Allahabad High Court
Chandra Bhan Singh vs State Of U.P. And Anr. on 6 January, 2003
Equivalent citations: 2003(1)AWC739, (2003)1UPLBEC749, 2003 ALL. L. J. 1342, (2003) 4 ALLINDCAS 419 (ALL), (2003) 1 ALL WC 739, (2003) 1 ESC 616, (2003) 1 UPLBEC 749
JUDGMENT R.B. Mishra, J.
1. In this writ petition order dated 29.11.1997, passed by Sub-Divisional Officer/ Appointing and Punishing Authority, Garautha (Jhansi), has been challenged whereby the petitioner's service has been terminated on the ground that the petitioner was absent from duty, for less collection of revenue, depositing the revenue to the treasury without getting it verified by senior officer, not depositing the revenue timely to the treasury or for not depositing to the concerned man.
Heard Sri Chandra Mohan Jha, learned counsel for the petitioner as well as Sri S.S. Sharma, additional chief standing counsel along with Sri Raj Kumar standing counsel for the respondents.
2. Brief fact necessary for adjudication of the present writ petition was that petitioner was suspended on 21.3.1996 and was served a charge-sheet on 5.9.1996 which was replied by the petitioner. An Enquiry Officer served a supplementary charge-sheet and the petitioner had again submitted his reply and thereafter the impugned order of termination dated 29.11.1997, had been passed removing the petitioner from his service. According to the learned counsel for the petitioner, the impugned order of termination was passed in violation of the principles of natural justice and in violation to the provision of Article 311 of the Constitution. It has also been brought to the notice of the Court that after the reply of the charges alleged against the petitioner the Enquiry Officer had not informed him the date, place and time of enquiry and also had not provided the petitioner an opportunity of hearing and had also not supplied the proper documents and the material evidence and documents relied by him in the enquiry report and the Enquiry Officer has also not given opportunity to cross-examine the witnesses, as such the enquiry of the termination was in violation of the principles laid down in the case of Union of India v. Mohd. Ramzan Khan, AIR 1991 SC 471.
3. It has also been submitted on behalf of the petitioner that the petitioner was awarded major punishment without informing the grounds on which the impugned order was passed and without furnishing the enquiry report to the petitioner after the conclusion of the enquiry report by the disciplinary authority, as such the petitioner was not afforded opportunity to defend himself and the entire procedure was in violation of prevailing rules.
4. The disciplinary enquiry against the Government servant is governed by the Rules, namely, the Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules, 1930. Rule 55 of the aforesaid rules lays down the procedure for conduct of the enquiry. Rule 55 of the aforesaid Rules is quoted below :
"55. (1) Without prejudice to the provisions of the Public Service Inquiries Act, 1850, an order (other than an order based on facts which had led to his conviction in a criminal court or by a court martial) of dismissal, removal or reduction in rank (which includes reduction to a lower post or time scale, or to a lower stage in a time scale but excludes the reversion to a lower post of a person who is officiating in a higher post) shall be passed on a person who is a member of a civil service, or holds a civil post under the State unless he has been informed in writing of the grounds on which it is proposed to take action and has been afforded an adequate opportunity of defending himself. The grounds on which it is proposed to take action shall be reduced in the form of a definite charge or charges which shall be communicated to the person charged and which be so clear and precise as to give sufficient indication to the charged Government servant of the facts and circumstances against him. He shall be required, within a reasonable time to put in a written statement of his defence and to State whether he desires to be heard in person. If he so desires, or if the authority concerned so directs, an oral inquiry shall be held in respect of such of the allegation as are not admitted. At that inquiry such oral evidence will be heard as the Inquiry Officer considers necessary. The person charged shall be entitled to cross-examine the witnesses, to give evidence in person and to have such witnesses called as he may wish, provided that the officer conducting the inquiry may for sufficient reason to be recorded in writing refuse to call a witness. The proceedings shall contain a sufficient record of the evidence and statement of the findings and the grounds thereof. The officer conducting the inquiry may also separately from these proceedings make his own recommendation regarding the punishment to be imposed on the charged Government servant."
