Xxx vs State Of Kerala on 17 June, 2025

[Cites 35, Cited by 0]

Kerala High Court

Xxx vs State Of Kerala on 17 June, 2025

This appeal, preferred under Section 374 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1973, is directed against the judgment dated 02.09.2021 passed by the Fast Track Special Court, Pathanamthitta in S.C. No. 421 of 2019. By the above judgment, the appellant herein was found guilty for the offence under Section 5(l), (m), (n) r/w. Section 6 of the Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012 (for brevity 'POCSO Act') and Sections 376(2)(f), 376(2)(i) and 376(2)(n) of the IPC. The appellant was sentenced:

(a) to undergo imprisonment for life and also to pay a fine of Rs.30,000/-

(Thirty Thousand only) under 376(2)(f) of the IPC, with a default clause, and if the fine is realised to pay Rs.25000/- out of it as compensation to the victim (PW1) u/s. 357 (1)(b) of the Cr.P.C.

(b) to undergo imprisonment for life and also to pay a fine of Rs.30,000/-

(Thirty Thousand only) under 376(2)(i) of the IPC, with a default clause, and if the fine is realised to pay Rs.25,000/- out of it as compensation to the victim (PW1) u/s. 357 (1)(b) of the Cr.P.C.

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(Thirty Thousand only) under Section 376(2)(n) of the IPC, with a default clause and if the fine is realised, to pay Rs.25000/- out of it_as compensation to the victim (PW1) u/s 357(1)(b) of the Cr.P.C. By this appeal, the appellant impugns the judgment passed by the learned Sessions Judge on various grounds.

Brief Statement of Facts

2. The victim in the instant case is a 12-year-old child and the daughter of the appellant. Her mother had abandoned the family, and she was living with her father and her elder brother. After her mother had left her, which was about 2 years prior to the registration of the crime, PW2 was living with the family as the wife of the appellant, though she had not legally married the appellant. The victim stated that the family used to stay in numerous houses for brief periods at Seethathodu Grama Panchayat and Vechoochira Grama Panchayat from 2016 onwards. She gave brief descriptions and details of the places where they had resided together as family. According to the victim, she used to be subjected to rape, penetrative sexual assault and such other abhorrent acts by the appellant. One day, PW2 noticed that tears were flowing down her eyes, and when she enquired, she complained of abdominal 2025:KER:42644 Crl.A.No. 323 of 2022 4 pain. After much persuasion, the child divulged to PW2, the persistent sexual assault and harm to which she had been subjected to by her father. Taken aback by the disclosure, she rushed to the police along with the child and got the statement of the child recorded by PW26, the Sub Inspector of Police. The child was sent for medical examination immediately thereafter. The Officer visited the homes where she was allegedly subjected to abuse by the appellant, and separate mahazars were prepared. The appellant was arrested and produced before the jurisdictional court. He was produced before the Doctor for medical examination. Steps were then taken to record the statement of the victim child under Section 164 of the Cr.P.C. Investigation was then taken over by PW25 and then by PW27. The material objects which had been seized were forwarded for analysis, and reports were obtained. Investigation was then completed, and the final report was laid before the jurisdictional court.

3. After complying with the procedure, the case was posted for trial before the Fast Track Special Judge, Pathanamthitta.

4. To prove its case, the prosecution examined 28 witnesses as PWs 1 to 28, and through them Exts.P1 to P40 were exhibited and marked. MOs 1 to 4 were produced and identified. After the close of the prosecution evidence, the 2025:KER:42644 Crl.A.No. 323 of 2022 5 incriminating materials were put to the accused under Section 313(1)(b) of the Cr.P.C. He denied the circumstances and maintained that he was innocent. He added that the victim used to sleep with her brother and if DNA analysis is conducted, the truth will be revealed. No evidence was adduced by the defence.

