Rajasthan High Court - Jodhpur
Dr Ashok Singhvi vs State on 23 March, 2018
Author: P.K. Lohra
Bench: P.K. Lohra
HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE FOR RAJASTHAN AT
JODHPUR
S.B. Criminal Misc(Pet.) No. 2805 / 2016
Dr. Ashok Singhvi S/o Dr. A.M. Singhvi, 7 Hospital Road,
C-Scheme, Jaipur.
----Petitioner
Versus
State of Rajasthan through Public Prosecutor
----Respondent
_____________________________________________________
For Petitioner(s) : Mr. Pankaj Gupta and Mr. Anil Bhansali.
For Respondent(s) : Mr. S.K. Vyas, AAG with Mr. O.P. Rathi,
Public Prosecutor.
_____________________________________________________
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE P.K. LOHRA
Order Reportable March 23, 2018 Petitioner, Dr. Ashok Singhvi, by the instant misc. petition, under Section 482 read with Section 483 Cr.P.C. of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (for short, 'Cr.P.C.'), has prayed for quashing FIR No.251/15, registered at Police Station ACB, District Jaipur, Charge-sheet No.276/2015 and the entire proceedings in Case No.234/15, pending before Sessions Judge (Anti Corruption), Udaipur.
2. Succinctly stated, the facts relevant and germane to the matter are that petitioner was selected in Indian Administrative Services of 1983 Batch and allotted Rajasthan Cadre. Since inception of his career as a bureaucrat uptil September 2015, spanning service career for about 32 years, he has served the State Government in various capacities. Boosting his honesty, (2 of 31) [CRLMP-2805/2016] integrity and administrative capabilities, petitioner has pleaded in the petition that during his service tenure he has earned many accolades and his uprightness was acknowledged by Government, his peers and subordinates. It is further averred in the petition that for a short stint from 2012 to 2014 he remained on deputation with Central Government as Joint Secretary, Ministry of Urban Development. At the behest of State Government, he was repatriated to parent cadre in Rajasthan in the year 2014 and after repatriation, he was deputed as Principal Secretary, Mines Department, the department with which he worked earlier for three years from 2005 to 2008. Highlighting his performance in the interregnum period between 2005 to 2008 with the Mines Department, petitioner has averred that he made sincere endeavour for augmenting the revenues of said department, streamlined mineral policy and introduced DMA online system with many innovative ideas in the best interest of department and the State of Rajasthan. While referring to his one year's second tenure with the Mines Department as Principal Secretary, petitioner has averred in the petition that within a span of one year he inked many MOUs for mineral prospecting and explorations, which paved the way for huge investment in mining and petroleum sectors in Rajasthan.
3. Concentrating on the principal grievances, petitioner has pleaded that abrupt coercive actions taken on 16.09.2015 by the ACB sleuths, when he was returning from Secretariat after attending meeting, and then taking into custody gave him rude (3 of 31) [CRLMP-2805/2016] shock. As per petitioner's version, simultaneous actions were undertaken by the ACB officials by seizure of computers, files etc. without any search warrant or authorization. In follow of actions, petitioner was taken to his official residence, already under control of ACB Personnel, and then extensive search operation was carried out to every nook & corner of the residence. The search operation lasted till morning of the next day. Petition also unfurls that finally the petitioner was taken to ACB Headquarters without furnishing him grounds of arrest and sans recording reasons in clear negation of the directions of Supreme Court in case of Arnesh Kumar Vs. State of Bihar [(2014) 8 SCC 273].
4. Ventilating his afflictions against the actions of ACB, petitioner has averred in the petition that I.G. (First) ACB, Rajasthan, Jaipur issued warrant of authorization under Section 165(3) Cr.P.C. to Additional S.P. ACB/SIW, Jaipur, without registration of FIR. According to petitioner, in absence of registration of FIR, house search conducted at his official residence, for unearthing acquisition of assets disproportionate to his known source of income and collecting documents in this behalf, is an arbitrary and high handed action by the ACB. The petitioner has also castigated his arrest as arbitrary and colorable exercise of power by the investigating agency.
5. Highlighting the sequence of events with clarity and precision, petitioner further averred in the petition that FIR against him was registered on 19.09.2015 at 06:05 PM, i.e., after (4 of 31) [CRLMP-2805/2016] 2-3 days from the date of arrest. In the FIR, petitioner is castigated for offence under Sections 7, 8, 9, 10, 12, 13(1)(a)(c)
(d) read with 13(2) and 14 of the P.C. Act besides offence under Section 120B & 409 IPC. As per petitioner, FIR in the matter projects an Inspector of ACB as complainant disclosing receipt of information by him regarding rampant collusive corruption in the Mines Department. Petitioner further asserts that the above information when forwarded to I.G.P.I., ACB, Jaipur, Rajasthan, the said authority without registering any Preliminary Inquiry ordered for its verification. Projecting versions of the complainant that ACB came to know nexus of one Sh. Sanjay Sethi with the dubious transactions in the department, it is submitted by the petitioner that his Mobile No.9929429910 was kept under interception to unveil alleged corruption.
6. Taking a dig at secret information, petitioner asserts that ACB has not disclosed date of such information and further conclusions drawn by it are also not forthcoming. Expressing indignation to the manner, in which matter is proceeded by ACB, upon receipt of alleged information without registering FIR, petitioner has made an affirmative attempt to castigate ACB for witch-hunt. Elaborating his submissions, in this behalf, petitioner has alleged that ACB was simply permitted to intercept mobile phone of Sh. Sanjay Sethi and its endeavor to intercept other mobile phones including the petitioner never came into offing. A significant fact, purportedly depicting ACB version that the agency had information on 15.09.2015 of a big deal to happen on (5 of 31) [CRLMP-2805/2016] 16.09.2015, is also pleaded by the petitioner. Follow of action in this behalf, including typing of secret information at 09:15 PM and forwarding the same to I.G.(First) ACB, Rajasthan, Jaipur, also finds mention in the petition.
7. Petitioner, in order to challenge impugned actions of the State, has once again reiterated that without registration of FIR against him, I.O. was deputed to lay a trap at Udaipur. The ACB sleuths accompanying the trap team then pounced the office of a C.A. at Udaipur on 16.09.2015 and found three persons, viz., Sh. Sanjay Sethi, Sh. Shyam Singh Singhvi (C.A.) and Sh. Dhirendra Singh in possession of Rs.2.55 crores in cash. Sh. Sanjay Sethi and Sh. Shyam Singh Singhvi were apprehended on the spot and third person Dhirendra Singh was also taken into custody on the same day. Petitioner, while narrating all these facts, has made an attempt to show that all these persons explained the source of available cash. While vehemently canvassing grounds to assail impugned FIR, petitioner has further challenged charge-sheet Annex.5, filed in the matter, by categorizing it mala fide, illegal and founded on false and concocted evidence. At the cost of repetition, petitioner has once again harped on inexplicable delay in lodging FIR/complaint without reasons for its annulment and entire proceedings pursuant thereto.