5. The U. P. Government servant (Discipline and Appeal) Rules, 1999, deals with the procedure for imposing major penalties. The relevant portions is quoted below :
"7. (iii) The charges framed shall be so precise and clear as to give sufficient indication to the charged Government servant of the facts and circumstances against him. The proposed documentary evidences and the name of witnesses proposed to prove the same along with oral evidence, if any, shall be mentioned in the charge-sheet.
7 (iv) The charged Government servant shall be required to put in a written statement of his defence in person on a specified date, which shall not be less than 15 days from the date of issuance of charges-sheet and to state whether he desires to cross-examine any witness mentioned in the charge-sheet and whether desires to give or produce evidence in his defence.
He shall also be informed that in case he does not appear or file the written statement on the specified date, it will be presumed that he has none to furnish and Inquiry Officer shall proceed to complete the inquiry ex parte.
7 (v) The charge-sheet, along with the copy of documentary evidences mentioned therein and list of witnesses and their statements, if any shall be served on the charged Government servant personally or by registered post at the address mentioned in the official records in case the charge-sheet could not be served in aforesaid manner, the charge-sheet shall be served by publication in a daily newspaper having wide circulation.
7 (viii) The Inquiry Officer may summon any witnesses to give evidence or require any person to produce documents before him in accordance with the provisions of the Uttar Pradesh Departmental Inquiries (Enforcement of Attendance of Witnesses and Production of Document) Act, 1976."
6. From perusal of the Rules, it is clear that no order of dismissal, removal of reduction in rank can be passed against a person unless he has been informed in writing of the grounds on which it is proposed to take action and has been afforded an adequate opportunity of defending himself. Definite charges shall be communicated to the person and he shall be required to put in a written statement of his defence and to state whether he desires to be heard in person. If he so desires, or if the authority concerned so directs, an inquiry shall be held in respect of such of the allegations as are not admitted. At that enquiry, such oral evidence will be heard as the Inquiring Officer considers necessary. The person charged shall be entitled to cross-examine the witnesses, to give evidence in person and to have such witnesses called as he may wish. The proceedings shall contain a sufficient record of the evidence and statement of the findings and the grounds thereof.
7. The reading of Rule 55, Sub-rule (1) expressly do not provide that it is obligatory on the employer to bring oral evidence to prove the charges. The rule do not indicate that in case oral evidence is not brought by the employer, the charges must fail. There is no doubt that oral enquiry is held to enquire the veracity of the charges and to examine the allegations made against the delinquent. The words used under Rule 55 are "an oral enquiry shall be held in respect of such of the allegation as are not admitted". Thus, the enquiry has to be confined to the allegations which are not admitted. The question is that if in the charge-sheet certain documents are referred, do the employers have necessarily to bring the witnesses to prove the correctness of the documents or unless the documents are proved, they cannot be relied upon. In the oral enquiry what evidence is required to prove the charges is a fact which may differ from case to case. If the allegations in the charges are such which can be proved by oral evidence it is necessary for the employer to bring oral evidence to prove the charges but if the allegations in an enquiry are such which can be proved from the documents, it is not obligatory for the employer to bring oral evidence. Moreover, even in cases where the charges are based on documents, employer may be required to prove the documents in an event when the genuineness or veracity of the documents have been denied by the delinquent. In a case where the genuineness or veracity of the documents have not been denied by the delinquent the employer may not fail on the ground ; that no witness has come forward to prove the document. The disciplinary enquiry is not governed by strict rule of evidence.
8. The counsel for the petitioner has cited several judgments of the Apex Court and this Court in support of his submission which are required to be considered. The first decision relied by the petitioner is Khem Chand v. Union of India and Ors., AIR 1958 SC 800. In paragraph 19 of the aforesaid judgment the Apex Court laid down as under :
"(19) To summarise the reasonable opportunity envisaged by the provision under consideration includes :
(a) An opportunity to deny his guilt and establish his innocence, which he can only do if he is told what the charges levelled against him are and the allegations on which such charges are based ;
(b) An opportunity to defend himself by cross-examining the witnesses produced against him and by examining himself or any other witnesses in support of his defence ; and finally ;
(c) An opportunity to make his representation as to why the proposed punishment should not be inflicted on him, which he can only do if the competent authority, after the enquiry is over and after applying his mind to the gravity or otherwise of the charges proved against the Government servant tentatively proposes to inflict one of the three punishments and communicates the same to the Government servant.
