Karnataka High Court
Binod Kumar Choudary vs State Of Karnataka on 21 February, 2025
Author: H.P.Sandesh
Bench: H.P.Sandesh
1
IN THE HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA AT BENGALURU
DATED THIS THE 21ST DAY OF FEBRUARY, 2025
BEFORE
THE HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE H.P. SANDESH
CRIMINAL REVISION PETITION NO.1518/2023
BETWEEN:
1. BINOD KUMAR CHOUDARY,
S/O LATE MAHAVEER PRASAD CHOUDARY,
AGED ABOUT 59 YEARS,
DIRECTOR, GIMPEX HOUSE,
NO.282 (OLD NO.181),
LINGICHETTI ROAD,
CHENNAI - 600 001.
2. T.R. SESHADRI,
S/O T.S. RAMASWAMY,
AGED ABOUT 55 YEARS,
DEPUTY GENERAL MANAGER,
CIMPEX HOUSE,
NO.282 (OLD NO.181),
LINGICHETTI ROAD,
CHENNAI - 600 001. ... PETITIONERS
(BY SRI. MURTHY D. NAIK, SENIOR COUNSEL FOR
SRI. MAHENDRA G., ADVOCATE PETITIONER NO.1;
SRI. SUMANTH M. HEGDE, ADVOCATE FOR PETITIONER NO.2)
AND:
STATE OF KARNATAKA
REPRESENTED BY KARNATAKA LOKAYUKTA POLICE,
CITY DIVISION,
BENGALURU-01. ... RESPONDENT
(BY SRI. B.S.PRASAD, SPECIAL COUNSEL)
2
THIS CRIMINAL REVISION PETITION IS FILED UNDER
SECTION 397 R/W 401 OF CR.P.C PRAYING TO ALLOW THE
ABOVE CRIMINAL REVISION PETITION AND DISCHARGE THE
PETITIONERS IN SPL.C.C.NO.41/2016 FOR THE ALLEGED
OFFENCES PUNISHABLE UNDER SECTIONS 379, 409 AND 420
R/W 120B OF IPC, 1860 AND SECTIONS 21 AND 23 R/W 4(1)
AND 4(1A) OF MMDR ACT, 1957 AND RULE 165 R/W 144 OF
KARNATAKA FOREST RULE, 1969.
THIS CRIMINAL REVISION PETITION HAVING BEEN HEARD
AND RESERVED FOR ORDERS ON 06.02.2025, THIS DAY, THE
COURT PRONOUNCED THE FOLLOWING:
CORAM: HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE H.P.SANDESH
CAV ORDER
This revision petition is filed by accused Nos.2 and 3
against the rejection of discharge application passed in
Spl.C.C.No.41/2016 dated 02.03.2023.
2. The factual matrix of the case of the prosecution is
that in pursuance to the order passed by the Apex Court on
I.A.No.189 filed in W.P.No.562/2009 vide order dated
16.09.2013 with regard to illegal mining and export of iron ore
from Belikere Port from 01.01.2009 to 31.05.2010 by various
companies, the CBI on investigation had filed a preliminary
enquiry report based on which the Apex Court had directed in its
order dated 16.09.2013 that any iron ore which was exported
from Belikere Port area by any company within the check period
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of 01.01.2009 to 31.05.2010 in which if the export is less than
50,000 metric ton by any company/persons as against which an
enquiry to be conducted by the CBI who in turn had directed the
Karnataka State Government to conduct an enquiry and
permitted the CBI to register criminal case against those
exporters who were enquired into the preliminary enquiry and
who had exported iron ore of more than 50,000/- MT without
valid permits and as recommended by the Central Empowered
Committee in its report dated 05.09.2012 and certain directions
were given. As per the order of the Apex Court, the State
Government vide order dated 22.11.2013 bearing No.CI/282/
MM011(P) had directed the complainant/respondent herein to
conduct an enquiry and vide order dated 24.01.2014 bearing
No.CRCE 10 Soloyu 2014, Bengaluru had directed for
establishing a Special Investigation Team (SIT) and vide order
dated 29.05.2014 bearing No.HD/129/POP/2014 had directed
the SIT to be constructed as a police station.
