Delhi District Court
State vs . Ramraj on 18 December, 2019
IN THE COURT OF SHRI SUMEET ANAND
METROPOLITAN MAGISTRATE-07, PATIALA HOUSE COURTS
NEW DELHI DISTRICT: NEW DELHI
FIR No. : 75/2017
Cr C No. : 17643/18
PS : Tilak Marg
U/s : 279/338 IPC
State Vs. Ramraj
JUDGMENT
A Case Identification 17643/18
Number
B Name of the D.P. Chaudhary, S/o Late Sh. Devi
Complainant Ram
C Name of the accused Ramraj, S/o Munna Lal, R/o H. No.
& his parentage and A-44, Block A, Shiv Mandir, Baljeet
address Nagar, Patel nagar, Delhi.
D Offence complained of 279 / 338 IPC
E Date of commission of 07.04.2017
offence
F Date of Institution 23.12.2017
G Offence Charged 279 / 338 IPC
H Plea of accused Pleaded not Guilty
I Order Reserved on 17.12.2019
J Date of 18.12.2019
Pronouncement
K Final Order Acquittal
FIR No.75/17
State Vs. Ramraj Page 1 of 13
BRIEF STATEMENT OF REASONS FOR DECISION OF THE CASE
1. Prosecution alleges that on 07.04.2017 at about 11:20 AM at Jawant Singh Marg, at round about of Asoka Road the accused Ramraj was driving the offending vehicle, bearing registration No. DL 8 CAK 8244 (Make Ford Eco-Sports) in a rash and negligent manner so as to endanger human life and personal safety of others and as a result of such driving, at the above mentioned place and at the abovementioned time, while driving the abovesaid vehicle in the abovesaid manner, the accused hit against a two wheeler scooter from behind, bearing registration number DL 4SAW 2485 and also crushed the right leg of the rider of the scoter under the tyre of offending vehicle, thereby causing grievous injuries to victims / complainant D.P. Chaudhary, thereby committing an offence punishable under section(s) 279 and 338 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (hereinafter IPC).
2. The case was registered on the written complaint of the victim / injured D.P. Chaudhary (PW-3) . His written complaint is on record and the same is Exhibited as EX PW 2/A. During the course of investigation the statement of injured was recorded, the vehicles involved in the alleged incident / accident were seized and subjected to mechanical inspections, the site plan was prepared. The accused Ram Raj was also apprehended and subsequently admitted to bail. After the completion of the investigation, final report in the form of charge sheet under section 173(2) Cr.P.C. for the commission offences under section 279 & 338 IPC was forwarded to the Court against the accused Ramraj for trial.
FIR No.75/17 State Vs. Ramraj Page 2 of 133. After taking cognizance of the offence, the court summoned the accused Ramraj. Pursuant to his appearance, in compliance of section 207 Cr.P.C copy of chargesheet was supplied to him. Subsequently after hearing the state and the defence and after perusal of the judicial file, prima facie case against the accused for the offence punishable under section 279 & 338 IPC was found to be made out. Accordingly, notice of accusation under section 251 Cr.P.C was served upon the accused for the commission of abovenoted offences, to which he pleaded not guilty and claimed trial. Accordingly, thereafter the matter was posted for Prosecution Evidence.
4. In order to prove its case against the accused beyond all reasonable doubts, the prosecution, in the list of witnesses attached with the final report, cited total 8 witnesses, out of which during the trial the following witnesses were examined, viz.
4.1 PW-1 ASI Vipin Kumar ( on the spot at the time of incident) 4.2 PW-2 SI Kapil Khokhar ( investigation officer) 4.3 PW-3 Sh D. P. Chaudhary ( complainant )
5. During the course of the prosecution evidence, the accused vide his statement recorded under section 294 Cr.P.C admitted the following documents, viz. i) arrest memo and seizure memo, ii) Mechanical inspection of both vehicles, iii) FIR No 75/17 registered with PS Tilak Marg, iv) MLC No E/70936/2017 and opinion on MLC No E/70936/2017 and accordingly the corresponding witnesses, mentioned in the list of witnesses attached with the final report, i.e. PW- Ct Neetu, PW- Tasnimuddin Siddiqui, PW- ASI Satyaveer Singh, PW- Dr Animesh Gupta and PW- Dr M Selvamari were dropped from FIR No.75/17 State Vs. Ramraj Page 3 of 13 array of witnesses.
6. In order to prove its case against the accused beyond all reasonable doubts, the prosecution filed and relied upon the following documents, viz.
6.1 Ex.PW-1/A seizure memo of scooter DL-4SAW-2485 6.2 Ex.PW-1/B site plan 6.3 Ex.P1 (Colly) Six Photographs of offending vehicle car bearing No DL- 8CAK-8244 6.4 Ex.PW-2/A DD NO 13A dated 07.04.2017 6.5 Ex.PW-2/B endorsement on rukka made by IO.