In short the substance of the protection provided by Rules, like Rule 55 referred to above, was bodily lifted out of the rules and together with an additional opportunity embodied in Section 240(3) of the Government of India Act, 1935, so as to give a statutory protection to the Government servants and has now been incorporated in Article 311(2) so as to convert the protection into a constitutional safeguard."
9. The next judgment relied upon by the counsel of the petitioner in Jagdish Prasad Saxena v. State of Madhya Bharat, AIR 1961 SC 1070. In the aforesaid judgment the Apex Court held that in taking disciplinary action against the public servant ; a proper disciplinary enquiry must be held against him after supplying him with the charge-sheet, and he must be allowed reasonable opportunity to meet the allegations contained in the charge-sheet. To the same effect is the judgment of the Apex Court In Town Area Committee, Jalalabad v. Jagdish Prasad and others, in which it was held that "a reasonable opportunity is a term of well known legal significance and Includes an opportunity given to the employee to cross-examine the witnesses examined against him ; and to lead defence in support of his version,"
10. Much emphasis has been given by the counsel for the petitioner on paragraph 5 of the judgment of the Apex Court in the case of Kulwant Singh Gill v. State of Punjab, 1991 SCC (L & S) 998. The Apex Court in paragraph 5 has held as under :
"5. The further contention of Shri Nayar that the procedure under Rule 8 was followed by Issuance of the show cause notice and consideration of the explanation given by the appellant would meet the test of Rules 8 and 9 of the Rules is" devoid of any substance. Conducting an enquiry, de hors the rules is no enquiry in the eye of law. It cannot be countenanced that the pretence of an enquiry without reasonable opportunity of adducing evidence both by the department as well as by the appellant in rebuttal, examination and cross-examination of the witnesses, if examined, to be an enquiry within the meaning of Rules 8 and 9 of the rules. Those rules admittedly envisage, on denial of the charge by the delinquent officer, to conduct an enquiry giving reasonable opportunity to the presenting officer as well as the delinquent officer to lead evidence in support of the charge and in rebuttal thereof, giving adequate opportunity to the delinquent officer to cross-examine the witnesses produced by the department and to examine witnesses if intended on his behalf and to place his version ; consideration thereof by the Enquiry Officer, if the Disciplinary Authority himself is not the Enquiry Officer. A report of the enquiry in that behalf to be placed before the Disciplinary Authority who then is to consider it in the manner prescribed and to pass an appropriate order as for the procedure to vogue under the Rules."
11. In the aforesaid case, the Apex Court held that without reasonable opportunity of adducing evidence both by the department as well as by the appellant in rebuttal, examination and cross-examination of the witnesses, it cannot be said to be valid enquiry under the Rules. As observed above, there cannot be any dispute that opportunity is required to both the delinquent and the employer. The Division Bench of this Court in the case of Subhash Chandra Sharma (supra), held that the dismissal is illegal since no regular enquiry was held in that case. It was held by the Division Bench that the evidence should have been led against the delinquent in his presence and he should have been given opportunity to cross-examine the witnesses. To the same effect is another Division Bench's judgment in the case of Smt. Ram Pyari v. State of U. P. and Anr., 2000 (2) AWC 1711 (LB).
