Madhya Pradesh High Court
Manoj Govil vs Ram Naresh Rathore on 28 August, 2017
1
Cona.2.17 Conc.521.16, Conc.806.16, Conc.808.16,
Conc.810.16, Conc.812.16, Conc.814.16, Conc.816.16,
Conc.1222.16 and Conc.848.15
28.08.2017
In Cont. Appeal No.2.2017
Shri Vishal Mishra, learned counsel for the
appellants.
Shri Anil Mishra, learned counsel for the
respondent.
In Conc.521.16, Conc.806.16, Conc.808.16, Conc.810.16, Conc.812.16, Conc.814.16, Conc.816.16, Conc.1222.16 and Conc.848.15 Shri B.P. Singh, Shri Devesh Sharma and Shri Kumar Gaurav Sharma, learned counsel for the petitioners.
Shri Rajendra Singh Yadav, Shri BPS Chouhan, Shri Nitin Agrawal, learned counsel for respondents.
With the consent of learned counsel for the parties the matter is finally heard.
This order would also govern the disposal of Conc.521.16, Conc.806.16, Conc.808.16, Conc.810.16, Conc.812.16, Conc.814.16, Conc.816.16, Conc.1222.16 and Conc.848.15. The relevant facts are taken from Contempt Appeal No.2/2017.
This appeal under Section 19(1) (a) of the Contempt of Court Act 1971 takes exception to order dated 01.03.2017 passed in Contempt Petition No.1222.2016.
The Contempt Case was directed for action 2 Cona.2.17 Conc.521.16, Conc.806.16, Conc.808.16, Conc.810.16, Conc.812.16, Conc.814.16, Conc.816.16, Conc.1222.16 and Conc.848.15 against respondents (present appellants) for alleged willful disobedience of order dated 23.09.2015 passed in Writ Petition No.6385/2015. The said Writ Petition was for direction for grant of regular pay-scale on the anvil that the petitioner had already been granted permanent classification in the year 2005 (vide order dated 15.06.2005). The said writ petition was disposed of in the terms of order passed by the Division Bench in W.A.No.110/2011. The direction by Writ Court in Writ Petition was that the order passed in WA No.110/2011 shall apply mutatis mutandis.
Be it noted, the Writ Petition No.6385/2015 was disposed of at motion hearing stage without adjudicating the claim of the petitioner of having been classified permanent on completion of 240 days. Such a permanent classification has since been held to be erroneous [Please See decisions in State of M.P. and others Vs. Lalit Kumar Verma [(2007) 1 SCC 575], Mahendra L. Jain and others Vs. Indore Development Authority and others [(2005) 1 SCC 639], M.P. Housing Board and another Vs. Manoj Shrivastava [(2006) 2 SCC 702]. Be that as it may.
The direction in WA.110.2011 which was mutatis mutandis to be followed was in the following terms:
"(1) The petitioner shall file a fresh representation before respondents along 3 Cona.2.17 Conc.521.16, Conc.806.16, Conc.808.16, Conc.810.16, Conc.812.16, Conc.814.16, Conc.816.16, Conc.1222.16 and Conc.848.15 with the proof of acquiring permanent status by way of classification. The respondents shall verify and if petitioner's permanent status remains intact, he shall be given similar treatment, i.e., grant of regular pay scale attached to the permanent post from the date of classification as permanent employee.
(2) The respondents shall also grant increments attached to the pay scale and if rules permit, extend benefit of DA in favour of the petitioner.
(3) The respondents shall also pass a speaking order regarding claim of grant of seniority to the petitioner from the date of classification as permanent employee.
(4) If for any justifiable reason, the petitioner is not found entitled for any of the benefits claimed, a detailed and reasoned order be passed and communicated to the petitioner. The aforesaid exercise be completed within 120 days from the date of production of copy of this order along with the representation.
(5) It is made clear that it will not be open to the respondents to deny relief to the petitioners on the ground that they were not litigants in W.A. No. 1266/2010 and other similar matters, which were decided on merits, if they are otherwise similarly situated. Petition is disposed of."
Thus, vide direction No.1 discretion was given to the authorities to verify the status of the petitioner being that of permanent 'remains intact'.