6.6 Ex.PW-2/C seizure memo of car bearing No DL- 8CAK-8244. 6.7 Ex.PW-2/D seizure memo of insurance.
6.8 Ex.PW-2/E seizure memo of driving license. 6.9 Ex.PW-2/F seizure memo of RC of offending vehicle. 6.10 Ex.PW-2/G arrest memo.
6.11 Ex.PW-2/H personal search memo.
6.12 Ex.PW-2/I punchnama of offending vehicle. 6.13 Ex.PW-2/J superdarinama of offending vehicle
7. After the completion of the prosecution evidence, the statement of accused Ramraj was recorded under section 313 Cr.P.C wherein all incriminating evidences led against him during the trial by the prosecution witnesses were put to him, affording him an opportunity to give his explanation, if any.
8. In his statement recorded under section 313 Cr.P.C., the accused admitted that at the date and time of the alleged incident he was FIR No.75/17 State Vs. Ramraj Page 4 of 13 indeed driving the offending vehicle; and he also admitted that the alleged incident / accident indeed occurred, however he denied that he was driving the offending vehicle in a rash and negligent manner. He claimed that the alleged incident / accident has actually occurred due to rash and negligent driving of the complainant D.P. Chaudhary, who struck against the right side of car of the accused. he claimed that he was arrayed as an accused by the police as he was driving the bigger vehicle in comparison with the vehicle of the injured. However, despite opportunity the accused did not lead any defence evidence.
9. At the stage of final arguments detailed submissions were heard on behalf of the state through Ld. APP and also for defence. This court has carefully perused the entire judicial record and carefully appreciated the evidence lead by the prosecution.
10. In order to prove the offences punishable U/s 279 and 338 IPC, the prosecution has to prove beyond all reasonable doubts, the following mandatory ingredients; viz,
i) the rash or negligent act / driving which is likely to cause hurt or injury to any other person; and
ii) the said rash or negligent act / driving of the accused was the proximate cause of injuries caused to the victim(s).
11. PW-1 (ASI Vipin Kumar) is a police official, who first reached the spot of the incident, as on the date of the alleged incident / accident he was posted and performing his duties near the spot of incident. However, PW-1 in his cross examination has stated that, "it is correct that I had not seen accident and reached at the place of occurrence after the incident as I was deputed 15-20 feet. It is wrong to suggest FIR No.75/17 State Vs. Ramraj Page 5 of 13 that victim had mnot told me that accident had occurred with the vehicle of the accused. it is wrong to suggest that I am deposing falsely. "
12. From the testimony, especially the cross-examination of PW-1 it is manifest that he is not an eye witness to the alleged incident / accident. According to his testimony the victim told him that the alleged incident / accident had occurred with the vehicle of the accused. if this portion of the testimony of PW-1 is even believed in its entirety; and also relied upon on the basis of principle / rule of evidence known as Regeste, even then the victim did not tell PW-1 regarding the manner in which the accused was allegedly driving the offending vehicle at the time of the incident to impute either rashness or negligence upon the accused. In the opinion of this court, had the victim told PW-1 about the manner in which the accused was driving the offending vehicle at the time of the alleged incident / accident, then he would have certainly deposed it. However, his silence regarding the manner of driving of the offending vehicle itself suggest that nothing in this regards was told by the victim to PW-1.
13. Accordingly, PW-1 is only a witness to the fact that the vehicles of the victim and the accused had collided with each other at the above mentioned date time and place. This fact also stands admitted by the accused in his statement recorded under section 313 Cr.P.C. Hence, in the most humble opinion of this court the testimony of PW-1 is of no benefit to the case of the prosecution.
14. PW-2 (SI Kapil) has only dealt with the investigation part. He has not witnesses the accident. Hence, his testimony is also of no benefit to the case of the prosecution.
FIR No.75/17 State Vs. Ramraj Page 6 of 1315. PW-3 (D.P. Chaudhary) is the complainant / victim / injured. In hs testimony recorded before the court he has deposed that he does not remember the registration number of the offending vehicle. He also deposed that the offending vehicle hit his scooter from behind while having been driven in a high speed and in rash or negligent manner. He also deposed that due to the impact of the accident he fell down on the road and his right leg was crushed under the tyre of the offending vehicle.
16. However, PW-3 has failed to identify the accused as the driver of the offending vehicle despite his attention having been drawn towards the accused by APP for the State. The examination in chief of PW-3 was conducted in two parts on two different dates. On the subsequent date of his further examination in chief he was confronted and subjected to cross-examination by APP for the State. On the aid date to a specific question, that as to how today he is able to identify the accused, the witness replied that, "I am identifying the accused today because only he is appearing again and again as an accused, so I am identifying him as an accused."
