Kerala High Court
Sajid Pasha vs Abdunnasir. P on 4 February, 2026
RP 48 of 2026 in AR 8 of 2025 2026:KER:9498
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IN THE HIGH COURT OF KERALA AT ERNAKULAM
PRESENT
THE HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE S.MANU
WEDNESDAY, THE 4TH DAY OF FEBRUARY 2026 / 15TH MAGHA, 1947
RP NO. 48 OF 2026
ARISING FROM THE ORDER DATED 12.12.2025 IN AR NO.8 OF
2025 OF HIGH COURT OF KERALA
REVIEW PETITIONERS/APPLICANTS:
1 SAJID PASHA
AGED 53 YEARS
S/O.MUSTHAFA KAMAL PASHA, RESIDING AT "PASHA'S
ESTANCIA, VAIDYARANGADI, RAMANATTUKARA,
KOZHIKODE, PIN - 673633
2 DR.ZARINA P.P
AGED 50 YEARS
W/O.SAJID PASHA, RESIDING AT "PASHA'S ESTANCIA,
VAIDYARANGADI, RAMANATTUKARA, KOZHIKODE,
PIN - 673633
BY ADVS.
SMT.M.A.VAHEEDA BABU
SRI.BABU KARUKAPADATH
SMT.ARYA RAGHUNATH
SHRI.KARUKAPADATH WAZIM BABU
SMT.P.LAKSHMI
RP 48 of 2026 in AR 8 of 2025 2026:KER:9498
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SMT.AYSHA E.M.
SHRI.HASHIM K.M.
SHRI.ABUASIL A.K.
SMT.HANIYA NAFIZA V.S.
SHRI.M.I.INSAF MOOPPAN
SHRI.RISHI VINCENT
RESPONDENTS/RESPONDENTS:
1 ABDUNNASIR P.
S/O.ABOOBAKKAR P., RESIDING AT KAKKANNTTU HOUSE,
VALIYAPARAMBA P.O, MALAPURAM DISTRICT,
PIN - 673637
2 REHNA N.
W/O.ABDUNNASIR, RESIDING AT KAKKANNTTU HOUSE,
VALIYAPARAMBA P.O, MALAPURAM DISTRICT,
PIN - 673637
3 SHEFIN NASIR
S/O MR.ABDUNNASIR P., RESIDING AT KAKKANNTTU
HOUSE, VALIYAPARAMBA P.O, MALAPURAM DISTRICT,
PIN - 673637
4 NESWA NASIR
D/O.MR.ABDUNNASIR P., RESIDING AT
KAKKANNTTU HOUSE, VALIYAPARAMBA P.O,
MALAPURAM DISTRICT, PIN - 673637
5 SHAMSUDEEN P.
S/O.ABOOBACKER P., RESIDING AT KAKKANATTU HOUSE,
ANDIYOORKKUNNU, VALIYAPARAMBA P.O,
MALAPPURAM DISTRICT, PIN - 673637
RP 48 of 2026 in AR 8 of 2025 2026:KER:9498
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6 SHAFEEF SHAMSUDEEN P.
S/O.SHAMSUDEEN P., RESIDING AT KAKKANATTU HOUSE,
ANDIYOORKKUNNU, VALIYAPARAMBA P.O, MALAPPURAM
DISTRICT, PIN - 673637
7 AZEEM M K @AZEEM MANNIKKUNNAN
S/O.ABOOBACKER M.K., RESIDING AT
MANNIKKUNNAN HOUSE, CHERIYA PARAMBA,
VELLIANCHERY PO, MALAPPURAM DISTRICT,
PIN - 679326
8 MUHAMMED P.V.
S/O.VEERANKUTTY, RESIDING AT RABEEL MANZIL,
VALIYAPARAMBA P.O., MALAPURAM DISTRICT,
PIN - 673637
9 FASMIN P.M.
S/O.MUHAMMEDKUTTY PEZHUKATTIL MALAYIL,
RESIDING AT MALAYIL HOUSE, PULIKKAL PO,
MALAPPURAM DISTRICT, PIN - 673637
10 ABDUL MAJEED
S/O MOOSA P., RESIDING AT NATU KANDATHIL HOUSE,
PERUVAYAL P.O., KOZHIKKODE DISTRICT, PIN - 673008
ADV VIJAY V PAUL - R3 to R10
ADV ANIL SEBASTIAN PULICKEL - R1 & R2
THIS REVIEW PETITION HAVING COME UP FOR ADMISSION ON
29.01.2026, THE COURT ON 04.02.2026 DELIVERED THE
FOLLOWING:
RP 48 of 2026 in AR 8 of 2025 2026:KER:9498
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S.MANU, J.