4Cona.2.17 Conc.521.16, Conc.806.16, Conc.808.16, Conc.810.16, Conc.812.16, Conc.814.16, Conc.816.16, Conc.1222.16 and Conc.848.15 The respondents (present appellants) on receiving representation examined the same as to the entitlement of the petitioner for permanent classification. The petitioner was issued show cause notice on 28.01.2017 that the classification was doubtful because it was found that the petitioner was not appointed as per recruitment rules, nor was he appointed against vacant post. The competent authority after considering the reply passed an order on 08.02.2017; whereby the petitioner was not found eligible for permanent classification immediately on completion of 240 days on daily wages. The competent authority after determining the status of the petitioner, went on to examine his case under the scheme of regularization of daily wagers brought in vogue vide Govt. of Madhya Pradesh General Administration Department's letter No.F 5- 1/2013/1/3 Bhopal dated 07/10/2016 and finding the petitioner eligible, accordingly passed the following order:-
**;kstuk ds laca/k eas Jh jkeujs'k jkBkSj dh ik=rk ij xaHkhjrk iwoZd fopkj fd;k x;k gS rFkk ;g ik;k x;k gS fd os ;kstuk dk ykHk izkIr djus laca/kh lHkh 'krkZsa dks iw.kZ djrs gSaA mijksDr foospuk vuqlkj bl fcUnq ij fuEu fu"d"kZ vfHkfyf[kr fd;k tkrk gS%& **vkosnd nSfud osruHkksxh Jfedksa gsrq LkkekU; iz'kklu foHkkx }kjk tkjh ifji= fnukad 07-10-2016 ds vuqlkj YkkHk izkIr 5 Cona.2.17 Conc.521.16, Conc.806.16, Conc.808.16, Conc.810.16, Conc.812.16, Conc.814.16, Conc.816.16, Conc.1222.16 and Conc.848.15 djus dh ik=rk j[krk gSA vkosnd mlds inuke **ckYoesu** ds vuq:i 'kklu ds vkns'k Øekad ,Q 6&102@2016@1@34] Hkksiky fnukad 24-12-2016 ds vuqlkj
v)Zdq'ky Js.kh ls lac) YkkHkksa dks izkIr djus dk ik= gSA** Jh jkeujs'k jkBkSj] nSfud osruHkksxh] v)Zdq'ky Jfed dks izkIRk gksus okys ikfjJfed ,oa vU; YkkHk fuEukuqlkj gS%& • v)Zdq'ky Jfed ds vuq:i ikfjJfed fn, tkus gsrq osrueku :i;s 4500&90&7500@& fu/kkZfjr fd;k x;k gSA • ofj"Brk dk YkkHk izkIr gksxkA ofj"Brk dk YkkHk nsus gsrq 01 flrEcj 2016 dh fLFkfr esa muds }kjk iw.kZ fd;s x;s o"kksZa ds vk/kkj ij lacaf/kr osrueku esa vafdr osruo`f) dh nj ls x.kuk dh tkosxhA vkosnd dk fu;kstu o"kZ 1990 esa fd;k x; Fkk] vr% mls 26 o"kZ dh ofj"Brk izkIr gksxh] rFkk rnuqlkj mldk osru fu/kkZj.k fd;k tk;sxkA • ;g osru fu/kkZj.k 01 flracj 2016 dh frfFk ls gksxkA vkxkeh osruo`f) flrEcj 2017 ls ns; gksxhA • eagxkbZ HkRrk Hkh ns; gksxkA • dksbZ ,fj;j ns; ugha gksxkA • vf/kokf"kZdh vk;q iw.kZ gksus ij 15 fnu izfro"kZ ds lsokdky ds osru ds vk/kkj ij miknku dh ik=rk gksxhA ;g jkf'k vkosnd ds fy;s :i;s 1]50]000@& rd lhfer gksxhA • prqFkZ Js.kh dk in fjDr gksus ij vkosnd dk ml in ij fu;ferhdj.k gsrq lkekU; iz'kklu foHkkx }kjk tkjh ifji= fnukad 07-10-2016 esa fofgr izfØ;k ,oa ik=rk vuqlkj fopkj fd;k tk ldsxkA fu;kstd }kjk dh xbZ x.kuk ds vuqlkj vkosnd dks fnukad 01 flrEcj 2016 dk ikfjJfed :i;s 17]456@& izfrekg izkIr gksaxsA fQygky Jek;qDr }kjk fu/kkZfjr nj ls vkosnd dks :i;s 11]685@& izfrekg izkIr gksrs gSaSA bl izdkj vkosnd dh ifjyfC/k;ksa esa izfrekg :i;s 5]771@& dh o`f) gksxh] tks fd orZeku ifjyfC/k;ksa ls yxHkx 53 izfr'kr vf/kd gSA x.kuk dk fooj.k fuEukuqlkj gS%& 6 Cona.2.17 Conc.521.16, Conc.806.16, Conc.808.16, Conc.810.16, Conc.812.16, Conc.814.16, Conc.816.16, Conc.1222.16 and Conc.848.15 iwoZ vuqlkj ikfjJfed ¼izfrekg :i;s esa½ Jek;qDr }kjk fu/kkZfjr ikfjJfed 8]435 20 o"kZ dh lsok mijkar fo'ks"k YkkHk 2]500 esgxkbZ HkRrk 750 ;ksx ifjyfC/k;k¡ 11]685 LkkekU; iz'kklu foHkkx }kjk tkjh ifji= fnukad 07-10-2016 ds vuqlkj ikk=rk ¼fnukad 01-09-2016 dh fLFkfr esa½%& vkosnd dks ns; osrueku 4500&90&7500 U;wure osrueku 4500 dqy iw.kZ o"kZ ¼26½ gsrq ns; osruo`f) 26x90¾2340 ewy osru 6840 eagxkbZ HkRRkk ¼132 izfr'kr½ 9028 dqy osru 15869 'kkldh; va'knku bZ-ih-,Q- ¼10 izfr'kr½ 1587 ;ksx ifjyfC/k;k¡ 17456 dk;Zikyu ;a=h] yksd LokLF; ;kaf=dh [kaM] fHk.M vkosnd dks mijksDrkuqlkj ifjyfC/k;ksa dk Hkqxrku 01 flrEcj 