Andhra HC (Pre-Telangana)
Chenna Basvanna vs Special Court Under A.P. Land Grabbing ... on 30 September, 2002
Equivalent citations: 2003(2)ALD607
JUDGMENT S.R. Nayak, J.
1. This writ petition is directed against the judgment and order dated 18.8.1998 passed in LGC No. 82 of 1996 on the file of the Special Court constituted under Andhra Pradesh Land Grabbing (Prohibition) Act, 1982 (for short 'the Act'). The petitioner who is the 1st respondent in the above LGC is held to be a land grabber within the meaning of that term as defined under Clause (d) of Section 2 of the Act. By the impugned order, the petitioner-1st respondent is directed to vacate and deliver vacant possession of the applicant schedule land to the applicant viz., V. Hari Shankar, who is the 2nd respondent in this writ petition within a period of two months.
2. The background facts of the case be stated briefly as under: The 2nd respondent-applicant filed L.G.C.No. 82 of 1996 under Section 8 of the Act for declaration that the writ petitioner is a land grabber in respect of the applicant schedule land, for his eviction and recovery of possession thereof. The case of the applicant is that one Ramulu was the owner of Plot No. 32 ad measuring 328 Sq.yards carved out of the land comprised in Sy.Nos.758, 759, 763 to 767 of Uppal Kalan village, Uppal Mandal and Municipality, Ranga Reddy District having purchased the same by registered sale deed dated 17.9.1992 from the State Bank of Hyderabad Employees Co-operative Housing Society Limited, the 3rd respondent in the writ petition. The 3rd respondent-society after purchasing the lands comprised in the aforementioned Sy.Nos converted the same into plots after obtaining lay-out sanction. The said Ramulu in turn sold Plot No, 32 to the applicant by registered sale deed dated 26.11.1994. The father of the writ petitioner was allotted Plot bearing No. 27 by the 3rd respondent-society which Plot is abutting Plot No. 32 on the southern side. No regular sale deed was executed in respect of Plot No. 27 in favour of the father of the writ petitioner or in favour of the writ petitioner. The father of the writ petitioner died long back and the writ petitioner grabbed about 65 Sq. yards of open land forming part of Plot No. 32 and constructed a compound wall. The applicant raised dispute in respect thereof and the managing committee of the 3rd respondent-society called for a meeting of the parties, but that exercise resulted in vain. Under those circumstances, the applicant caused a legal notice dated 9.11.1995 to the writ petitioner to which the writ petitioner sent up a reply dated 23.11.1995 raising untenable pleas. Under those circumstances, the above LGC was instituted before the Special Court for the reliefs already noticed above.
3. Opposing the LGC, a counter was filed on behalf of the writ petitioner. In the counter, the writ petitioner stated that his father became a member of the 3rd respondent-society for seeking allotment of a Plot of land ad measuring 400 Sq.yards; the 3rd respondent-society having purchased Ac. 12.20 guntas of land in Sy.Nos.758, 759, 763 to 767 of Uppal Kalan village, Uppal Mandal and Municipality, Ranga Reddy District converted the same into plots after obtaining lay-out sanction and allotted Plot No. 27 alongwith the house constructed thereon to his father and since then, the petitioner's father was in possession till his death on 9-11-1990 and after death, the writ petitioner has been in possesion and enjoyment thereof in his own right being a legal heir of his father. However, in the counter, the writ petitioner did not dispute title of the applicant to the house bearing No. 17-57 situated in Plot No. 32, but he denied the extent of the land comprised in Plot No. 32. The writ petitioner in his counter admitted that plot No. 32 was allotted to Mr.Ramulu by the 3rd respondent-society and the same was subsequently purchased by the applicant by a registered sale deed dated 26.11.1994 along with the house thereon. The writ petitioner denied that he encroached or grabbed the application schedule land i.e., Plot No. 32. However, the writ petitioner contended in the counter that the 3rd respondent-society, after allotting 400 Sq.yards of land to each of its members, created more plots and illegally sold the same to various persons for extraneous considerations and thereby the area of the plots got reduced.