5. The learned Sessions Judge, after careful evaluation of the evidence, came to the conclusion that the prosecution had established by reliable evidence the date of birth of the victim was 7.08.2007 and she would have completed 12 years only on 7.08.2019. The court held that the prosecution had also established that the victim had stayed with the accused and her brother in various houses on rent as established by the evidence let in through the evidence of PWs 1 to 8. The fact that the appellant was the father of the child was also admitted. The Court held that the oral evidence of the victim with ample corroboration by PW2, her stepmother, and PW3, brother, together with the evidence of the PW13 Doctor who issued Ext.P8 Certificate established that the appellant had subjected the child to repeated acts of penetrative sensual assault/rape from 2016 onwards till the registration of the crime in the year 2019. The court held that the prosecution having established the foundational facts, the appellant had failed to rebut the presumption under Section 29 of POCSO Act even under the touchstone of preponderance of probability. The court held that the evidence of the victim is eminently reliable and credible, and 2025:KER:42644 Crl.A.No. 323 of 2022 6 holding so the finding of guilt was arrived at. The learned Sessions Judge also held that the accused had failed to rebut the presumption either by tendering evidence or by relying on any patent absurdities, infirmities or improbabilities in prosecution case. Holding so, the finding of guilt was arrived at and the accused was sentenced accordingly.

6. Sri. Ranjith Marar, the learned counsel appearing for the appellant, submitted that the learned Sessions Judge has erred in relying on the evidence of the victim. It is submitted that the child was speaking falsehood at the instance of her stepmother, who had an axe to grind against the appellant. It is further submitted that the contention of the appellant that the child was sleeping with her elder brother and he might have been the culprit was not accepted by the court. According to the learned counsel, the defence was able to make serious dents in the version of the victim, rendering her evidence unreliable. According to the learned counsel, the learned Sessions Judge has erred in applying the presumption under Sections 29 and 30 of the POCSO Act despite the fact the foundational facts were not proved by the prosecution.

7. In response, it is submitted by the learned Public Prosecutor that none of the contentions advanced by the learned counsel can be accepted. It is 2025:KER:42644 Crl.A.No. 323 of 2022 7 submitted that the age of the child was proved in accordance with law and the same has not even been disputed in cross-examination. The evidence tendered by the child stands corroborated by the medical evidence and there is no reason to doubt her version. The evidence of PWs 2 and 3 corroborates her version. According to the learned Public Prosecutor, the learned Sessions Judge was absolutely right in holding the appellant guilty of the offence after finding that the prosecution had established its case to its teeth.

8. We have carefully considered the submissions advanced and have perused the records.

9. The first question is whether PW1 is a child below 12 years as on the date of the alleged occurrence.

10. We find that the prosecution has examined PW24, the Registrar, Births and Deaths, who deposed before the court that the date of birth of the child was on 07.08.2007. The evidence was tendered by the said witness relying on Ext.P23 extract of the Birth Register issued by the Registrar of Births and Deaths, Arpookara Grama Panchayat. The prosecution has also placed on record Ext.P34 original of the Birth Certificate of PW1, which reveals that the Date of Birth is 07.08.2007. The appellant being the father, he cannot be heard to contend otherwise. Furthermore, 2025:KER:42644 Crl.A.No. 323 of 2022 8 there is no challenge with regard to the age of the child while she was being cross-examined. The prosecution has also examined the Headmistress of the School, whether the victim had been pursuing her education. She had also produced before the Court the original of the Admission Register and it was after verifying the same, true copy of the extract was marked in evidence as Ext.P40. The Headmistress deposed that the date of birth of the victim was 07.08.2007. In Jarnail Singh v. State of Haryana1, the Apex Court has held that even though the rules framed under the Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2000, apply strictly only for determination of the age of a child in conflict with law, the statutory provisions therein can certainly be the basis for determining the age of even a child who is a victim of crime, for there is hardly any difference insofar as the issue of minority is concerned, between a child in conflict with law and a child who is a victim of a crime. In view of the law laid down above and in the light of the evidence let in, it can safely be held that the date of birth of the child is 07.08.2007 and that she would have turned 12 years of age only on 7.08.2019.