8. For substantiating his pleas against the impugned action of respondent-State, petitioner has articulated various grounds. Petitioner in order to seek reliefs craved has urged that clear (6 of 31) [CRLMP-2805/2016] violation of Section 154 Cr.P.C. before his arrest vitiated entire proceedings. Romping in Article 21 of the Constitution which enshrines sacrosanct right of life and liberty, petitioner has reiterated that investigation under Section 156 Cr.P.C. in terms of procedure provided under Section 157 Cr.P.C. cannot commence without registration of FIR. Assailing the conduct of search, seizure and arrest of the petitioner, a ground is set out in the petition that all these actions of ACB were dehors the law being in clear negation of Section 165, 167 Cr.P.C. and Section 17 of the P.C. Act. In order to challenge impugned actions of the State, petitioner has also taken shelter of CBI Manual by relying on Para 63 sub-para(12). For authenticating all the grounds, petitioner has also relied on various legal precedents.
9. The respondent-State contested the petition by submitting its reply. In the return, State has defended all the actions of ACB for exposing a big mining scam showing direct nexus of the petitioner. It is also averred in the reply that corruption has engulfed the Mines Department, involving many of its officers including the petitioner as Principal Secretary of the department. As per version of the State, one Sher Khan, Chartered Accountant
- Shyam Singh Singhvi, Sanjay Sethi and Pankaj Gehlot jointly struck a dubious deal for settling an issue in connivance with the petitioner upon receipt of illegal gratification amounting to Rs.1.25 Crores with share of petitioner and Sanjay Sethi Rs.1 Crore. The reply further contained recitals that initially Sher Khan was to pay the amount to Sanjay Sethi on 15.09.2015 in the office of Shyam (7 of 31) [CRLMP-2805/2016] Singh Singhi but he got late, and therefore, the deal was rescheduled for next day.
10. According to the stand of State, this sort of situation prompted immediate action and therefore Addl. S.P. ACB(I) was instructed to conduct raid on 16.09.2015. During raid, at the office of Shyam Singh Singhvi, two other persons; namely, Sanjay Sethi and Dhirendra Singh @ Chintu, were present with a bag containing Rs.2.5 Crores. When asked, Mr. Sanjay Sethi disclosed that money is brought by Sher Khan for purchase of two mines but no document was shown by him to prove sale transaction. Likewise, Dhirendra Singh revealed a different version regarding the available cash amount without furnishing any proof. Respondent-State, in the return, has also pleaded that Shyam Singh Singhvi admitted his professional relationship with Sher Khan and Rashid Khan for more than two and half decades.
11. A significant fact, that Rashid Khan handed over two bags to Shyam Singh Singhvi, allegedly containing Rs.5 Lacs, for giving them to Sanjay Sethi, and his ignorance about total amount lying in these bags, also finds mention in the reply. State has specifically averred in the reply that Sanjay Sethi and Shyam Singh Singhvi were engaged in corrupt practices with Sher Khan for their personal gains while hand in gloves with the petitioner, Pankaj Gehlot, Addl. Director(Mines) and Pukhraj Ameta, Superintending Mining Engineer. Admission of Sh. Sanjay Sethi during interrogation that an amount of Rs.1 Crore was to be given (8 of 31) [CRLMP-2805/2016] to petitioner, with equal share of remaining amount between him and Pankaj Gehlot, is also forthcoming from reply.
12. With a view to defend State action in arresting the petitioner, it is further submitted in the reply that prima facie commission of cognizable offence by him necessitated his arrest in accordance with law. Castigating petitioner for being engaged in corrupt practices in connivance with Pankaj Gehlot and Pukhraj Ameta and misusing their official position, State has made a positive assertion in the reply that all of them caused huge pecuniary loss to the exchequer besides colossal losses of valuable minerals. Apart from these insinuations, State has laid emphasis on their criminal conspiracy and the act of accepting illegal gratification for justifying registration of FIR and filing charge-sheet against petitioner and others for these offences. Some of the facts revealed during search are also highlighted in the return to make out a case of disproportionate assets amassed by the petitioner and registration of another Case No.266/2015. Investigation of Case No.266/15 still in vogue, is also borne out from the reply.
13. Allegations of the petitioner about violation of Section 154 Cr.P.C. are met by citing peculiar facts of the instant case with emphasis that the legality of detention is insignificant vis-a-vis proceedings in this petition. Relying on a verdict of Supreme Court in case of Col. Dr. B. Ramachandra Rao vs. The State of Orissa and Ors. [(1972) 3 SCC 256], State has submitted in its reply that the issue vociferously canvassed by the petitioner is (9 of 31) [CRLMP-2805/2016] having no ramification on legality/propriety of impugned FIR and further proceeding pursuant thereto, including charge-sheet. Respondent has also pleaded that Sections 154 & 167 Cr.P.C. are to be construed liberally and technicalities cannot be allowed to frustrate cause of justice at the cost of sacrificing public interest and allowing someone to go scot-free despite his involvement in seriously denting state economy. The State, in its reply, has also relied upon some legal precedent for defending impugned actions and refuted all the grounds with vehemence.
14. Mr. Pankaj Gupta, learned counsel for the petitioner, submits that investigation in the matter, started on secret information without registration of FIR, is per se dehors the law. Mr. Gupta would contend that particulars about secret information are absolutely vague, cryptic & unspecific inasmuch as neither date of information nor identity of alleged secret informer is disclosed, sufficiently casts a shadow of doubt on the complaint of Inspector Vikram Singh.
15. Learned counsel would contend that case in hand is a glaring example of blatant misuse of power and dogmatic actions of ACB inasmuch as petitioner was arrested and his official residence is also searched without registration of FIR. Learned counsel argues that starting investigation in the matter 2-3 days before registration of FIR has vitiated entire proceedings. Laying emphasis on mandate of Section 154 Cr.P.C., learned counsel has urged that sans registration of FIR, remand of the petitioner and (10 of 31) [CRLMP-2805/2016] filing charge-sheet in the matter, on the basis of investigation carried out anterior to it, is a highhanded action of ACB in clear negation of law. Learned counsel submits that search and seizure proceedings were undertaken by ACB in flagrant violation of Section 165 Cr.P.C. Emphasizing registration of FIR at the earliest, learned counsel contends that object of legislation in this behalf is to set criminal law into motion and to ensure prevention against possible embellishment in complainant's version. Learned counsel has further argued that completely eschewing ACB Manual Chapter V by the investigating agency at its whims and fancy has per se rendered entire proceedings vulnerable.
