Delhi District Court
Jain Cooperative vs Avtar Kishan Kaur on 10 February, 2026
IN THE COURT OF SH. DEVANSHU SAJLAN, CCJ-CUM-ARC
CENTRAL, TIS HAZARI COURTS
RC ARC/61/2019
DLCT030004522019
In the matter of:
JAIN COOPERATIVE BANK LTD.
...Petitioner
v.
AVTAR KISHAN KAUR
...Respondent
Eviction Petition under Section 14 (1)(e) of Delhi Rent Control
Act, 1958
1. Date of Institution : 21.01.2019
2. Date of Reserving Order : 04.02.2026
3. Date of Decision : 10.02.2026
4. Decision : Dismissed.
Argued by-: Sh. Abhinav Sharma, Sh. Shreesh Pathak and Ms. Gurjot
Sethi, Ld. Counsels for petitioner.
Ms. Anju Lal and Ms. Shalu Lal, Ld. Counsel for the
respondent.
JUDGMENT
1. Vide this judgment, this Court shall dispose of the eviction petition filed by the petitioner Bank against the respondent under Section 14 (1) (e) of the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958 (hereinafter, the RC ARC 61/2019 Jain Cooperative Bank Ltd. v. Avtar Kishan Kaur Page No.1/18 'DRC Act') with respect to the tenanted premises i.e., shop bearing pvt. No. 5 on mezzanine floor measuring 9'3" x 9'6", forming part of property No. 80, Darya Ganj, New Delhi-110002.
2. As per the petition, the bona-fide need of the petitioner Bank is that it wishes to shift its branch from the basement to the mezzanine and the ground floor (see paragraph No. 4 of the Annexure A filed with the petition).
3. Summons were served upon the respondent on 16.02.2019, and a leave to defend application was filed on 05.03.2019 on behalf of the respondent within the statutory time period. Vide order dated 29.11.2019, leave to defend was granted to the respondent.
EVIDENCE
4. After the completion of pleadings, the matter proceeded for trial. At the stage of PE, the petitioner examined Mr. Parmander Kumar Jain, AR of the petitioner bank, as PW-1, and tendered his evidence by way of affidavit as Ex.PW1/A. He was thereafter cross- examined and discharged. He relied upon the following documents:
1. Resolution authorizing AR Ex. PW1/1
2. Photocopy of a certified copy of Ex. PW1/2 (OSR) sale deed dated 14.11.1973
3. Photocopy of Court certified Ex. PW1/3 (OSR) copy of lease deed/ agreement to construct dated 22.07.1978 4. Site plan Ex. PW1/4 5. Photographs Ex. PW1/5 RC ARC 61/2019 Jain Cooperative Bank Ltd. v. Avtar Kishan Kaur Page No.2/18
6. The legal notice dated Ex. PW1/6 23.06.2015
7. Photocopies of letter dated Mark Z and Mark ZA 03.12.2018 and 03.01.2019, photocopy of e-mail dated 08.01.2019
8. Architect drawings Ex. PW1/7 (Colly.)
9. Photocopy of letter dated Ex. PW1/8 (OSR) 16.08.2018 written by petitioner to RBI
10. Photocopy of minutes of AGM Ex. PW1/9 (OSR) held on 24.06.2018
11. Photocopy of letter dated Ex. PW1/10 (OSR) 13.09.2018 written by the petitioner to RBI
12. Photocopy of letter dated Ex. PW1/11 (OSR) 17.09.2018 written by Assistant Registrar Banking to RBI
13. Photocopy of letter dated Ex. PW1/12 (OSR) 20.09.2018 of RBI
5. Thereafter, vide order dated 19.04.2023, the petitioner's evidence was closed.
6. Pursuant to the aforesaid, the matter progressed to the stage of RE, where the respondent examined himself as RW-1. He tendered his evidence by way of affidavit Ex.RW1/A. RW-1 was duly cross-
RC ARC 61/2019 Jain Cooperative Bank Ltd. v. Avtar Kishan Kaur Page No.3/18examined by the Ld. counsel for the petitioner and discharged.
