Himachal Pradesh High Court
Amandeep Kaur vs Vikram Anantrai Doshi on 20 September, 2021
Author: Anoop Chitkara
Bench: Anoop Chitkara
1
IN THE HIGH COURT OF HIMACHAL PRADESH AT SHIMLA
ON THE 20thDAY OF SEPTEMBER, 2021
BEFORE
.
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE ANOOP CHITKARA
CRIMINAL MISC. PETITION (MAIN) U/S 482 CrPC No. 447 of 2021.
Between:-
AMANDEEP KAUR, WIFE OF
SHRI BALJEET MARWAHA,
RESIDENT OF HOUSE NO.259,
KASHMIRI MOHALLA, SABATHU,
TEHSIL AND DISTRICT SOLAN,
H.P.
....PETITIONER
(BY SH. DALIP K. SHARMA, ADVOCATE)
AND
1. STATE OF H.P.
2. BALJEET MARWAHA, SON OF
SHRI ASHOK MARWAHA,
RESIDENT OF HOUSE NO.259,
KASHMIRI MOHALLA,
SABATHU, TEHSIL AND
DISTRICT SOLAN, H.P.
3. IQBAL MARWAH, WIFE OF
SHRI ASHOK MARWAHA,
RESIDENT OF HOUSE NO.259,
KASHMIRI MOHALLA,
SABATHU, TEHSIL AND
DISTRICT SOLAN, H.P.
....RESPONDENTS
(SHRI NAND LAL THAKUR,
ADDITIONAL ADVOCATE GENERAL,
WITH SHRI KUNAL THAKUR,
DEPUTY ADVOCATE GENERAL
AND SHRI SUNNY DHATWALIA,
ASSISTANT ADVOCATE GENERAL,
FOR R-1
Sh. N.K. BHALLA, ADVOCATE, FOR
R-2 & R-3.
::: Downloaded on - 31/01/2022 23:05:55 :::CIS
2
RESERVED ON :17.09.2021
DECIDED ON :20.09.2021
__________________________________________________________
This petition coming on for presence of parties this day, the Court passed the
.
following:
ORDER
FIR No. Dated Police Station Sections
07/2020 20.1.2020 Dharampur, 324, 326, 307, 506 of IPC
District Solan,
H.P.
A wife, arraigned as an accused and facing prosecution for assaulting her husband, has come up before this Court under Section 482, Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, for quashing the proceedings because they have compromised the matter. r
2. The facts of the case are that on 19.1.2020, Cantonment Hospital, Subathu informed the Police Post about admission of a person with injury on his throat. Based on this information, the Investigator reached the said hospital. They noticed Baljeet Marwah (respondent No.2 herein) admitted in the hospital. He was referred to IGMC or PGI. The Doctor, who had provided first aid to him, informed the Investigator that the injured had received injury with a sharp edged weapon on his throat and body. After that, the Police recorded statement of the mother of the injured (third respondent herein) under Section 154 Cr.PC. She stated that the injured is running a shop of General Merchandise in Subathu. He was married to the petitioner in the year 2013 and two children were born from the wedlock. She further stated that her son alongwith his family stays separately in the upper floor of the house. His wife keeps on quarrelling with him on small things. In the intervening night of 18.1.2020 and 19.1.2020 at about 3:30 a.m., her husband made her wake up by saying that the petitioner, Amandeep Kaur had inflicted injuries on the throat of her husband, Baljeet Marwah (respondent No.2 herein). On this, she reached there and respondent No.2, Baljeet told her that petitioner Amandeep Kaur i.e. his wife had inflicted such injuries to him. Based on such information, Police registered the FIR captioned above. Subsequently, the second respondent got his treatment from PGI, Chandigarh and when he recovered he was discharged from the hospital. During investigation, Police also recovered the knife with which the ::: Downloaded on - 31/01/2022 23:05:55 :::CIS 3 petitioner had caused injuries to her husband. After that the Police arrested the petitioner and later on she was released on bail by the Sessions Court. After completion of investigation, the Officer in-Charge of Police Station, Dharampur .
launched prosecution against the accused by filing report under Section 173(2) Cr.PC for commission of offence punishable under Sections 324, 326, 307 and 506 of IPC.