16. Espousing cause of the petitioner for annulment of FIR and further proceedings pursuant thereto, learned counsel submits that Chapter 3-1.1 of Anti Corruption Bureau Manual though envisages conducting Preliminary Inquiry without registering a formal FIR under Section 154 Cr.P.C. but then scope of Preliminary Inquiry is limited just to ascertain whether the information received reveals any cognizable offence and not to verify the veracity or otherwise of the information received. Learned counsel further contends that registration of Preliminary Inquiry as per Manual is permissible only after approval of competent authority. Learned counsel argued that as soon as enquiry officer is able to makeup his mind on this point, he should report his opinion with reasons to the Superintendent of Police to facilitate issuance of necessary orders and only thereafter the Preliminary Inquiry is to be continued for registering a regular case. It is argued by (11 of 31) [CRLMP-2805/2016] learned counsel that registration of FIR sets the criminal law into motion and marks the commencement of investigation which ends up with the formation of opinion under Section 169 and 170 Cr.P.C., as the case may be, to be forwarded in the form of police report under Section 173 Cr.P.C. Learned counsel would contend that the definition of "investigation" under Section 2(h) of the Code includes all the proceedings under the Code for collection of evidence.
17. Making a scathing attack on the role of investigating agency for proceeding with investigation in the matter, learned counsel has urged that the mandatory provisions of Cr.P.C. as well as procedure provided in the Manual has been given complete go- bye, which has obviously vitiated the entire proceedings. For substantiating his arguments, learned counsel for the petitioner has placed reliance on following legal precedents:
(1) Lalita Kumar Vs. Government of Uttar Pradesh & Ors. [(2014) 2 SCC 1] (2) Ashok Kumar Todi vs Kishwar Jahan & Ors. [2011 Cr.L.J. 2317 (SC)] (3) Shri L. Shankaramurthy Vs. State by Lokayuktha Police (Criminal Petition No.3213/2012 with other connected petitions, decided on 3rd September 2012 by Bangalore Bench of Karnataka High Court) and other decisions of Karnataka High Court and order of Supreme Court passed on 24.09.2014 in Special Leave to Appeal (Cri) No.3508/2013 and other Special Leave to Appeals dismissing the leave petitions filed by State of Karnataka including the one filed against the order of Karnataka High Court dated 3rd of September 2012 in Criminal Petition No.2142/2012, which was decided alongwith Criminal Petition No.3213/12.
18. Per contra, learned Addl. Advocate General Mr. S.K. Vyas would urge that arguments advanced by the learned counsel for (12 of 31) [CRLMP-2805/2016] the petitioner are per se alluring but lacking legal foothold. Mr. Vyas contends that after investigation, prima facie, evidence is collected by investigating agency against the petitioner to prosecute him for various offences under the Prevention of Corruption Act, and therefore, at this stage, it would not be appropriate to exercise inherent jurisdiction to shuttle the trial. Learned Addl. Advocate General submits that in cases of corruption, involving public servants, inherent powers are to be exercised very sparingly with great care and circumspection for quashment of criminal proceedings. Mr. Vyas further submits that instant one is a glaring example wherein omissions and commissions of the petitioner have caused immense pecuniary loss to the exchequer and colossal losses of valuable minerals in connivance with other public servants and individuals.
19. Learned Addl. Advocate General submits that in corruption cases, before registration of FIR, Preliminary Inquiry is permissible, and therefore, of late, grounds sought to be urged by the learned counsel for the petitioner, touching legality of detention, cannot have any ramification on further investigation and filing of charge-sheet in the matter, much less vitiate the proceedings. Learned Addl. Advocate General has also argued that yet another case of disproportionate assets under the P.C. Act is registered against the petitioner clearly reflects his conduct as public servant is yet another significant fact for thwarting this petition. Mr. Vyas contends that the ACB Manual contemplates Preliminary Inquiry, which is conducted as per procedure and (13 of 31) [CRLMP-2805/2016] minor infraction in the procedure cannot furnish a ground to the petitioner for annulment of the entire proceedings.
20. Learned Addl. Advocate General submits that, in the backdrop of peculiar facts and circumstances of the instant case, Section 154 and 167 Cr.P.C. are to be construed liberally in public interest when FIR prima facie discloses commission of cognizable offence by the petitioner. Lastly, learned AAG contends that inherent jurisdiction of this Court is not liable to be exercised to camouflage alleged corrupt activities of a public servant as investigation or trial in such matters neither amounts to abuse of the process of the Court, nor the same would result in miscarriage of justice. Learned Addl. Advocate General, in support of his arguments, has placed reliance on a Division Bench decision of Aurangabad Bench of Bombay High Court in Shriman Shekha Gaikvad Vs. State of Maharashtra & Anr. (Criminal Application No.6739 of 2013, decided with four other petitions on 30 th of September, 2014).
21. I have given my anxious consideration to the arguments advanced by learned counsel for the petitioner and learned Addl. Advocate General. For evaluating afflictions of the petitioner, the material available on record is also scanned by me, besides legal precedents, on which reliance is placed by the rival counsels.
(14 of 31) [CRLMP-2805/2016]
22. The case in hand involves a senior bureaucrat of the State and therefore the learned counsel espousing his cause has endeavoured to articulate his submissions with full gusto and rhetorics. Likewise, State too has locked the horns with full vehemence to defend its impugned actions. However, concern of the Court is to examine legality and propriety of the impugned proceedings on the touchstone of inherent powers of this Court uninfluenced by the status of an individual. In our democratic polity, where rule of law prevails, no individual, howsoever highly placed he may be, can claim immunity much less absolute immunity from the law and every individual citizen is always under law. If the facts and circumstances of the case leading to prosecution of the petitioner for various offences under the P.C. Act are meticulously scrutinized, then it would ipso facto reveal that the concern of the ACB was to unearth alleged large scale corruption in Mines Department upon receipt of information by an Inspector of the Department in this behalf.
23. Well it is true that information received by the concerned Inspector did not culminate into registration of FIR with promptitude and preliminary investigation commenced wherein petitioner is apprehended and search of his official residence is carried out by ACB sleuths, but then with the advent of time investigation reached to its logical conclusion in the form of submission of final report, i.e., charge-sheet under Section 173 Cr.P.C. Therefore, at this stage, coercive actions undertaken by the ACB without registration of FIR, which is mandatory under (15 of 31) [CRLMP-2805/2016] Section 154 Cr.P.C., and search carried out of the official residence of the petitioner, merits examination with pragmatic approach in the light of facts of the instant case. Legal position is no more res integra that registration of FIR upon an information disclosing cognizable offence is mandatory as per Sections 154, 155, 156 and 157 of the Cr.P.C.
