cz;ikahd thrfk; jhd;/ ehd; fpuak; bgWifapy; brhj;ij mse;J jhd; th';fpndd;/ me;j mst[jhd; vd; gj;jpuj;jpy; nghl;oUf;fpwJ/ fp - nk $hjpao 66 1-4 vd;Ws;sJ/ mJ jtW/ 77 1-4 vd;W nghlntz;Lk;/ jtwhfg; nghl;Ltpl;lhh;fs;/ Ex.B1Yk; mnj mst[ jhd; bfhLf;fg;gl;Ls;sJ/ Ex.A2tpy; mst[ jtwhff; bfhLf;fg;gl;lJ vd;gJ 2. 3 tUlj;jpw;F Kd;g[ jhd; bjhpa[k;/ ehd; th';fpaJ 77 1-4 mo Mdhy; 66 1-4 vd;W gj;jpuj;jpy; jtWjyhf brhy;ypapUf;fpwJ vd;W vjpUiuapy; brhy;ypapUf;fpnwd;/ ehd; fpuak; th';fpa brhj;jpy; tPl;Lf;Fg;gpd;g[wk; xURth; cs;sJ/ ////////////////////////////////////// kjpy;RtUf;F nky;g[wk; vdf;F ve;jtpjkhd brhj;Jf;Fk; chpikapy;iy vd;gJ jtW/
(ix)Therefore, admittedly the boundary in terms of length has been short stated in the Title Deed of the defendant.
(x)It is evident from the description of the Schedule in Ex.A2 Sale Deed which reads as follows:
nk/m/o!;o/flY}h; hp/o/flY}h; tJ rg;o flY}h; Kdprpg; vy;iyf;Fl;gl;l /////////////////////////////////////////////////// nky;g[uk; kjpy;Rth; cs;gl rf;Fge;jpf;Fs; fp/nk $hjpao nky;g[uk; kjpy; Rth; cs;gl 66 1-4 nkw;go $hjpao //g[uk; RtUk; tlg[uk; ////// Rtw;wpy; ghjpa[k; cs;gl 32 1-4 ,e;j mst[s;s fPH;kida[ld; ,jpy; 32 x 18 = 576 rJuoapy; ////////// 32 x 18=576//////// 32 x 32=1024 rJuo mstpy; ehlnlhL nghl;l Xl;Ltpy;iy fl;olKk;/////// This takes us to the question as to whether boundaries will prevail over extent in the instant case.
(xi)While Mr.M.Muruganantham, learned counsel on record for the appellant, strenuously contend that it is a settled position of law that boundaries will always prevail over extent whenever there is a discrepancy, Mr.Muralidharan, learned counsel for the respondent would contend that it is not a universal principle and in cases where one is able to establish and demonstrate that the vendor did not have the right to convey the property which he is said to have conveyed, this principle of boundaries prevailing over extent will not operate. To buttress and support his submission, Mr.Muralidharan, learned counsel for the respondent relied on the following three judgments:
(a)First judgment relied on by the learned counsel for the respondent is 1984 2 MLJ 306 (Dina Malar Publications Vs. The Tiruchirapalli Municipality rep. by its Executive Authority and others). My attention was drawn to paragraph nos.11 and 12 of the said judgment. In my reading, the following portion of the paragraph 11 is relevant and the same is extracted hereinbelow:
the principle laid down in the above cited decisions can be applied only to a case where there is an element of doubt with reference to the extent and in this case, it cannot be said that there is any element of doubt with reference to the extent. The documents Exhibit B-1 and B-2 unambiguously prove that what was permitted to be conveyed was an extent of 60'x 35' and not the entire area covered by the four boundaries. Hence, the above cited decisions cannot be of any avail to the appellant. Besides Exhibits B-1 and B-2, the Government Order and the proceedings of the Collector do not mention the boundaries.
(b)The next judgment pressed into service by the learned counsel for the respondent is AIR 2006 SC 2172 (Mst.Sugani vs. Rameshwar Das and another). My attention was drawn to paragraph 27. I am not extracting paragraph 27. This judgment was relied on to buttress the principle that appreciation of facts, documentary evidence and meaning of entries in documents and contents of documents cannot be raised as a substantial question of law.
(c)The third judgment pressed into service is (2013) 2 MLJ 424 (S.Lakshmi and others Vs. M.Tamilselvi and another). My attention was drawn to paragraphs 17 and 18 of the said judgment. Paragraph 18 would be useful. Paragraph 18 of the said judgment reads as follows:
18.In support of the contention raised on the side of the respondents, the following decisions have been relied upon:
In Roohnisha Beevi and 15 Others v. A.M.M. Mahudu Mohamed and 29 Others (1998) 1 LW 244, this Court has held that In case of conflict, usually boundaries predominate and the rest is regarded as erroneous or inaccurate descriptions.
