Karnataka High Court
Smt Pillamma vs The Deputy Commissioner on 14 December, 2021
IN THE HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA AT BENGALURU
DATED THIS THE 14TH DAY OF DECEMBER 2021
BEFORE
THE HON'BLE MR.JUSTICE ASHOK S. KINAGI
WRIT PETITION NO.3972 OF 2020 (SC-ST)
BETWEEN:
SMT. PILLAMMA
AGED ABOUT 65 YEARS,
W/O SRI MUNIYAPPA,
R/AT GADDAKANNURU VILLAGE,
KASABA HOBLI, KOLAR TALUK,
KOLAR DISTRICT - 563 101.
...PETITIONER
(BY MS. SWETHA G DESHPANDE, ADVOCATE FOR
SRI. PAPI REDDY G, ADVOCATE)
AND:
1 . THE DEPUTY COMMISSIONER
KOLAR DISTRICT,
KOLAR -563 1O1.
2 . THE ASSISTANT COMMISSIONER
KOLAR SUB DIVISION,
KOLAR -563 1O1.
3 . THE TAHSILDAR
KOLAR TALUK, KOLAR DISTRICT,
KOLAR -563 1O1.
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4 . SRI. CHICKAMUNIYAPPA
AGED ABOUT 59 YEARS
S/O SI DODDAHANUMANTHAPPA
R/AT H.MALLANDAHALLI VILLAGE,
HUTHUR HOBLI,
KOLAR TALUK, KOLAR -563 1O1.
5 . SRI. HANUMANTHAPPA
AGED ABOUT 37 YEARS
S/O SRI.MUNIYAPPA,
R/AT H.MALLANDAHALLI VILLAGE,
HUTHUR HOBLI,
KOLAR TALUK, KOLAR -563 1O1.
...RESPONDENTS
(BY SRI. V. SESHU, HCGP FOR R-1 TO R-3
SRI. CHANNABASAPPA S.N, ADVOCATE FOR C/R-5
R-4 SERVED UNREPRESENTED)
THIS WRIT PETITION IS FILED UNDER ARTICLE 226
OF THE CONSTITUTION OF INDIA PRAYING TO
QUASH THE ORDER DATED 18.09.2019 PASSED BY THE
R-1 IN CASE VIDE ANNEXURE-H AND THE ORDER DATED
24.11.2016 PASSED BY THE R-2 IN CASE VIDE
ANNEXURE-G AND CONSEQUENTLY DIRECT THE R-3 TO
CANCEL THE REVENUE ENTRIES MADE IN THE NAMES OF
R-4 AND 5 AND RESTORE THE ENTRIES IN THE NAME OF
THE PETITIONER IN RESPECT OF THE SCHEDULE
PROPERTY.
THIS WRIT PETITION COMING ON FOR PRELIMINARY
HEARING IN 'B' GROUP THIS DAY, THE COURT MADE THE
FOLLOWING:
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ORDER
The petitioner being aggrieved by the order dated 18.09.2019 passed by respondent No.1, vide Annexure-H and also order dated 24.11.2016 passed by respondent No.2, vide Annexure-G has filed this writ petition.
