Gujarat High Court
Ea Singh vs State Of Gujarat on 5 December, 2014
Author: S.H.Vora
Bench: S.H.Vora
C/SCA/7157/2002 CAV JUDGMENT
IN THE HIGH COURT OF GUJARAT AT AHMEDABAD
SPECIAL CIVIL APPLICATION NO. 7157 of 2002
FOR APPROVAL AND SIGNATURE:
HONOURABLE MR.JUSTICE S.H.VORA
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1 Whether Reporters of Local Papers may be allowed to see
the judgment ?
2 To be referred to the Reporter or not ?
3 Whether their Lordships wish to see the fair copy of the
judgment ?
4 Whether this case involves a substantial question of law as
to the interpretation of the Constitution of India, 1950 or any
order made thereunder ?
5 Whether it is to be circulated to the civil judge ?
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EA SINGH....Petitioner(s)
Versus
STATE OF GUJARAT....Respondent(s)
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Appearance:
MR VAIBHAV A VYAS, ADVOCATE for the Petitioner(s) No. 1
MR SWAPNESHWAR GOUTAM AGP for the Respondent(s) No. 1
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CORAM: HONOURABLE MR.JUSTICE S.H.VORA
Date : 05/12/2014
CAV JUDGMENT
1. By way of this petition filed under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, the petitioner has challenged the order dated 20.06.2002 passed by the State Government whereby, Page 1 of 18 C/SCA/7157/2002 CAV JUDGMENT the petitioner was compulsorily retired from the service pursuant to Departmental Inquiry conducted against the petitioner.
2. Brief facts leading to present petition and as emerging from record, are as under.
2.1. The petitioner joined services as Sub-Inspector in Gujarat Police in the year 1965 and in due course, he was promoted as Police Inspector and then as Deputy Superintendent of Police. While the petitioner was working as Police Inspector at Vejalpur Police Station, Ahmedabad City, he registered one case being C.R.No.I-57 of 1991 under the provisions of Sections 420, 465, 467, 468, 471, 472 and 120B of the Indian Penal Code read with Section 25(1)(C) of the Arms Act. The petitioner conducted investigation of the offences from the date of its registration on 06.02.1991 till he was transferred on 15.08.1991. The remaining part of investigation was conducted by one Mr.V.K. Amliyar, who filed charge-sheet in the competent Court against one Mr.Jahangir Majarban Patel and 7 other accused persons. The learned Chief Judicial Magistrate, Ahmedabad, vide judgment dated 29.04.1995, acquitted all the accused persons but criticized the manner in which, the investigation was conducted and, therefore, gave benefit of doubt to the accused persons by holding that the prosecution has failed to prove charges framed against the accused persons.
2.2. Upon receipt of copy of the judgment, the State Government referred the matter to the Anti Corruption Bureau to suggest course of action to be taken in light of observations made by the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate with regard to Page 2 of 18 C/SCA/7157/2002 CAV JUDGMENT the manner in which, the investigation was conducted by the Investigating Officers. The Anti Corruption Bureau gave its opinion somewhere in the year 1998 that it was a fit case for initiation of Departmental Inquiry against the Investigating Officer. Subsequently, papers were sent to the Vigilance Cell which concurred with the opinion of Anti Corruption Bureau and suggested that action may be initiated against the petitioner for major penalty. Consequently, the State Government accepted suggestion of the Vigilance Cell and issued memorandum dated 31.07.1999 for holding Departmental Inquiry against the petitioner on the following charges:-
"Charge No.1:-
During investigation Shri Singh had recovered four bogus arms licences of another province and arms from the accused, but he did not make necessary inquiry whether the the said licences were bogus or not.
Charge No.2:-
He has not obtained opinion of F.S.L. whether arms attached as muddamal was in working condition or not.
Charge No.3:-
He has not attached papers of bogus arm lincence, seal and stamp from main accused of offence Abidbhai.
