Andhra HC (Pre-Telangana)
Jayarama Naidu And Ors. vs M. Nallaiah @ Muthyala Naidu on 10 January, 2003
Equivalent citations: AIR2003AP357, 2003(2)ALD687, 2003(4)ALT491, AIR 2003 ANDHRA PRADESH 375, (2003) 2 ANDHLD 687, (2003) 94 REVDEC 591, (2003) 4 ANDH LT 491, (2003) 3 ICC 479
JUDGMENT Dubagunta Subrahmanyam, J.
1. This is an appeal against the judgment and decree dated 16.12.1997 in A.S. No. 178 of 1991 on the file of 1st Additional District Judge at Chittoor (A.S. No. 98 of 1990 on the file of III Additional District Judge, Tirupati) confirming the judgment and decree dated 17.9.1990 in O.S. No. 124 of 1987 on the file of Additional Subordinate Judge, Tirupati. Defendants in the suit are the appellants.
2. Necessary facts for the disposal of this appeal are as follows:
Bollini Munaswamy Naidu was the owner of plaint schedule property. He was having two daughters, namely, Lakshmamma and Kamala. He got married both the daughters to one and the same person by name Medasani Chengama Naidu. Plaintiff is the son of the first daughter Lakshmamma.
Defendants 1 to 3 are the sons of the second daughter Kamala. On 30.7.1947 Bollini Munaswamy Naidu and his two sons including P.W.2 executed a registered settlement deed Ex.A1 gifting the plaint schedule property to the plaintiff and first defendant who were then minors. The other male issues to be born later were given similar rights in the same property. The two sisters are appointed as guardians of their minor sons respectively till they attain their respective ages of majority. After the execution of the settlement deed Ex.A.1, the second daughter Kamala gave birth to two other sons, namely, defendant Nos.2 and 3. Lakshmamma's only son, namely, the plaintiff filed the suit seeking partition of the property covered by Ex.A.1 into two equal half shares and for separate possession of his half share in the said property. Defendants contested the suit taking various pleas. The main plea is that as per the recitals in Ex.A.1 settlement deed the plaintiff and the three defendants are each entitled to 1/4th share in plaint schedule property. Both parties adduced oral and documentary evidence before the trial court. The trial court on a consideration of the oral evidence as well as the recitals in Ex.A.1 settlement deed accepted the case of the plaintiff that he was given half a share in plaint schedule property under Ex.A.1 settlement deed and that the remaining half share is to be equally shared by the defendants 1 to 3. The trial court accordingly decreed the suit. Aggrieved by the judgment of the trial court, the defendants preferred an appeal before the lower Appellate Court. After considering various contentions raised by both the parties, the lower Appellate Court confirmed the judgment and decree passed by the trial court. Aggrieved by the judgment and decree of the lower Appellate Court, the defendants preferred the present appeal.
3. In this appeal notice before admission was given to the respondent -plaintiff. He appeared before the court through his counsel and contested the appeal. The following substantial question of law falls for consideration in the present appeal. Whether as per the recitals in the settlement deed Ex.A.1 the intention of the donors is to confer equal rights in the property covered by Ex.A.1 on the plaintiff and the defendants, and if so, whether the judgments and decrees of the two courts below holding that the plaintiff is entitled to half a share and not to 1/4th share are liable to be set aside?
4. The learned Subordinate Judge extracted relevant recitals in vernacular language in Teiugu in Ex.A.1 in the course of his judgment. It is recited in Ex.A.1 that plaintiff, first defendant and male issues born to the two sisters thereafter and their mothers have to enjoy the gifted property till all the male issues attain their ages of majority and thereafter they have to divide "their respective shares" in Ex.A.1 property "equally" among themselves and enjoy the same with absolute rights of sale, etc. At another portion of Ex.A.1 document, it is further recited that till all the sons attain their respective ages of majority, the two sisters have to enjoy the produce from the property in equal snares. Keeping in view these two important recitals in Ex.A.1 settlement deed, the learned Subordinate Judge came to the opinion that the intention of the donors as clear from the recitals in Ex.A.1 is that the sons of Lakshmamma will get half a share and the sons of the other sister Kamala will get the remaining half a share and the respective sons have to divide equally their respective shares. To know the intention of the donors from the recitals in Ex.A.1, the learned Subordinate Judge placed further reliance on the oral testimony of P.W.2 who was one of the executants of Ex.A.1 document. P.W.2 deposed that their intention was to give half a share to the sons of Lakshmamma and half a share to the sons of Kamala. This interpretation given by the learned Subordinate Judge was accepted by the learned Additional District Judge who dismissed the appeal. The lower Appellate Court Judge also accepted that the evidence of P.W.2 regarding the intention of the donors is true and correct.