3. Seeking quashing of FIR and subsequent proceedings, the accused came up before this Court by filing the present petition under Section 482 Cr.PC. She has arraigned her husband as 2nd respondent and her mother-in-law as 3rd respondent, who is formal in nature.
4. Paragraph-2 of the petition reads as follows:-
"That petitioner and respondent No.2 are residing separately since 19th January, 2019. That thereafter in the first week of July, 2021 the respectable family members of both of petitioner and respondent No.2 sit together and resolved all the disputes amicably taking into the consideration the future of children and entered into an compromise the relevant portion of the terms and condition as stipulated in compromise are reproduced as under:-
I That both of the parties shall file a joint petition under Section 13 (B) of Hindu Marriage Act for dissolution of the marriage by mutual consent.
II Thatin view of consent divorce, the second party has returned dowry, stridhan and other article belonging to be first party list whereof was supplied by the first party to the second party. The petitioner has now nothing to be received from the complainant. The custody of children shall always remain with the father. The petitioner shall not, therefore, claim custody in the children during all time to come. The petitioner shall not claim any maintenance or any right from the complainant, husband. The petitioner shall also not claim any right in the property of the complainant.
III The FIR No.7 of 2020 under Section 324, 307, 506 IPC which has been lodged on the basis of complaint filed by second party the second party shall not pursue the same and will not object in case the first party file the petition for quashing under Section 482 Cr.PC before the Hon'ble High Court.::: Downloaded on - 31/01/2022 23:05:55 :::CIS 4
The copy of compromise deed attached herein as Annexure P-2."
5. Ld. Counsel for the parties submitted that the parties have resolved the .
criminal dispute between them and seek quashing of the FIR mention above and closure of all consequential proceedings.
6. Ld. Additional Advocate General contended that the High Court could not quash FIR solely based on the settlement/compromise between the complainant and the accused, without even considering the gravity and seriousness of the offences alleged against the accused person because the offences alleged were against the society at large and not restricted to the personal disputes between the parties.
ANALYSIS AND REASONING:
7. On Sep 17, 2021, both husband and wife had appeared before this Court and made separate and joint statement on oath requesting quashing of the FIR. They stated that a divorce petition under section 13-B of the Hindu Marriage Act, has already been filed by them, and they shall neither change their respective stands nor delay the proceedings.
8. The following aspects would be relevant to conclude this petition:-
a) On 17.9.2021, the victim was present in the Court. His statement was also recorded, on oath, in which he says that he has compromised the entire matter with the accused without any coercion, duress, pressure, or any wrong tactics. He further states that he made the statement in his conscious state of mind and admitted that he is aware that this stand would result in the quashing of F.I.R. against the petitioner.
b) The parties have amicably settled the matter between them in terms of the compromise deed (Annexure P-2). The 2nd respondent in his statement stated that he has been authorized by his mother, who is the complainant, to make statement on her behalf that she has no objection in case present FIR and consequent proceedings are quashed.::: Downloaded on - 31/01/2022 23:05:55 :::CIS 5
c) In the given facts, the occurrence does not affect public peace or tranquility.
d) The rejection of compromise may also lead to ill will, and the .
purpose of criminal jurisprudence is reformatory in nature and to work for bringing peace in family and society.
e) The pendency of trial affects career and happiness.
f) Even if this case is put to trial, the parties are likely to maintain the stand they have taken in this compromise, which is expected to result in the accused's acquittal.
g) Accused is the first offender.
h) The accused is facing prosecution for the last more
than one and half years.
STAGE OF QUASHING FIR:
9. In Ashok Chaturvedi v Shitul H. Chanchani, 1998(7) SCC 698, Hon'ble Supreme Court holds that the determination of the question as regards the propriety of the order of the Magistrate taking cognizance and issuing process need not necessarily wait till the stage of framing the charge. The Court holds, "...This argument, however, does not appeal to us inasmuch as merely because an accused has a right to plead at the time of framing of charges that there is no sufficient material for such framing of charges as provided in Section 245 of the Criminal Procedure Code, he is debarred from approaching the court even at an earliest (sic earlier) point of time when the Magistrate takes cognizance of the offence and summons the accused to appear to contend that the very issuance of the order of taking cognizance is invalid on the ground that no offence can be said to have been made out on the allegations made in the complaint petition. It has been held in a number of cases that power under Section 482 has to be exercised sparingly and in the interest of justice. But allowing the criminal proceeding to continue even where the allegations in the complaint petition do not make out any offence would be tantamount to an abuse of the process of court, and therefore, there cannot be any dispute that in such case power under section 482 of the Code can be exercised..."