12. The petitioner placed reliance on the judgment dated 25.5.2001 of this Court (DB) (M. Katju and R.B. Misra, JJ.) in Writ Petition No. 7133 of 2001, Radhey Shyam v. Secretary, Minor Irrigation Department and Rural Engineering Services, U. P. and Ors., (2001) 2 UPLBEC 1676, where the writ petitioner working as Incharge Executive Engineer in the Rural Engineering Services and Minor Irrigation Department was charge-sheeted for his alleged involvement of embezzlement, financial irregularities and financial loss, however, was made handicapped to participate in the inquiry for non-payment of subsistence allowance as well as legal dues during his suspension and the request of change of Inquiry Officer was not accepted by the competent authority and the ex parte inquiry was conducted behind his back without adopting proper procedure, no specific date, time and place of inquiry was fixed, oral and documentary evidence against the writ petitioner was not adduced in his presence and he was not given opportunity to cross-examine the witnesses against him and he was not afforded opportunity to produce his own witnesses and evidences. The ex parte inquiry was found illegal and the order of dismissal of writ petitioner was quashed while allowing the writ petition, however, keeping in view the financial loss and irregularities, it was made open to the respondents to hold a fresh inquiry in accordance with law and pass a fresh order. It is pertinent to mention that the Special Leave Petition No. 15226 of 2001. State of U. P. v. Radhey Shyam Pandey and Ors., preferred against the above order dated 25.5.2001 was dismissed on 1.2.2002 by the Supreme Court.
13. The petitioner also placed reliance on the judgments of this High Court in K.P. Giri v. State of U. P. and Ors., 2001 (1) UPLBEC 908 paras 7 and 8 as well as on Bajrang Prasad Srivastava v. U. P. Pariyojana Prabandha, U. P. State Bridge Corporation Ltd. and Ors., 2000 (3) AWC 1960 : 2000 UPLBEC 1321. It was held in the case of K.P. Giri (supra).
"even in the absence of any reply submitted by the petitioner to the charge-sheet, it was incumbent upon the Enquiry Officer to fix the date in the enquiry and to intimate the petitioner about the same which has not been done in the present case. Moreover, from a perusal of the order of dismissal dated 20.3.1998 it will be seen that the management had produced the evidence in support of the charges levelled against the petitioner which had been accepted by the Enquiry Officer without making any effort to confront the same to the petitioner. Thus, the entire proceedings have been conducted in gross violation of equity, fair play and is in breach of the principles of natural justice."
14. In respect of change of Enquiry Officer, the petitioner has further placed reliance on Registrar of Co-operative Societies, Madras and Anr. v. F.X. Farnando, 1994 (2) SCC 746 para 12, where it was held that justice must not only be done must be seen to be done, therefore, the Supreme Court has directed that an another Enquiry Officer be appointed in order to remove any apprehension of bias on the part of the respondent. In Indrani Bai (Smt.) v. Union of India and Ors., 1994 Supp (2) SCC 256 para 5, the Supreme Court has held that :
"it is seen that right through, the delinquent officer had entertained a doubt about the impartiality of the enquiry to be conducted by the Enquiry Officer. When he made a representation at the earliest, requesting to change the Enquiry Officer, the authorities should have acceded to the request and appointed another Enquiry Officer, other than the one whose objectivity was doubted."
15. The petitioner has placed reliance on Subhash Chand Sharma v. M. D. V. P. Co-operative Spg. Mills Fed. Ltd., 1994 (4) AWC 3227 para 5. In this Judgment of this Court, it was held that :
"In our opinion, after the petitioner replied to the charge-sheet a date should have been fixed for the enquiry and the petitioner should have been intimated the date, time and place of the enquiry and on that date the oral and documentary evidence against the petitioner should have been led in his presence and he should have been given an opportunity to cross-examine the witnesses against him and also he should have been given an opportunity to produce his own witnesses and evidence. If the petitioner in response to this intimation had failed to appear for the enquiry, then an ex parte enquiry should have been held but the petitioner's service should have not been terminated without holding an enquiry. In the present case, it appears that no regular enquiry was held at all. All that was done that after receipt of the petitioner's reply to the charge-sheet he was given a show cause notice and thereafter the dismissal order was passed. In our opinion, this was not the correct legal procedure and there was violation of the rules of natural justice. Since no date for enquiry was fixed nor any enquiry held in which evidence was led in our opinion, the impugned order is clearly violative of natural justice."
16. In Meenglas Tea Estate v. Workmen, AIR 1963 SC 1719, the Supreme Court observed :
"It is an elementary principle that a person who is required to answer a charge must know not only the accusation but also the testimony by which the accusation is supported. He must be given a fair chance to hear the evidence in support of the charge and to put such relevant questions by way of cross-examination as he desires. Then he must be given a chance to rebut the evidence led against him. This is the barest requirement of an enquiry of this character and the requirement must be substantially fulfilled before the result of the enquiry can be accepted."
