Jharkhand High Court
Om Prakash Gupta vs Smt. Munni Devi on 5 May, 2006
Equivalent citations: [2006(3)JCR454(JHR)]
JUDGMENT Navniti Prasad Singh, J.
1. The present civil revision application has been filed under Section 14(8) of the Bihar Buildings (Lease, Rent & Eviction) Control Act (hereinafter referred to as "the Act") against order of eviction of the petitioner passed on 25.8.2003 by Munsif, Khagaria in Civil Eviction Suit No. 2 of 2001/4 of 2001. The sole opposite party smt. Munni Devi was the plaintiff/landlady. Both the parties are represented and heard at length.
2. The plaintiff-opposite party filed eviction suit before Munsif, Khagaria against the defendant-petitioner for his eviction on ground of personal necessity. The case was tried under procedure prescribed under Section 14 of the Act. The plaintiffs case, as per the plaint, was that the suit premises, which is Schedule B, the plaintiff had purchased it from Md. Israfil, Bibi Majda Khatoon being son and daughter of Abdul Razzaque and several others who were children of Md. Latifuddin by registered sale deed dated 20.11.2000. It may be mentioned that Abdul Razzaque and Md. Latifuddin were two brothers being two sons out of four of Majid, the other two brothers being Gulam Rasul and Habibuddin. The plaintiff asserted that the defendant had been inducted as a tenant In the suit premises by the vendor at a monthly rent of Rs. 150/-but in spite of attorneying the tenancy with the plaintiff, the defendant did not pay rent to her. Plaintiff has purchased the suit premises for starting cloth business or settling her son as the premises is located in market. Request to vacate premises having not been acceded to, the suit for eviction was filed. The defendant-petitioner appeared and filed affidavit seeking leave to contest the suit which was granted. The said affidavit was treated as written statement. In the written statement, the defendant-petitioner denied the relationship of landlord-tenant. The defendant-petitioner asserted in the written statement that the suit premises was a part of a building on one katha six dhur land all of which had been in his occupation since 1957 to the knowledge of all including plaintiff and her vendor. That the suit premises was originally jointly owned by the four sons of Majid Karim and there jointly devolved of their children. It is further asserted that considering the long occupation of the premises by the defendant-petitioner, various descendants of Majid Karim started approaching the defendant-petitioner to purchase their shares in the said property. It is his case that Md. Israfil entered into and oral agreement with the defendant-petitioner in the year, 1992 to sell his alleged one fourth share for rupees one lac and, accordingly, the defendant-petitioner paid rupees five thousand and three hundred and balance was to be paid as and when demanded in future. Sale deed was to be executed after other three co- sharers sold their shares to the defendant-petitioner. In pursuance of the aforesaid oral agreement for sale and payment, it is said that defendant-petitioner was put in possession of the one fourth share of Md. Israfil as a prospective buyer. In January, 2001, defendant-petitioner came to know that Md. Israfil and Ors. executed sale deed in favour of the plaintiff-opposite party contrary to the oral agreement with him which forced the defendant-petitioner to file Title Suit No. 7 of 2001 in the Court of Sub-Judge I, Khagaria against Md. Israfil and Smt Munni Devi, the plaintiff-opposite party for specific performance of contract and setting aside the sale deed as executed by Md. Israfil in favour of the plaintiff-opposite party, on corning to know of the said suit, then filed the present eviction suit. In the meantime, the defendant got sale deeds executed from Md. Ali being one of the sons of Habibuddin, other son being Md. Abdul Gani and Md. Alauddin being the sole son of Gulam Rasul.
3. On basis of the pleadings, issues were framed and parties led evidence. The trial Court has come to a finding that there existed landlord-tenant relationship as between the plaintiff and the defendant by virtue of plaintiffs purchase of the share of late Abdul Razzaque and late Md. Latifuddin from their descendants and the suit premises had fallen to the share of Md. Israfil who had sold it to the plaintiff and, as such, the defendant being the tenant under Md. Israfil became the tenant of the plaintiff-opposite party. The trial Court came to the finding that personal necessity was established and the suit premises was was a very small premises and, therefore, decreed eviction.
4. The tenant in this revision has not challenged findings of personal necessity or any other finding except the finding in relation to the landlord-tenant relationship. Contention on his behalf was that no doubt he was, admittedly, a tenant of the entire house on the land since 1957 but pursuant to the oral agreement for sale with Md. Israfil and in part performance thereof, he was put in possession of that portion as a prospective buyer and, therefore, ceased to be a tenant. For specific performance of the said oral agreement, his suit was pending. It was, as such, admitted in course of argument that his plea of oral agreement and his right was yet to be established and/or accepted by Court and the matter was still subjudiced. On the other hand, the sale by Md. Israfil and Ors. by registered sale deed to the plaintiff-opposite party was not disputed. Therefore, the question is what was the status of the defendant in the present suit and his relationship with the plaintiff opposite party.
5. Records having been called for , I have gone through the pleadings. Both the parties were asked to file typed copies of the various sale deeds. On behalf of defendant, it is asserted that the story of partition amongst the second generation heirs of Majid Karim is not established. The finding in this regard by the trial Court is wrong. In any view of the matter, the suit for specific performance being pending, it could not be said that the defendant-petitioner continued to be a tenant. Both these submissions cannot be accepted.
6. If what the defendant says that there was no partition is to be believed then he is unable to explain as to how he got sale deeds executed from the two branches of the second generation of Majid Karim. The sale deeds are not for any unspecified share in the property. Further, how he was negotiating with Md. Israfil for the suit premises if it was not identified to his share. This itself is enough to demolish the stand of the defendant-tenant- petitioner. The parties understood their cases. They were aware of the rights of their respective vendors. It is admitted that he was a tenant originally. The disputed premises which he had intended to purchase was also identified which was purchased by the plaintiff. Plaintiff, as such, acquired all the rights of her vendor and therefore, inherited the defendant as a tenant. Thus, the status and the relationship between the plaintiff and defendant was established as landlord and tenant. There is apparently no dispute with regard to the portion purchased by the defendant from other person. I, therefore, do not find any infirmity in the judgment of the trial Court in regards this issue.
7. Now coming to the second contention that suit for specific performance being pending, it could not be said that the defendant was a tenant. I am afraid this is equally devoid of substance. The oral agreement is only an allegation, it is yet to be accepted. The sale in favour of plaintiff is admitted and as such, the title of plaintiff is admitted. The status of defendant as tenant since 1957 is admitted. Therefore, on facts, as stand admitted, the status of defendant continues to be a tenant and there is no change much less by virtue of any finding of any Court as that matter is subjudiced. Merely on ground of a declaration of a right, title or interest at a future date, the present status of a person cannot change till such declaration is made in a lawful manner, the status remains as before which, as admitted by the defendant himself, was that of a tenant.
Accordingly, I find that there is no substance in the grounds as raised and argued before this Court and there is no merit in this revision application. No other issue, having been raised, the revision implication is, accordingly, dismissed.