17. In his cross examination conducted by the defence PW-3 deposed that, "it is correct that today, I am identifying the accused as he is appearing in this case on regular basis. It is correct that I had not seen the accused at the spot and came to know about him later on. I was unconscious due to accident, so I cannot say whether IO obtained my signatures on blank paper or after writing my statement / complaint EX PW 2/A. it is correct that there were many persons gathered at the spot after the accident. I cannot say whether IO made any interrogation from the said public persons with respect FIR No.75/17 State Vs. Ramraj Page 7 of 13 to accident or not. It is wrong to suggest that the accident had not occurred due to rash and negligent driving of the offending vehicle by the accused. it is wrong to suggest that the accident occurred from some other vehicle. It is wrong to suggest that the accused was not driving the offending vehicle at the time of the accident. It is wrong to suggest that I am deposing falsely as I am presenting two contradictory views with respect to identity of the accused. "
18. According to the testimony of PW-3 the offending vehicle had hit his vehicle from behind. Therefore, PW-3 could not have seen the manner in which the offending vehicle was being allegedly driven at the time of the alleged incident / accident. From the testimony of PW- 3 it can be clearly made out that as due to the impact of the accident he had fell down and the offending vehicle allegedly run over his leg, therefore on this basis PW-3 claims that the accused was driving the vehicle at a high speed and in rash or negligent manner.
19. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in Rathnashalvan v. State of Karnataka AIR 2007 SC 1064 while dealing with a case u/s 304A IPC observed :
7. ...Culpable negligence lies in the failure to exercise reasonable and proper care and the extent of its reasonableness will always depend upon the circumstances of each case. Rashness means doing an act with the consciousness of a risk that evil consequences will follow but with the hope that it will not. Negligence is a breach of duty imposed by law. In criminal cases, the amount and degree of negligence are determining factors.
A question whether the accused's conduct amounted to culpable rashness or negligence depends directly on the question as to what is the amount of care and circumspection which a prudent and reasonable man would consider it to be sufficient considering all the circumstances of the case. Criminal rashness means FIR No.75/17 State Vs. Ramraj Page 8 of 13 hazarding a dangerous or wanton act with the knowledge that it is dangerous or wanton and the further knowledge that it may cause injury but done without any intention to cause injury or knowledge that it would probably be caused.(underlining added)'
8. As noted above, "Rashness" consists in hazarding a dangerous or wanton act with the knowledge that it is so, and that it may cause injury. The criminality lies in such a case in running the risk of doing such an act with recklessness or indifference as to the consequences. Criminal negligence on the other hand, is the gross and culpable neglect or failure to exercise that reasonable and proper care and precaution to guard against injury either to the public generally or to an individual in particular, which, having regard to all the circumstances out of which the charge has arisen it was the imperative duty of the accused person to have adopted.
20. In the most humble opinion of this Court, the testimony of PW 3 is absolutely deficient so as to assist this court to form even a vague opinion, let alone to arrive at any conclusion, regarding the offending vehicle being driven by the accused in a rash or negligent manner; and whether the accident and injuries sustained by him is the proximate result of rashness, or negligent driving of the accused.
21. Even if the fact that PW-3 failed to identify the accused as the driver of the offending vehicle; and the facts highlighted in his cross examination are ignored, even than in the entire testimony of PW-3, except for reiteration of the words "Driving Rashly or Negligently" , and "Driving at High Speed" there is no elaboration, or even mention of the facts that may, even remotely, enable the court to ascertain that whether the offending vehicle was being driven in a rash or negligent manner.
FIR No.75/17 State Vs. Ramraj Page 9 of 1322. The Hon'ble Apex Court in the judgment of "State of Karnataka vs. Satish" SCC (CRI) 1508 and the Hon'ble Delhi High Court in case titled "Abdul Subhan vs. State" 2007 (1) CCC (HC) 414 observed that in the absence of material facts and circumstances indicating that the accused driver acted in a rash or negligent manner, he cannot be held guilty of the offence.
23. The testimony of PW-3, lack material particulars capable of imputing either rashness, or even the negligence upon the accused while driving the offending vehicle. The alleged eye witnesses / victim of the prosecution has neither stated the approximate speed of the offending vehicle at the time of incident / accident, or the manner in which the traffic was moving, or about the status of the traffic signals etc. Merely reiterating that the accused was driving the offending vehicle at a fast speed, or that he was driving the vehicle in a negligent manner is not, in the opinion of this court, sufficient to take the case of the prosecution beyond the bracket of "all reasonable doubts.