2. Brief facts leading rise to filing of this petition are as under:
That land in old Sy.No.85, new Sy.No.99 measuring 2 acres was granted in favour of one Smt.Lakshmakka on 20.10.1948. Smt.Lakshmakka has sold the property in favour of Sri.Beerappa in the year 1961. Another 2 acres of land in old Sy.No.85 was granted in favour of one Sri.Doddahanumanthu S/o Dasappa on 20.10.1948 as per the entry made in the Record of Rights. The said two entries relating to the grants in favour of Smt.Lakshmakka and Sri.Doddahanumanthu S/o Dasappa have been 4 entered in the Record of Rights. One Sri.Beerappa had purchased the land measuring 2 acres in old Sy.No.85 including the schedule property under a registered sale deed dated 19.06.1961 from Smt.Lakshmakka. The partition was effected in the family of Sri.Beerappa. In the said partition, the said property was allotted to the share of one Sri.Venkatesh Gowda under a registered partition deed dated 27.11.1975. On the strength of registered partition deed, the name of Sri.Venkatesh Gowda was entered in the Record of Rights. The petitioner has purchased the land measuring 1 acre 5 guntas in old Sy.No.85, new Sy.No.99 under a registered sale deed dated 29.12.1994. On the strength of registered sale deed dated 29.12.1994, the revenue entries have been mutated in the name of the petitioner. The petitioner is cultivating the schedule property from the date of purchase. The respondents No.4 5 and 5 had misconstrued the grant made in favour of Smt.Lakshmakka and Sri.Doddahanumanthu S/o Dasappa and had initiated PTCL proceedings before respondent No.2 and filed an application under Section 5 of the Karnataka Scheduled Caste and Scheduled Tribes (Prohibition of Transfer of Certain Lands) Act, 1978 ('the PTCL Act' for short) alleging that the said transactions are in violation of Section 4 of the PTCL Act. Respondent No.2 allowed the application vide order dated 24.11.2016. The petitioner being aggrieved by the order of respondent No.2 has filed an appeal before respondent No.1.
Respondent No.1 vide order dated 18.09.2019 has confirmed the order passed by respondent No.2 and consequently dismissed the appeal filed by the petitioner. Hence, the petitioner has filed this writ petition.
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3. Though notice was issued to the respondent No.4, respondent No.4 remained absent.
4. Heard learned counsel for petitioner, learned HCGP for respondents No.1 to 3 and learned counsel for caveat/respondent No.5.
5. Learned counsel for the petitioner submits that the original grantee had sold the land in favour of Sri.Beerappa in the year 1961. Respondents No.4 and 5 have filed an application under Section 5 of the PTCL Act, in the year 2010-11. She further submits that there is an inordinate delay in filing the application under Section 5 of the PTCL Act. In support of her contention she places reliance on the judgment of the Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of NEKKANTI RAMA LAKSHMI VS. STATE OF KARNATAKA & ANR. [2020(14) SCC 232] which is further reiterated in the case of MR.VIVEK H HINDJUJA AND OTHERS v. 7 MR. ASWATHA AND OTHERS reported in (2020) 14 SCC 228. She further submits that respondents No.1 and 2 have committed an error in passing the impugned orders. The impugned orders are contrary to law laid down by the Hon'ble Apex Court in the aforesaid judgments. Hence, on these grounds, she prays to allow the writ petition.
6. Per contra, learned HCGP and learned counsel for respondent No.5 supports the impugned order.
7. Perused the records and considered the submissions made by learned counsel for the parties.
8. It is not in dispute that the land was granted in favour of Smt.Lakshmakka and Sri.Doddahanumanthu S/o Dasappa in the year 1948. Smt.Lakshmakka had sold the land in favour of Sri.Beerappa under the registered sale deed dated 8 19.06.1961. A partition was effected among the family members of Sri.Beerappa. In the said partition, the said property had fallen to the share of Sri.Venkatesh Gowda under a registered partition deed dated 27.11.1975. The said Sri.Venkatesh Gowda had sold the land in favour of the petitioner under a registered sale deed dated 29.12.1994. After lapse of more than 30 years respondents No.4 and 5 filed the application under Section 5 of the PTCL Act, before respondent No.2. The PTCL Act came into force on 01.01.1979. Respondents No.4 and 5 have filed the application under Section 5 of the PTCL Act, in the year 2010-11 alleging that the sale transaction is in violation of Section 4 of the PTCL Act. Respondent No.2, after due enquiry, allowed the application filed by respondents No.4 and 5 and declared the registered sale deed dated 19.06.1961 and also registered sale deed dated 29.12.1994 as 9 null and void and directed to restore the possession in favour of respondents No.4 and 5. Petitioner being aggrieved by the order passed by respondent No.2 preferred an appeal before respondent No.1. Respondent No.1 has confirmed the order passed by respondent No.2.