11. The next question is whether the prosecution has established its case against the appellant.



                   12.     As stated earlier, the victim is none other than the minor daughter of
1
    [(2013) 7 SCC 263]
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the appellant. The prosecution charge is that she had lived with the appellant in various rented houses across different locations over a span of time. From the year 2016 until 16.08.2017, they resided at Kochukoikkal, in a house bearing Assessment No.310 in Ward No. 6 of Seethathodu Grama Panchayat. Thereafter, from 17.08.2017 to April 2018, they lived at Vallikkavu, in a house bearing Assessment No. 186 in Ward No. 12 of Vechoochira Grama Panchayat. Subsequently, from April 2018 to 01.03.2019, they resided at Paruva, in a house bearing Assessment No. 347 in Ward No. 12 of the same Grama Panchayat. Finally, from 03.02.2019 to 17.04.2019, they lived at Kakkudukka, in a house bearing Assessment No. 472 in Ward No. 11 of Vechoochira Grama Panchayat. According to the prosecution, in all of the aforementioned residences, the accused repeatedly subjected the victim to acts of penetrative sexual assault/rape. These allegations form the gravamen of the charges levelled against the appellant.

13. The prosecution examined PW5, PW6, and PW7, who are the respective owners of the houses situated at Vallikkavu, Kollamulla and Kakudakayil wherein the appellant stayed with the victim and her brother. The witnesses deposed before court that the above houses were let out to the accused during the relevant period and that the appellant had stayed in their houses with family. Their evidence stands unchallenged. The version of the above witnesses corroborates the 2025:KER:42644 Crl.A.No. 323 of 2022 10 version of the child. PW15, the Secretary of the Grama Panchayat, produced Exts. P10, P11, and P12, ownership certificates relating to the aforesaid houses bearing Assessment Nos. 347, 472, and 186 in Ward No. 12, thereby corroborating their existence and confirming the identity of their registered owners. PW16, the Village Officer, who prepared the scene plans marked as Exts. P13, P14, and P15 which correspond to the houses bearing Assessment Nos. 472, 186, and 347 respectively, while PW22, another Village Officer, prepared Ext. P21, the scene plan relating to the house bearing Assessment No. 310 in Ward No. 6. PW23, the Secretary of Seethathodu Grama Panchayat, issued Ext. P22, the ownership certificate in respect of the said house. These documents and testimonies collectively establish that the accused had resided in multiple rented premises, which are alleged to be locations where the victim was subjected to repeated acts of sexual assault.

14. With respect to the evidence of PW1, she stated that at the time of tendering her testimony, she was 13 years of age. Prior to recording her statement, the learned Trial Judge examined PW1 under Section 118 of the Indian Evidence Act to assess her competency, including her ability to distinguish right from wrong and to speak the truth in a court of law. It was after finding her competence that the Court proceeded to record her evidence. She deposed that in the year 2016, she was studying in the IV Standard and was residing at a place called Seethathodu along 2025:KER:42644 Crl.A.No. 323 of 2022 11 with her father and brother. After her mother had abandoned the family, her father had entered into a second marriage with PW2. She deposed that, one day, her brother went to the shop and she was playing at home, the appellant called her and asked her to lie on the bed and intimidated her to do that. It was during the day, however, she was not in a position to recollect the exact time. She stated that the appellant held her hands together and inserted his penis into her vagina. This was repeated by her father on numerous occasions thereafter. She stated that she was repeatedly abused while they had stayed at a place called Vallikkad, Kakkadukka and Paruva. She stated that her father married PW2 while they had stayed at Vechoochira. She went on to state that she used to have constant stomach pain due to this abuse by her father. She stated about the abuse first to PW2. She took her to the Police Station, where she revealed the incident. She identified her signature in the FI statement. When asked why she had not informed anyone earlier, she explained that she was afraid that her father would get angry. She was taken for medical examination, and her statement was recorded by the learned Magistrate. She identified the appellant in court. Though she was cross-examined at length, no material contradictions or inconsistencies were brought out to discredit her version. The only suggestion made was that the witness had personal animosity towards the appellant and had, therefore, made false allegations. However, this suggestion 2025:KER:42644 Crl.A.No. 323 of 2022 12 remained unsubstantiated.