4. The 3rd respondent-society filed a counter in the LGC and in the said counter, it is stated that Plot No. 32 ad measuring 320 Sq.yards was allotted by it to A.Ramulu under a registered sale deed. It is also admitted in the counter of the 3rd respondent that the applicant purchased the petition schedule Plot ad measuring 328 Sq.yards from the said A.Ramulu. It is also stated that as per the records of the 3rd respondent-society and sanctioned lay-out, the Plot No. 32 measures 328 sq. yards. It is further stated that the father of the writ petitioner was allotted plot bearing Plot No. 32 along with the house raised thereon ad measuring 328 sq.yards. The society in its counter also stated that the writ petitioner encroached upon the Plot No. 32 to an extent of 60 sq. yards.
5. On the basis of the above pleadings, the Special Court framed the following issues:
1. Whether the applicant is the owner of the application schedule land ?
2. Whether the respondent is a land grabber within the meaning of the Act XII of 1982 ?
3. Whether the applicant is entitled for compensation under the provisions of Section 8(7) of the Act ?
4. Whether the rival title set up by the respondent is true and valid ?
5. To what relief ?
On behalf of the applicant, the applicant himself examined as PW1 and marked Exs.A1 to A5. On behalf of the writ petitioner, he examined himself as RW1 and marked Exs.B1 to B6. On behalf of the 3rd respondent-society neither oral nor documentary evidence was adduced.
6. The Special Court having dealt with issues 1 and 4 held that the applicant is the owner of the application schedule land and the writ petitioner has no title to the applicant schedule land to an extent of 44 sq. yards. On issue No. 2, the Court held that the writ petitioner is a land grabber within the meaning of that term as defined under Section 2(d) of the Act to an extent of 44 Sq.yards forming part of Plot No. 32 belonging to the applicant. On issue No. 3, the Special Court held that the applicant is not entitled to compensation contemplated under the provisions of Sub-section 7 of Section 8 of the Act. The Special Court having answered the issues 1 to 4 as above, passed the judgment and order in the following terms:
"23. Issue No. 5 :--In view of the findings recorded above and for all the reasons given in the foregoing paragraphs, the application is allowed to the extent of 44 sq. yards only and the first respondent is declared as land grabber within the meaning of the Act XII of 1982 and he is directed to vacate and deliver possession of the same to the applicant within a period of two months from today, failing which the concerned R.D.O. shall initiate action for evicting the first respondent from the said property and deliver the same to the applicant within a period of two months after the expiry of two months fixed above and submit compliance report to this Court under Rule 15(2) of the Rules framed under the Act. In the circumstances, we direct the parties to bear their own costs.
24. Since the applicant and the first respondent are neighbours and they have to live together long and having regard to the extent of the property involved, we are not inclined to order prosecution as against the first respondent."
The petitioner being aggrieved by the judgment and order passed by the Special Court has preferred this writ petition. We have heard Sri Vedula Venkatramana, learned Counsel for the petitioner and Sri T. Lakshminarayana, learned Counsel for the 2nd respondent. Sri Venkatramana first contended that the Special Court ought not to have taken cognizance of the application filed under Section 8(1) of the Act in view of the fact that the land involved is only 65 Sq.yards value of which is shown as Rs. 39,000/-. Sri Venkatramana contended that the Special Court did not exercise its discretion properly under Section 8(1) of the Act in assuming jurisdiction. Sri Venkatramana next contended that the reasons stated by the Special Court for recording the finding that the writ petitioner is a land grabber are perverse. Sri T. Lakshminarayana, learned Counsel for respondent No. 2, on the other hand, supported the judgment and order of the Special Court.
7. Before dealing with the 1st contention of Sri Venkatramana that the Special Court ought not to have taken cognizance of the application filed under Section 8(1) of the Act having regard to the fact that the land involved is only 65 Sq.yards, value of which is shown as Rs. 39,000/-, it is appropriate to notice the relevant statutory provisions. The relevant statutory provisions to be considered with regard to the 1st contention are Sub-sections (1), (1-A) and (2-A) of Section 8 and they read as follows:
Section 8. Procedure and powers of the Special Courts :--(1) The Special Court may, either suo motu or on application made by any person, officer or authority take cognizance of and try every case arising out of any alleged act of land grabbing or with respect to the ownership and title to, or lawful possession of, the land grabbed, whether before or after the commencement of this Act, and pass such orders (including orders by way of interim directions) as it deems fit.