7. Thereafter, the respondent examined Mr. Deepak Kumar, Sr. Assistant, Registrar Cooperative Societies, GNCTD, Old Court building, Parliament Street, New Delhi 110001, who exhibited the following documents in his evidence:
1. The certified copies of the order Ex. RW2/1 (Colly.) dated 18.09.2014
2. Certified copies of the letter dated Ex. RW2/2 23.01.2019
8. Thereafter, the respondent examined Mr. Jitendra Singh, HC, Belt No. 1000/C, PS Daryaganj, Delhi, who exhibited the following documents in his evidence:
1. Certified copy of FIR No. 420/16 Ex. RW3/ 1 (Colly.) dated 26.12.2016 against the petitioner Bank
9. Thereafter, vide separate statement dated 17.12.2025, the respondent's evidence was closed, and the matter was listed for final arguments.
10. I have heard final arguments on behalf of both parties. On perusal of the record, I now proceed to dispose of the case by the present judgment.
11. Before examining the merits of the case, it would be appropriate to refer to the legal position governing Section 14(1)(e) of the DRC Act. It is settled law that, to succeed under Section 14(1)(e), the landlord must establish:
i. Existence of a landlord-tenant relationship;RC ARC 61/2019 Jain Cooperative Bank Ltd. v. Avtar Kishan Kaur Page No.4/18
ii. Bona fide requirement of the tenanted premises for the landlord or any family member dependent upon him/her; and iii. Non-availability of any other reasonably suitable alternative accommodation.
12. In this regard, reliance may be placed on the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Abid-Ul-Islam v. Inder Sain Dua, AIR 2022 SC 1778, wherein it was observed that:
12. Section 14(1)(e) carves out an exception to the regular mode of eviction. Thus, in a case where a landlord makes an application seeking possession of the tenanted premises for his bona fide re-
quirement, the learned Rent Controller may dispense with the pro- tection prescribed under the Act and then grant an order of eviction. Requirement is the existence of bona fide need, when there is no other "reasonably suitable accommodation". Therefore, there has to be satisfaction on two grounds, namely, (i) the requirement being bona fide and (ii) the non availability of a reasonably suit- able residential accommodation. Such reasonableness along with suitability is to be seen from the perspective of the landlord and not the tenant. When the learned Rent Controller comes to the conclu- sion that there exists a bona fide need coupled with the satisfaction that there is no reasonably suitable residential accommodation, the twin conditions mandated Under Section 14(1)(e) stand satisfied.
13. The concept of bona fide need has been further elucidated by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Shiv Sarup Gupta v. Mahesh Chand Gupta, 1999 INSC 364, wherein it was held that the requirement must be based on a sincere, honest, and natural desire as distinguished from a mere pretext:
A requirement in the sense of felt need which is an outcome of a sincere, honest desire, in contra-distinction with a mere pretence or pretext to evict a tenant, on the part of the landlord claiming to occupy the premises for himself or for any member of the family would entitle him to seek ejectment of the tenant. Looked at from this angle, any setting of the facts and circumstances pro- truding the need of landlord and its bonafides would be capable of successfully withstanding the test of objective determination by the Court. The Judge of facts should place himself in the arm chair RC ARC 61/2019 Jain Cooperative Bank Ltd. v. Avtar Kishan Kaur Page No.5/18 of the landlord and then ask the question to himself-whether in the given facts substantiated by the landlord the need to occupy the premises can be said to be natural, real, sincere, honest. If the answer be in the positive, the need is bonafide. The failure on the part of the landlord to substantiate the pleaded need, or, in a given case, positive material brought on record by the tenant en- abling the court drawing an inference that the reality was to the con- trary and the landlord was merely attempting at finding out a pre- tence or pretext for getting rid of the tenant, would be enough to persuade the Court certainly to deny its judicial assistance to the landlord. Once the court is satisfied of the bonafides of the need of the landlord for premises or additional premises by applying objec- tive standards then in the matter of choosing out of more than one accommodation available to the landlord his subjective choice shall be respected by the court. The court would permit the landlord to satisfy the proven need by choosing the accommodation which the landlord feels would be most suited for the purpose; the court would not in such a case thrust its own wisdom upon the choice of the landlord by holding that not one but the other ac- commodation must be accepted by the landlord to satisfy his such need. In short, the concept of bonafide need or genuine re- quirement needs a practical approach instructed by realities of life. An approach either too liberal or two conservative or pedantic must be guarded against.