24. Constitution Bench of Supreme Court in Lalita Kumari's case (supra), while interpreting Section 154 Cr.P.C., observed that use of word "shall" in sub-sec.(1) of the aforesaid Section needs to be construed with its ordinary meaning of being mandatory character. The Court then proceeded to hold:
49. Consequently, the condition that is sine qua non for recording an FIR under Section 154 of the Code is that there must be information and that information must disclose a cognizable offence. If any information disclosing a cognizable offence is led before an officer in charge of the police station satisfying the requirement of Section 154(1), the said police officer has no other option except to enter the substance thereof in the prescribed form, that is to say, to register a case on the basis of such information. The provision of Section 154 of the Code is mandatory and the officer concerned is duty-bound to register the case on the basis of information disclosing a cognizable offence. Thus, the plain words of Section 154(1) of the Code have to be given their literal meaning.
"Shall"
50. The use of the word "shall" in Section 154(1) of the Code clearly shows the legislative intent that it is mandatory to register an FIR if the information given to the police discloses the commission of a cognizable offence.
51. In Khub Chand, this Court observed as under:
(AIR p.1077, para 6) "6. ... The term 'shall' in its ordinary significance is mandatory and the court shall ordinarily give that interpretation to that term unless such an interpretation leads to some absurd or inconvenient consequence or be at variance with the intent of the (16 of 31) [CRLMP-2805/2016] legislature, to be collected from other parts of the Act.
The construction of the said expression depends on the provisions of a particular Act, the setting in which the expression appears, the object for which the direction is given, the consequences that would flow from the infringement of the direction and such other considerations."
52. It is relevant to mention that the object of using the word "shall" in the context of Section 154(1) of the Code is to ensure that all information relating to all cognizable offences is promptly registered by the police and investigated in accordance with the provisions of law.
53. Investigation of offences and prosecution of offenders are the duties of the State. For "cognizable offences", a duty has been cast upon the police to register FIR and to conduct investigation except as otherwise permitted specifically under Section 157 of the Code. If a discretion, option or latitude is allowed to the police in the matter of registration of FIRs, it can have serious consequences on the public order situation and can also adversely affect the rights of the victims including violating their fundamental right to equality.
54. Therefore, the context in which the word "shall" appears in Section 154(1) of the Code, the object for which it has been used and the consequences that will follow from the infringement of the direction to register FIRs, all these factors clearly show that the word "shall" used in Section 154(1) needs to be given its ordinary meaning of being of "mandatory" character. The provisions of Section 154(1) of the Code, read in the light of the statutory scheme, do not admit of conferring any discretion on the officer in charge of the police station for embarking upon a preliminary inquiry prior to the registration of an FIR. It is settled position of law that if the provision is unambiguous and the legislative intent is clear, the court need not call into it any other rules of construction.
55. In view of the above, the use of the word "shall" coupled with the scheme of the Act lead to the conclusion that the legislators intended that if an information relating to commission of a cognizable offence is given, then it would mandatorily be registered by the officer in charge of the police station. Reading "shall" as "may", as contended by some counsel, would be against the scheme of the Code. Section 154 of the Code should be strictly construed and the word "shall" should be given its natural meaning. The golden rule of interpretation can be given a go-by only in cases where the language of the section is ambiguous and/or leads to an absurdity.
56. In view of the above, we are satisfied that Section 154(1) of the Code does not have any ambiguity in this regard and is in clear terms. It is relevant to mention that Section 39 of the Code casts a statutory duty on every person to inform about (17 of 31) [CRLMP-2805/2016] commission of certain offences which includes offences covered by Sections 121 to 126, 302, 64-A, 382, 392, etc. of the Penal Code. It would be incongruous to suggest that though it is the duty of every citizen to inform about commission of an offence, but it is not obligatory on the officer in charge of a police station to register the report. The word "shall" occurring in Section 39 of the Code has to be given the same meaning as the word "shall" occurring in Section 154(1) of the Code.
While embarking on significance of compelling reasons for registration of FIR at the earliest, the Court held:
93. The object sought to be achieved by registering the earliest information as FIR is inter alia twofold:
one, that the criminal process is set into motion and is well documented from the very start; and second, that the earliest information received in relation to the commission of a cognizable offence is recorded so that there cannot be any embellishment, etc. later.
94. Principles of democracy and liberty demand a regular and efficient check on police powers. One way of keeping check on authorities with such powers is by documenting every action of theirs. Accordingly, under the Code, actions of the police, etc. are provided to be written and documented. For example, in case of arrest under Section 41(1)(b) of the Code, the arrest memo along with the grounds has to be in writing mandatorily; under Section 55 of the Code, if an officer is deputed to make an arrest, then the superior officer has to write down and record the offence, etc. for which the person is to be arrested;
under Section 91 of the Code, a written order has to be passed by the officer concerned to seek documents; under Section 160 of the Code, a written notice has to be issued to the witness so that he can be called for recording of his/her statement, seizure memo/panchnama has to be drawn for every article seized, etc.
95. The police is required to maintain several records including case diary as provided under Section 172 of the Code, General Diary as provided under Section 44 of the Police Act, etc. which helps in documenting every information collected, spot visited and all the actions of the police officers so that their activities can be documented. Moreover, every information received relating to commission of a non- cognizable offence also has to be registered under Section 155 of the Code.
96. The underpinnings of compulsory registration of FIR is not only to ensure transparency in the criminal justice-delivery system but also to ensure "judicial oversight". Section 157(1) deploys the word "forthwith". Thus, any information received under Section 154(1) or otherwise has to be duly informed (18 of 31) [CRLMP-2805/2016] in the form of a report to the Magistrate. Thus, the commission of a cognizable offence is not only brought to the knowledge of the investigating agency but also to the subordinate judiciary.
97. The Code contemplates two kinds of FIRs: the duly signed FIR under Section 154(1) is by the informant to the officer concerned at the police station. The second kind of FIR could be which is registered by the police itself on any information received or other than by way of an informant [Section 157(1)] and even this information has to be duly recorded and the copy should be sent to the Magistrate forthwith. The registration of FIR either on the basis of the information furnished by the informant under Section 154(1) of the Code or otherwise under Section 157(1) of the Code is obligatory. The obligation to register FIR has inherent advantages:
97.1. (a) It is the first step to "access to justice"
for a victim.