5. The learned counsel for the appellants placed reliance on a judgment of a learned Single Judge of this Court reported in P. Venkatarama Reddi v. P.Raghava Reddi and Ors., 1969 (1) ALT (NRC) 47. As it is a short notes judgment, I had sent for the entire judgment in S.A.Nos.517 and 853 of 1965 and read the entire judgment. In that case the father executed a settlement deed dated 4.5.1949 in favour of his son through his first wife. He vested the title in the property covered by the settlement deed on his son. The disposition of property in favour of the donee was effected by the donor. The transfer of title by way of gift in favour of the donor was complete. Later in the same deed the donor vested the property in the Deity of a local Temple and directed the donee, namely, his son to utilise the entire produce from the gifted property for the maintenance of the said Temple. Therefore, there was repugnance between conferring of absolute title on the donee and later conferring absolute title in the Deity. The learned Single Judge held that if there is conflict between the two provisions of the deed, the earlier disposition of the absolute title should prevail and the later direction of disposition should be disregarded as unsuccessful attempts to restrict the title already given. The provision in Section 11 of Transfer of Property Act was also considered. This decision is of no assistance to the appellants in the present case. It is to be stated that in Ex.A.1 there are no two conflicting dispositions. Therefore, the question of which disposition should prevail does not fall for consideration in this appeal.
6. The right given to the two sisters to enjoy in equal shares the produce from the property covered by Ex.A.1 till their sons attain their respective ages of majority was taken into consideration by the two Courts below to ascertain the intention of the donors. The father was having two daughters. He wanted to give property to both the daughters. In all probability and naturally he would give property of equal value to each of his daughters. When the property is given to both the daughters under a single document with a direction to them to enjoy in "equal shares" the produce from the said property till their male issues attain their ages of majority, it is to be construed that his intention is to benefit in equal measure the two branches, namely, each branch represented by each of his two daughters. In that context the words used in the settlement deed that after the sons attain their respective ages of majority, they have to divide their "respective shares" equally among themselves assume significance and play a key role in ascertaining the intention of the donors. If it was the intention of the donors that all the sons of Chengama Naidu, the husband of the two daughters of Munaswamy Naidu, have to divide the property in equal shares, there was no necessity to mention in Ex.A1 that the "respective shares" have to be divided "equally". Simple words to the effect that each son will get equal share would have been sufficient to express the said intention of the donors. Munaswamy Naidu did not appoint his son-in-law as the guardian of his minor sons. He did not appoint one guardian alone to all his minor maternal grandsons. He appointed his first daughter as guardian of her sons. He appointed his second daughter as separate guardian of her minor sons. This circumstance also indicates clearly that he was treating his two daughters, though married to one and the same person, as two separate branches or families. In view of these circumstances, I do not see any reason whatsoever to interfere with the interpretation given by the two Courts below. Even if the interpretation sought to be given by the appellants in the present appeal is one of the probable interpretations, as it is a second appeal, this Court cannot interfere with the concurrent finding of interpretation given by the two Courts below when that interpretation is possible from the recitals in Ex.A.1 document and especially when that interpretation is supported by the evidence of one of the donors, namely, P.W.2. This Court need not substitute its preference to the interpretation concurrently given by the two Courts below. I, therefore, do not find any grounds to interfere with the judgments passed by the two Courts below. There are no merits in the appeal.
7. In the result, the appeal is dismissed with costs.