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RP No.48 of 2026 in AR No.8 of 2025
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Dated this the 04th day of February, 2026
ORDER
Petitioners in AR No.8 of 2025, rejected by order dated 12.12.2025, have filed this review petition.
2. The arbitration request was rejected as this Court found that there was no proper request under Section 21 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act.
3. The petitioners have produced some documents along with the present review petition to contend that the disputes between the parties were clear to each of them, as the same were communicated in clear terms through the additional documents now produced. Further it is contended RP 48 of 2026 in AR 8 of 2025 2026:KER:9498 5 that under Section 21 of the Act, the only requirement is a notice/request seeking arbitration. Petitioners state that Annexure A3 produced with the memorandum of arbitration request fulfilled the said purpose and hence the order rejecting the arbitration request is flawed. According to the petitioners, the order dated 12.12.2025 in the arbitration request is liable to be reviewed as errors are apparent on the face of it.
4. Respondents 1 and 2 filed a detailed counter affidavit. According to them the review petition is not maintainable and even if it is assumed as maintainable no reason justifying review is presented in it.
5. Heard the learned counsel for the review petitioners, learned counsel for the respondents 1 and 2 as also the learned counsel for the respondents 3 to 10. RP 48 of 2026 in AR 8 of 2025 2026:KER:9498 6
6. Learned counsel for the petitioners made elaborate submissions. He relied on various judgments of the Hon'ble Supreme Court to buttress the contentions. Respective counsel for the respondents 1 and 2 and respondents 3 to 10 stoutly opposed the review petition and made submissions with reference to various judgments particularly to the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Hindustan Construction Company Ltd. v. Bihar Rajya Pul Nirman Nigam Limited and Others [2025 SCC OnLine SC 2578] and of this Court in Koshy Phillip v. Thomas P. Mathew & Others [2025 SCC OnLine Ker 13830].
7. In Koshy Phillip's case (Supra) this Court considered the scope of review in a proceeding under Section 11 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act. This Court relied on the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Hindustan RP 48 of 2026 in AR 8 of 2025 2026:KER:9498 7 Construction Company's case (Supra).
8. In Hindustan Construction Company Ltd. (Supra), the Hon'ble Supreme Court held as under:
"11.8. While High Courts, as courts of record, do possess a limited power of review, such power is extremely circumscribed in matters governed by the Arbitration Act. It may be exercised only to correct an error apparent on the face of the record or to address a material fact that was overlooked. It cannot be used to revisit findings of law or reappreciate issues already decided.
11.9. In Grindlays Bank Ltd v. Central Government Industrial Tribunal and others, (1980 supp SCC 420) this Court drew a clear distinction between procedural review and review on merits, holding that the latter is impermissible unless expressly provided. Applied to the Arbitration Act, this means that review is available only to cure a patent or procedural error
- not to reopen interpretation of the arbitration agreement.
11.10. Referring to the aforesaid decision in Bharat Heavy Electricals Limited v. Jyothi Turbopower Services Private Limited, (2016 SCC OnLine Mad. 4029: 2016 (3) LW 683) in which, one of us (R. Mahadevan, J.) was a member, the Madras High RP 48 of 2026 in AR 8 of 2025 2026:KER:9498 8 Court held that while a Tribunal has no inherent power to undertake a review on merits, it nonetheless possesses the inherent procedural power to recall an order terminating the proceedings. It cannot be that a constitutional court of record lacks such power, to presume otherwise would amount to a constitutional fallacy. The Court further observed that the A&C Act, 1996 is a complete code in itself and is premised on minimal judicial intervention in arbitral proceedings. The following paragraphs are apposite:
"18. The learned Arbitrator has also opined that an order under S.25(a) of the said Act cannot be construed to be an award as there is no decision on merit and thus, it may not be possible to maintain an appeal under S.34 of the said Act (reliance was placed on the decision of the Division Bench of the Delhi High Court in ATV Projects India vs. IOC & another, 2013 (200) DLT 553). The learned Arbitrator thus opined that since a party cannot be without a remedy, what should be the remedy in such a situation needed to be examined. The Tribunal, while accepting that there cannot be any power of review inherent in character, that proposition would apply to decision on merits. However, with respect to procedural review, the RP 48 of 2026 in AR 8 of 2025 2026:KER:9498 9 implied power is available with the Tribunal to deal with petitions similar to the ones in the present case. The observations made by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Grindlays Bank Ltd. v. the Central Govt. Industrial Tribunal, reported in AIR 1981 SC 806, in latter part of para 13 were specifically referred to, which are once again extracted as under:
"13..............Furthermore, different considerations arise on review. The expression 'review' is used in the two distinct senses, namely (1) a procedural review which is either inherent or implied in a Court or Tribunal to set aside a palpably erroneous order passed under a misapprehension by it, and (2) a review on merits when the error sought to be corrected is one of law and is apparent on the face of the record. It is in the latter sense that the Court in Patel Narshi Thakershi case (AIR 1970 SC 1273) held that no review lies on merits unless a statute specifically provides for it. Obviously when a review is sought due to a procedural defect, the inadvertent error committed by the Tribunal must be corrected ex debito RP 48 of 2026 in AR 8 of 2025 2026:KER:9498 10 justitiae to prevent the abuse of its process, and such power inheres in every Court or Tribunal."