14. Thus, for the petitioner to succeed, it must be shown that it is the owner of the property, that a landlord-tenant relationship exists, that it has a bona fide requirement of the premises, and that no other suitable alternative accommodation is available. Once these essential ingredients are proved, the petition succeeds.
PRELIMINARY OBJECTION:
15. Before examining the aforesaid ingredients, it is necessary to deal with the preliminary objection of the respondent to the extent that the present petition has been filed without any authorisation from the Board of Directors of the petitioner Bank. It has been submitted that the authorisation was given by the Board of Directors to only shift the branch from the basement to the ground floor, and no resolution has been filed on record to show that the Board of Directors authorised RC ARC 61/2019 Jain Cooperative Bank Ltd. v. Avtar Kishan Kaur Page No.6/18 anybody to initiate eviction petitions on behalf of the petitioner Bank in relation to the mezzanine floor (where the tenanted premises is located).
16. Ld. Counsel for the petitioner has submitted that the present case was filed by Sh. Gurpreet Singh, who was duly authorised by the CEO of the Bank to file the present petition. Thereafter, at the stage of evidence, the AR of the Bank was substituted, and Sh. Parmander Kumar Jain deposed on behalf of the petitioner Bank, on the basis of an authorisation letter issued by the CEO of the Bank. It is not in dispute that the ARs have been authorised by the CEO to represent the Bank in the present petition. However, the respondent has raised an objection that there is no underlying Board Resolution that authorises the CEO to file the present eviction petition.
17. With respect to authorisation passed by the Board of Directors, Ld. Counsel for the petitioner relied upon two resolutions to answer the issue of maintainability. The first resolution is an extract of the minutes of the AGM of the petitioner company held on 24.06.2018 (Ex. PW1/9 (OSR)). The same is in Hindi and has been reproduced hereinafter:
बबक ककी दररियया गगज शयाखया कको बबेसममट सबे ऊपरि लयानबे हबेततू वविषय परि चचयार्चा।
सभयापवत महकोदय शश्री रियाजबेश ककमयारि जजैन, चबेयरिमजैन नबे सभया मबे प्रस्तकोवि रिखया ककी कयानतूनन बबेसममट मबे शयाखया ठश्रीक नहहीं हजै एग वि वियास्ततू कबे तहत बबेसममट मम नहहीं हकोनश्री चयावहए। बजैठक मबे यह भश्री बतयायया गयया ककी गयाउग ड फलकोरि परि कयाफकी जगह खयालश्री हजै। एक वकरियायबेदयारि कबे खखलयाफ इवविक्शन आडर्चा रि ककोटर्चा सबे लबे खलयया गयया हजै उसनबे हयाई ककोटर्चा मबे स्टबे लबे खलयया हजै खजसबे खयालश्री करियानबे कया प्रयत्न वकयया जया रिहया हजै। बयाककी दको दक क यानको कबे खखलयाफ भश्री इवविक्शन डयाल वदयया गयया हजै। सभया मम सभश्री पहलकओग परि चचयार्चा हह ई औरि चचयार्चा कबे बयाद सविर्चा सम्मवत सबे प्रस्तयावि पयाररित वकयया गयया वक दररियया गगज शयाखया कको बबेसमबट सबे उपरि लयानबे हबेततू शयाखया कया वनमयार्चाण गयाउग ड फलकोरि परि वकयया जयाए। वनमयार्चाण परि हकोनबे वियालश्री अनकमयावनत RC ARC 61/2019 Jain Cooperative Bank Ltd. v. Avtar Kishan Kaur Page No.7/18 लयागत लगभग रूपयबे 30.00 लयाख पयाररित ककी गई। इसकबे खलए एक आवकर्चाटबेक्ट वनयकक करि, उवचत नक्शया बनयाकरि वनमयार्चाण कयायर्चा शकरू वकयया जयाए।
18. I am of the considered view that the aforesaid Board Resolution does not authorize filing of eviction petitions to evict the tenants from the mezzanine floor. In fact, the said resolution does not authorize filing of eviction petitions at all, whether for the ground floor or the mezzanine floor. The aforesaid resolution only authorises the construction of the branch on the ground floor, and thereafter, the shifting of the branch from the basement to the ground floor.