3. It was alleged against these petitioners that they had
conducted trading of iron ore between the check period of
01.01.2009 and 31.02.2010 from Bellary and Chitradurga
District and was exported through Belikere port to an extent of
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1,04,070 metric ton was exported and out of which 21,585.210
metric tons of iron ore was dispatched without obtaining Mineral
Dispatch permit from the Forest Department or the Department
of Mines and Geology. Hence, the petitioners were arrayed as
accused since the export of iron ore without obtaining mineral
dispatch permit had caused loss to the State exchequer. It is
also alleged that the petitioners had involved with the officials
and by conducting theft of iron ore had caused loss to the State
exchequer. Based on the same, a crime was registered in Crime
No.5/2014 dated 11.07.2014 and investigation was completed
and charge-sheet was filed for the offences punishable under
Sections 379, 409, 420 read with Section 120B of IPC and
Sections 21 and 23 read with 4(1) and 4(1)(a) of the Mines and
Minerals (Development and Regulation) Act, 1957 ('MMDR Act'
for short) and Rule 165 read with 144 of the Karnataka Forest
Rules, 1969. It is also contended that the primary allegation as
against the petitioners is that the company had purchased iron
ore and the said purchase was done without the permit from the
Department of Mines and Geology and caused loss to the State
exchequer. Hence, charge-sheet was filed and an application
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was filed before the Trial Court for discharge and the same was
rejected.
4. Being aggrieved by the said order, the present
revision petition is filed contending that the respondent is
alleging that the accused which is a company is vicariously liable
for the offences committed by its Director, which is incorrect and
holding the petitioners responsible for the alleged offences, who
was challenged before the Trial Court by way of discharge
application. It is contended that the petitioners are not a lease
holder or mine owners and have not even involved in
transporting of the mineral, but have only traded with the
mineral. The charge-sheet does not indicate committing of any
such offence. The very definition of theft would indicate that
with an intention of dishonestly moving out or taking possession
of a movable property without another person's consent would
amount to theft. The learned counsel brought to the notice of
this Court the ingredients of Section 409 of IPC with regard to
the criminal breach of trust and also Section 405 of IPC. It is
contended that none of the ingredients attracts against the
petitioners. The petitioners are only traders who had traded in
the minerals which originated from a mine head and was
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extracted from the mine head with a valid lease. The learned
counsel contend that the offences under Section 420 of IPC not
attracts against the petitioners. The ingredients of the offence of
cheating is also not forthcoming. It is contended that the
allegation as against the petitioners is that the ore was illegally
transported without payment of royalty. The question of
payment of royalty would arise at the time when a mineral
dispatch permit is sought for, processed and issued. The learned
counsel contend that in order to invoke Section 120B of IPC,
there must be criminal conspiracy to commit the offence and the
ingredients of Section 120B of IPC does not attract against the
petitioners. It is contended that the offences invoked under the
MMDR Act also does not attract against the petitioners. It is
contended that the charge-sheet had indicated that it was M/s.
Shalini Impex, which had sold the mineral to this accused and
the said mineral was transported by RY Logistics from the
stockyard of M/s. Shanthalakshmi Jayaram storage premises to
Belikere Port. If the provisions of the MMDR Act which are
attributed to the petitioners is seen, the said provisions of law
can be attributed only as against accused No.4 i.e., M/s.
Shanthalakshmi Jayaram, since the allegation by the respondent
7
is that it was accused No.4 who transported the mineral. The
Trial Court fails to take note of this fact into consideration while
rejecting the application and failed to consider the entire
material placed by the prosecution against the petitioners to
frame the charges at the behest of the prosecution and hence
prayed this Court to set aside the impugned order.
5. The learned counsel for the petitioners would
contend that these petitioners are the Director and the Deputy
General Manager and they are in no way connected to the day-
to-day affairs of the company. The learned counsel contend that
the offences under the MMDR Act was invoked and cannot file
charge-sheet, since there is a clear bar under Section 22 of the
MMDR Act. The very approach of the Trial Court is erroneous
and even framing of points for consideration is erroneous. The
Trial Court while passing the order in one breath says Managing
Director, but the reasons are contrary and not Managing
Director. In support of his arguments the learned counsel would
contend that no vicarious liability can be invoked in criminal law
in case of company.
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6. The learned counsel for the petitioner in support of
his arguments relied upon the judgment of the Apex Court in the
case of SANJAY DUTT AND OTHERS v. STATE OF HARYANA
AND ANOTHER reported in 2025 SCC ONLINE SC 32 and
brought to the notice of this Court paragraph Nos.11 to 13,
wherein discussion was made with regard to vicarious liability.