17. In S.C. Girotra v. United Commercial Bank. 1995 Supp (3) SCC 212, the Supreme Court set aside the dismissal order which was passed without giving the employee an opportunity of cross-examination. In Punjab National Bank A.I.P.N.B.E. Federation, AIR 1960 SC 160 (vide para 66), the Supreme Court held that in such enquiries evidence must be recorded in the presence of the charge sheeted employee and he must be given an opportunity to rebut the said evidence. The same view was taken in A.C.C. Ltd, v. Their Workman, 1963 (II) LLJ 396 and in Tata Oil Mills Co, Ltd. v. Their Workmen 1963 (II) LLJ 78 (SC).
18. Learned standing counsel has placed reliance on the Apex Court's judgment in State of Haryana and Anr. v. Rattan Singh, 1982 (1) LLJ 46 (SC). It was held in paragraph 4 by the Apex Court :
"4. it is well-settled that in a domestic enquiry the strict and sophisticated rules of evidence under the Indian Evidence Act may not apply. All materials which are logically probative for a prudent mind are permissible. There is no allergy to hearsay evidence provided it has reasonable nexus and creditability. It is true that departmental authorities and Administrative Tribunals must be careful in evaluating such material and should not glibly swallow what Is strictly speaking not relevant under the Indian Evidence Act. For this proposition it is not necessary to cite decisions nor text books, although we have been taken through case law and other authorities by counsel on both sides. The essence of a judicial approach is objectively, exclusion of extraneous materials or considerations and observance of rules of natural justice. Of course fairplay is basis and if perversity or arbitrariness, bias or surrender of independence of judgment vitiate the conclusions reached such finding, even though of a domestic, Tribunal, cannot be held good. However, the courts below misdirected themselves, perhaps in insisting that passengers who had come in and gone out should be chased and brought before the Tribunal before the valid finding could be recorded. The "residlum" rule to which counsel for the respondent referred, based upon certain passages from the American jurisprudence does not go to that extent nor does the passage from the Halsbury insist on such rigid requirement. The simple point is, was there some evidence or was there no evidence not in the sense of the technical sides governing regular Court proceedings but in a fair common sense way as men of understanding and worldly wisdom will accept."
19. Further reliance has been placed on Employees of Fire Stone Tyre and Rubber Co. (P.) Ltd. v. Workmen, AIR 1968 SC 236, in which it was held by the Apex Court in paragraph 9 :
"9. This leaves over the contention that before examining the witnesses Subramaniam was subject to a cross-examination. This was said to offend the principles of natural justice and reliance was placed on, Tata Oil Mills Co. Ltd. v. Its Workmen, 1963-2 Lab LJ 78 (SC) ; Sur Enamel and Stamping Works Ltd. v. Their Workmen, 1963-2 Lab LJ 367 ; AIR 1963 SC 1914 ; Meenglas Tea Estate v. Its Workmen, 1963 (2) Lab LJ 392 (SC) : AIR 1963 SC 1719 and Associated Cement Co. Ltd. v. Their Workmen, 1963-2 Lab LJ 396 (SC). These cases no doubt lay down that before a delinquent is asked anything all the evidence against him must be led. This cannot be an invariable rule in all cases. The situation is different where the accusation is based on a matter of record or the facts are admitted. In such a case it may be permissible to draw, the attention of the delinquent to the evidence on the record which goes against him and which if he cannot satisfactorily explain must lead to a conclusion of guilt. In certain cases it may even be fair to the delinquent to take his version first so that the enquiry may cover the point of difference and the witnesses may be questioned properly on the aspect of the case suggested by him. It is all a question of Justice and fair play. If the second procedure leads to a just decision of the disputed points and is fairer to the delinquent than the ordinary procedure of examining evidence against him first, no exception can be taken to it. It is, however, wise to ask the delinquent whether he would like to make a statement first or wait till the evidence is over but the failure to question him in this way does not ipso facto vitiate the enquiry unless prejudice is caused. It is only when the person enquired against seems to have been held at a disadvantage or has objected to such a course that the enquiry may be said to be vitiated. It must, however, be emphasised ; that in all cases in which the facts in controversy are disputed the procedure ordinarily to be followed is the one laid down by this Court in the cited cases.