19. The second resolution is an extract of the minutes of the meeting of the Board of Directors on 06.10.2018. The said resolution authorizes Mr. Upender Garg, CEO of the petitioner Bank to represent the Bank in all Courts/Tribunals/any Judicial Authority in connection with any legal proceeding initiated by or against the Bank, and to do all such acts and deeds on behalf and in the interest of the Bank as may be necessary in respect of all such legal proceedings initiated by or against the Bank. It further authorises Mr Upender Garg to act, appear and plead on behalf of the Bank and to sign/file/verify and present pleadings, appeals, cross-objections or petitions for execution/review/revision/compromise or other petitions or affidavits or evidence on behalf of the Bank. The same is reproduced hereinafter:
In continuation to earlier Resolution No. 13 passed by the Board of Directors in its Meeting held on 18.08.2018.
The Board of Directors of the Jain Co-operative Bank Ltd. hereby authorize Sh. Upender Garg s/o Late Sh. Amba Prashad, Chief Executive Officer, Jain Co-operative Bank Ltd. to represent the Jain Co-operative Bank Ltd. in all Courts, Forum, Tribunal including Supreme Court of India, High Court of Delhi, District Courts in Delhi, Debt Recovery Tribunals, Debt Recovery Appellate Tribunal, Registrar, Co-operative Societies, Delhi Co-operative Tribunal, RC ARC 61/2019 Jain Cooperative Bank Ltd. v. Avtar Kishan Kaur Page No.8/18 Financial Commissioner, Consumer Forum, State Consumer Disputes Redressal Commissions, Arbitration Tribunals, Enquiry Tribunal and /or any judicial authority or tribunal or Court in connection with any legal proceeding initiated by or against the Jain Co-operative Bank Ltd. and to do all such acts and deeds on behalf and in the interest of the Jain Co-operative Bank Ltd. as may be necessary in respect of all such legal proceedings initiated by or against the Jain Co-operative Bank Ltd., to act, appear and plead on behalf of the Jain Co-operative Bank Ltd. in any Court, to sign, file, verify and present pleadings, appeals, cross-objections or petitions for execution, review, revision, compromise or other petitions or affidavits or evidence (orally or an affidavit) withdrawal of case and / or any amount and / or any documents on behalf of the Jain Cooperative Bank Ltd., other documents as may be deemed necessary or proper on behalf of the Jain Co-operative Bank Ltd. He is also authorized to execute affidavit, documents, deeds, papers on behalf of the Jain Cooperative Bank Ltd. and to appoint advocates etc. and to sign consequent, Vakalatnama thereof on behalf of the Jain Co-operative Bank Ltd. as may be necessary in connection with such legal proceedings and also to lead evidence, depose on behalf of the Jain Co-operative Bank Ltd. in such legal proceeding and to receive or to take possession of various documents, copies, originals, etc on behalf of the Jain Co-operative Bank Ltd. from any such Court / Tribunal / Arbitrator/ Authority and to do all acts and deeds ancillary and incidental thereto. He is also authorized to appoint any of the staff member as authorized representative on behalf of Jain Co-operative Bank Ltd. and entrust him the work as above.
20. With respect to the aforesaid resolution, it is pertinent to note that the same was not exhibited in evidence by the petitioner during PE, and hence, the same cannot be taken into consideration.
21. Secondly, even if the same is taken into consideration, I am of the considered view that the said resolution only authorises the CEO to represent the Bank in the litigations which have already been initiated by or against the Bank. The said resolution, by no stretch of imagination, can be interpreted to mean that it also authorises the CEO to initiate any litigation on behalf of the Bank, without needing any approval from the Board of Directors. During arguments, Ld. Counsel for the petitioner strongly relied upon the phrase "all such legal RC ARC 61/2019 Jain Cooperative Bank Ltd. v. Avtar Kishan Kaur Page No.9/18 proceedings initiated by or against the Jain Co-operative Bank Ltd" to contend that the said resolution authorises the CEO to initiate fresh litigations on behalf of the Bank.