There must exist something to show that such actions of the
director stemmed from their personal involvement and arose
from actions or conduct falling outside the scope of its routine
corporate duties. Thus, where the company is the offender,
vicarious liability of the Directors cannot be imputed
automatically, in the absence of any statutory provision to this
effect. The learned counsel also brought to the notice of this
Court paragraph No.13, wherein discussion was made with
regard to the cardinal principle of criminal jurisprudence that
there is no vicarious liability unless the statute specifically
provides so. Thus, an individual who has perpetrated the
commission of an offence on behalf of a company can be made
an accused, if the statute provides for such liability and if there
is sufficient evidence of his active role coupled with criminal
intent.
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7. The learned counsel also relied upon the judgment of
the Apex Court in the case of SUNIL BHARTI MITTAL v.
CENTRAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION reported in (2015) 4
SCC 609 and brought to the notice of this Court paragraph
Nos.42 to 44, wherein discussion was made with regard to the
circumstances when Director/person in charge of the affairs of
the company can also be prosecuted, when the company is an
accused person. The learned counsel also brought to the notice
of this Court the discussion made in paragraph No.45.1.
8. The learned counsel also relied upon the judgment of
the Apex Court in the case of RAVINDRANATHA BAJPE v.
MANGALORE SPECIAL ECONOMIC ZONE LIMITED AND
OTHERS reported in (2022) 15 SCC 430 and brought to the
notice of this Court paragraph Nos.8.2, 8.3 and 9, wherein
discussion was made with regard to the summoning of an
accused in a criminal case is a serious matter. Merely because
they are Chairman, Managing Director and other office bearers,
without any specific role attributed and the role played by them
in their capacity, they cannot be arrayed as an accused, more
particularly they cannot be held vicariously liable for the offences
committed.
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9. The learned counsel also brought to the notice of this
Court the judgment of the Apex Court in the case of NARENDRA
KUMAR A. BALDOTA v. STATE OF KARNATAKA reported in
2022 SCC Online SC 1880 and brought to the notice of this
Court paragraph Nos.26 and 27, wherein discussion was made
with regard to arraying of the accused as Chairman and Deputy
General Manager and in the absence of specific allegations and
the specific role attributed to them, the learned Magistrate was
not justified in issuing process against them and discussion was
made in paragraph No.28 with regard to the judgment in the
case of STATE OF HARYANA v. BHAJAN LAL.
10. The learned counsel also brought to the notice of this
Court the judgment in the case of STANDARD CHARTERED
BANK AND OTHERS v. DIRECTORATE OF ENFORCEMENT
AND OTHERS reported in (2005) 4 SCC 530 and brought to
the notice of this Court paragraph Nos.30 to 32, wherein also
discussion was made with regard to as the company cannot be
sentenced to imprisonment, the Court has to resort to
punishment of imposition of fine which is also a prescribed
punishment. As the company cannot be sentenced to
imprisonment, the Court cannot impose that punishment, but
11
when imprisonment and fine is the prescribed punishment, the
Court can impose the punishment of fine which could be
enforced against the company. An observation is also made that
we do not think that there is a blanket immunity for any
company from any prosecution for serious offences merely
because the prosecution would ultimately entail a sentence of
mandatory imprisonment.
11. The learned counsel also relied upon the judgment of
the Apex Court in the case of KRISHNA LAL CHAWLA AND
OTHERS v. STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH AND ANOTHER
reported in (2021) 5 SCC 435 and brought to the notice of this
Court paragraph Nos.16, 17, 18 and 23, wherein also discussion
was made that the Trial Courts have the power to not merely
decide on acquittal or conviction of the accused person after the
trial, but also the duty to nip frivolous litigations in the bud even
before they reach the stage of trial by discharging the accused in
fit cases.
12. The learned counsel also relied upon the judgment of
the Apex Court in the case of RAM PRAKASH CHADHA v.
STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH reported in 2024 SCC Online SC
12
1709 and brought to the notice of this Court paragraph No.22,
wherein discussion was made with regard to when an application
is filed for discharge under Section 227 of Cr.P.C, it is an
irrecusable duty and obligation of the Court to apply its mind and
answer to it regarding the existence of or otherwise, of ground
for proceeding against the accused, by confining such
consideration based only on the record of the case and the
documents submitted therewith and after hearing the
submissions of the accused and the prosecution in that behalf.
13. The learned counsel referring these judgments would
contend that the Trial Court committed an error in not
considering the material on record as there was no such
material.