97.2. (b) It upholds the "rule of law" inasmuch as the ordinary person brings forth the commission of a cognizable crime in the knowledge of the State. 97.3. (c) It also facilitates swift investigation and sometimes even prevention of the crime. In both cases, it only effectuates the regime of law. 97.4. (d) It leads to less manipulation in criminal cases and lessens incidents of "antedated" FIR or deliberately delayed FIR.
While carving out certain exceptions to mandatory registration of FIRs, the Court has given some latitude owning to change in genesis and novelty of crimes with the passage of time to permit preliminary inquiry in such matters in relation to such offences. While dilating on the scope of preliminary inquiry, the Court finally concluded:
119. Therefore, in view of various counterclaims regarding registration or non-registration, what is necessary is only that the information given to the police must disclose the commission of a cognizable offence. In such a situation, registration of an FIR is mandatory. However, if no cognizable offence is made out in the information given, then the FIR need not be registered immediately and perhaps the police can conduct a sort of preliminary verification or inquiry for the limited purpose of ascertaining as to whether a cognizable offence has been committed. But, if the information given clearly mentions the commission of a cognizable offence, there is no other option but to register an FIR forthwith. Other considerations are not relevant at the stage of registration of FIR, such (19 of 31) [CRLMP-2805/2016] as, whether the information is falsely given, whether the information is genuine, whether the information is credible, etc. These are the issues that have to be verified during the investigation of the FIR. At the stage of registration of FIR, what is to be seen is merely whether the information given ex facie discloses the commission of a cognizable offence. If, after investigation, the information given is found to be false, there is always an option to prosecute the complainant for filing a false FIR.
Conclusion/Directions
120. In view of the aforesaid discussion, we hold: 120.1. The registration of FIR is mandatory under Section 154 of the Code, if the information discloses commission of a cognizable offence and no preliminary inquiry is permissible in such a situation. 120.2. If the information received does not disclose a cognizable offence but indicates the necessity for an inquiry, a preliminary inquiry may be conducted only to ascertain whether cognizable offence is disclosed or not.
120.3. If the inquiry discloses the commission of a cognizable offence, the FIR must be registered. In cases where preliminary inquiry ends in closing the complaint, a copy of the entry of such closure must be supplied to the first informant forthwith and not later than one week. It must disclose reasons in brief for closing the complaint and not proceeding further. 120.4. The police officer cannot avoid his duty of registering offence if cognizable offence is disclosed. Action must be taken against erring officers who do not register the FIR if information received by him discloses a cognizable offence.
120.5. The scope of preliminary inquiry is not to verify the veracity or otherwise of the information received but only to ascertain whether the information reveals any cognizable offence.
120.6. As to what type and in which cases preliminary inquiry is to be conducted will depend on the facts and circumstances of each case. The category of cases in which preliminary inquiry may be made are as under:
(a) Matrimonial disputes/family disputes
(b) Commercial offences
(c) Medical negligence cases
(d) Corruption cases
(e) Cases where there is abnormal delay/laches in initiating criminal prosecution, for example, over 3 months' delay in reporting the matter without satisfactorily explaining the reasons for delay.
The aforesaid are only illustrations and not exhaustive of all conditions which may warrant preliminary inquiry.
120.7. While ensuring and protecting the rights of the accused and the complainant, a preliminary inquiry should be made time-bound and in any case it (20 of 31) [CRLMP-2805/2016] should not exceed 7 days. The fact of such delay and the causes of it must be reflected in the General Diary entry.
120.8. Since the General Diary/Station Diary/Daily Diary is the record of all information received in a police station, we direct that all information relating to cognizable offences, whether resulting in registration of FIR or leading to an inquiry, must be mandatorily and meticulously reflected in the said diary and the decision to conduct a preliminary inquiry must also be reflected, as mentioned above.
25. Thus, when an information discloses commission of cognizable offence, registration of FIR is mandatory and it is only in exceptional cases for limited purpose preliminary inquiry can be conducted by the police/investigating agency. As per ratio of Lalita Kumari's case (supra), preliminary inquiry in corruption cases is permitted by the Court precisely for ascertaining whether the information reveals any cognizable offence. For assailing the impugned actions of the State, petitioner has essentially buttressed arguments on delay and laches in registration of FIR. True it is that from the record it is borne out that FIR was registered after 2 or 3 days and the coercive actions were undertaken against the petitioner prior to it, but then in the considered opinion of the Court, this sort of delay cannot be construed as inordinate or deliberate which can be categorized as inexcusable in the backdrop of peculiar facts and circumstances of the case. Undeniably, the information received by the Inspector of ACB in the matter purportedly unearthed large scale corruption in Mines Department showing involvement of many officials of department and a senior officer of administration, per se delay 2-3 days cannot be categorized as abnormal.
(21 of 31) [CRLMP-2805/2016]
26. My aforesaid view is fortified by the Division Bench judgment of Aurangabad Bench of Bombay High Court in Shriman Shekha Gaikvad's case (supra). The Division Bench, after considering the Constitution Bench judgment of Supreme Court in Lalita Kumari (supra), dilated on importance and significance of Preliminary Inquiry in corruption cases and further examined the question regarding admissibility of evidence collected against the accused- applicants prior to registration of crime. The Court held:
"In order to take the case to its logical conclusion, it is always necessary to keep the information secrete. If upon complaint received by the Anti Corruption Bureau it is immediately sent for registration of crime and First Information Report to police station, the same would be a public document available to all the public at large including proposed accused and in most of the cases the trap would not succeed. It is for this reason, the Supreme Court in Lalita Kumari's case (cited supra) held that as an exceptional preliminary inquiry is permissible in criminal cases before registration of offence.
There is one more reason why in these kind of cases elaborate preliminary inquiry such as truthfuness of complaint and laying of trap is essential. It is for protecting a honest public servant from unwanted discomfiture. If the public servant, who is subject matter of the trap, does not accept the anthrasene smeared currency notes and refused to be party to such arrangement, the trap would fail and he would be saved and no offence would be registered against him even though initial complaint was lodged against him. In fact, the procedure undertaken by the Anti Corruption Bureau is part of fair procedure. The applicants were also protected by this elaborate procedure. In that sense by undertaking such procedure in their cases no prejudice was caused to them. Had they not accepted the illegal gratification as alleged, no offence would have been registered against them. So, the procedure that is followed prior to registration of the case in these corruption cases, is part of preliminary inquiry, as mentioned above.