(1-A) The Special Court shall, for the purpose of taking cognizance, of the case, consider the location, or extent or value of the land alleged to have been grabbed or of the substantial nature of the evil involved or in the interest of justice required or any other relevant matter:
Provided that the Special Court shall not take cognizance of any such case without hearing the petitioner.
(2-A) If the Special Court is of the opinion that any case brought before it, is not a fit case to be taken cognisance of, it may return the same for presentation before the Special Tribunal.
8. The specific submission of Sri Venkatramana is that provisions of Sub-section (1-A) of Section 8 clearly indicates that the Special Court in appropriate cases can refuse to take cognizance having regard to the location or extent or value of the land alleged to have been grabbed or of the substantial nature of the evil involved in the case or in the interest of justice required or any other relevant matter. According to Sri Venkatramana, the Special Court ought not to have taken cognizance of the case having regard to the extent and value of the application schedule land. Sri Venkatramana also submitted that the provisions of Sub-section (1-A) of Section 8 are vague and they do not provide necessary guidelines to exercise the discretion vested in the Special Court either to take cognizance or not to take cognizance. But, that contention of the learned Counsel need not be considered in the present case, because, we are not called upon to decide the validity of Sub-section (1-A) of Section 8 of the Act. If we may say so, the provisions of Sub-section (1) of Section 8, are badly drafted. The provisions of Sub-section (1) and the provisions of Sub-section (1-A), if they are read together harmoniously, it is permissible for the Special Court in appropriate cases not to take cognizance having regard to the location or extent or value of the application schedule land and other factors to which reference is made in Sub-section (1-A). However, that if the provision of Sub-section (1) is read separately, it becomes clear the Special Court is required to take cognizance of every case arising out of any alleged act of land grabbing or with respect to the ownership and title to, or lawful possession of, the land grabbed and try the same. The word "every" occurring in Sub-section (1) is very significant. According to Black's Law Dictionary, the word "every" means "each one of all, all the separate individuals who constitute the whole, regarded one by one". It also means "all and each". Thus, the word "every" is often synonymous with either "all and each." Its generality may be restricted by the context in which that word occurs in a Statute. The word "every" indicates that it has been used in Sub-section (1) of Section 8 in wider sense extending from one to all. The word "every" excludes limitation or qualification. The word "every" is expressive and it indicates in the context "all or every", "in the given category"; it has no reference to any particular or definite individual case, but to a positive but undetermined number in that category without restriction or limitation of choice. Therefore, in terms of provisions of Sub-section (1) of Section 8 of the Act, the Special Court is required to take cognizance of each and every case arising out of any alleged act of land grabbing or with respect to the ownership and the title, or lawful possession of, the land grabbed, whether before or after the commencement of this Act. Therefore, if Sub-section (1-A) were not to be there in Section 8, such an interpretation could have been placed, but having regard to the provisions of Sub-section (1-A) and the legislative intendment flowing from that provision, it is obvious that, as already stated supra, in appropriate cases, the Special Court may refuse to take cognizance on considerations of the location or extent or value of the land in question and other factors set out in Subsection (1-A). It is true that Sub-section (1-A) does not lay down any guideline to guide the Special Court to take or not to take cognizance of cases on considerations of location or extent or value of the land in question and other considerations. The discretion to be exercised under Sub-section (1-A) is left to the good faith of the Special Court. Therefore, it becomes necessary to read the postulates of Article 14 of the Constitution into Sub-sections (1) and (1-A) of Section 8 to control the discretion of the Special Court so that the discretion exercised by the Special Court in taking cognizance of a case instituted before can be scrutinised/reviewed by the reviewing Court on the touchstone of postulates of Article 14, that is to say, on considerations of fairness, reasonableness and non-arbitrariness. There cannot be any hard and fast rule to apply the standards with regard to location or extent or value of the concerned land and the question whether the Special Court has exercised its discretion judiciously, fairly and reasonably has to be decided with reference to the totality of facts and circumstances of each case. The Court cannot assume the role of a law-maker and define standards either to take cognizance or not to take cognizance. For example, the Court cannot specify or prescribe standards or ceilings with regard to location or extent or value of the land for the purpose of taking cognizance of the case under Sub-section (1). It is outside the power of the Court under Article 226 of the Constitution.