::: Downloaded on - 31/01/2022 23:05:55 :::CIS 610. In Kunstocom Electronics (I) Pvt. Ltd. v. Gilt Pack Ltd. and another, (2002) 2 SCC 383, Para 8, Hon'ble Supreme Court Held that "...There is no hard and fast rule that the objection as to cognizability of offence and maintainability of the complaint .
should be allowed to be raised only at the time of framing the charge."
JUDICIAL PRECEDENTS ON QUASHING UNDER SECTION 307 IPC:
11. In Ram Prasad v State of Uttar Pradesh, (1982) 2 SCC 149, Supreme Court holds, The appellants, who are the accused and the complainant, Shri Ram, who was the person injured as a result of firing, have appeared before us and stated that they wish to compound the offence. The offence for which both the appellants have been convicted is one under Section 307 read with Section 34 of the Indian Penal Code, but having regard to the nature of the injury sustained by Shri Ram, we think that the proper offence for which the appellants should have been convicted was under Section 324 read with Section 34. Shri Ram received only one injury on the shoulder and that was also in the nature of simple hurt. We would, therefore, convert the conviction of the appellants to one under Section 324 read with Section 34. Since the parties belong to the same village and desire to compound the offence, we think, in the larger interest of peace and harmony between the parties and having regard to the nature of the injury, that it would be proper to allow the parties to compound the offence.
12. In Mahesh Chand v State of Rajasthan, 1990 SCC 781, Hon'ble Supreme Court holds as under:
[2]. The accused were acquitted by the trial court, but they were convicted by the High Court for the offence under section 307 Indian Penal Code This offence is not compoundable under law. The parties, however. want to treat it a special case, in view of the peculiar circumstances of the case. It is said and indeed not disputed that one of the accused is a lawyer practising in the lower court. There was a counter case arising out of the same transaction. It is said that this case has already been compromised. The decision of this Court in Suresh Babu v. State of Andhra Pradesh, 1987(2) JT 361, has been also referred to in support of the plea for permission to compound the offence.
13. In Dimpey Gujraj v Union Territory, (2013) 11 SCC 497, Supreme Court holds, [5]. In light of the above observations of this court in Gian Singh v. State of Punjab and another, 2012(4) R.C.R.(Criminal) 543 : 2012(4) Recent Apex Judgments (R.A.J.) 549 : 2012(5) CTC 526 (SC) we feel that this is a case where the continuation of criminal proceedings would tantamount ::: Downloaded on - 31/01/2022 23:05:55 :::CIS 7 to abuse of process of law because the alleged offences are not heinous offences showing extreme depravity nor are they against the society. They are offences of a personal nature and burying them would bring about peace and amity between the two sides. In the circumstances of the case, FIR No. 163 dated 26/10/2006 registered under Section 147, 148, .
149, 323, 307, 452 and 506 of the Indian Penal Code at Police Station Sector 3, Chandigarh and all consequential proceedings arising therefrom including the final report presented under Section 173 of the Code and charges framed by the trial court are hereby quashed.
14. In State of Rajasthan v. Shambhu Kewat, (2014) 4 SCC 149, Hon'ble Supreme Court holds, [14] We notice that the gravity of the injuries was taken note of by the Sessions Court and it had awarded the sentence of 10 years rigorous imprisonment for the offence punishable under Section 307 IPC, but not by the High Court. The High Court has completely overlooked the various principles laid down by this Court in Gian Singh , and has committed a mistake in taking the view that, the injuries were caused on the body of Abdul Rashid in a fight occurred at the spur and the heat of the moment. It has been categorically held by this Court in Gian Singh that the Court, while exercising the power under Section 482, must have "due regard to the nature and gravity of the crime" and "the societal impact". Both these aspects were completely overlooked by the High Court. The High Court in a cursory manner, without application of mind, blindly accepted the statement of the parties that they had settled their disputes and differences and took the view that it was a crime against "an individual", rather than against "the society at large".