(22 of 31) [CRLMP-2805/2016] The second question that arose in these cases is, whether circumstances and evidence collected against the applicants prior to registration of crime is admissible as evidence. The answer has to be in affirmative, mainly because the events from demand of illegal gratification, agreeing to receive such grantification and accepting such gratification in presence of independent punch witnesses would form a chain of events that would ultimately constitute offence under section 7 of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988. The main ingredients for constituting offence under section 7 of the Act are as under:
i) The accused must be a public servant;
ii) He must agree to accept for himself or for
any other person;
iii) Gratification other than legal remuneration;
iv) As a motive or reward;
v) For doing or forbearing to do any official act;
vi) In exercise of his official function;
vii) Favour or disfavour to any person.
When a complainant lodges a complaint it contain narration of all the events that constitute the offence under section 7 of the Act. As far as demand agreement of illegal gratification is concerned, the complainant would vouch for it. When it comes to proving acceptance of such gratification, the complainant and shadow punch would vouch for it. In view of these necessary requirements to prove an offence under section 7 of the Act, the First Information Report must contain entire narration, and the entire narration is possible only if earlier a trap is laid and it is successful. The pre-trap panchanama and post-trap panchanama are merely formalities to give credence to the allegation. What is important in evidence that is given in such case is substantive evidence of the complainant and shadow panch. So, the formalities that are undertaken during the preliminary inquiry are merely stleps that are required to be followed before lodging a complaint. In a way all that takes place prior to registration of offence under section 7 of the Prevention of Corruption Act is more or less part of the original complainant's narration. As said above, if such narration constituted an offence, it is only then an offence is registered."
27. Apprehending the petitioner and carrying out search and seizure proceedings before registration of FIR is certainly an (23 of 31) [CRLMP-2805/2016] instance of infraction of the mandate of law but then at this stage what can be its probable ramification on the investigation carried out in the matter and charge-sheet submitted cannot be examined while divorcing the material available on record as well as remand order dated 17th of September 2015. The remand order was passed by the Sessions Judge (Anti Corruption), Udaipur after hearing counsel for the petitioner is certainly having some mitigating effect to mollify the rigor of enthusiastic arguments of the learned counsel for the petitioner regarding violation of Section 154, 165 and 167 Cr.P.C. The order dated 17.09.2015, in vernacular, reads as under:
^^fnukad 17-09-2015 yksd vfHk;kstd Jh jkts"k /kM+ds mifLFkrA vfHk;qDrx.k loZ Jh lat; lsBh] ';ke lqUnj fla?koh] /khjsUnz flag mQZ fpUVw] iq"djjkt vkesVk] eksgEen j'khn] iadt xgyksr] eksgEen 'ksj[kku o Mk- v"kksd fla?koh dks esjs le{k Jh lqjsUnz "kekZ] iqfyl mi v/kh{kd] Hkz-fu-C;wjks mn;iqj us is"k fd;k vkSj vfHk;qDrx.k dh 5 ;kse iqfyl vfHkj{kk dh ekax dhA vfHk;qDrx.k lat; lsBh] ";ke lqUnj fla?koh] /khjsUnz flag o iadt xgyksr ds vf/koDrk Jh ds-,l- fgj.k] vfHk;qDr iq"djjkt vkesVk ds vf/koDrk Jh cqf) izdk'k MhMokfu;k] vfHk;qDr eksgEen j"khn ds vf/koDrk Jh jke dqekj 'kekZ] vfHk;qDr eksgEen "ksj[kku ds vf/koDrk Jh Qjtan vyh vkSj vfHk;qDr Mk- v"kksd fla?koh ds vf/koDrk Jh fujatu xkSM+ Hkh mifLFkrA nksuksa i{kksa dks foLrkj iwoZd lqukA izdj.k vUrxZr /kkjk 7] 8] 13¼1½¼Mh½@13¼2½ Hkz-fu- vf/kfu;e] 1988 o /kkjk 120ch Hkk-n-la- ls lEcfU/kr gSA geus dsl Mk;jh dk voyksdu fd;kA mifLFkr fo}ku yksd vfHk;kstd o iqfyl mi v/kh{kd us crk;k fd ;g ekeyk cgqr cM+h jkf"k ds ysunsu@fj"or ls lEcfU/kr gSA vfHk;qDrx.k dks ijLij vkil esa feyok dj fj"or dh Chain ¼J`a[kyk½ ds ckjs es tkudkjh ,df=r djuh gS] ,slk djus ls lkjh fLFkfr lkeus vk ldsxh vkSj dkSu&dkSu yksx fyIr gSa] bl lEcU/k esa Hkh tkudkjh gks ldsxhA mUgksaus dsl Mk;jh ij miyC/k vU; rF;ksa dks Hkh crk;kA blds foijhr vfHk;qDrx.k ds fo}ku vf/koDrkx.k us vfHk;qDrx.k dks iqfyl vfHkj{kk esa Hkstus dk fofHkUu rdZ j[krs gq, iqjtksj fojks/k fd;k vkSj dFku fd;k fd vc vfHk;qDrx.k ls dksbZ vuqla/kku ugha djuk gSA mUgsa dsoy izrkfM+r djus vkSj >wBk ekeyk cukus ds fy, iqfyl vfHkj{kk dh ekax dh tk jgh gSA iqfyl vfHkj{kk (24 of 31) [CRLMP-2805/2016] esa j[kdj vc vuqla/kku dh vko";drk ugha gSA iqfyl vfHkj{kk ugha nh tkosaA geus fopkj fd;kA izdj.k vHkh izkjfEHkd LVst ij gSA vfHk;qDrx.k dks ijLij feyok dj ¼vkil esa ,d nwljs ls lkeuk djok dj½ vkSj vuqla/kku djus o J`a[kyk ¼Chain½ ds ckjs esa irk yxkus gsrq o vU; dkj.kksa gsrq iqfyl vfHkj{kk dh tks ekaxh dh xbZ gS] og mfpr izrhr gksrh gSA vr% lHkh vfHk;qDrx.k dh fnukad 21-09-2015 dks 1-00 ih-,e- ¼nksigj ,d cts½ rd dh iqfyl vfHkj{kk Lohdkj dh tkrh gSA vfHk;qDrx.k ";ke lqUnj fla?koh vkSj eksgEen "ksj[kku dk LokLF; Bhd ugha gksuk crk;k x;k gSA bl laca/k esa vfHk;qDr ";ke lqUnj fla?koh ds vf/koDrk us fyf[kr esa vkosnu is"k fd;k gSa ¼ftlds lkFk bZykt lEcU/kh ifpZ;ka Hkh is"k dh xbZ gS vkSj vfHk;qDr dk bZykt jktdh; fpfdRld Mk- vfer [k.Msyoky ds }kjk djuk crk;k x;k gS½ rFkk vfHk;qDr eksgEen "ksj[kku ds vf/koDrk Jh Qjtan vyh us ,slk ekSf[kd dFku fd;k gSA bu nksuksa vfHk;qDrx.k dh LokLF; dh fLFkfr dks ns[krs gq, vuqla/kku vf/kdkjh Jh lqjsUn 'kekZ dks funsZf"kr fd;k tkrk gS fd os bUgsa jktdh; fpfdRlky; ds fpfdRld dks ;Fkkvko";drk fn[kkos o mipkj miyC/k djkosA vfHk;qDr ";ke lqUnj fla?koh dk jktdh; fpfdRld Mk- vfer [k.Msyoky }kjk bZykt djuk crk;k x;k gS] vr% mls bl fpfdRld ls bZykt eqgS;k djok;k tkosA bl vkns"k ds tfj;s vfHk;qDrx.k dks iqfyl vfHkj{kk esa Hkstk tk jgk gS vuqla/kku vf/kdkjh Jh lqjsUnz "kekZ dks funsZf"kr fd;k tkrk gS fd os vuqla/kku ds nkSjku n.M izfØ;k lafgrk dh /kkjk 41¼Mh½] tks bl izdkj gS& 41&Mh iwNrkN ds nkSjku mldh ilUn ds odhy ls feyus ds fy, fxj¶rkj fd, x, O;fDr dk vf/kdkj & tc fdlh O;fDr dks iqfyl }kjk fxj¶rkj fd;k tkrk gS vkSj mlls iwNrkN dh tkrh gS] og iwNrkN ds nkSjku] ;|fi lEiw.kZ iwNrkN esa ugha] viuh ilUn ds vf/koDrk ls feyus dk gdnkj gksxkA* dh ikyuk lqfuf"pr djsaA lgh@& fo"ks"k U;k;k/kh"k] ls'ku U;k;ky;