The procedure of examining the delinquent first may be adopted in a clear case only."
20. From the aforesaid two decisions, it is clear that the strict proof of evidence is not attracted in the disciplinary enquiry. Further, in certain cases, the charges can be based only on the documents. It was held by the Apex Court where the question is based on the matter of record, in such cases it may be permissible to draw attention of the delinquent to evidence on record. Learned counsel has also submitted that the burden of proof in disciplinary enquiry depends on nature of charges and nature of explanation. It was held in paragraph 5 by the Apex Court in the case of Orissa Mining Corporation and Anr. v. Ananda Chandra Prusty, 1998 (3) LLJ (Supp) 1207 :
"5. On a consideration of the totality of the facts and circumstances of the case including the nature of charges we are not inclined to interfere in the matter. The position with respect to burden of proof is as clarified by us herein above viz. that there is no such thing as an absolute burden of proof, always lying upon the department in a disciplinary enquiry. The burden of proof depends upon the nature of explanation and the nature of charges. In a given case the burden may be shifted to the delinquent officer, depending upon his explanation. For example take the first charge in this case. The charge was that he made certain false notings on account of which loans were disbursed to certain ineligible persons. The respondent's case was that those notings were based upon certain documents produced and certain records maintained by other employee in the office. In such a situation it is for the respondent to establish his case. The department is not expected to examine those other employees in the office to show that their acts or records could not have formed the basis of wrong notings made by the respondents."
21. It has been argued on behalf of the respondents relying on the judgment of Raj Babu Agnihotri v. Labour Commissioner. U. P., Kanpur and Ors., 2002 (3) AWC 2605 : 2002 (3) UPLBEC 2336, where the enquiry was conducted in reference to Rule 55 of the Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules, 1930, for the alleged charges of irregularity, embezzlement and misappropriation and in the enquiry the petitioner was given show cause notice which was responded by the incumbent and therefore, after affording full opportunity of hearing the incumbent produced certain receipts and cash books which were duly considered with and noted that the incumbent did not ask for cross-examination of the witnesses produced in the matter and after perusing the entire record produced before the Court the High Court found that there was no irregularity in the enquiry, in those circumstances, the removal was treated to be proper. The facts of the present case is different and distinguishable from the facts involved in the case of Raj Babu Agnihotri (supra).
22. Now the question arises whether the petitioner after the dismissal/removal has been set aside, has been allowed to reinstate in service and what should be the amount of back wages is to be paid to him. Withdrawal of resignation of the appellant was considered and appellant was entitled to remain in continuity in service was not allowed any back wages if the employee did not actually worked.
23. In Surendra Kumar Verma and Ors. v. Central Government Industrial Tribunal-cum-Labour Court, New Delhi and Anr., (1980) 4 SCC 443, the Supreme Court has held that reinstatement with full back wages is common principle, however, the Court has power to mould the relief in exceptional cases. In para 6 of Surendra Kumar Verma (supra) it was held :
"Plain common sense dictates that the removal of an order terminating the services of workmen must ordinarily lead to the reinstatement of the services of workmen. It is as if the order has never been, and so it must ordinarily lead to back wages too. But there may be exceptional circumstances which make it impossible or wholly inequitable vis-a-vis the employer and workmen to direct reinstatement with full back wages. For instance, the Industry might have closed down or might be in severe financial doldrums ; the workmen concerned might have secured better or other employment elsewhere and so on. In such situations, there is a vestige of discretion left in the Court to make appropriate consequential orders. The Court may deny the relief of reinstatement where reinstatement is impossible because the industry has closed down. The Court may deny the relief of award of full back wages where that would place an impossible burden on the employer. In such and other exceptional cases the Court may mould the relief, but, ordinarily the relief to be awarded must be reinstatement with full back wages. That relief must be awarded where no special impediment in the way of awarding the relief is clearly shown. True, occasional hardship may be caused to an employer but we must remember that, more often than not, comparatively far greater hardship is certain to be caused to the workmen if the relief is denied than to the employer if the relief is granted."