15. PW2 is the stepmother of the child. She stated that from 2017 onwards, she has been staying with the victim and her family at Vallikkavu. The appellant had married her. She stated that on 31.05.2019, she saw the victim with her eyes flooding with tears. Initially, she stated that she was suffering from a headache. Then she stated that she was having severe stomach pain. When PW2 offered to take the child to the hospital, she said that she would wait till her father returns back from work. Since the pain was not subsiding, PW2 decided to take her to the hospital. The child then asked her whether the doctors would examine her private parts. PW2 probed further, and it was at that stage that PW1 told her that she had been subjected to sexual abuse by her father on numerous occasions. Initially, PW2 did not believe and when she probed more, she could realise that the child was speaking the truth. It was then that she took the child to the Police Station, where her statement was recorded and the crime was registered. She also identified the appellant who was standing in the dock, as the abuser. In cross-examination, the witness denied that she was stating falsehood against her husband as she was not on good terms with him.



              16.     PW3 is the brother of the victim. He only stated that the victim used
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to stay with the family consisting of himself and his father.

17. The evidence let in by PW2 and PW3 corroborates the version of PW1 that she was staying with her father.

18. PW13, the Gynaecologist, General Hospital, Pathanamthitta, conducted a medical examination of the victim on 03.06.2019. Ext.P8 is the report. The history and alleged cause stated in the report as stated by PW1, is abuse by her father from the IV standard onwards. In the report dated 3.06.2019, it is stated that the child was last subjected to abuse in the month of February of that year. In Ext. P8 report, the Doctor has stated emphatically that there is evidence of vaginal penetration. PW13 stated further that the victim had abdominal pain, and the same could have been due to urinary infection caused due to sexual intercourse.

19. The testimony of PW14, the Doctor who examined the accused, reveals that on examination of the accused, there was nothing to suggest that he was incapable of performing the sexual acts.

20. When the above evidence is read as a whole, it is clear that the accused continued the act of penetrative sexual assault on the victim since the year 2016 till 2019.

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              21.     The contention advanced by the learned counsel is that PW1 has not

provided specific details with regard to the instances of sexual abuse to which she was subjected to. After stating that she was abused while she was studying in the IV Standard, she merely mentioned that he repeated the same acts thereafter. We find that the child stated in so many words the manner in which her father had subjected her to penetrative sexual assault/rape. She also mentioned specific details as regards the places where she had stayed and the manner in which the appellant subjected her to abuse. Of course, the child has not given the specific dates and time and graphic details of the act committed by the appellant, but at the same time, a careful evaluation of the evidence of the child would unequivocally make it clear that after the abandonment of her mother and while she was staying with the father in various houses at Seethathodu Grama Panchayat and Vechoochira Grama Panchayat, the appellant subjected her to abuse from the year 2016 till April, 2019. We find absolutely no reason to doubt the testimony of the child which was found to be reliable and trustworthy by the learned Sessions Judge who had occasion to note the demeanor of the child. The prosecution has also adduced evidence by examining PW5, PW6, PW7, PW8, who are the owners of the houses where the appellant and his family resided, and they have stated that their premises were rented out and the family had stayed there. There is no serious dispute with regard to the above 2025:KER:42644 Crl.A.No. 323 of 2022 15 aspect. In that view of the matter, the evidence of PW1 gets ample corroboration from the evidence of the landlords.

22. The next contention advanced by the learned counsel appearing for the appellant is that the delay in setting the law in motion undermines the credibility and worth of the testimony of the child. We are afraid that the argument forcefully advanced by the learned counsel is meritless in view of the well-settled legal principles. It has been repeatedly held by the Apex Court as well as this Court that delay in lodging a complaint in cases of sexual assault cannot be viewed on the same footing as delay in other categories of offences. The unique psychological trauma, social stigma, and familial pressures surrounding such offences have been shown to inhibit prompt reporting. In the case on hand, the situation is even more sensitive and complex. The alleged perpetrator is none other than the biological father of the child, a figure ordinarily associated with care, protection, and authority. The mother of the victim had already abandoned the family, leaving her emotionally vulnerable and dependent only on her elder brother, who himself was a minor and incapable of offering the guidance or support that an adult might have provided. In her testimony, the child clearly stated that she was afraid of her father, which, in our view, is a significant and compelling reason for her silence and hesitation. The delay in disclosure is not only understandable but is, in fact, fully justified when viewed in the 2025:KER:42644 Crl.A.No. 323 of 2022 16 background of these telling and distressing circumstances. PW2, the stepmother of the child, moved by the tears and visible distress of the child, acted with sensitivity and turned into a guardian angel and took the child to the law enforcement authorities. It was in the said circumstances that these horrific acts of the appellant had come to light. The delay, therefore, is not indicative of fabrication or embellishment, but due to the helplessness and fear experienced by a cornered young child. We find no merit in the argument that the delay, in this case, would cast serious doubts on the credibility of the testimony of the victim.