"27. We reject the plea of the learned counsel for the petitioner that on termination of proceedings under S.25(a) of the said Act, the Arbitrator becomes functus officio, as he is a persona designata. Both the methods of appointment of Arbitrator are possible, i.e. by consent or through the process of Court. The position would not be different in the two situations. It is not as if there is a better sanctity to the appointment of an Arbitrator which enlarges the power if he is appointed by mutual consent, while there are abridged powers if he is not appointed by the Court."
"29. We are also in agreement with the views of both the Calcutta and Delhi High Courts and in view of the aforesaid finding, that the remedy under Art.226 of the Constitution of India is not really available as the aforesaid is the appropriate remedy. The invocation of jurisdiction of this Court by the petitioner is, in turn, predicated on a RP 48 of 2026 in AR 8 of 2025 2026:KER:9498 11 belief that either of the parties aggrieved have to approach this Court under its extraordinary writ jurisdiction. However, we have already explained the remedy available and any further challenge to an order which may be passed in such application would, in turn, depend on the fate of it. The said Act is a complete code in itself and the basis is that there should not be periodic judicial intervention in arbitration proceedings. Were a favourable order to be passed commencing arbitration proceedings, the option would only be to challenge the award, if so advised, under S.34 of the said Act. Similarly, if the application was to be dismissed, the position would really be no different."
11.11. The decisions such as Municipal Corporation of Greater Mumbai and another v. Pratibha Industries Ltd. and others, ((2019) 3 SCC 203) and Mohd. Anwar & others v. Pushpalata Jain & others, (SLP (C) No. 4820 of 2021 dated 05.04.2021) illustrate this narrow window, where review was permitted only because the earlier orders had been passed in ignorance of fundamental facts. These cases are confined to procedural lapses, not to re- examining matters of law.
RP 48 of 2026 in AR 8 of 2025 2026:KER:9498 12 11.12. By contrast, in the present case, the High Court reopened the issue of interpretation of the arbitration clause based solely on a subsequent judgment. Such an exercise falls squarely outside the scope of review jurisdiction. Even assuming that a review was maintainable, it was filed after an unexplained delay of nearly three years and was not founded on any error apparent on the face of the record or any suppression of material fact. 11.13. Once the S.11 order had attained finality, the only remedies available to the respondents were to approach this Court under Art.136 or to raise objections under S.16 before the arbitral tribunal. Having chosen neither route, and having participated in the arbitral proceedings, including joint applications under S.29A, they were estopped from reopening the matter through review. A later judgment cannot revive a concluded cause of action. 11.14. As emphasized in BSNL v. Nortel Networks (India) (P) Ltd (supra), courts must resist "attempts to re-enter through the back door what the statute has shut through the front door". S.11 is intended to trigger arbitration, not to create multiple stages of judicial reconsideration.
11.15. For the reasons discussed above, this Court is of the considered view that the High Court did not have the jurisdiction to reopen or review its earlier RP 48 of 2026 in AR 8 of 2025 2026:KER:9498 13 order passed under S.11(6) of the A&C Act. Once the appointment was made, the court became functus officio and could not sit in judgment over the very issue it had already settled. The review order cuts against the grain of the Act, undermines the principle of minimal judicial interference, and effectively converts the review into an appeal in disguise. Such an exercise cannot stand. Accordingly, this issue is answered in the negative."
