Jenson vs State Of Kerala on 22 May, 2025

[Cites 11, Cited by 0]

Kerala High Court

Jenson vs State Of Kerala on 22 May, 2025

This is a writ petition filed under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, challenging Ext.P2 order of externment passed against the petitioner under Section 15(1) of the Kerala Anti-Social Activities (Prevention) Act, 2007 [KAA(P) Act for the sake of brevity].

2. By the said order, the petitioner was interdicted from entering the jurisdictional limits of the District Police Chief, Alappuzha for six months from the date of the receipt of the order.

3. The records available before us reveal that, it was after considering the recurrent involvement of the petitioner in criminal activities, the District Police Chief, Alappuzha submitted a proposal for the initiation of proceedings against the petitioner under Section 15(1) of the KAA(P) Act, 2007 before the authorised officer, the Deputy Inspector General of Police, Alappuzha Range. For initiation of proceedings, the petitioner has been classified as a "known rowdy" as defined under Section 2(p)(iii) of the KAA(P) Act, 2007.

                                         




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      4.    The authority considered 4 cases in which the petitioner

was involved for passing the order of externment. The last case considered for passing the impugned order of externment is crime No.800/2024 of Alappuzha North Police Station registered, alleging commission of offences punishable under Sections 323, 324, 326, 308 r/w 34 IPC, wherein the petition was arrayed as the 1st accused.

5. Heard Sri. V. Vinay, the learned counsel appearing for the petitioner, and Sri. K.A. Anas, the learned Government Pleader.

6. The learned counsel for the petitioner would submit that the Ext.P2 order was passed on improper consideration of facts and without proper application of mind. According to the counsel, there is an inordinate delay in mooting the proposal as well as in passing the order of externment, and hence, the live link between the last prejudicial activity and the purpose of the externment order is snapped. The learned counsel further submitted that though the petitioner was released on bail in the case registered with respect to the last prejudicial activity on stringent conditions, the said fact is not adverted to, in the impugned order and the sufficiency of bail conditions imposed in the said order was also not considered by the WP(Crl) No. 143/2025 5 2025:KER:35030 jurisdictional authority. It was further submitted that the jurisdictional authority should have considered the fact that already proceedings were initiated against the petitioner under Section 107 of Cr.P.C. and the said proceedings would certainly be sufficient to prevent the petitioner from involving in criminal activities. Moreover, the learned counsel submitted that the impugned order was passed in a casual manner without arriving at the requisite objective and subjective satisfaction, and hence warrants interference.

7. Per contra, the learned Government Pleader submitted that the impugned order was passed by the jurisdictional authority after proper application of mind and upon arriving at the requisite objective as well as subjective satisfaction. According to the learned Government Pleader, there is no inordinate delay in passing the impugned order, and hence, the petitioner could not be heard to say that the live link between the last prejudicial activity and the purpose of externment was snapped. It was further submitted that all the procedural safeguards were complied with while passing the order of externment against the petitioner and hence, no interference is warranted.

                                            




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8. On perusal of the records, it is gatherable that the last prejudicial activity considered by the jurisdictional authority to pass Ext.P2 order of externment is crime No.800/2024 of Alappuzha North Police Station, registered against the petitioner alleging commission of offences punishable under Sections 323, 324, 326, 308 r/w 34 IPC. The petitioner is arrayed as the 1st accused in the said case. The last prejudicial activity was committed on 03.06.2024, and in the said case, the petitioner was arrested on 05.06.2024. Subsequently, the petitioner was released on bail on 28.06.2024. It was thereafter, on 13.08.2024, that the District Police Chief, Alappuzha, forwarded the proposal for initiation of proceedings under KAA(P)Act against the petitioner. Thereafter, a notice was issued to the petitioner on 02.09.2025 to show cause why action under Section 15(1) of the KAA(P) Act should not be initiated against him. In response to the said notice, the petitioner filed a written reply on 13.09.2024. Thereafter, on 09.10.2024, another notice was issued to the petitioner to appear in person to afford him an opportunity for a personal hearing. Accordingly, the petitioner appeared on 18.10.2024. After considering his written as well as oral submissions, WP(Crl) No. 143/2025 7 2025:KER:35030 the jurisdictional authority passed the order of externment on 25.10.2024, whereby the petitioner was restrained from entering the limits of the District Police Chief, Alappuzha, for a period of six months from the date of receipt of the order.

9. The sequence of events narrated above reveals that there is no inordinate delay in passing the impugned order. Moreover, an externment order under the KAA(P) Act is having significant bearing on the personal as well as fundamental rights of an individual. Therefore, some minimum time is required to collect the details of the cases in which the petitioner is involved and to comply with the procedural formalities. Therefore, we are of the view that the delay occurred in this case is only justifiable, and it could not be said that the livelink between the last prejudicial activity and the purpose of the impugned order is snapped. Moreover, unlike in the case of an order of detention passed under Section 3 of KAA(P) Act, even if some delay has occurred in passing an order of externment, the same has no serious bearing as the consequences of both the orders are different. Because an order of detention is a grave deprivation of the personal liberty of the person detained. We are WP(Crl) No. 143/2025 8 2025:KER:35030 cognizant that Section 15 of the KAA(P) Act also visits the person concerned with an intrusion on his personal liberty within the limit of Article 21 especially when the said order restrains a citizen from his right to travel in any part of India. However, when a detention order under Section 3 of KAA(P) Act is compared with an order of externment passed under Section 15(1) of KAA(P) Act, the latter visits a person with lesser deprivation of liberty. Therefore, the nature of proceedings under Sections 3 and 15 is inherently different. In this regard, we are fortified by the decision in Stalin C.V. v. State of Kerala and others [2011 (1) KHC 852]. Moreover, an order under Section 15 can be treated only as equivalent to a condition imposed in a bail order, especially when the same only curtails the movement of the petitioner. Consequently, we have no hesitation in holding that the minimal delay in mooting the proposal and in passing the externment order after the date of the last prejudicial activity has no serious impact at all, and the same is only liable to be discarded.