24. Rashness and negligence in driving a vehicle are subjective concepts and no straight jacket formula can be put to use to ascertain the rashness or negligence while driving the vehicle. Criminal rashness and negligence have to be proved like a 'Relevant Fact' during the course of trial and this onus lies upon the prosecution. There cannot be any reason, including the unfortunate death of a person involved in the incident / accident which may compel the courts to presume rashness or negligence in driving the offending vehicle. The Hon'ble Apex Court in the Judgment titled as Miyam vs. State of A.P. (2000)7 SCC 72:
"7. It is a wrong proposition that for any motor accident FIR No.75/17 State Vs. Ramraj Page 10 of 13 negligence of the driver should be presumed. An accident of such a nature as would prima facie show that it cannot be accounted to anything other than the negligence of the driver of the vehicle may create a presumption and in such a case the driver has to explain how the accident happened without negligence on his part. Merely because a passenger fell down from the bus while boarding the bus, no presumption of negligence can be drawn against the driver of the bus. ...
9. A rash act is primarily an overhasty act. It is opposed to a deliberate act. Still a rash act can be a deliberate act in the sense that it was done without due care and caution. Culpable rashness lies in running the risk of doing an act with recklessness and with indifference as to the consequences. Criminal negligence is the failure to exercise duty with reasonable and proper care and precaution guarding against injury to the public generally or to any individual in particular. It is the imperative duty of the driver of a vehicle to adopt such reasonable and proper care and precaution."
25. It is a settled proposition of law that mere reiteration either of term rash and negligent or use of term 'high / fast speed' would not serve the purpose of prosecution to establish criminal rashness or negligence against the accused. The Hon'ble Apex Court in the judgment titled "State of Karnataka vs. Satish" SCC (CRI) 1508 observed;
"Merely because the truck was being driven at a 'high speed' does not bespeak of either 'negligence or rashness' by itself. High speed is a relative term. It was for the prosecution to bring on record material to establish as to what is meant by 'high speed' in the facts and circumstances of the case. None of the witnesses examined by prosecution could give any indication, even approximately, as to what they meant by high speed".FIR No.75/17 State Vs. Ramraj Page 11 of 13
26. The Hon'ble Delhi High Court in Judgment titled "Abdul Subhan vs. State" 2007 (1) CCC (HC) 414 observed;
"10 ... In the present case also, I find that apart from the allegations that truck was being driven at a very high speed, there is nothing to indicate that the petitioner acted in a manner which could be regarded as rash or negligent. therefore, in the absence of material facts it cannot be said merely because there is an allegation that petitioner was driving the truck at high speed, that the petitioner is guilty of the rash or negligent act. Clearly, the petitioner cannot be convicted on the sole testimony of PW3 which itself suffers from various ambiguities"
27. A perusal of the testimony of PW-3 in the light of the observations made by Hon'ble Superior Courts, as above referred, this court is of the humble opinion that the testimony of PW-3 is short of material averments attributing either criminal rashness or negligence upon the accused at the time of driving the offending vehicle. In the most humble opinion of this court, the testimony of PW-3 is deficient to conclusively opine the nature of manner in which the offending vehicle was being driven at the relevant time. And, this deficiency materially affects the case of the prosecution.
28. Moreover, considering the mechanical inspection report of the offending vehicle, and also considering the Site Plan that the alleged incident occurred at Round About and not on a straight road; and that the fresh dents are on the right driver side door of the offending vehicle, there exists serious doubts regarding the claim of the victim / PW-3 that the offending vehicle hit him from behind.
FIR No.75/17 State Vs. Ramraj Page 12 of 1329. On the basis of the Site Plan and the Mechanical inspection of the offending vehicle it is manifest that the scooter of PW-3 collided with the offending vehicle from its right side and not from behind. This aspect is a material contradiction in the case of the prosecution that further drags its deeper within the ambit of reasonable doubts, the benefit of which has to be extended to the accused.
30. Based on the abovedone discussion, this court is of the opinion that there are material shortcomings in the case of the prosecution to attribute criminal rashness or negligence upon the accused while driving the offending vehicle at the time of alleged accident / incident. As such, prosecution failed to successfully bring home the guilt of accused Ramraj for the offences punishable under section(s) 279 and 338 IPC through the testimony of examined witnesses. Accordingly, accused Ramraj is entitled to benefit of doubts in the case of prosecution. Hence, accused Ramraj is acquitted of the Digitally offence under section 279 and 338 IPC. signed by SUMEET SUMEET ANAND ANAND Date:
2019.12.24 Announced in the Open (SUMEET ANAND) 14:54:21 Court on 18th December, 2019 MM-07/PHC/New Delhi +0530 FIR No.75/17 State Vs. Ramraj Page 13 of 13