9. This Court in Koshy Phillip's case (Supra) held as under:
"20............................................................... In the light of the judgment of the Hon'ble Apex Court in Hindustan Construction Company Ltd (supra), the legal position regarding maintainability of review is no longer res integra. Though the Hon'ble Supreme Court was considering a case arising from a review from an order appointing an arbitrator, the principles would definitely apply in case of rejection of an arbitration request also.
21. The concept of limited judicial engagement with arbitration is adequately addressed in IN RE Interplay (Supra) judgment of the seven-judge bench of the Hon'ble Supreme Court. The Arbitration and Conciliation Act is a self-contained code, according to the Hon'ble Supreme Court. The highest court in the land has made it plain that anything beyond what is explicitly stated in the Arbitration Act is not permissible. The principles of RP 48 of 2026 in AR 8 of 2025 2026:KER:9498 14 modern arbitration were highlighted by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in IN RE Interplay (Supra). The legislature has made it a policy to limit the role of courts in arbitration. This policy is reflected in Section 5 of the Act. In addition, the legislature reaffirmed the same policy by adding sub-section (6A) to Section 11. The legislative goal of limiting judicial involvement would be plainly undermined if the proposition that every order issued under Section 11 of the Act is subject to substantive review is accepted. Nevertheless, power for limited procedural review on the basis of well settled principles would be inherently available to the High Court with respect to every order passed. Hence it can be firmly concluded that this Court, even though has inherent plenary powers, would not be justified in entertaining petitions for substantive review against orders issued under Section 11 of the Act for want of any enabling provision for review under the Act. Judgment of the Hon'ble Apex Court in Hindustan Construction Company Ltd (supra) makes the proposition abundantly clear.
To sum up, this review petition is not maintainable and it is accordingly dismissed."
10. In Koshy Phillip (Supra) this Court held that though power for limited procedure in review would be inherently available to the High Court, it could not be justified in entertaining petition for substantive review against orders RP 48 of 2026 in AR 8 of 2025 2026:KER:9498 15 issued under Section 11 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996.
11. Arguments advanced by the learned counsel for the petitioners are to be analyzed keeping in mind the law laid down in the judgments referred above.
12. The learned counsel for the petitioners placed reliance on the judgments of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in M/s.Bhagheeratha Engineering Ltd. v. State of Kerala [1994 Supp (3) SCC 477] and ASF Buildtech Private Limited v. Shapoorji Pallonji and Company Private Limited [(2025) 9 SCC 76] and of the Delhi High Court in Brilltech Engineers Private Limited v. Shapoorji Pallonji and Company Private Limited [2022 SCC OnLine Del 4422] and contended that the purpose of a notice under Section 21 of the Act is very limited and in view of the law laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court RP 48 of 2026 in AR 8 of 2025 2026:KER:9498 16 in the judgments cited, Annexure A3 produced with the memorandum of Arbitration Request satisfies the requirement of issuing a notice/raising a demand for arbitration.
13. This Court analyzed the contents of Annexure A3 in the order sought to be reviewed and held as under:
"28. Contents of Annexure -A3 communication in the case at hand needs to be analysed, bearing in mind the above position of law. It contains a request to the respondents 1 and 2 to give their suggestion about the arbitrator. Further, a person was suggested as an arbitrator, in case the respondents 1 and 2 had no other suggestion. There is no mention, as noted at the outset, about any particular dispute. As pointed out by the learned counsel appearing for the respondents, there are two different partnership deeds executed by the applicants and respondents 1 and 2, Annexures - A1 and A2. Both contain arbitration clauses. Disputes have arisen with respect to both deeds. However, the first applicant did not make any mention in Annexure A3 about the arbitration clause invoked. In the facts and circumstances of this case, wherein serious contentions with regard to limitation are raised by the respondents, in my view, Annexure-A3 does not satisfy the prime object of the request/notice under Section 21 for want of clarity regarding the dispute sought to RP 48 of 2026 in AR 8 of 2025 2026:KER:9498 17 be resolved. With no specific arbitration clause being pointed out and no particular dispute being mentioned in it, the date of receipt of Annexure-A3 cannot be considered as the point of time of commencement of arbitration with respect to any particular dispute between the parties. It failed in marking the point of commencement of arbitral proceedings. In the facts and circumstances of the instant case, lack of vital details in Annexure-A3 is fatal. Hence, I find that Annexure-A3, being too vague, cannot be considered as a proper and valid request under Section 21 of the Act."