Hkz'Vkpkj fuokj.k] mn;iqj ¼jkt-½**
28. Therefore, if the FIR, material/evidence collected during investigation including transcripts and the charge-sheet filed against the petitioner are scanned with a subsisting legal submission pertaining to violation of Section 154 and 165 Cr.P.C., (25 of 31) [CRLMP-2805/2016] then, it clearly emerges out that prima facie evidence for constituting offences under the P.C. Act is available. In the wake of such material available against the petitioner, clogging the trial perpetually appears to be unjust even if the Court concurs with the submission of the learned counsel seriously insinuating some of the actions of ACB to question legitimacy of those actions. Moreover, of late, taking a decision to vitiate the investigation, rendering charge-sheet and subsequent proceedings vulnerable in a corruption case, is per se not fathomable. As regards non- adherence of guidelines provided in ACB Manual, suffice it to observe that essentially those guidelines are in consonance and in conformity with Lalita Kumari's case (supra), and therefore, no detailed discussion on this issue is required. The grounds sought to be canvassed by the learned counsel at such a belated stage, by no stretch of imagination satisfy the requirements envisaged under Section 482 Cr.P.C. to nullify entire proceedings.
29. While reiterating that alleged grievances of the petitioner about his detention and search and seizure carried out at his official residence before registration of FIR cannot be given undue credence after completion of investigation and filing of charge- sheet, it may be observed here that even a fortiori the Court would not be concerned with the legality or otherwise of the detention, a date prior to initiation of proceedings for a writ of habeas corpus. Therefore, judgment in Arnesh Kumar's case (supra) relied upon by the learned counsel for the petitioner cannot render any assistance to his cause. At this juncture, it is (26 of 31) [CRLMP-2805/2016] also pertinent to note that petitioner is charge-sheeted for offence under Section 14 of the P.C. Act and Section 409 IPC wherein punishment prescribed is above 7 years and direction issued in Arnesh Kumar's case for adherence of Section 41, 41A and 57 Cr.P.C. is confined to offences punishable with imprisonment for a term which may be less than 7 years or which may extend to 7 years whether with or without fine.
30. Moral deterioration in public life is a serious blow to good governance and its mushrooming has become menace to the Society. Rampant corruption amongst public servants is really a cause of grave and serious concern which by no means be under- played. The ill-effects of corruption are really distressing inasmuch as, at time, citizens belonging to have-notes of the society may be deprived of the benefits of Public Distribution System, other government subsidies and legitimate claims besides fruits flowing from various welfare schemes. Likewise, infiltrated favoritism and nepotism is an unlikely hurdle for deserving educated youths to seek public employment and avail other benefits for self-employment in clear negation of right to equality. Corruption in a civilized society is akin to a dreaded disease and if not detected is sure to seriously malign the polity of the country leading to disastrous consequences. In common parlance, it has also been termed as "Royal thievery". Therefore, being opposed to democracy and social order, if not nipped in the bud at the earliest, its repercussions are obvious in the form of turbulence of the socio-economic-political system of the State.
(27 of 31) [CRLMP-2805/2016]
31. Now I proceed to examine inherent powers of the High Court under Section 482 Cr.P.C. in the backdrop of facts and circumstances of the instant case as well as afflictions of the petitioner. Supreme Court, in State of Haryana & Ors. Vs. Choudhary Bhajanlal & Ors. [1992 Suppl. (1) SCC 335], laid down guidelines for exercising inherent powers under Section 482 Cr.P.C. to quash FIR and criminal proceedings. The Court held:
"102. In the backdrop of the interpretation of the various relevant provisions of the Code under Chapter XIV and of the principles of law enunciated by this Court in a series of decisions relating to the exercise of the extraordinary power under Article 226 or the inherent powers under Section 482 of the Code which we have extracted and reproduced above, we give the following categories of cases by way of illustration wherein such power could be exercised either to prevent abuse of the process of any court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice, though it may not be possible to lay down any precise, clearly defined and sufficiently channelised and inflexible guidelines or rigid formulae and to give an exhaustive list of myriad kinds of cases wherein such power should be exercised.
1. Where the allegations made in the first information report or the complaint, even if they are taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety do not prima-facie constitute any offence or make out a case against the accused.
2. Where the allegations in the first information report and other materials, if any, accompanying the FIR do not disclose a cognizable offence, justifying an in- vestigation by police officers under Section 156(1) of the Code except under an order of a Magistrate within the purview of Section 155(2) of the Code.
3. Where the uncontroverted allegations made in the FIR or complaint and the evidence collected in support of the same do not disclose the commission of any offence and make out a case against the accused.
4. Where, the allegations in the FIR do not constitute a cognizable offence but constitute only a non-cognizable offence, no investigation is permitted (28 of 31) [CRLMP-2805/2016] by a police officer without an order of a Magistrate as contemplated under Section 155(2) of the Code.