23. Now the question is whether the presumption under Section 29 of the POCSO Act can be applied. It is trite that it is the duty of the prosecution to establish a prima facie case beyond reasonable doubt, in accordance with the settled tenets of criminal jurisprudence. It is only upon the establishment of such foundational facts that any statutory presumption against the accused can legitimately be invoked. At that stage, the burden shifts to the accused, not to prove innocence beyond doubt, but to rebut the presumption by adducing evidence that meets the threshold of preponderance of probability. In the context of an offence under the Protection of Children from Sexual Offences (POCSO) Act, it is incumbent upon the prosecution, at the threshold, to prove that the victim is a child as defined under Section 2(d) of the Act. Thereafter, it must be 2025:KER:42644 Crl.A.No. 323 of 2022 17 demonstrated, by cogent and legally admissible evidence, that the alleged incident did occur and that the involvement of the accused has been established beyond a reasonable doubt. Any medical or forensic evidence adduced must serve to corroborate the version of the victim and thereby lend probative value to the case of the prosecution. If the Court is satisfied that these foundational facts have been duly proved, the onus then shifts to the accused to rebut the statutory presumption of guilt. This may be achieved by exposing inherent improbabilities, glaring inconsistencies, or material contradictions in the prosecution's narrative. It is equally open to the accused to demonstrate the existence of prior enmity, ulterior motive, or undue delay in lodging the complaint, all of which may undermine the case of the prosecution. The accused may also seek to establish that the victim is not a child within the meaning of the Act, or that the relationship in question was consensual. The burden may also be discharged either by discrediting prosecution witnesses through effective cross-examination or, where required, by leading defence evidence. It would be open to the accused to enter the box if he chooses so or cite any witness whose examination may aid him in establishing his contention that he has been falsely implicated and that the prosecution case is meritless. In essence, the evidentiary structure of a trial under the POCSO Act aligns with that of other criminal trials, save for the added 2025:KER:42644 Crl.A.No. 323 of 2022 18 dimension of statutory presumptions in favour of the prosecution and the corresponding obligation on the accused to rebut the same. [See: Unnikrishnan V. State of Kerala 2, Naresh Kumar Alias Nitu v. State of Himachal Pradesh3, Justin @ Renjith and Another v. Union of India and Others4, Gangadhar @ Gangaram v. State of Madhya Pradesh5, Noor Aga v. State of Punjab and Others6]

24. In the case on hand, the defence, except for pointing fingers at the elder brother of PW1, who was a student then, has not been able to expose or highlight any inherent improbabilities, glaring inconsistencies, or material contradictions in the narrative of the child. In State of U.P v. Ashok Dixit7. In Raju v. State of Madhya Pradesh8, the Apex Court while reiterating the principles of law laid down in earlier precedents held that ordinarily the evidence of a prosecutrix should not be suspected and should be believed, more so as her statement has to be evaluated on a par with that of an injured witness and if the evidence is reliable, no corroboration is necessary.