9. From perusal of the records, it is clear that Smt.Lakshmakka has sold the said land in favour of Sri.Beerappa under a registered sale deed dated 19.06.1961. Respondents No.4 and 5 have filed the application under Section 5 of the PTCL Act in the year 2010, after more than 30 years the PTCL Act came into force. Thus, there is an inordinate delay in filing the application. Respondents No.4 and 5 have not explained the sufficient cause in filing an application at a belated stage.
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10. The Hon'ble Apex Court in the cases referred above, has held as under:
(a) In the case of NEKKANTI RAMA LAKSHMI (SUPRA):
"8. However, the question that arises is with regard to terms of Section 5 of the Act which enables any interested person to make an application for having the transfer annulled as void under Section 4 of the Act. This Section does not prescribe any period within which such an application can be made. Neither does it prescribe the period within which suo motu action may be taken. This Court in the case of CHHEDI LAL YADAV & ORS. VS. HARI KISHORE YADAV (D) THR. LRS. & ORS., 2017(6) SCALE 459 and also in the case of NINGAPPA VS. DY. COMMISSIONER & ORS. (C.A.NO.3131 of 2007, decided on 14.07.2011) reiterated a settled position in law that whether Statute provided for a period of limitation, provisions of the Statute must be invoked within a reasonable time. It is held that action whether on an application of the parties, or suo motu, must be taken within a reasonable time. That action arose under the provisions of a similar Act which provided for restoration of certain lands to farmers which were sold for 11 arrears of rent or from which they were ejected for arrears of land from 1st January, 1939 to 31st December, 1950. This relief was granted to the farmers due to flood in the Kosi River which make agricultural operations impossible. An application for restoration was made after 24 years and was allowed. It is in that background that this Court upheld that it was unreasonable to do so. We have no hesitation in upholding that the present application for restoration of land made by respondent-Rajappa was made after an unreasonably long period and was liable to be dismissed on that ground. Accordingly, the judgments of the Karnataka High Court, namely, R. RUDRAPPA VS. DEPUTY COMMISSIONER, 2000 (1) KARNATAKA LAW JOURNAL, 523, MADDURAPPA VS.
STATE OF KARNATAKA, 2006 (4) KARNATAKA LAW JOURNAL, 303 AND G. MAREGOUDA VS. THE DEPUTY COMMISSIONER, CHITRADURGA DISTRICT, CHITRADURGA AND ORS, 2000(2) KR.L.J.SH. N.4B holding that there is no limitation provided by Section 5 of the Act and, therefore, an application can be made at any time, are overruled. Order accordingly."
(b) In the case of VIVEK M. HINDUJA (SUPRA): 12
"10. In PUNE MUNICIPAL CORPORATION V. STATE OF MAHARASHTRA [(2007) 5 SCC 211] this court reproduced the following observations with regard to the declaration of orders beyond the period of limitation as invalid:
"39. Setting aside the decree passed by all the courts and referring to several cases, this court held that if the party aggrieved by invalidity of the order intends to approach the court for declaration that the order against him was inoperative, he must come before the court within the period prescribed by limitation. 'If the statutory time of limitation expires, the court cannot give the declaration sought for'."
11. Thus, respondents No.4 and 5 have not filed application within the reasonable time. Respondents No.1 and 2 without considering that the application is filed beyond reasonable time, have allowed the application filed by respondents No.4 and 5. The impugned orders passed by respondents No.1 and 2 are contrary to the law laid down by the Apex Court in the judgments referred supra. Thus, this Court is of 13 the opinion that the application filed by respondents No.4 and 5 is beyond reasonable time.
12. In view of the aforesaid discussion, the following order is passed :
ORDER The writ petition is allowed;
The impugned orders are hereby set aside and quashed.
SD/-
JUDGE GRD