[Emphasis added ]
14. Findings of this Court in the above extracted paragraph of the order are to be read in conjunction with the findings of law in the previous paragraphs of the order. Therefore, if the contention of the learned counsel for the petitioners noticed above are accepted and a different view is taken, it will amount to revisiting findings of law as well as re-appreciation of issues already decided.
15. It is pertinent to note that the Hon'ble Supreme RP 48 of 2026 in AR 8 of 2025 2026:KER:9498 18 Court in Hindustan Construction Company Ltd. (Supra) held unmistakably that the inherent power of review available to the High Court cannot be used to revisit findings of law or reappreciate issues already decided.
16. Nevertheless, to be fair to the learned counsel for the petitioners, I shall mention the contentions raised and address them notwithstanding the conclusion in previous paragraphs. The learned counsel for the petitioners emphasized that most of the disputes narrated in the memorandum of arbitration request were not specifically denied by the respondents in their counter affidavits. He hence submitted that those contentions should be deemed to have been admitted by the respondents and under said circumstances this Court ought to have concluded that there was no lack of clarity regarding the disputes between RP 48 of 2026 in AR 8 of 2025 2026:KER:9498 19 the parties. That being so, according to the learned counsel, the conclusion of this Court in the order sought to be reviewed that Annexure A3 failed to indicate even the bare minimum details of the dispute is an error apparent on the face of the record. I am afraid that the said contention has been raised without a proper scrutiny of the order sought to be reviewed. In the order, this Court examined whether Annexure A3 communication would satisfy the requirements of a request contemplated under Section 21 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act. The analysis was essential in the peculiar circumstances of this case wherein two partnership deeds each containing arbitration clauses are involved and transactions mentioned in the memorandum of arbitration request spread over a long period. Clarity regarding limitation being a main objective RP 48 of 2026 in AR 8 of 2025 2026:KER:9498 20 of the request under S.21, it became necessary to analyse Annexure A3 as the respondents vehemently contended that there was no proper request for arbitration. The said analysis was obligatory to arrive at a conclusion as to whether the conditions to approach this Court under Section 11 of the Act are satisfied. This court would misdirect itself if it proceeds to examine as to whether there is clarity among the respondents regarding the nature of the disputes. Such an enquiry would be definitely out of the purview of a proceeding under S.11. It needs to be emphasised that the finding rendered by this Court was regarding the lack of clarity in Annexure A3, projected by the petitioners as a valid request under Section 21 of the Act. Therefore, the contention built upon the alleged non- denial in the counter affidavits is not at all relevant in this RP 48 of 2026 in AR 8 of 2025 2026:KER:9498 21 review.
17. Another contention raised during the course of argument was that in a proceeding under Section 11, the scope of analysis by this Court is too narrow and therefore this Court ought to have referred the parties to the arbitrator and left all issues to be decided by the arbitrator. The learned counsel for the petitioners relied on the judgments of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in IN RE Interplay Between Arbitration Agreements Under Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 And The Indian Stamp Act 1899 [(2024) 6 SCC 1] and Aslam Ismail Khan Deshmukh v. ASAP Fluids Pvt. Ltd. [2024 KHC 6613] in support of his contention that the ambit of the jurisdiction under Section 11 of the Act is constricted. There cannot be any quarrel with regard to the proposition canvassed. However, a Court considering an RP 48 of 2026 in AR 8 of 2025 2026:KER:9498 22 application under Section 11 of the Act seeking reference is bound to satisfy itself regarding validity of the arbitration agreement between the parties. It is settled beyond any iota of doubt that an order passed under S.11 is a judicial order. Hence the court considering an application under S.11 should apply mind judiciously and satisfy about existence of the essential jurisdictional facts. It is therefore elementary to satisfy whether there is a valid arbitration agreement and whether the party seeking reference had made a proper request to initiate arbitral proceedings as contemplated under Section 21 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996. Unless such a request was made, the conditions to invoke the jurisdiction under Section 11 of the Act would not be satisfied. Therefore, it was indispensable in the instant case also to verify whether RP 48 of 2026 in AR 8 of 2025 2026:KER:9498 23 there was a valid request under Section 21 of the Act. In the order sought to be reviewed, this Court analyzed the said aspect and concluded that there was no proper request. It cannot be the law that whenever a request is made under Section 11 of the Act, the Court should obligatorily refer the parties to the arbitrator. Though the scope of the enquiry under Section 11 of the Act is narrow, the Court can exercise the power under Section 11 of the Act, which indisputably is a judicial power, only on being satisfied about the rudimentary requirements pointed out above. Hence, I find no merit in the contention that this Court committed an error by examining whether there is a valid request for arbitration.