22. I humbly disagree. The use of the word "initiated" in the past tense is deliberate and signifies proceedings that stand previously commenced, not those yet to be instituted. This interpretation is fortified by the overall structure of the resolution, which consistently employs execution-oriented verbs such as appear, sign, file, verify, plead, defend, and pursue appeals, all of which presuppose the existence of pending proceedings. It is further pertinent to note that initiation of litigation is a substantive policy decision and, under settled principles of corporate governance, vests with the Board of Directors unless expressly delegated. The absence of any express language authorising the CEO to institute or commence legal proceedings is therefore determinative. Consequently, the aforesaid resolution cannot be construed as empowering the CEO to unilaterally initiate fresh litigation on behalf of the Bank without a specific Board resolution authorising the filing of such proceedings.
23. Ld. Counsel for the petitioner strongly relied upon the judgment of United Bank of India v. Naresh Kumar, (1996) 6 SCC 660, in which it was held that:
9. In cases like the present where suits are instituted or defended on behalf of a public corporation, public interest should not be permitted to be defeated on a mere technicality. Procedural defects which do not go to the root of the matter should not be permitted to defeat a just cause. There is sufficient power in the courts, under the Code of Civil Procedure, to ensure that injustice is not done to any party who has a just case. As far as possible a substantive right should not be allowed to be defeated on account of a procedural irregularity which is curable.
10. It cannot be disputed that a company like the appellant can sue RC ARC 61/2019 Jain Cooperative Bank Ltd. v. Avtar Kishan Kaur Page No.10/18 and be sued in its own name. Under Order 6 Rule 14 of the Code of Civil Procedure a pleading is required to be signed by the party and its pleader, if any. As a company is a juristic entity it is obvious that some person has to sign the pleadings on behalf of the company.
Order 29 Rule 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure, therefore, provides that in a suit by or against a corporation the Secretary or any Director or other Principal Officer of the corporation who is able to depose to the facts of the case might sign and verify on behalf of the company. Reading Order 6 Rule 14 together with Order 29 Rule 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure it would appear that even in the absence of any formal letter of authority or power of attorney having been executed a person referred to in Rule 1 of Order 29 can, by virtue of the office which he holds, sign and verify the pleadings on behalf of the corporation. In addition thereto and dehors Order 29 Rule 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure, as a company is a juristic entity, it can duly authorise any person to sign the plaint or the written statement on its behalf and this would be regarded as sufficient compliance with the provisions of Order 6 Rule 14 of the Code of Civil Procedure. A person may be expressly authorised to sign the pleadings on behalf of the company, for example by the Board of Directors passing a resolution to that effect or by a power of attorney being executed in favour of any individual. In absence thereof and in cases where pleadings have been signed by one of its officers a corporation can ratify the said action of its officer in signing the pleadings. Such ratification can be express or implied. The court can, on the basis of the evidence on record, and after taking all the circumstances of the case, specially with regard to the conduct of the trial, come to the conclusion that the corporation had ratified the act of signing of the pleading by its officer.
11. The courts below could have held that Shri L.K. Rohatgi must have been empowered to sign the plaint on behalf of the appellant. In the alternative it would have been legitimate to hold that the manner in which the suit was conducted showed that the appellant-Bank must have ratified the action of Shri L.K. Rohatgi in signing the plaint. If, for any reason whatsoever, the courts below were still unable to come to this conclusion, then either of the appellate courts ought to have exercised their jurisdiction under Order 41 Rule 27(1)(b) of the Code of Civil Procedure and should have directed a proper power of attorney to be produced or they could have ordered Shri L.K. Rohatgi or any other competent person to be examined as a witness in order to prove ratification or the authority of Shri L.K. Rohatgi to sign the plaint. Such a power should be exercised by a court in order to ensure that injustice is not done by rejection of a genuine claim.
24. I am of the considered view that the aforesaid judgment does RC ARC 61/2019 Jain Cooperative Bank Ltd. v. Avtar Kishan Kaur Page No.11/18 not come to the aid of the petitioner. There is no dispute with respect to the position of law that, in terms of Order 29 Rule 1 of the CPC, the people mentioned therein are authorised to sign and verify pleadings on behalf of the company, without needing any Board Resolution to that effect. However, Order 29 Rule 1 of the CPC does not authorise the people mentioned therein to initiate litigation or file suits on behalf of the company.