(b) In Dharmakanny Nadar Siviseshamuthu and Others v. Mahalingam Nadar Gopalakrishna Nadar and Others AIR 1963 Mad 147, it has been held that ordinarily when a piece of land is sold with definite boundaries, unless it is very clear form the circumstances surrounding the sale that a smaller extent than what is covered by the boundaries was intended to be sold, the rule of interpretation is that boundaries must prevail as against measurement.
(c)In the Church of South India Trust Association through its power of Attorney Agents C.E.Soundiraraj and Another v. Raja Ambrose (died) and Another (1978) 2 MLJ 260, it is held that the principle of construction of grants made under instruments in writing seems to be now well-settled not only in this country, but in many other systems as well. The principle accords with common sense and might be stated broadly, thus: The subject-matter of the grant would depend on the intention of the parties as expressed in the relevant conveyance deed. Where the deed sets out the extent and measurements correctly, there can be no difficulty in determining the subject-matter of the grant. But where no measurements are given or the extent mentioned in the deed is either vague or is only a rough and ready approximation, one has no look to other indications in the deed in order to fix the identity of the property which is the subject of the grant. If the deed in question sets out the boundaries of the property conveyed, then these boundaries will have to be accepted as a clear reflection of the intention of the grantor and they will conclude not only the exact positioning of the property conveyed, but also its true extent. The boundaries given in the deed will also, in such cases, prevail over the measurements given in the deed, if these are given as approximations.
(d)In Kamakshi Ammal v. R.Ranganathan Chettiar and Another 82 LW 142 it is held that if the deed of conveyance gives both the extent and the boundaries, the Court will have to determine what the intention of the parties was at the time of the grant, having due regard to the law of evidence. The problems can arise only when there is inconsistency and both the area and the boundaries are specific. First, we have to ascertain if there is real inconsistency between the boundaries and area, or is the inconsistency only seeming? There can be no hard and fast rule in a matter of this kind that when both the boundaries and area are given and both cannot stand together, the intention was to convey the entire extent covered by the boundaries. Equally, reference to the area, particularly when it is not precise, cannot falsify the conveyance by boundaries. One test is, which of them is precise and capable of identification and easy location on the ground, for the attempt should be to give effect to the grant according to terms. We have to find out which of them may be discarded an which taken for identification of the grant, as the governing mark or the substantial or true part of the description.
(xii)Based on the above citations and on applying the factual matrix of the instant case, to the principles enunciated in the said judgments, this Court is of the view that the judgment in Rameshwar Dhas's case does not really help the respondent as it is not a substantial question of law. The same does not help the respondent owing to the question of law on which this second appeal was admitted, which has been extracted supra.
(xiii)The third judment cited being Lakshmi's case also restates the principle that boundaries prevail over extent. Therefore, Lakshmi's case also does not come to the aid of the respondent.
(xiv)However, a perusal of the facts in S.Lakshmi's case would reveal that it is not a case where the plea that the vendor who conveyed the property did not have title to convey the disputed extent of property was set up, it was a case of conflict between boundaries and extent simplicitor that leaves us that the first judgment cited by the respondent namely, Dina Malar Publications case.
(xv)Dina Malar Publications case certainly helps the respondent. That was a case where the documents placed before the Court unambiguously establish that the vendor was not permitted to convey the disputed extent of land. Therefore, what is contained within the boundaries could not have been conveyed. Therefore, the Dina Malar Publications case helps the case of the respondent.