[15] We are not prepared to say that the crime alleged to have been committed by the accused persons was a crime against an individual, on the other hand it was a crime against the society at large. Criminal law is designed as a mechanism for achieving social control and its purpose is the regulation of conduct and activities within the society. Why Section 307 IPC is held to be non-compoundable, because the Code has identified which conduct should be brought within the ambit of non- compoundable offences.
Such provisions are not meant, just to protect the individual, but the society as a whole. High Court was not right in thinking that it was only an injury to the person and since the accused persons had received the monetary compensation and settled the matter, the crime as against them was wiped off. Criminal justice system has a larger objective to achieve, that is safety and protection of the people at large and it would be a lesson not only to the offender, but to the individuals at large so that such crimes would not be committed by any one and money would not be a substitute for the crime committed against the society. Taking a lenient view on a serious offence like the present, will leave a wrong impression about the criminal justice system and will encourage further criminal ::: Downloaded on - 31/01/2022 23:05:55 :::CIS 8 acts, which will endanger the peaceful co-existence and welfare of the society at large.
[16] We are, therefore, inclined to allow this appeal and set aside the judgment of the High Court. The High Court was carried away by the .
settlement and has not examined the matter on merits, hence, we are inclined to direct the High Court to take back the appeal to its file and decide the appeal on merits.
15. In Yogendra Yadav v State of Jharkhand, 21.7.2014, Supreme Court holds, [4]. Now, the question before this Court is whether this Court can compound the offences under Sections 326 and 307 of the IPC which are non-compoundable. Needless to say that offences which are non- compoundable cannot be compounded by the court. Courts draw the power of compounding offences from Section 320 of the Code. The said provision has to be strictly followed (Gian Singh v. State of Punjab, 2012(4) R.C.R.(Criminal) 543 : 2012(4) Recent Apex Judgments (R.A.J.) 549 : (2012)10 SCC 303). However, in a given case, the High Court can quash a criminal proceeding in exercise of its power under section 482 of the Code having regard to the fact that the parties have amicably settled their disputes and the victim has no objection, even though the offences are non-compoundable. In which cases the High Court can exercise its discretion to quash the proceedings will depend on facts and circumstances of each case. Offences which involve moral turpitude, grave offences like rape, murder etc. cannot be effaced by quashing the proceedings because that will have harmful effect on the society. Such offences cannot be said to be restricted to two individuals or two groups. If such offences are quashed, it may send wrong signal to the society. However, when the High Court is convinced that the offences are entirely personal in nature and, therefore, do not affect public peace or tranquillity and where it feels that quashing of such proceedings on account of compromise would bring about peace and would secure ends of justice, it should not hesitate to quash them. In such cases, the prosecution becomes a lame prosecution. Pursuing such a lame prosecution would be waste of time and energy. That will also unsettle the compromise and obstruct restoration of peace.
16. In State of Madhya Pradesh v. Dhruv Gurjar, (2019) 5 SCC 570, the FIR was registered under S 307, 294 and 34 IPC based on the allegations that Dhruv Gurjar (accused) armed with a 12-bore gun, and his gang, visited the house of the complainant with a view to take revenge with his nephew. When the complainant told them that his nephew was not present at home, on this Dhruv Gurjar fired, and the pellets struck on his forehead, left shoulder and left ear. Disagreeing with the order of High Court quashing the FIR, Hon'ble Supreme Court held, ::: Downloaded on - 31/01/2022 23:05:55 :::CIS 9 [16.1] However, the High Court has not at all considered the fact that the offences alleged were non-compoundable offences as per Section 320 of the Cr.P.C. From the impugned judgments and orders, it appears that the High Court has not at all considered the relevant facts and circumstances of the case, more particularly the seriousness of the offences and its .