14. Per contra, the learned counsel for the respondent
would contend that accused No.4 had earlier approached this
Court on similar ground by filing a criminal petition and the same
was dismissed, so also accused No.5 approached the Court and
this Court dismissed the same. These petitioners have indulged
in trading of the mines without licence and specific allegations
are made against these petitioners since one is the Director for
13
permanent and the Deputy General Manager accused No.3 is
also looking after the business of the company of trading of
mines. The learned counsel contend that Section 23 attracts
against both the petitioners. The learned counsel contend that
the Trial Court has given the reasons while rejecting the
application and also taken note of the material collected by the
Investigating Officer and dismissed the application and hence it
does not require interference.
15. The learned counsel in support of his arguments
would contend that whatever grounds which have been urged is
a matter of trial and these defences cannot be addressed at the
time of consideration of discharge application. The learned
counsel brought to the notice of this Court the judgment of the
Apex Court in the case of PRADEEP S. WODEYAR v. STATE OF
KARNATAKA reported in (2021) 19 SCC 62, wherein the Apex
Court held that if failure of justice, then only the Court can
exercise the powers. The learned counsel brought to the notice
of this Court the vicarious liability of the Directors, if prima facie
case is found, it is sufficient to arraign him as an accused and
question whether he was responsible and he was in charge of
the affairs of the company during the commission of the alleged
14
offence as required under Section 23(1) proviso of the MMDR Act
is a matter for trial. The Court has to take note of the combined
reading of Section 22 and 4 and these grounds cannot be urged
at the time of discharge application. The learned counsel
contend that this Court already dismissed Crl.P.No.3212/2014
vide order dated 18.11.2020, wherein similar grounds were
urged before this Court and in elaborate discussed the same.
16. In reply to the arguments of the learned counsel for
the respondent, the learned counsel for the petitioners would
contend that not stated anything about petitioner No.2 and he
was not the Managing Director and unnecessarily he is
prosecuted by filing a false case.
17. Having heard the learned counsel for the petitioners
and the learned counsel for the respondent, the points that arise
for the consideration of this Court are:
(i) Whether the Trial Court committed an error in
dismissing the discharge application and
whether it requires interference of this Court?
(ii) What order?
15
Point No.(i):
18. Having considered the grounds urged in the petition
as well as the oral submission of the respective learned counsel,
the Court has to take note of the accusations made against
these petitioners. It has to be noted that accused No.1 is the
Company M./s. Gimpex Limited. No doubt, it is shown that the
company is represented by its Managing Director and these
petitioners are accused Nos.2 and 3 i.e., Director and Deputy
General Manager of the very same Company. It is important to
note that the allegations made against them in the charge-sheet
is that they have transported 9090.200 MT of iron ore without
mineral dispatch permit and hence they are liable to pay
Rs.1,35,61,106/- to the Government. As per the charge-sheet
allegations, out of 12 transportations, 7 are in order and
remaining 4 are not forthcoming. The offences alleged in the
charge-sheet are under Sections 379, 409, 415 and 120B of IPC
and also under MMDR Act. An application is filed for discharge
on the ground that these petitioners have not played any role.
The said application is resisted by the respondent contending
that accused Nos.1 to 3 in criminal conspiracy with accused
Nos.6, 7 and 15, without obtaining the valid permit and payment
16
of royalty and other charges transported the iron ore in the
particular period. It is the contention of the petitioners that they
have not committed any such offence and the prosecution has
not considered the accused are only purchasers of the mineral
from the lease holders and when transporting the same from
mine head to the port, the lease holders have paid the royalty to
the iron ore and hence the charges cannot be attributed against
the accused. But the prosecution mainly relies upon the
statement of witnesses C.Ws.29 and 30 and also statement
recorded under Section 164 of Cr.P.C. so also statement of
witnesses C.Ws.36, 37 and 38 and specific allegations are made
that accused No.7 purchased the iron ore and accused Nos.8 to
10 have transported the same from Belikere port and sold to
accused Nos.1 to 3 and caused loss to the State exchequer.
19. The Trial Court while considering the allegations
against these petitioners, no doubt, formulated the points for
consideration together since accused Nos.1 to 5, 7, 10, 11 to 14
have filed similar application for discharge. It is important to
note that though common order was passed, the Trial Court in
paragraph Nos.7(a) and 15(a) taken note of that the documents
collected during the investigation prima facie show that accused
17
No.1 company has exported 11,290 MT of iron ore, but it had no
mining licence. According to the prosecution case, the company
had purchased 4,124 MT or iron ore from M/s. Shalini Impex,
transported from Kallahalli mining yard and the said stock was
illegally mined, stored and transported. The company had
purchased 3,426 MT of iron ore from accused No.7 - M/s.