2016 ls lqfuf'pr djsaxsA This order is the cause for filing contempt petition whereon learned Single Judge holding that respondents "with calculated intentions, intended to defy the order passed by the Court and that if the Supreme Court and thereby have made inroads with administration of justice. The effect of contemptuous act, in fact, is to render the order passed by this Court and that of 'Hon'ble Supreme Court in identical matters otiose. Hence, 7 Cona.2.17 Conc.521.16, Conc.806.16, Conc.808.16, Conc.810.16, Conc.812.16, Conc.814.16, Conc.816.16, Conc.1222.16 and Conc.848.15 respondents are held to have committed contempt of court", called upon the present appellants to address on the question of quantum of punishment.
Against this order present appeal is filed. Preliminary objection as to maintainability of present petition is raised. It is urged that unless punished, the appellants have no locus standi to file an appeal under Section 19 of 1971 Act. Reliance is placed on the decision in Midnapore Peoples' Coop. Bank Ltd and others Vs. Chunilal Nanda and others [(2006) 5 SCC 399].
Careful reading of the judgment in Midnapore Peoples' Coop. Bank Ltd and others (supra), and more particularly paragraph 11(iv), however, negatives the contention in the given facts of present case.
In the case at hand, as noticed, learned Single Judge having arrived at a conclusion holding the appellants herein guilty of committing contempt, had directed for hearing on sentence. Thus, a final verdict of punishment has been arrived at. Nothing remains for the appellants to defend. In Midnapore Peoples' Coop. Bank Ltd and others (supra), it is held:
"11(iv) Any direction issued or decision made by the High Court on the merits of a dispute between the parties, will not be in the exercise of 'jurisdiction to punish for contempt' and, therefore, not appealable 8 Cona.2.17 Conc.521.16, Conc.806.16, Conc.808.16, Conc.810.16, Conc.812.16, Conc.814.16, Conc.816.16, Conc.1222.16 and Conc.848.15 under Section 19 of the CC Act. The only exception is where such direction or decision is incidental to or inextricably connected with the order punishing for contempt, in which event the appeal under Section 19 of the Act, can also encompass the incidental or inextricably connected directions.
The present case falls in the category of the exception carved out by the Hon'ble Supreme Court i.e. such direction or decision which is incidental to or inextricably connected with the order punishing for contempt. In view whereof, the preliminary objection as to maintainability of the appeal is overruled.
As to the facts of the case, evidently, learned Single Judge in WP.6385/2015 did not adjudicate the right of the petitioner nor of his status as being classified as permanent. The Writ Court only recorded the submission and directed that the authorities concerned to consider the claim in the light of the direction issued by the Division Bench in WA.110.2011, thus, leaving the discretion with the authorities to consider the status of the petitioner and if found eligible to extend all the benefits he would be entitled for as per said status. The authorities concerned did consider the claim and having found that the alleged conferral of permanent classification being de hors the Standard Standing Order and the law laid down by 9 Cona.2.17 Conc.521.16, Conc.806.16, Conc.808.16, Conc.810.16, Conc.812.16, Conc.814.16, Conc.816.16, Conc.1222.16 and Conc.848.15 Supreme Court went on to further examine the status and entitlement under new policy. As the petitioner was found eligible under the new policy he has been extended with all the benefits. The petitioner if he had any grievance against such decision was at liberty to have questioned its validity before appropriate forum. Instead, alleging willful disobedience, the petitioner filed the contempt petition which is in our considered opinion was ill-advised.