25. In this regard, reliance may be placed upon the judgment of C. Krishniah Chetty v. Deepali Co. (P) Ltd., 2021 SCC OnLine Kar 12513, in which it was held that in the absence of a Board Resolution, a Chief Financial Officer or any other Principal Officer of a Private Limited Company cannot institute a suit/appeal or any other legal proceedings on behalf of the company on the strength of Order 29 Rule 1 of the CPC:
42. In the case of Nibrolimited, (supra), the suit was instituted by a Director of the Company without the Board Resolution of the Company authorizing him to institute the suit. Even after the suit was instituted, no resolution was passed by the Company ratifying the action. Though a plea was taken that on the strength of Order XXIX Rule 1 of CPC, a suit could be maintained by the Director of the Company even in the absence of a Board Resolution, it was held that Order XXIX Rule 1 of CPC does not authorize persons mentioned therein to institute suit on behalf of the Corporation but only authorizes them to sign and verify the pleadings on behalf of the Corporation and unless a power to institute the suit is specifically conferred on a particular Director, by a resolution to the said effect, he has no authority to institute a suit on behalf of the Company. The judgment in Nibro Limited's case, has been confirmed by the Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of State Bank of Travancore, (supra) and therefore, it can be safely held that a suit or any other legal proceedings can be instituted by a Director or Officer of the Company only on the strength of Board Resolution by the Company to the said effect and in the absence of such a Board Resolution, if a suit or legal proceedings is instituted, then necessarily there has to be a resolution by the Company ratifying the defect, failing which the suit or legal proceedings cannot be maintained. Therefore, the RC ARC 61/2019 Jain Cooperative Bank Ltd. v. Avtar Kishan Kaur Page No.12/18 question framed for consideration in this appeal is answered negatively.
44. In the present case, it is not in dispute that the Company has not authorized the Chief Financial Officer by passing a Board Resolution to institute the suit or appeal on behalf of the Company. In a suit or appeal, "a prima facie case," would depend upon the facts of the said case and in the present appeal having regard to the undisputed facts of the case, wherein equal shareholders of the Company have been fighting against each other, in the absence of a Board Resolution, the suit or appeal instituted by the Chief Financial Officer of the Company is definitely defective and therefore, there is no prima facie case made out for a trial in the suit and in the absence of the party making out a case for trial, the prayer made by the said party for grant of interim orders/interim injunctions in such a suit cannot be favoured.
26. The said position of law was also clarified by the Hon'ble High Court of Delhi in the case of Nibro Ltd. v. National Insurance Co. Ltd., 1990 SCC OnLine Del 65, wherein it was held that Order 29 Rule 1 CPC does not authorize persons mentioned therein to institute suit on behalf of the Corporation but only authorizes them to sign and verify the pleadings :
It was contended by learned counsel for the plaintiff that under Order 29, rule 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure, the pleadings can be signed and verified on behalf of the corporation by the secretary or by any director or other principal officer of the corporation who is able to depose to the facts of the case. Thus, since Shri G. Jhajharia was the director of the plaintiff company he was authorised to sign and verify the plaint on behalf of the plaintiff company and thus no separate resolution of the plaintiff company was necessary authorising him to institute the suit. Learned counsel relied on the judgment of this court in Mercantile Bank Ltd. v. Phool Chand Fateh Chand (Suit No. 11 of 1967-10-8- 1973) and submitted that a principal officer of the company is competent to sign and verify the plaint under the provisions of Order 29, rule 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure without his being specifically empowered by a resolution to institute the suit. Learned counsel submitted that Shri G. Jhajharia who was the director of the company was in a position to depose to the facts of the case and thus competent to file the suit. Learned counsel further submitted that non-filing of the resolution of the board of directors authorising Shri G. Jhajharia is a mere technicality which must be ignored. He relied on S.B. Naronah v. Prem Kumari Khanna, AIR 1980 SC 193 (para
6), and Bhagwan Swaroop v. Mool Chand, AIR 1983 SC 355, in RC ARC 61/2019 Jain Cooperative Bank Ltd. v. Avtar Kishan Kaur Page No.13/18 support of this submission. Learned counsel further submitted that under Order 3, rule 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure the suit can be presented either by a party in person or by his recognised agent or by a pleader appearing, applying or acting, as the case may be, on his behalf. Thus, since the advocate had filed the suit in whose favour Shri G. Jhajharia has given the power of attorney, no further resolution was required. He relied on Mst. Barkate v. Feroz Khan [1944] PLR 96, 98, in support of this contention.