social impact. From the impugned judgments and orders passed by the High Court, it appears that the High Court has mechanically quashed the respective FIRs, in exercise of its powers under Section 482 Cr.P.C. The High Court has not at all considered the distinction between a personal or private wrong and a social wrong and the social impact. As observed by this Court in the case of State of Maharashtra vs. Vikram Anantrai Doshi, 2014 15 SCC 29, the Court's principal duty, while exercising the powers under Section 482 Cr.P.C. to quash the criminal proceedings, should be to scan the entire facts to find out the thrust of the allegations and the crux of the settlement. As observed, it is the experience of the Judge that comes to his aid and the said experience should be used with care, caution, circumspection and courageous prudence.
JURISPRUDENCE ON QUASHING:
17. In the present case, the offences are not compoundable under Section 320 CrPC. However, the law is almost settled by larger benches judgments of Supreme Court that the offences, those are not listed as compoundable, under Section 320 CrPC, can also be compounded, and the procedure to follow would be by quashing the FIR, and consequent proceedings.
18. In R.P. Kapur v State of Punjab, AIR 1960 SC 866, a three-member Bench of Hon'ble Supreme Court holds, "[6]. ...It is well established that the inherent jurisdiction of the High Court can be exercised to quash proceedings in a proper case either to prevent the abuse of the process of any Court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice. Ordinarily, criminal proceedings instituted against an accused person must be tried under the provisions of the Code, and the High Court would be reluctant to interfere with the said proceedings at an interlocutory stage. It is not possible, desirable or expedient to lay down any inflexible rule which would govern the exercise of this inherent jurisdiction. However, we may indicate some categories of cases where the inherent jurisdiction can and should be exercised for quashing the proceedings. There may be cases where it may be possible for the High Court to take the view that the institution or continuance of criminal proceedings against an accused person may amount to the abuse of the process of the Court or that the quashing of the impugned proceedings would secure the ends of justice. If the criminal proceeding in question is in respect of an offence alleged to have been committed by an accused person and it manifestly appears that there is a legal bar against the institution or continuance of the said proceeding, the High Court would ::: Downloaded on - 31/01/2022 23:05:55 :::CIS 10 be justified in quashing the proceedings on that ground. Absence of the requisite sanction may, for instance, furnish cases under this category. Cases may also arise where the allegations in the First Information Report or the complaint, even if they are taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety, do not constitute the offence alleged; in such .
cases no question of appreciating evidence arises; it is a matter merely of looking at the complaint or the First Information Report to decide whether the offence alleged is disclosed or not. In such case, it would be legitimate for the High Court to hold that it would be manifestly unjust to allow the process of the criminal Court to be issued against the accused person. A third category of cases in which the inherent jurisdiction of the High Court can be successfully invoked may also arise. In cases falling under this category the allegations made against the accused person do constitute an offence alleged but there is either no legal evidence adduced in support of the case or evidence adduced clearly or manifestly fails to prove the charge. In dealing with this class of cases, it is important to bear in mind the distinction between a case where there is no legal evidence or where there is evidence which is manifestly and clearly inconsistent with the accusation made and cases where there is legal evidence which on its appreciation may or may not support the accusation in question. In exercising its jurisdiction under S. 561-A, the High Court would not embark upon an enquiry as to whether the evidence in question is reliable or not. That is the function of the trial magistrate, and ordinarily it would not be open to any party to invoke the High Court's inherent jurisdiction and contend that on a reasonable appreciation of the evidence the accusation made against the accused would not be sustained. Broadly stated that is the nature and scope of the inherent jurisdiction of the High Court under S. 561-A in the matter of quashing criminal proceedings, and that is the effect of the judicial decisions on the point (Vide : In Re: Shripad G. Chandavarkar, AIR 1928 Bom 184, Jagat Chandra Mozumdar v. Queen Empress, ILR 26 Cal 786, Dr. Shankar Singh v. State of Punjab, 56 Pun LR 54 : (AIR 1954 Punj
193), Nripendra Bhusan Roy v. Gobina Bandhu Majumdar, AIR 1924 Cal 1018 and Ramanathan Chettiyar v. Sivarama Subramania, ILR 47 Mad 722 : (AIR 1925 Mad 39).