18. As already stated, if this Court accepts the grounds raised in the review petition and the arguments RP 48 of 2026 in AR 8 of 2025 2026:KER:9498 24 advanced by the learned counsel for the petitioners, undoubtedly the same would amount to substantive review. The same is impermissible as found in Koshy Phillip (Supra). The learned counsel for the respondents 1 and 2 pointed out that the order in Koshy Phillip (Supra) was challenged before the Hon'ble Supreme Court in SLP(C)No.36921 of 2025 and by order dated 05.01.2026 the SLP was rejected. Hence the said order has become final.
Following the law laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Hindustan Construction Company Ltd. (Supra) and by this Court in Koshy Phillip (Supra), I find that this review petition is not maintainable. It is accordingly dismissed.
Sd/-
S.MANU JUDGE MC RP 48 of 2026 in AR 8 of 2025 2026:KER:9498 25 APPENDIX OF RP NO. 48 OF 2026 PETITIONER ANNEXURES Annexure A A TRUE COPY OF THE E-MAIL DATED 16/10/2019 SENT BY THE APPLICANTS TO THE RESPONDENTS 1 & 2 Annexure B A TRUE COPY OF THE MINUTES OF THE MEETING DATED 04/05/2020 HELD BY AND BETWEEN THE APPLICANTS AND THE RESPONDENTS 1 & 2 AT KAKKANAT HOUSE Annexure C A TRUE COPY OF THE E-MAIL DATED 11/07/2023 SENT BY THE APPLICANTS TO THE RESPONDENTS 1 AND 2 ACCEDING TO THE STAND OF THE RESPONDENTS 1 AND 2 TO CONTINUE IN MANAGEMENT OF THE FIRM Annexure D A TRUE COPY OF THE E-MAIL DATED 11/08/2023 SENT BY THE APPLICANTS TO THE RESPONDENTS 1 AND 2 DETAILING THE PROBABLE RECONCILIATED FINANCIAL STATEMENT OF THE FIRM, INDICATING THE MINIMUM PROBABLE SHARE OF PROFIT TO BE PAID TO EACH OF APPLICANT AT RS.
5,71,43,370/- UP TO THE FINANCIAL YEAR 2022-2023 Annexure E A TRUE COPY OF THE REPLY E-MAIL DATED 17/08/2023 SENT BY THE RESPONDENTS 1 AND 2 TO THE APPLICANTS IN RESPONSE TO THE EMAIL DATED 11.08.2025 OF THE APPLICANTS, INDICATING THAT, THE CALCULATION OF PROFIT MADE BY THE APPLICANTS IS NOT ACCEPTABLE TO THEM Annexure F A TRUE COPY OF THE E-MAIL DATED 18.08.2023 SENT BY THE APPLICANTS TO THE RESPONDENTS 1 AND 2 REQUESTING THEM RP 48 of 2026 in AR 8 of 2025 2026:KER:9498 26 TO PROVIDE RECONCILIATED FINANCIAL STATEMENT OF THE FIRM ACCEPTABLE TO THEM Annexure G A TRUE COPY OF THE E-MAIL DATED 22.08.2023 SENT BY THE APPLICANTS TO RESPONDENTS 1 AND 2 REQUESTING THEM TO SEND THE DETAILS OF ACCOUNTS RECEIVED FROM THE CHARTERED ACCOUNTANT AND BANK STATEMENTS OF ROOFS AND SHADES TO THE APPLICANTS BY 25/08/2023 Annexure H A TRUE COPY OF THE E-MAIL DATED 02.09.2023 SENT BY THE APPLICANTS TO RESPONDENTS 1 AND 2 REQUESTING THEM TO SEND THE DETAILS OF ACCOUNTS RECEIVED FROM THE CHARTED ACCOUNTANT AND BANK STATEMENTS TO THE APPLICANTS Annexure I A TRUE COPY OF THE CMA NO. 01/2024 ON THE FILE OF THE HON'BLE COMMERCIAL COURT, KOZHIKODE FILED BY THE APPLICANTS