Mahesh Babu Nayaka and the said iron ore was illegally stored
and transported and 1,539 MT from M/s Chunduru Associates.
M/s. Chunduru Associates had purchased the said iron ore from
the accused No.11 M/s. Sai Krishna Mineral Pvt. Ltd.
20. It is important to note that the Trial Court culled out
the allegation made against the company in paragraph No.7(a)
that M/s. Gimpex Ltd., Chennai during the period 01.01.2009 to
31.05.2010 had transported iron ore from Bellary, Chitradurga
and other places to Belikere port and exported the same. It is
important to note that the Trial Court also taken note of the
statement of the witnesses, particularly C.Ws.3, 5, 6, 7 and 9.
It is important to note that specific allegations are made that the
accused not obtained any licence and permit from the concerned
Department and in violation of law they had transported iron ore
to Belikere port and caused loss of Crores of rupees to the State
18
exchequer. It is important to note that a specific allegation is
made that they conspired with each other and conspired to
illegally, extract, store, transport and export 9090 MT of iron ore
without obtaining the permission from the concerned
Department.
21. It is observed in paragraph No.18 that accused Nos.1
to 3 being the traders have contended that they are not involved
in purchase and sale of iron ore and therefore, they were not
required to obtain permit or to pay royalty to the Government.
The earlier order passed in Crl.P.No.572/2017 dated 19.11.2020
was taken note, wherein this Court has observed that the
allegations made against the accused squarely attracts Section
4(1-A) of MMDR Act. It is observed in paragraph No.22 that
criminal conspiracy is always hatched in secrecy and it is not
possible to place direct evidence of the common intention of the
accused. Therefore, conspiracy can be inferred from the
circumstances and it is a matter of trial. In the case on hand,
accused No.1 being the company and accused Nos.2 and 3 being
the Director and Deputy General Manager had exported the iron
ore and specific allegation are made in the charge-sheet against
these two petitioners. The fact that accused No.2 is the Director
19
and accused No.3 is the Deputy General Manager is not in
dispute. A specific allegation is made against them that they are
in the helm of affairs of transporting the same and exporting the
iron ore. When such specific material is collected against the
petitioners, it is rightly pointed out by the learned counsel for
the respondent that it is a matter of trial.
22. It is important to note that the Apex Court in the
judgment in the case of Pradeep S. Wodeyar (supra), held that
whether accused No.1 was in charge of and responsible for the
affairs of the company during the commission of the alleged
offence as required under Section 23(1) proviso of MMDR Act is
a matter for trial. It is important to note that the learned
counsel for the petitioners relied upon several judgments,
wherein also discussion was made with regard to the principles
laid down with regard to the vicarious liability is concerned. The
allegation against these petitioners is not with regard to the
vicarious liability is concerned, as contended by the learned
counsel for the respondent. The Apex Court in the judgment in
the cases of Sanjay Dutt, Sunil Bharti Mittal and
Ravindranatha Bajpe (supra), has discussed whether they
have played active role in the said act. In the absence of no
20
such role, they cannot be prosecuted and also an observation is
made that facing of criminal trial is a serious issue. It is
important to note that in the case of Krishna Lal Chawla
(supra), the Apex Court held that the Trial Courts have the
power to not merely decide on acquittal or conviction of the
accused person after the trial, but also the duty to nip frivolous
litigations in the bud even before they reach the stage of trial by
discharging the accused in fit cases.
23. The principles laid down in this judgments referred
supra is not in dispute. If no such material before the Court,
then the Court can discharge and only at the time of discharging
the accused, the Court has to look into the material collected by
the Investigating Officer during the course of investigation.
Specific allegations and charges are made against these
petitioners that accused No.2 is the permanent Director of the
company and accused No.3 is the Deputy General Manager.
Specific statements are also made against them by the
witnesses, which have been relied upon. In the judgment in the
case of Ram Prakash Chadha (supra), the Apex Court in
paragraph No.22 discussed with regard to when an application is
filed for discharge under Section 227 of Cr.P.C, it is an
21
irrecusable duty and obligation of the Court to apply its mind and
answer to it regarding the existence of or otherwise, of ground
for proceeding against the accused, by confining such
consideration based only on the record of the case and the
documents submitted therewith and after hearing the
submissions of the accused and the prosecution in that behalf.
There is no dispute with regard to this principle and while
considering the discharge application, the defence cannot be
considered and only material collected by the Investigating
Officer to be taken note of. In the case on hand, specific
allegations are made against these two petitioners that both of
them are in helm of affairs of the company and have actively
involved in trading of iron ore without any permit or licence.