2 2025:KER:35503 3 [AIR 2017 SC 3859] 4 [ILR 2020 (4) Ker. 679] 5 [ AIR 2020 SC 3656] 6 [2008 KHC 5054] 7 [(2000) 3 SCC 70] 8 [(2008) 15 SCC 133] 2025:KER:42644 Crl.A.No. 323 of 2022 19

25. In State of Maharashtra v. Chandraprakash Kewalchand Jain9, the Apex Court held that a woman, who is the victim of sexual assault, is not an accomplice to the crime but is a victim of another person's lust and, therefore, her evidence need not be tested with the same amount of suspicion as that of an accomplice. The Court observed as under in paragraph No.16:

"16. A prosecutrix of a sex offence cannot be put on a par with an accomplice. She is in fact a victim of the crime. The Evidence Act nowhere says that her evidence cannot be accepted unless it is corroborated in material particulars. She is undoubtedly a competent witness under Section 118 and her evidence must receive the same weight as is attached to an injured in cases of physical violence. The same degree of care and caution must attach in the evaluation of her evidence as in the case of an injured complainant or witness and no more. What is necessary is that the court must be alive to and conscious of the fact that it is dealing with the evidence of a person who is interested in the outcome of the charge levelled by her. If the court keeps this in mind and feels satisfied that it can act on the evidence of the prosecutrix, there is no rule of law or practice incorporated in the Evidence Act similar to Illustration (b) to Section 114 which requires it to look for corroboration. If for some reason the court is hesitant to place implicit reliance on the testimony of the prosecutrix it may look for evidence which may lend assurance to her testimony short of corroboration required in the case of an accomplice. The nature of evidence required to lend assurance to the testimony of the 9 [(1990) 1 SCC 550] 2025:KER:42644 Crl.A.No. 323 of 2022 20 prosecutrix must necessarily depend on the facts and circumstances of each case. But if a prosecutrix is an adult and of full understanding the court is entitled to base a conviction on her evidence unless the same is shown to be infirm and not trustworthy. If the totality of the circumstances appearing on the record of the case disclose that the prosecutrix does not have a strong motive to falsely involve the person charged, the court should ordinarily have no hesitation in accepting her evidence."

26. In State of Punjab v. Gurmit Singh10, the Apex Court held that in cases involving sexual harassment, molestation etc., the court is duty-bound to deal with such cases with utmost sensitivity. Minor contradictions or insignificant discrepancies in the statement of a prosecutrix should not be a ground for throwing out an otherwise reliable prosecution case. Evidence of the victim of sexual assault is enough for conviction and it does not require any corroboration unless there are compelling reasons for seeking corroboration. The court may look for some assurances of her statement to satisfy judicial conscience. The statement of the prosecutrix is more reliable than that of an injured witness as she is not an accomplice. The Court further held that the delay in filing FIR for sexual offence may not be even properly explained, but if found natural, the accused cannot be given any benefit thereof. The Court went on to observe as 10 [1996 (2) SCC 384] 2025:KER:42644 Crl.A.No. 323 of 2022 21 under in paragraph Nos. 8 & 21:

'8. .................... The court overlooked the situation in which a poor helpless minor girl had found herself in the company of three desperate young men who were threatening her and preventing her from raising any alarm. Again, if the investigating officer did not conduct the investigation properly or was negligent in not being able to trace out the driver or the car, how can that become a ground to discredit the testimony of the prosecutrix? The prosecutrix had no control over the investigating agency and the negligence of an investigating officer could not affect the credibility of the statement of the prosecutrix. ........................... The courts must, while evaluating evidence, remain alive to the fact that in a case of rape, no self-respecting woman would come forward in a court just to make a humiliating statement against her honour such as is involved in the commission of rape on her. In cases involving sexual molestation, supposed considerations which have no material effect on the veracity of the prosecution case or even discrepancies in the statement of the prosecutrix should not, unless the discrepancies are such which are of fatal nature, be allowed to throw out an otherwise reliable prosecution case. .................................Seeking corroboration of her statement before relying upon the same, as a rule, in such cases amounts to adding insult to injury. ................................ Corroboration as a condition for judicial reliance on the testimony of the prosecutrix is not a requirement of law but a guidance of prudence under given circumstances.