On the analysis of the judgments, it is clear that Order 29, rule 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure does not authorise persons mentioned therein to institute suits on behalf of the corporation. It only authorises them to sign and verify the pleadings on behalf of the corporation.
It is well-settled that under section 291 of the Companies Act except where express provision is made that the powers of a company in respect of a particular matter are to be exercised by the company in general meeting, in all other cases the board of directors are entitled to exercise all its powers. Individual directors have such powers only as are vested in them by the memorandum and articles. It is true that ordinarily the court wilt not, unsuit a person on account of technicalities. However, the question of authority to institute a suit on behalf of a company is not a technical matter. It has far-reaching effects. It often affects the policy and finances of the company. Thus, unless a power to institute a suit is specifically conferred on a particular director, he has no authority to institute a suit on behalf of the company. Needless to say such a power can be conferred by the board of directors only by passing a resolution in that regard.
The plaintiff has not placed on record any resolution passed by the company authorising Shri G. Jhajharia to institute the suit. Shri G. Jhajharia did not come forward to make a statement that he was in a position to depose to the facts of the case. In the plaint signed by him, he claims to be a principal officer and director, but there is no evidence on record to indicate that he had the authority to institute the suit. The memorandum and articles of association of the plaintiff company are also not placed on record. Even after the suit was instituted by Shri G. Jhajharia, no resolution was passed by the company ratifying this action. No such decision of the board of directors is placed on record in the present case. The plaintiff has examined Shri Ashok Kumar Jhajharia. He has placed on record, exhibit PW-2/1, which is the resolution of the board of directors reappointing Shri G. Jhajharia as the director but this resolution does not empower Shri G. Jhajharia as a director to institute the present suit. Shri Ashok Kumar Jhajharia has stated that he was handling the day-to-day management of the plaintiff company including the insurance part of it. He, however, does not state that Mr. G. Jhajharia was handling the day-to-day management or was in charge of the insurance claim.
RC ARC 61/2019 Jain Cooperative Bank Ltd. v. Avtar Kishan Kaur Page No.14/18Thus, there is no evidence to prove that Shri G. Jhajharia had the authority to institute the present suit.
27. The aforesaid judgment, passed by the Hon'ble High Court of Delhi, was cited with approval by the Hon'ble Supreme Court of India in the case of State Bank of Travancore v. Kingston Computers (I) (P) Ltd., (2011) 11 SCC 524. Even the facts of the present case are similar to the facts involved in Kingston Computers (supra). In the said case, the suit was filed by the respondent through a person named Shri Ashok K. Shukla, who described himself as one of the Directors of the Company and claimed that he was authorised by the Chief Executive Officer of the company vide an authority letter to sign, verify and file a suit for recovery on behalf of the Company. However, the Hon'ble Supreme Court of India held that the letter of authority issued by the Chief Executive Officer of the company was nothing but a scrap of paper because no resolution was passed by the Board of Directors delegating its power to the Chief Executive Officer to authorise another person to file a suit on behalf of the company. The relevant extract from the said case is reproduced hereinafter:
2. The suit was filed by the respondent through Shri Ashok K. Shukla, who described himself as one of the Directors of the Company and claimed that he was authorised by Shri Raj K. Shukla, the Chief Executive Officer of the Company vide authority letter dated 2-1-2003 to sign, verify and file suit for recovery on behalf of the Company. A copy of the authority letter allegedly signed by Shri Raj K. Shukla was also annexed with the plaint. In the written statement filed on behalf of the appellant, a preliminary objection was taken as to the maintainability of the suit on the ground that Shri Ashok K. Shukla was not authorised by the Company to file the suit and the authority letter given by Shri Raj K. Shukla was not sufficient to entitle him to do so. The respondent filed replication but did not plead that Shri Ashok K. Shukla was authorised by the Company to file the suit.