9. Sri Venkatramana also contended that whereas the proviso to Sub-section (1-A) of Section 8 provides that applicant should be heard before taking cognizance of a case, it does not provide any opportunity of hearing to the alleged land grabber before taking cognizance. We do not find the relevancy of this submission in the context of this case because we are not called upon to decide the validity of Sub-section (1-A) of Section 8. Simply because, proviso to Sub-section (1-A) does not require issuance of notice to the alleged land grabber giving him an opportunity of being heard before the Special Court takes cognizance of a case filed before it, it cannot be said that the cognizance taken by the Special Court is bad only on that count without anything further. It is true that at the stage of taking cognizance in terms of the statute, the alleged land grabber will not have any opportunity of being heard or to contest that the case filed before the Special Court is not a fit case in respect of which cognizance can be taken. However, it is permissible for the alleged land grabber on appearance to contend that the Special Court ought not to have taken cognizance of the case and if such a plea is urged by the respondent-land grabber on his appearance, by filing necessary application in that regard, it becomes necessary for the Special Court to deal with the question and record its finding. Although the petitioner did not file any application in the LGC raising question of maintainability, it is true that the petitioner on appearance filed counter affidavit opposing the LGC. In para (2) of the counter affidavit, he has stated thus :
"2. The respondent at the outset submits that the present case does not satisfy the mandatory provisions of the Land Grabbing Act. That the dispute land has neither substantial value or the extent is substantial in nature, as such, this Hon'ble Court does not have any jurisdiction to take cognizance of the case much less the proceedings under reply."
The above contentions raised in the counter affidavit was considered by the Special Court in para (22) of the impugned order and for the reasons stated therein it has rejected the contention. Para (22) reads as follows :
"22. The learned Counsel for the respondent then contended that having regard to the small extent that is involved in this case viz., 44 sq. yards the LGC itself is not maintainable. The contention is based on Sub-section (1-A) of Section 8 of Act XII of 1982, which says that the Special Court shall, for the purpose of taking cognizance of the case, consider the location, extent or value of the land alleged to have been grabbed or of the substantial nature of the evil involved or in the interest of justice etc. According to the learned Counsel, the present case does not involve that much of value or location or extent of the property to take cognizance of the case. Cognizance has already been taken by this Court having taken into consideration of the facts and the circumstances. Apart from that grabbing of any property without any entitlement by another itself is to be dealt with in the interest of justice. A person, who is guilty of grabbing of land of another without any entitlement, should not be allowed to raise this contention. It is for this Court, having regard to the location, extent or value of the subject matter, to take cognizance of. One important factor for taking cognizance is the interest of Justice. In a given case the evil of grabbing is itself may be substantial irrespective of the extent or location or value. 44 Sq. yards may not be valuable to one but, may be valuable to another in a given case. We cannot fix the entire process in a straight jacket and no hard and fast rule can be laid in that regard, it depends upon each individual case and that is why the discretion is left to this Court with reference to each case. Therefore, we are not accepting this contention."
We are of the considered opinion that the circumstances and factors set out by the Special Court in para (22) are valid grounds to take cognizance of the application even in terms of the provisions of Sub-section (1-A) of Section 8 of the Act. We accord our approval to the opinion of the Special Court that in a given case the evil of land grabbing itself may be substantial ground to take cognizance of the case irrespective of the extent or location or value of the land. The concepts of extent, location, value are relative in nature and the significance and importance of the same may vary from person to person, from place to place, from time to time, that is to say, a land which is valuable to 'A' person may not be so valuable to 'B' person having regard to the situation in which 'B' person is placed in terms of place and time and other attendant circumstances. Similarly, are the considerations of location and extent.