(xvi)In other words, the principle that evolves is that though the well established boundaries prevailing over extent principle continues to prevail, in a given case, where there is discrepancy between boundaries and extent but where the extent that lies within the given boundaries is much more than what could have actually been conveyed a departure has to be made.
(xvii)In the given case, Durairangam Pillai, his wife Krishnaveni and son Jagadheesan had sold the entire extent under Ex.A2 Sale Deed to the defendant. Thereafter Durairangam's son Jagadheesan along with his two sisters could not have conveyed this 608 sq.ft extent also, eighteen years later to the plaintiff under Exhibits A1 Sale Deed dated 26.04.1994.
(xviii)Furthermore, the burden of proof lies heavily on the plaintiff. The plaintiff has to necessarily discharge the burden of proof to establish that the suit land being an extent of 608 sq.ft. was also conveyed to the plaintiff and that the vendors had the right to do so under the plaintiff's Title Deed being Ex.A1 Sale Deed. A perusal of the judgments of the Courts below reveal that the plaintiff has not discharged their burden for two reasons. First reason is that the plaintiff has not produced the Will dated 24.09.1983 of which there is reference in the Ex.A1 Sale Deed. The second reason is that the plaintiff has not chosen to examine Durairangam Pillai's son Jagadheesan, who is the common vendor in both the Sale Deeds.
(xix)The submission of the learned counsel for the appellant that the defendant could have produced this documentary and oral evidence, in my opinion is unacceptable. The reason is, burden of proof never shifts. Only onus shifts. Onus not only shifts, but it is well settled that it swings like a pendulum from one end of the litigation to other end. Only if the plaintiff had discharged prima facie, the burden cast on him, would the onus have shifted to the defendant. In the instant case, the plaintiff who has not produced the Will dated 24.09.1983 and the plaintiff has not examined the common vendor Jagadheesan, may not now be heard to contend under Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure that the defendant could have dispelled the ambiguity that has set in owing to the erroneous description of boundaries. Furthermore, the plaintiff who examined himself as P.W.1 does not talk about the Will anywhere in the deposition. A perusal of the deposition of P.W.1 reveals that there is no whisper about the Will in the deposition of P.W.1. Therefore, I have no hesitation in answering the substantial question of law in favour of the respondent. I answer the substantial question of law by saying that this is a case where the vendor did not have any Title to convey the suit land being 608 sq.ft. Therefore, the principle of boundaries prevailing over extent cannot be made wholly applicable to the instant case. In other words, I hold that the principle of boundaries prevailing over extent cannot be the sole principle for deciding the instant case. The factual matrix of the instant case is whether a departure from the principle is imperative. Having answered the substantial question of law on which the second appeal was admitted by this Court in favour of the respondent it follows as a scquiter that the second appeal fails and deserves to be dismissed.

5.Conclusion:

(i)The second appeal is dismissed confirming the concurrent judgments of the Trial Court and the First Appellate Court.

6.Decision:

(i)Second Appeal 1460 of 1999 is dismissed confirming the judgment and decree dated 07.02.1997 made by the First Appellate Court in A.S.No.107 of 1995 on the file of Sub Judge, Cuddalore which in turn confirms the dismissal of the suit in O.S.No.837 of 1994 by the Trial Court being the District Munsif Court, Cuddalore in and by judgment and decree dated 31.07.1995.
(ii)Considering the nature of the matter and the trajectory the litigation has taken, the parties are left to bear their respective costs. Consequently, the connected miscellaneous petition, if any, is closed.

24.03.2017 pri Index: Yes / No Internet: Yes / No To The Sub Judge, Cuddalore.

M.SUNDAR,J.

pri S.A.No.1460 of 1999 24.03.2017 http://www.judis.nic.in