14. In our view, the judgment under challenge is liable to be set aside because the respondent had not produced any evidence to prove that Shri Ashok K. Shukla was appointed as a Director of the Company and a resolution was passed by the Board of Directors of RC ARC 61/2019 Jain Cooperative Bank Ltd. v. Avtar Kishan Kaur Page No.15/18 the Company to file a suit against the appellant and authorised Shri Ashok K. Shukla to do so. The letter of authority issued by Shri Raj K. Shukla, who described himself as the Chief Executive Officer of the Company, was nothing but a scrap of paper because no resolution was passed by the Board of Directors delegating its powers to Shri Raj K. Shukla to authorise another person to file a suit on behalf of the Company.
28. Therefore, a clear distinction exists between the power to sign/verify pleadings and to initiate/file suit on behalf of a company. The latter cannot be done without the express authorisation of the Board of Directors, and Order 29 Rule 1 of the CPC does not allow the filing of a suit without the express authorisation of the Board of Directors. It cannot be used to allow a CEO to initiate litigation on behalf of a company unilaterally, without express authorisation in that regard.
29. I am cognizant of the position of law laid down in Naresh Kumar (supra) that a suit filed on the strength of Order 29 Rule 1 of CPC needs ratification, which could be either express or implied. Therefore, the defect of not passing any specific resolution is curable, but the said defect needs to be cured through ratification. I am also cognizant of the position of law that a petition/suit should not be dismissed on account of procedural formalities and that there is a presumption in favour of valid filing of a suit/petition, especially when the same has been duly fought on behalf of the plaintiff/petitioner till final arguments.
30. However, the aforesaid presumption is rebuttable, and once the defendant/respondent raises an objection in this regard, the burden shifts to the plaintiff/petitioner to show the authorisation to initiate the litigation. In the present matter, the respondent, during cross- examination, duly questioned PW-1 about the Board Resolution RC ARC 61/2019 Jain Cooperative Bank Ltd. v. Avtar Kishan Kaur Page No.16/18 authorizing filing of the present case. PW-1 deposed that he does not know whether any Resolution was passed by the Bank for filing the present eviction petition (see the cross-examination dated 23.01.2023).
31. Further, except for Ex. PW1/9 (OSR) and the resolution dated 06.10.2018, no other resolution passed by the Board of Directors has been placed on record. It has already been discussed above that Ex. PW1/9 (OSR) nowhere authorises the filing of an eviction petition in relation to the mezzanine floors on the demised premises (or any eviction petitions for that matter). Further, it has also been discussed already that the resolution dated 06.10.2018 does not authorise the CEO to initiate fresh litigation. Therefore, once the authorisation to file the present case was duly questioned, the onus was upon the petitioner to furnish a Board Resolution or file any subsequent Board Resolution ratifying the act of filing the present petition. However, no such Resolution has been filed on record. Therefore, a presumption of the petition's valid institution cannot be raised in the present matter. Similarly, since no resolution has been brought on record, as discussed above, it can be concluded that the filing of the present petition has not been expressly ratified by the Bank's Board of Directors. Further, with respect to implied ratification, there is no other circumstance on record to show that the present litigation has been pursued at the behest of the Bank, and not at the behest of the CEO unilaterally.
32. It was duly noted in Nibro Ltd (supra) that ordinarily, a court will not unsuit a person on account of technicalities; however, the question of authority to institute a suit on behalf of a company is not a technical matter, as it often affects the policy and finances of the RC ARC 61/2019 Jain Cooperative Bank Ltd. v. Avtar Kishan Kaur Page No.17/18 company and has far-reaching consequences.
33. Therefore, since the petitioner has not been able to furnish any valid Board Resolution authorizing filing of the present eviction petition, the present eviction petition is not maintainable and deserves to be dismissed.
CONCLUSION:
34. In view of the aforesaid discussion, the instant petition stands dismissed as not maintainable.
File be consigned to the record room after due compliance.
Digitally
signed by
Pronounced in open court: DEVANSHU
DEVANSHU
SAJLAN
10th day of February, 2026 SAJLAN Date:
2026.02.10
17:11:27
+0530
(Devanshu Sajlan)
CCJ-cum-ARC (Central)
THC/Delhi
RC ARC 61/2019 Jain Cooperative Bank Ltd. v. Avtar Kishan Kaur Page No.18/18