10. The contention is that the above plea of the petitioner is not properly dealt with by the Special Court in the impugned order. But the question for our consideration is whether this Court would be justified in setting aside the order of the Special Court impugned in the writ petition even assuming that the Special Court has not dealt with that plea properly as contended by Sri Venkatramana. The answer to the question would depend upon the facts and circumstances of each case. If the Court having regard to the facts and circumstances of a case is not satisfied that the Special Court was not justified in taking cognizance of the case, on that ground it can set aside the order of the Special Court. On the other hand, if the Court is satisfied that the Special Court was justified in taking cognizance of the case having regard to the facts and circumstances of the case, it would not set aside the order of the Special Court only on the ground that the Special Court has not dealt with the question of taking cognizance specifically or on the ground that the reasons stated by the Special Court to take cognizance are not sound. In the instant case, in the first instance, the petitioner on appearance did not make any interlocutory application before the Special Court raising the plea that the LGC instituted by the applicant is not maintainable having regard to the extent and value of the land and praying the Special Court to decide that question in the first instance. It is true that the petitioner raised a contention in the counter affidavit that the Special Court does not have jurisdiction to take cognizance of the case on the ground that the extent and value of the application schedule land is not substantial and that contention was considered by the Special Court. This Court only on the ground that that objection was not dealt with by the Special Court as a preliminary issue, the Court cannot set aside the order of the Special Court without examining the question whether there was justification for the Special Court to take cognizance having regard to the facts and circumstances of the case. In this case, we are satisfied that having regard to the facts and circumstances of the case, the Special Court was fully justified in taking cognizance of the case for the reasons we presently state.
11. It is true that the extent of land is only 65 sq.yards and the value of the land is Rs. 39,000/-. The extent and value of the application schedule land cannot be regarded as too small or trivial to divest the jurisdiction of the Special Court to entertain the case. Further in terms of locality also, it was a fit case for the Special Court to take cognizance. Besides all these considerations, it needs to be emphasised that the condition precedent for assuming jurisdiction by the Special Court is that the case must have arisen out of an alleged act of land grabbing. The allegation of land grabbing levelled against the writ petitioner is well substantiated by adducing substantive legal evidence in the case and sound reasoning of the Special Court. The primary objective of the Act being to prohibit the activity of the land grabbing in the State and to provide adjudicatory forums to decide the cases involving land grabbing, it cannot be said that though the essential condition to attract the jurisdiction of the Special Court is established by producing prima facie legal evidence, the Special Court should decline to entertain the application merely on the ground that the extent and value of the land in question are not large or high in relative terms. If such an interpretation is placed on the jurisdiction of the Special Court to take cognizance under Sub-section (1) of Section 8 of the Act read with Sub-section (1-A) thereof, it would defeat the very objective of the Act. The Statement of Objects and Reasons placed before the Legislature while tabling the Bill which culminated in the Act would loudly speak the main objects of the Act. It reads as follows:
"It has come to the notice of the Government that there are organised attempts on the part of certain lawless persons operating individually and in groups to grab either by force, or by deceit or otherwise lands belonging to the Government, a local authority, a religious or charitable institution or endowment, including wakf or any other private person. The land grabbers are forming bogus co-operative housing societies or setting up fictitious claims and including in large scale and unprecedented and fraudulent sales of land through unscrupulous real estate dealers or otherwise in favour of certain section of people, resulting in large scale accumulation of the unaccounted wealth. As public order is also adversely affected thereby now and then by such unlawful activities of land grabbers in the State, particularly in respect of urban and urbanisable lands, it was felt necessary to arrest and curb such unlawful activities immediately by enacting a special law in that regard."
Further, the Preamble to the Act reads as follows :
"An Act to prohibit the activity of land grabbing in the State of Andhra Pradesh and to provide for matters connected therewith.
Whereas there are organised attempts on the part of certain lawless persons operating individually and in groups, to grab, either by force or by deceit or otherwise, lands (whether belonging to the Government, a local authority, a religious or charitable institution or endowment, including a wakf, or any other private persons) who are known as "land grabbers".
And whereas such land grabbers are forming bogus co-operative housing societies or setting up fictitious claims and indulging in large scale and unprecedented and fraudulent sales of lands belonging to the Government, local authority, religious or charitable institutions or endowments including a wakf or private persons, through unscrupulous real estate dealers or otherwise in favour of certain sections of the people resulting in large accumulation of unaccounted wealth and quick money to land grabbers.
And whereas, having regard to the resources and influence of the persons by whom, the large scale on which and the manner in which, the unlawful activity of land grabbing was, has been or is being organised and carried on in violation of law by them, as land grabbers in the State of Andhra Pradesh, and particularly in its urban areas, it is necessary to arrest and curb immediately such unlawful activity of land grabbing;
And whereas public order is adversely affected by such unlawful activity of land grabbers.