24. In A.L. Kalra v. Project and Equipment Corporation of India Limited, AIR 1984 SC 1361, it was held that when the delinquent highly placed officer in public sector though not guilty of misconduct found to have committed lapses in not returning House Building Advance and Vehicle Purchase Advance was reinstated after dismissal from service, then having regard to all the aspect of the case, the appellant was paid 50% of the back wages for the period since his removal from service up to his reinstatement excluding the period for which he had procured an alternative employment.
25. In Dipti Prakash Banerjee v. Satyendra Nath Bose National Centre for Basic Sciences, Calcutta and Ors., 1999 (2) AWC 1184 (SC) : 1999 (3) SCC 60, it was held that the employee was entitled to back wages when the termination of probationer was set aside and under the facts and circumstance of the case the reinstatement was allowed with back wages and continuity in service.
26. In State Bank of India and Ors. v. T.J. Paul 1999 (4) SCC 759, when the respondent, employee, in doing act prejudicial to the Interests of the bank, or gross negligence involving or likely to involve the bank in serious loss even if the actual loss was not necessary to attract this clause ahead enough to hold such employee, respondent, guilty when such bank officer charges to have sanctioned loans without adequate security and without prior approval/ ratification from superior authorities.
This was contrary to the departmental instructions but in the departmental proceedings the penalty of removal Imposed on respondent employee was found ultra vires and case remitted to the appellant for fresh consideration of penalty in accordance with rules then the order of High Court directing payment of back wages, promotions, increments, etc. was allowed to sustain.
27. In Hardwari Lai v. State of U. P. and Ors., 2000 (1) AWC 96 (SC) :
1999 (8) SCC 582, wherein the appellant, a police constable, charged of having abused his colleague while he (appellant) was under the influence of liquor and neither complainant nor the other employee who accompanied the appellant to hospital for medical examination, examined as witnesses, inquiry was held to be vitiated being in violation of principle of natural justice and plea rejected that there was other material sufficient to come to conclusion one way or the other on the failure of the respondents to examine material witnesses. The finding of departmental enquiry was set aside and the appellant was reinstated, however, considering that long time had elapsed between dismissal and reinstatement for which no blame could be made on respondent, 50% of back wages was allowed.
28. In Prabhudayal Birari v. M. P. Rajya Nagrik Aapurti Nigarm Ltd., 2000 (4) AWC 2951 (SC) : 2000 (7) SCC 502, the Supreme Court observed that termination being in contravention of the specific conditions mentioned In the appointment order, the appellant was reinstated in service with back wages.
29. In Municipal Corporation of Delhi (M.C.D.) v. Prem Chand Gupta and Anr. 2000 (10) SCC 115, the Supreme Court has held that where termination of respondent's services declared invalid being violative of Section 25F of the Industrial Dispute Act, 1947 and keeping in view that the case dragged on for 33 years but neither of the contesting parties were at fault. The delay was due to pendency of the case in Courts and the employer was a Municipal Corporation whose funds were primarily meant for public benefit. In the facts and circumstances of the case, only 50% back wages was allowed with all other consequential benefits.
30. In Vinod Bhanti v. State of Bihar and Ors., 2000 (10) SCC 146, the Supreme Court has held that the appellant a confirmed employee of Artificial Limb Centre, absented from duty, submitted his resignation but before acceptance of the resignation letter, he withdrew the same. It was held after that having withdrawn the resignation, the appellant could not be deemed to have been relieved from service. The centre remaining nonfunctional for said period and the appellant was allowed to resume work at later stage when centre became non-functional. It was found that the appellant was not in service, therefore, he would be deemed to have been relieved from service. He was entitled to continue In service after the resignation having been withdrawn but he was not entitled for back wages for the period the appellant did not actually worked.
31. In Ex Constable Chhote Lai v. Union of India and Ors., 2000 (10) SCC 196, the Supreme Court has held that such an opinion of departmental authority that it was not reasonably practical to hold inquiry, was not justified and argument advanced by the respondents that the appellant being a police constable could have influenced witnesses and therefore, dispensing of inquiry was done, such argument rejected. Dispensing of inquiry was not found according to law, therefore, the liberty was given to respondents to proceed against appellant by holding inquiry. This was observed while setting aside the order of dismissal that in view of the nature of the charges against the appellant.