10. One of the main contentions raised by the learned counsel for the petitioner is that the jurisdictional authority, while WP(Crl) No. 143/2025 9 2025:KER:35030 passing the order, did not take notice of the fact that the petitioner was released on bail in the last case registered against him. According to the counsel, the jurisdictional authority failed to consider the sufficiency of the bail conditions imposed by the court at the time when he was granted bail. While considering the contention of the counsel for the petitioner in the above regard, it is to be noted that there is no law which precludes the jurisdictional authority to pass an order of externment against a person who is already on bail. However, when an order of externment is passed against a person who is on bail, it is incumbent upon the authority to take note of the said fact and to consider whether the bail conditions imposed on such a person while granting bail by the court are sufficient to prevent the externee from involving in criminal activities. Keeping in mind the above, while reverting to the case at hand, it can be seen that in the impugned order itself, the fact that the petitioner was released on bail in the case registered against him with respect to the last prejudicial activity is specifically adverted to. Moreover, in the impugned order, the sufficiency of the bail conditions is also seen properly considered by the jurisdictional authority. In the impugned WP(Crl) No. 143/2025 10 2025:KER:35030 order, it is specifically mentioned that the conditions clamped on the externee are not sufficient to restrain him from repeating criminal activities. Therefore, the contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner in the above regard will not sustain.

11. The next contention of the petitioner is that proceeding under Section 15(1) of the KAA(P)Act was not at all necessitated in this case, as a proceeding under Section 107 Cr.P.C. had already been initiated. This Court in Anita Antony v. State of Kerala and Others [2022 KHC OnLine 455] has held that the relative scope of the two proceedings is different and independent. Proceedings under S.107 of the Cr. P.C, is in the nature of security for keeping peace and public tranquility, and the free movement of such a person is not curtailed at all. The power of externment under Section 15(1) of the KAA(P) Act, on the other hand, allows an authorized officer to restrain an individual, identified as a "known goonda" or "known-rowdy" under the Act, from entering specified areas. This order can be issued if, after affording an opportunity of being heard, the officer is satisfied that the individual is engaging in, about to engage in, or likely to engage in anti-social activities. The affected WP(Crl) No. 143/2025 11 2025:KER:35030 person must meet the criteria for a Known goonda or Known rowdy, and the officer must satisfy himself, objectively and subjectively, that restrictions are necessary to prevent further anti-social activities as defined under section 2(a) of the KAAP Act. In other words, Section 107 proceedings under the Cr.P.C. and the provisions under the KAAP Act operate in different spheres. At the same time, it has to be borne in mind that in a case where it is possible to prevent the petitioner from continuing his anti-social activity by methods other than his preventive detention or externment, the authorities are bound to adopt those methods rather than depriving his rights under Article 21 of the Constitution of India. It was therefore that this court as well as the Apex Court have held that in cases where proceedings such as those under Section 107 of the Cr.P.C are initiated, the authorities should consider whether, in spite of the initiation of such proceedings it is necessary to preventively detain or extern the person concerned and that on such examination if the authorities are satisfied that detention or externment is necessary, it is open to the authorities to validly do so.

                                         




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12. In the case at hand, the records clearly reveal that the jurisdictional authority adverted to the proceedings initiated under Section 107 of the Cr.P.C. There is specific mention in the impugned order that the proceedings under Section 107 of the Cr.P.C. is not sufficient to prevent the recurrent involvement of the petitioner in criminal activities. Therefore, it is evident that the impugned order is passed after arriving at the requisite objective and subjective satisfaction and after taking note of the fact that proceedings under Section 107 of the Cr.P.C. alone are not sufficient to restrict the criminal activities of the petitioner.

13. From a perusal of the records, we are satisfied that all the necessary requirements before passing an order under Section 15(1) of the KAA(P) Act have been scrupulously complied with in this case. We are further satisfied that the competent authority passed the externment order after thoroughly verifying all the materials placed by the sponsoring authority and after arriving at the requisite satisfaction. Therefore, it cannot be said that the order passed under Section 15(1) of the KAA(P) Act is vitiated in any manner.

                                            




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14. In view of the discussion above, we hold that the petitioner has not made out any case for interference.

Hence, the writ petition stands dismissed.

                                                  Sd/-
                                            P.B. SURESH KUMAR
                                                    JUDGE

 
                                                      
                                                 Sd/-
                                            JOBIN SEBASTIAN
                                                       JUDGE


ncd

                                       
                                      




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                   APPENDIX OF WP(CRL.) 143/2025

PETITIONER EXHIBITS

Exhibit P1                     THE TRUE COPY OF THE REPORT DATED 13.08.2024
                               SUBMITTED BY THE 3RD RESPONDENT BEFORE THE
                               2ND RESPONDENT

Exhibit P2                     THE TRUE COPY OF THE ORDER

NO.KAAPA-15900/2024/ER DATED 25.10.2024 OF THE 2ND RESPONDENT Exhibit P3 THE TRUE COPY OF THE ORDER DATED 28.01.2025 IN O.P NO.5/2025 OF THE ADVISORY BOARD, KAAPA Exhibit P4 THE TRUE COPY OF THE ORDER DATED 28.06.2024 IN CMP NO.4910/2024 IN CRIME NO.800/2024 OF JFCM-I, ALAPPUZHA

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