Be it enacted by the Legislature of the State of Andhra Pradesh in the Thirty-third year of the Republic of India as follows :"
12. Although it is well settled that the Statement of Objects and Reasons is not admissible as an aid to the construction of the Statute, reference to the Statement of Objects and Reasons is permissible for understanding the background, the antecedent state of affairs, the surrounding circumstances in relation to the statute, and the evil which the statute was sought to remedy. It is permissible to refer to the Statement of Objects and Reasons only for the limited purpose of ascertaining the conditions prevailing at the time which actuated the sponsor of the Bill to introduce the same and the extent and urgency of the evil which it sought to remedy. The Statement of Objects and Reasons tabled with the Bill has highlighted the attendant circumstances then prevailing and the State's desire to arrest and curb unlawful activities of the land grabbers by forming bogus co-operative housing societies for setting up fictitious claims. Therefore, the Statement of Objects and Reasons clearly indicates that the lawmaker thought it necessary and expedient to enact the Act to arrest and curb the socially and economically damaging activities of the land grabbers.
13. Although the preamble of a Statute is simply a prefatory statement at its beginning, following the title and preceding the enacting clause, explaining or declaring the reasons and motives for, and the objects sought to be accomplished by the statute, it is seldom used in interpretation of the statute. But when used, it is an excellent aid to the construction of ambiguous statutes or statutes of doubtful meaning. It is quite often said by the Courts that the preamble is a key to the construction of a statute and should be resorted to unlock the minds of its makers. The Savigny's three aids to interpretation are : First, the consideration of the law as a whole; Second, the consideration of the reasons of the statutes; Third, the excellence of the result reached by a particular interpretation. But their lack of precision he himself notes, saying that the application of the second rule calls for much reserve, and that the third must be kept within the narrowest limits. It is because the primary purpose of interpretative process is to ascertain the legislative intent and make it effective. Therefore, where doubt exists regarding the proper construction of the provisions of a statute, in many cases, there is no better source than the preamble for aid in the ascertainment of the intention of the legislature, since it contains a statement of the purpose, reason or occasion for the enactment of the law to which it is affixed. Consequently, the provisions of the Act must be considered as having been enacted with these various purposes set out in the preamble. A preamble of a statute though not an enacting part, it is expected to express the scope, object and purpose of the statute more comprehensively than the title of the statute. The preamble to the Act refers to the organised attempts on the part of certain lawless persons and groups of persons to grab the land belonging to government, local authorities and other institutions as well as private persons and the necessity to enact the law to arrest and curb immediately such unlawful activity of land grabbing. Therefore, both the Statement of Objects and Reasons as well as the Preamble to the Act recite the ground and cause of enacting the Act, the evils sought to be remedied. Therefore, it is permissible for the Court to look for the reason or spirit of the Act. Having regard to the explicit object and purpose of the Act and the evils sought to be remedied by enacting the Act, we cannot accept the contention of Sri Venkatramana that the Special Court ought not to have taken cognizance of the case, simply because, the extent and value of the land in question, in relative terms, are not large and high respectively.
14. In the instant case, even according to the petitioner, the applicant is the owner of Plot No. 32 having purchased the same from the original owner Ramulu by registered sale deed dated 26.7.1993. The 3rd respondent-society in its counter has stated, the father of the petitioner was allotted Plot No. 22 ad measuring 333 Sq.yards alongwith the house raised thereon and the father of the petitioner encroached upon the plot bearing No. 32 to an extent of 60 sq. yards. The petitioner in his cross-examination stated that he was in possession of 400 Sq. yards which is more than the land allotted under Ex.B3. Therefore, it is a clear case of land grabbing. In addition to the petitioner's own admission, the Commissioner appointed by the Special Court after surveying the land found that the writ petitioner was in possession of an extent of 44 Sq.Yards forming part of Plot No. 32 of which the applicant is the owner. Therefore, it cannot be said that the Special Court was not justified in taking cognizance of the case and trying the same.
15. In conclusion, we hold that the petitioner has utterly failed to make out any ground warranting our interference with the impugned order. Writ Petition is devoid of merit and it is accordingly dismissed with no order as to costs.