32. In Director of Collegiate Education and Anr. v. Sri Jagadguru Panchacharya Vishwa Dharma Vidya Peetha and Ors., 2000 (10) SCC 200, where the direction of the High Court to the Government to pay the back wages and other monetary benefits to respondent No. 3 was set aside as the question of liability of Government to pay the back wages and other benefits was not in issue either before the Tribunal or before the High Court and, therefore, the High Court was justified to pass such a direction.
33. In Assistant General Manager, S.B.I. v. Thomas Jone and Anr., 2000 (10) SCC 280. In that case Bank employee was dismissed from service on account of his admitting of misconduct of withdrawing money unauthorisedly from customer's account. The Industrial Tribunal has power to modify punishment of discharge/ dismissal imposed by employer. The Industrial Tribunal ordered reinstatement without back wages and the writ petition filed by the Bank against the award of the Tribunal was dismissed by High Court relying upon Scooters India Ltd. v. Labour Court, 1989 (1) SCC 31. It was held that the bank employee deals with public money and therefore, cannot be treated leniently as has been done by the Tribunal in the case in question and the award of the Tribunal, therefore, modified by inserting an additional condition that the employee would not get any increment for ten years with cumulative effect. However, the reinstatement of the appellant was allowed with back wages without any increment for period of ten years.
34. In Hardwari Lal v. State of U. P. and Ors., 2000 (1) AWC 96 (SC) : 1999 (8) SCC 582 : (2000) 1 VPLBEC 331 (SC), where the Supreme Court has held that failure to examine material witness, appellant a police constable, charged of having abused his colleague while he (appellant) was under the influence of liquor, however, neither complainant nor the other employee accompanied the appellant to hospital for medical examination, examined as witnesses. The inquiry was held to be vitiated being in violation of natural justice and the plea rejected that there was other material sufficient to come to conclusion one way or the other, observing that impact of complainant's testimony could not be visualised and also evidence of the employee who accompanied the appellant in apprehension and the applicant was reinstated and the applicant's dismissal order was set aside with a reinstatement with 50% of back wages.
35. In reference to the alleged charges made against the incumbent at an early stage consequent enquiry on the similar charges and on the same facts were initiated, therefore, the second inquiry was not treated to be legally permissible in absence of any specific rule which empowers the Employer/State Government to make a second inquiry. In those circumstances, the order of dismissal of the incumbent employee of the State Government was set aside on the ground that since the petitioner has not rendered any work during the period of his dismissal order was effective. In the facts and circumstances, this Court while allowing the writ petition with all consequential benefits had only given 50% of the wages for the past.
36. I have heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the documents.
37. 1 find that the documents relied upon by the Enquiry Officer has not been fully given to the petitioner and only after obtaining the reply, the order of termination has been passed. The norms of Rules 1930 and 1999 have not been observed. No specific date, place or time was fixed or documents relied upon by the Enquiry Officer was sufficiently provided to the petitioner. Evidence relied upon against the petitioner should have been provided to the petitioner and the petitioner should have been allowed to cross-examine the witnesses. A dismissal order is a major punishment having serious consequences and hence, should be passed only after complying with the rules of natural justice. Since in the present case, no regular and proper inquiry was held, hence in these circumstances, for lack of providing proper opportunity much less a reasonable opportunity to defend the petitioner himself, the order of termination is not legally sustainable, as such it is set aside.
38. In view of the facts and circumstances and the observations made above, the writ petition is allowed and the petitioner is directed to be reinstated in service forthwith. It is indicated that since the petitioner was out of Job and he has not rendered any service. It is also not known whether he was in any kind of gainful employment during the period in which he was out of job. However, keeping in view the interest of the revenue and specifically that he has not rendered any service, the petitioner shall be given only 50% of the basic wages within six months from today. A certified copy of this order shall be presented by the petitioner himself to the Concerned Officer.
39. No order as to costs.