5. Where the allegations made in the FIR or complaint are so absurd and inherently improbable on the basis of which no prudent person can ever reach a just conclusion that there is sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused.
6. Where there is an express legal bar engrafted in any of the provisions of the Code or the concerned Act (under which a criminal proceeding is instituted) to the institution and continuance of the proceedings and/or where there is a specific provision in the Code or the concerned Act, providing efficacious redress for the grievance of the aggrieved party.
7. Where a criminal proceeding is manifestly attended with mala fide and/or where the proceeding is maliciously instituted with an ulterior motive for wreaking vengeance on the accused and with a view to spite him due to private and personal grudge.
103. We also give a note of caution to the effect that the power of quashing a criminal proceeding should be exercised very sparingly and with circumspection and that too in the rarest of rare cases; that the court will not be justified in embarking upon an enquiry as to the reliability or genuineness or otherwise of the allegations made in the FIR or the complaint and that the extraordinary or inherent powers do not confer an arbitrary jurisdiction on the court to act according to its whim or caprice."
The Court further relied on the observations made by Krishna Iyer J. in State of Punjab and Anr. Vs. Gurdial Singh and Ors. [(1980) 2 SCC 471] and concluded as follows:
"We feel that the following observation made by Krishna Iyer, J in State of Punjab v. Gurdial Singh may be recapitulated in this connection, that being:
"If the use of the power is for the fulfilment of a legitimate object the actuation or catalysation by malice is not legicidal."
In the light of the above decisions of this Court, we feel that the said observations made in the impugned judgment are unwarranted and the historical (29 of 31) [CRLMP-2805/2016] anecdote is out of context and inappropriate. We are afraid if such a view is to be judicially accepted and approved, then it will be tantamount to laying down an alarming proposition that an incoming Government under all circumstances, should put its seal of approval to all the commissions and omissions of the outgoing Government ignoring even glaring lapses and serious misdeeds and the deleterious and destructive consequences that may follow therefrom. Hence we are constrained to express our disapproval since the text, tenor and tone of the above observations leave us with the feeling that such misplaced sympathy indicated therein appears to have considerably weighed with the learned Judges in taking the extreme step in quashing the first information report. We do not like to make any more comment except saying that as we have pointed out in our exordial note, in our democratic polity where the 'Rule of Law' regions no one - however highly placed he may be - can claim immunity, much-less absolute immunity from the Law, but he is always under the Law."
32. Yet again, Supreme Court, in case of Janta Dal Vs. H.S. Choudhary [(1992) 4 SCC 305], while relying on Choudhary Bhajanlal's case (supra), held:
"This inherent power conferred by Section 482 of the Code should not be exercised to stifle a legitimate prosecution. The High Court being the highest Court of a State should normally refrain from giving a premature decision in a case wherein the entire facts are extremely incomplete and hazy, more so when the evidence has not been collected and produced before the Court and the issues involved whether factual or legal are of great magnitude and cannot be seen in their true perspective without sufficient material. Of course, no hard and fast rule can be laid down in regard to the cases in which the High Court will exercise its extraordinary jurisdiction of quashing the proceedings at any stage. This Court in State of Haryana v. Ch. Bhajan Lal and Ors., to which both of us were parties have dealt with this question at length and enunciated the law listing out the circumstances under which the High Court can exercise its jurisdiction in quashing proceedings. We do not, therefore, think it necessary in the present case to extensively deal with the import and intendment of the powers under Sections 397, 401 and 482 of the Code."
(30 of 31) [CRLMP-2805/2016]
33. In a subsequent decision, Vinod Raghuvanshi Vs. Ajay Arora & Ors. [(2013) 10 SCC 581], in a case under the P.C. Act, Supreme Court affirmed the order passed by the High Court whereby it declined to exercise inherent powers for quashment of criminal proceedings. The Court observed:
"It is a settled legal proposition that while considering the case for quashing of the criminal proceedings the court should not "kill a still born child", and appropriate prosecution should not be stifled unless there are compelling circumstances to do so. An investigation should not be shut out at the threshold if the allegations have some substance. When a prosecution at the initial stage is to be quashed, the test to be applied by the court is whether the uncontroverted allegations as made, prima facie establish the offence. At this stage neither can the court embark upon an inquiry, whether the allegations in the complaint are likely to be established by evidence nor should the court judge the probability, reliability or genuineness of the allegations made therein. More so, the charge-sheet filed or charges framed at the initial stage can be altered/amended or a charge can be added at the subsequent stage, after the evidence is adduced in view of the provisions of Section 216 CrPC. So, the order passed even by the High Court or this Court is subject to the order which would be passed by the trial Court at a later stage."
34. In yet another later decision, in case of N. Soundaram Vs. P.K. Pounraj & Anr. [(2014) 10 SCC 616], Supreme Court, while reiterating the principles laid down in Bhajan Lal (supra) on scope of exercise of powers under Section 482 Cr.P.C., held:
"It is well settled by this Court in a catena of cases that the power under Section 482 CrPC has to be exercised sparingly and cautiously to prevent the abuse of process of any Court and to secure the ends of justice [See State of Haryana v. Bhajanlal]. The inherent power should not be exercised to stifle a legitimate prosecution. The High Court should refrain (31 of 31) [CRLMP-2805/2016] from giving a prima facie decision unless there are compelling circumstances to do so. Taking the allegations and the complaint as they were, without adding or subtracting anything, if no offence was made out, only then the High Court would be justified in quashing the proceedings in the exercise of its power under Section 482, CrPC [See MCD v. Ram Kishan Rohtagi]. An investigation should not be shut out at the threshold if the allegations have some substance. [See Vinod Raghuvanshi v. Ajay Arora]."
35. Therefore, viewed from any angle, the material available on record, if objectively scrutinized at this juncture, when after completion of investigation charge-sheet in the matter has been filed, while taking note of the submissions made on behalf of petitioner, I am unable to subscribe the view that inherent power is to be exercised in the matter to give effect to any order passed under the Code; or to prevent abuse of the process of any Court, or otherwise to secure the ends of justice. Moreover, even if left-handed compliments made on behalf of petitioner to question the action of State, through its investigating agency ACB, are considerately examined, then too sans any cogent material, I am afraid, no case of misuse of process of law to harass him is made out. In totality, exercising inherent powers, at this stage, would stifle a legitimate prosecution.
The upshot of the above discussion is that the instant petition lacks merit and the same is, therefore, rejected. Before parting, it is made clear that the observations made in the order shall have no ramification on the trial and the trial Judge is expected to proceed with the trial dispassionately, uninfluenced by these observations, strictly in adherence of law.
(P.K. LOHRA)J.