19. In Madhavrao Jiwaji Rao Scindia v Sambhajirao Chandrojirao Angre, 1988 (1) SCC 692, a three judges' bench of the Hon'ble Supreme Court holds, [7]. The legal position is well-settled that when a prosecution at the initial stage is asked to be quashed, the test to be applied by the court is as to whether the uncontroverted allegations as made prima facie establish the offence. It is also for the court to take into consideration any special features which appear in a particular case to consider whether it is expedient and in the interest of justice to permit a prosecution to continue. This is so on the basis that the court cannot be utilised for any oblique purpose and where in the opinion of the court chances of an ultimate conviction is bleak and, therefore, no useful purpose is likely to be served by allowing a criminal prosecution to continue, the court may ::: Downloaded on - 31/01/2022 23:05:55 :::CIS 11 while taking into consideration the special facts of a case also quash the proceeding even though it may be at a preliminary stage."
20. In Gian Singh v. State of Punjab, 2012(10) SCC 303, three Judges bench of .
Hon'ble Supreme Court holds, "[53]. Section 482 of the Code, as its very language suggests, saves the inherent power of the High Court which it has by virtue of it being a superior court to prevent abuse of the process of any court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice. It begins with the words, 'nothing in this Code' which means that the provision is an overriding provision. These words leave no manner of doubt that none of the provisions of the Code limits or restricts the inherent power. The guideline for exercise of such power is provided in Section 482 itself i.e., to prevent abuse of the process of any court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice. As has been repeatedly stated that Section 482 confers no new powers on High Court; it merely safeguards existing inherent powers possessed by High Court necessary to prevent abuse of the process of any Court or to secure the ends of justice. It is equally well settled that the power is not to be resorted to if there is specific provision in the Code for the redress of the grievance of an aggrieved party. It should be exercised very sparingly and it should not be exercised as against the express bar of law engrafted in any other provision of the Code.
[57]. Quashing of offence or criminal proceedings on the ground of settlement between an offender and victim is not the same thing as compounding of offence. They are different and not interchangeable.
Strictly speaking, the power of compounding of offences given to a court under Section 320 is materially different from the quashing of criminal proceedings by the High Court in exercise of its inherent jurisdiction. In compounding of offences, power of a criminal court is circumscribed by the provisions contained in Section 320 and the court is guided solely and squarely thereby while, on the other hand, the formation of opinion by the High Court for quashing a criminal offence or criminal proceeding or criminal complaint is guided by the material on record as to whether the ends of justice would justify such exercise of power although the ultimate consequence may be acquittal or dismissal of indictment.
[58]. Where High Court quashes a criminal proceeding having regard to the fact that dispute between the offender and victim has been settled although offences are not compoundable, it does so as in its opinion, continuation of criminal proceedings will be an exercise in futility and justice in the case demands that the dispute between the parties is put to an end and peace is restored; securing the ends of justice being the ultimate guiding factor. No doubt, crimes are acts which have harmful effect on the public and consist in wrong doing that seriously endangers and threatens well-being of society and it is not safe to leave the crime- doer only because he and the victim have settled the dispute amicably or that the victim has been paid compensation, yet certain crimes have been ::: Downloaded on - 31/01/2022 23:05:55 :::CIS 12 made compoundable in law, with or without permission of the Court. In respect of serious offences like murder, rape, dacoity, etc; or other offences of mental depravity under Indian Penal Code or offences of moral turpitude under special statutes, like Prevention of Corruption Act or the offences committed by public servants while working in that .
capacity, the settlement between offender and victim can have no legal sanction at all. However, certain offences which overwhelmingly and predominantly bear civil flavour having arisen out of civil, mercantile, commercial, financial, partnership or such like transactions or the offences arising out of matrimony, particularly relating to dowry, etc. or the family dispute, where the wrong is basically to victim and the offender and victim have settled all disputes between them amicably, irrespective of the fact that such offences have not been made compoundable, the High Court may within the framework of its inherent power, quash the criminal proceeding or criminal complaint or F.I.R if it is satisfied that on the face of such settlement, there is hardly any likelihood of offender being convicted and by not quashing the criminal proceedings, justice shall be casualty and ends of justice shall be defeated. The above list is illustrative and not exhaustive. Each case will depend on its own facts and no hard and fast category can be prescribed."