When such allegations are made, the principles laid down in the
judgments referred supra by the learned counsel for the
petitioners are not applicable to the facts of the case on hand. It
is settled law that there cannot be vicarious liability if company
is an accused and the same also to be considered at the time of
trial and not at the stage of discharge application. It is not in
dispute that earlier other accused approached this Court and it
was held that the matter requires trial.
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24. The other contention of the learned counsel for the
petitioners is that the Court cannot take cognizance in respect of
MMDR offence. There is a force in the contention of the learned
counsel for the petitioners that law is settled that unless a
private complaint is filed, the Court cannot take cognizance in
respect of MMDR offence. There is a bar under Section 22 of the
MMDR Act and no Court shall take any cognizance. In the case
on hand, no doubt, the charge-sheet is filed for IPC offences and
MMDR Act is also invoked. The learned counsel for the
respondent also brought to the notice of this Court by producing
the order sheet as well as the certified copy of the private
complaint and already filed the private complaint before the very
same Court and also endorsement made on the complaint by the
P.O. is placed on record dated 23.12.2015. Hence, it is clear
that when the charge-sheet was filed, for both the IPC offences
and MMDR offences separate complaint is filed before the very
same Court and there is an endorsement. But on perusal of the
order sheet dated 23.12.2015, there is no any order passed on
the private complaint and the documents clearly discloses that
the same was filed before the very same Court. Having perused
the order sheet, not found anything about passing of order on
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the private complaint. When already private complaint was filed
before the Trial Court for the MMDR offence, the Trial Court
ought to have taken the decision and if not taken any decision
on the private complaint, the Trial Court is directed to take
decision on the private complaint filed by the respondent, since
there is a specific bar under Section 22 of the MMDR Act and no
Court can take cognizance on the police report and on the
private complaint the Court can take cognizance. This Court as
well as the Apex Court in several judgments have held that
private complaint needs to be filed by an authorized person and
the Court can take cognizance and when both the private
complaint and the police report are filed before a Special Court,
the Trial Court has to act upon the private complaint and deal
with the matter in accordance with law and on the police report,
the Court cannot take cognizance and the Court can take
cognizance on the private complaint since there is a bar under
Section 22 of the MMDR Act. On that ground, the Court cannot
discharge the accused that MMDR offence was invoked and
cannot proceed with the case and the very same Court is having
power to deal with the matter when the private complaint is filed
invoking the offences under the special enactment. I have
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already pointed out that having perused the entire order sheet,
nothing is found with regard to the private complaint is
concerned, but there is an endorsement on the private complaint
"seen on 23.12.2015" and also complaint is signed by the
Superintendent of SIT, Karnataka Lokayuktha and the same is
also signed on 14.12.2015. Hence, it is only a curable defect
and the same can be cured by passing appropriate order by the
concerned Court and on that ground also cannot be discharged.
25. Having considered the material on record, the very
contention that these two petitioners are in no way connected to
the day-to-day activities of the company cannot be accepted
when specific allegations are made and statement of witnesses
have been recorded and the same is placed on record. The very
contention of the petitioners that point for consideration is
erroneous cannot be accepted and the same is considered only
for consideration of discharge, since all of them have filed the
application for discharge. No doubt, there is an error in
mentioning that one of the accused is the Managing Director.
But accused is not the Managing Director and he is a permanent
Director and another accused is the Deputy General Manager
and specific allegations are made that they are in helm of affairs
25
of the company. To that effect, the documents are also placed
before the Court. Under the circumstances, the contention of
the petitioners cannot be accepted and hence I do not find any
error in the order of the Trial Court in rejecting the application.
The Trial Court also rightly discussed with regard to the
conspiracy is concerned and the same requires trial and the
same also to be proved only inferring the circumstances and in
order to come to such a conclusion, unless the witnesses have
been examined and also with regard to the involvement of the
petitioners in trading of iron ore without the licence or permit
also to be considered during the course of trial. The defence
cannot be considered at the time of considering the discharge
application. The Court has to look into the material collected by
the Investigating Officer during the course of investigation.
When ample material is available before the Court, the question
of discharge does not arise. Hence, I answer point No.(i) in the
negative.
Point No.(ii):
26. In view of the discussions made above, I pass the
following:
26
ORDER
The criminal revision petition is dismissed. The Trial Court is directed to pass appropriate order on the private complaint filed by the respondent in accordance with law.
Sd/-
(H.P. SANDESH) JUDGE MD