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                           21.     ............................         The courts should examine the broader

probabilities of a case and not get swayed by minor contradictions or insignificant discrepancies in the statement of the prosecutrix, which are not of a fatal nature, to throw out an otherwise reliable prosecution case. If evidence of the prosecutrix inspires confidence, it must be relied upon without seeking corroboration of her statement in material particulars. If for some reason the court finds it difficult to place implicit reliance on her testimony, it may look for evidence which may lend assurance to her testimony, short of corroboration required in the case of an accomplice. The testimony of the prosecutrix must be appreciated in the background of the entire case and the trial court must be alive to its responsibility and be sensitive while dealing with cases involving sexual molestations.'

27. In State of H.P. v. Raghubir Singh11, the Apex Court held that there is no legal compulsion to look for any other evidence to corroborate the evidence of the prosecutrix before recording an order of conviction. Evidence has to be weighed and not counted. Conviction can be recorded on the sole testimony of the prosecutrix if her evidence inspires confidence and there is absence of circumstances which militate against her veracity.

28. In Gurmit Singh (supra), it was observed that rape destructs the whole personality of the victim. A murderer destroys the physical body of his victim, a rapist degrades the very soul of the helpless female. The courts, 11 [(1993) 2 SCC 622] 2025:KER:42644 Crl.A.No. 323 of 2022 23 therefore, shoulder a great responsibility while trying an accused on charges of rape. If evidence of the prosecutrix inspires confidence, it must be relied upon without seeking corroboration of her statement in material particulars. If, for some reason, the court finds it difficult to place implicit reliance on her testimony, it may look for evidence which may lend assurance to her testimony, short of corroboration required in the case of an accomplice. Any minor variations in the testimony of the child witness concerning trivial aspects of the incident, such as the precise sequence of events or the specific portion of the body touched, cannot be viewed as material contradictions that would undermine the core of the prosecution case. Such minor deviations, which are natural in the recollection of a child, do not detract from the essential allegation that the act of the appellant was driven by lascivious intent. (See: Unnikrishnan v. State of Kerala (supra))

29. Having carefully evaluated the evidence of PW1 in the light of the medical evidence, we find the same to be credible, trustworthy and reliable. We hold that the learned Sessions Judge has rightly relied on the evidence tendered by the prosecution to arrive at the finding of guilt. The contentions fervently raised by the learned counsel to assail the finding of guilt are meritless and hence rejected.

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              30.     Now coming to the offences made out, the learned Sessions Judge

has concluded that the offence under Sections 5(n), 5(m) and 5(l) r/w. Section 6 of the POCSO Act has been made out. The court also held that the offences under Sections 376(2)(f), 376(2)(i) and 376(2)(n) of the IPC have also been made out. Applying the law under Section 42 of the POCSO Act, the learned Sessions Judge concluded that the accused has to be punished under Sections 376(2)(f), 376(2)(i) and 376(2)(n) of the IPC as those offences are greater in degree than the punishment provided for the offences under the POCSO Act. Having considered the facts of the instant case, we find no reason to interfere with the findings as well as the sentence awarded by the learned Sessions Judge. We dismiss this appeal confirming the finding of guilt, conviction and sentence passed by the learned Sessions Judge.

Before parting, we note that under Section 33(8) of the Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012, the Special Court in addition to the punishment, is to order compensation to the child for any physical or mental trauma or for immediate rehabilitation of such child. In the case on hand, the learned Sessions Judge has not chosen to do so. Under Section 357A of the Cr.P.C, the Victim Compensation Scheme is required to be formulated for the purpose of disbursal of compensation. Under Section 357A (2) of the Cr.P.C., the 2025:KER:42644 Crl.A.No. 323 of 2022 25 District Legal Services Authority or the State Legal Services Authority is required to determine the quantum. We are of the view that this is a fit case where victim compensation is to be granted to the victim child. In that view of the matter, there will be a direction to the Kerala State Legal Services Authority to initiate appropriate steps and determine the compensation to which the victim child is entitled to. A decision shall be taken at any rate within a period of two months as mandated under Section 357(5) of the Cr.PC. and the amount disbursed to the child within a further period of one month. Sd/-


                                                            RAJA VIJAYARAGHAVAN V,
                                                               JUDGE
                                                 

                                                                Sd/-
                                                           K.V. JAYAKUMAR,
                                                                 JUDGE



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