21. In Parbatbhai Aahir v State of Gujarat, (2017) 9 SCC 641, a three Judges Bench of Hon'ble Supreme Court, laid down the broad principles for quashing of FIR, which are reproduced as follows:
[16]. The broad principles which emerge from the precedents on the subject, may be summarised in the following propositions:
16 (i) Section 482 preserves the inherent powers of the High Court to prevent an abuse of the process of any court or to secure the ends of justice. The provision does not confer new powers. It only recognises and preserves powers which inhere in the High Court;
16 (ii) The invocation of the jurisdiction of the High Court to quash a First Information Report or a criminal proceeding on the ground that a settlement has been arrived at between the offender and the victim is not the same as the invocation of jurisdiction for the purpose of compounding an offence. While compounding an offence, the power of the court is governed by the provisions of section 320 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973. The power to quash under Section 482 is attracted even if the offence is non-compoundable.
16 (iii) In forming an opinion whether a criminal proceeding or complaint should be quashed in exercise of its jurisdiction under Section 482, the High Court must evaluate whether the ends of justice would justify the exercise of the inherent power;::: Downloaded on - 31/01/2022 23:05:55 :::CIS 13
16 (iv) While the inherent power of the High Court has a wide ambit and plenitude it has to be exercised; (i) to secure the ends of justice or (ii) to prevent an abuse of the process of any court;
16 (v) The decision as to whether a complaint or First Information Report .
should be quashed on the ground that the offender and victim have settled the dispute, revolves ultimately on the facts and circumstances of each case and no exhaustive elaboration of principles can be formulated;
16 (vi) In the exercise of the power under Section 482 and while dealing with a plea that the dispute has been settled, the High Court must have due regard to the nature and gravity of the offence. Heinous and serious offences involving mental depravity or offences such as murder, rape and dacoity cannot appropriately be quashed though the victim or the family of the victim have settled the dispute. Such offences are, truly speaking, not private in nature but have a serious impact upon society. The decision to continue with the trial in such cases is founded on the overriding element of public interest in punishing persons for serious offences;
16 (vii) As distinguished from serious offences, there may be criminal cases which have an overwhelming or predominant element of a civil dispute. They stand on a distinct footing in so far as the exercise of the inherent power to quash is concerned;
16 (viii) Criminal cases involving offences which arise from commercial, financial, mercantile, partnership or similar transactions with an essentially civil flavour may in appropriate situations fall for quashing where parties have settled the dispute;
16 (ix) In such a case, the High Court may quash the criminal proceeding if in view of the compromise between the disputants, the possibility of a conviction is remote and the continuation of a criminal proceeding would cause oppression and prejudice; and 16 (x) There is yet an exception to the principle set out in propositions
(viii) and (ix) above. Economic offences involving the financial and economic well-being of the state have implications which lie beyond the domain of a mere dispute between private disputants. The High Court would be justified in declining to quash where the offender is involved in an activity akin to a financial or economic fraud or misdemeanour. The consequences of the act complained of upon the financial or economic system will weigh in the balance.
22. In State of Madhya Pradesh v Laxmi Narayan, (2019) 5 SCC 688, Hon'ble Supreme Court holds, ::: Downloaded on - 31/01/2022 23:05:55 :::CIS 14 [15]. Considering the law on the point and the other decisions of this Court on the point, referred to hereinabove, it is observed and held as under:
[15.1] That the power conferred under Section 482 of the Code to quash .