It is manifestly clear from the order passed by learned Single Judge in the Contempt Case No.1222/2016 that the the claim of the petitioner was examined on merit. This would be evident from the findings in paragraph 21 and 22 of the decision. In view whereof, we are of the considered opinion that learned Single Judge transgressed its jurisdiction in a Contempt Petition.
In our considered opinion, the contempt court was only to examine whether the direction for consideration has been carried out. It was not required to consider the correctness of the order on merit.
It is held in Anil Kumar Shahi (2) and others Vs. Prof. Ram Sevak Yadav and others [(2008) 14 SCC 115]:
"50. It is by now well settled under the Act and under Article 129 of the Constitution of India that if it is alleged before this 10 Cona.2.17 Conc.521.16, Conc.806.16, Conc.808.16, Conc.810.16, Conc.812.16, Conc.814.16, Conc.816.16, Conc.1222.16 and Conc.848.15 Court that a person has willfully violated its order it can invoke its jurisdiction under the Act to enquire whether allegation is true or not and if found to be true it can punish the offenders for having committed "civil contempt" and if need be, can pass consequential orders for enforcement of execution of the order, as the case may be, for violation of which, the proceeding for contempt was initiated. In other words, while exercising its power under the Act, it is not open to the Court to pass an order, which will materially add to or alter the order for alleged disobedience of which contempt jurisdiction was invoked. When the Court directs the authority to consider a matter in accordance with law, it means that the matter should be considered to the best of understanding by the authority and, therefore, a mere error of judgment with regard to the legal position cannot constitute contempt of Court. There is no willful disobedience if best efforts are made to comply with the order.
In Dinesh Kumar Gupta Vs. United India Insurance Company Limited and others [(2010) 12 SCC 770], it is held:
"23. Besides this, it would also not be correct to overlook or ignore an important statutory ingredient of contempt of a civil nature given out under Section 2(b) of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 that the disobedience to the order alleging contempt has to satisfy the test that it is a wilful disobedience to the order. Bearing this important factor in mind, it is relevant to note that a proceeding for civil contempt would not lie if the order alleged 11 Cona.2.17 Conc.521.16, Conc.806.16, Conc.808.16, Conc.810.16, Conc.812.16, Conc.814.16, Conc.816.16, Conc.1222.16 and Conc.848.15 to have been disobeyed itself provides scope for reasonable or rational interpretation of an order or circumstance which is the factual position in the instant matter. It would equally not be correct to infer that a party although acting due to misapprehension of the correct legal position and in good faith without any motive to defeat or defy the order of the Court, should be viewed as a serious ground so as to give rise to a contempt proceeding.
24. To reinforce the aforesaid legal position further, it would be relevant and appropriate to take into consideration the settled legal position as reflected in the judgment and order delivered in Ahmed Ali V. Supdt. District Jail as also in B.K. Kar V. High Court of Orissa that mere unintentional disobedience is not enough to hold anyone guilty of contempt and although disobedience might have been established, absence of wilful disobedience on the part of the contemnor, will not hold him guilty unless the contempt involves a degree of fault or misconduct. Thus, accidental or unintentional disobedience is not sufficient to justify for holding one guilty of contempt. It is further relevant to bear in mind the settled law on the law of contempt that casual or accidental or unintentional acts of disobedience under the circumstances which negate any suggestion of contumacy, would amount to a contempt in theory only and does not render the contemnor liable to punishment and this was the view expressed also in State of Bihar Vs. Rani Sonabati Kumari and N. Baksi V. O.K. Ghosh."
In view whereof, the impugned order is set 12 Cona.2.17 Conc.521.16, Conc.806.16, Conc.808.16, Conc.810.16, Conc.812.16, Conc.814.16, Conc.816.16, Conc.1222.16 and Conc.848.15 aside. The consequential actions ensuing from the said order are also set aside. The contempt petition 1222/2016 is dismissed.
It is, however, made clear that if the petitioner is aggrieved by the order passed by the authorities in compliance to direction in WP.No.6385/2015 he is at liberty to assail the same before the appropriate forum. As we have not expressed any opinion to the correctness of the order passed by the competent authority, the same, if assailed, to be decided on its own merit.
The appeal is allowed to the extent above. No costs.
(Sanjay Yadav) (S.K. Awasthi)
Judge Judge
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