the criminal proceedings for the non-compoundable offences under Section 320 of the Code can be exercised having overwhelmingly and predominantly the civil character, particularly those arising out of commercial transactions or arising out of matrimonial relationship or family disputes and when the parties have resolved the entire dispute amongst themselves;
[15.1] Such power is not to be exercised in those prosecutions which involved heinous and serious offences of mental depravity or offences like murder, rape, dacoity, etc. Such offences are not private in nature and have a serious impact on society;
[15.3] Similarly, such power is not to be exercised for the offences under the special statutes like Prevention of Corruption Act or the offences committed by public servants while working in that capacity are not to be quashed merely on the basis of compromise between the victim and the offender;
[15.4] Offences under Section 307 IPC and the Arms Act etc. would fall in the category of heinous and serious offences and therefore are to be treated as crime against the society and not against the individual alone, and therefore, the criminal proceedings for the offence under Section 307 IPC and/or the Arms Act etc. which have a serious impact on the society cannot be quashed in exercise of powers under Section 482 of the Code, on the ground that the parties have resolved their entire dispute amongst themselves. However, the High Court would not rest its decision merely because there is a mention of Section 307 IPC in the FIR or the charge is framed under this provision. It would be open to the High Court to examine as to whether incorporation of Section 307 IPC is there for the sake of it or the prosecution has collected sufficient evidence, which if proved, would lead to framing the charge under Section 307 IPC. For this purpose, it would be open to the High Court to go by the nature of injury sustained, whether such injury is inflicted on the vital/delegate parts of the body, nature of weapons used etc. However, such an exercise by the High Court would be permissible only after the evidence is collected after investigation and the charge sheet is filed/charge is framed and/or during the trial. Such exercise is not permissible when the matter is still under investigation. Therefore, the ultimate conclusion in paragraphs 29.6 and 29.7 of the decision of this Court in the case of Narinder Singh (supra) should be read harmoniously and to be read as a whole and in the circumstances stated hereinabove;
[15.5] While exercising the power under Section 482 of the Code to quash the criminal proceedings in respect of non-compoundable offences, ::: Downloaded on - 31/01/2022 23:05:55 :::CIS 15 which are private in nature and do not have a serious impact on society, on the ground that there is a settlement/compromise between the victim and the offender, the High Court is required to consider the antecedents of the accused; the conduct of the accused, namely, whether the accused was absconding and why he was absconding, how he had managed with .
the complainant to enter into a compromise etc. CONCLUSION:
23. Upon perusal of the record, it appears that wife allegedly assaulted her husband. After this incident, they have parted company. They have also settled their disputes amicably, and no untoward incident has ever taken place after the date of the incident. Both of them made a joint statement before this Court, on oath not to delay and not to change their stands in the divorce proceedings which are pending adjudication.
24. This Court has inherent powers under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure to interfere in this kind of matter. Given the entirety of the case and judicial precedents, I am of the considered opinion that the continuation of these proceedings will not suffice any fruitful purpose whatsoever. The Court is inclined to invoke the inherent jurisdiction under section 482 CrPC to quash the FIR and all subsequent proceedings in the peculiar facts and circumstances.
25. In Himachal Pradesh Cricket Association v State of Himachal Pradesh, 2018 (4) Crimes 324, Hon'ble Supreme Court holds "[47]. As far as Writ Petition (Criminal) No. 135 of 2017 is concerned, the appellants came to this Court challenging the order of cognizance only because of the reason that matter was already pending as the appellants had filed the Special Leave Petitions against the order of the High Court rejecting their petition for quashing of the FIR/Chargesheet.
Having regard to these peculiar facts, writ petition has also been entertained. In any case, once we hold that FIR needs to be quashed, order of cognizance would automatically stands vitiated."
26. In Shakuntala Sawhney v Kaushalya Sawhney, (1979) 3 SCR 639, at p 642, Hon'ble Supreme Court observed that the finest hour of Justice arises propitiously when parties, who fell apart, bury the hatchet and weave a sense of fellowship or reunion.
::: Downloaded on - 31/01/2022 23:05:55 :::CIS 1627. Given above, because of the compromise, this is a fit case where the inherent jurisdiction of the High Court under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure is invoked to quash the proceedings mentioned above. The FIR mentioned above is .
quashed, and all the consequential proceedings are also quashed and set aside. The bail bonds are accordingly discharged. All pending application(s), if any, stand closed.
In the facts and circumstances peculiar to this case, the petition is allowed in the aforementioned terms.
(Anoop Chitkara), Judge September 20, 2021 (ks) ::: Downloaded on - 31/01/2022 23:05:55 :::CIS