Charge No.4:-
Accused No.3 Abbasbhai was obtained on remand and was taken to Mumbai on 14/4/91. According to Gujarat Police Manual and Criminal Procedure Code, the accused on remand should be put in lock up at the time other than investigation but accused was kept with him in private hotel instead of keeping him in police lock up."Page 3 of 18 C/SCA/7157/2002 CAV JUDGMENT
2.3. In response to the charge-sheet which was accompanied by statement of imputations and lists of documents and witnesses, the petitioner filed reply and denied the charges in toto. The petitioner pleaded that the prosecution case against accused persons i.e. said Mr.Jahangir Patel and others had failed due to the negligence of Mr.V.K. Amliyar and, therefore, the petitioner could not be held responsible for any lapses in further investigation which was to be carried out by said Investigating Officer - Mr.Amliyar. The State Government did not accept or satisfy with the reply of the petitioner and appointed one Mr.K.S. Vora, retired Deputy Secretary, for conducting Departmental Inquiry as per Rule 9(2) of the Gujarat Civil Services (Discipline and Appeal) Rules, 1971 (for short, the 'said Rules').
2.4. At the end of detailed Departmental Inquiry, Inquiry Officer - Mr.K.S. Vora submitted report dated 22.08.2000 with the findings that Charge Nos.2 and 3 have been proved against the present petitioner - delinquent and remaining Charge Nos.1 and 4 have not been proved. The State Government accepted findings recorded by the Investigating Officer in respect of Charge Nos.2 and 3 but disagreed with the findings recorded qua Charge Nos.1 and 4. Therefore, the State Government opined that Charge Nos.1 and 4 have also been proved and accordingly, issued show cause notice dated 03.01.2001 requiring the petitioner to file defence statement within 15 days. The petitioner filed detailed reply on 20.05.2001 to controvert the findings recorded by the Inquiry Officer in respect of Charge Nos.2 and 3 and further contested the findings recorded by the State Government in respect of Page 4 of 18 C/SCA/7157/2002 CAV JUDGMENT Charge Nos.1 and 4.
2.5. Upon consideration of inquiry report, Record and Proceedings of Departmental Inquiry and reply of the petitioner, the State Government passed order dated 20.06.2002 whereby, the petitioner was compulsorily retired from the service.
2.6. The petitioner challenged the order of punishment by way of present petition mainly on the ground that the proceedings of inquiry and the order of punishment are liable to be quashed on the ground of unexplained delay of 8 years between the commission of so-called delinquency in the investigation of criminal case being C.R.No.I-57 of 1991 registered at Vejalpur police station and initiation of Departmental Inquiry in the year 1999. According to the petitioner, 8 years' delay in initiation of Departmental Inquiry was fatal to the order of punishment. It is further case of the petitioner that the observations made by the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate could not have been made basis for initiation of Departmental Inquiry and, in any case, the petitioner could not be held guilty because part of investigation was conducted by Mr.V.K. Amliyar, who filed charge-sheet in the Court of learned Chief Judicial Magistrate, Ahmedabad.
2.7. Per contra, the State of Gujarat filed its reply, inter alia, stating that the order of compulsory retirement has been passed after giving all the opportunities to the petitioner and after following all the Rules and Regulations. It is contended by Page 5 of 18 C/SCA/7157/2002 CAV JUDGMENT the State that the petitioner had undertaken investigation of criminal case being C.R.No.I-57 of 1991 registered at Vejalpur police station since its registration i.e. from 06.02.1991 to 15.08.1991. According to the State, most of the investigation was carried out by the petitioner. The petitioner being complainant and also an Investigating Officer, has deposed before the trial court and during the cross-examinations, he had admitted certain lapses in his investigation. It is contended by the State that the petitioner kept one accused, namely, Mr.Abbasbhai with him in the hotel during night halt at Mumbai instead of putting the said accused in the police lock-up as per Rule 441(5) of the Gujarat Police Manual. It is contended that because of certain specific lapses on the part of the petitioner while conducting investigation of the offences in question, the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate recorded observations/strictures qua the petitioner which have not been challenged by the petitioner. It is further contended by the State that the judgment and order of the trial court was not only considered but was made basis of initiation of the Departmental Inquiry against the petitioner. In fact, after the judgment and order passed by the trial court, preliminary inquiry was conducted by the Anti Corruption Bureau and after consideration of the preliminary inquiry report of the Anti Corruption Bureau, after obtaining opinion of the Vigilance Cell and after consulting G.P.S.C., it was recommended to initiate Departmental Inquiry against the petitioner.
3. Before the submissions made at bar are considered, it requires to be noted that vide judgment dated 23.08.2004 passed by the learned Single Judge of this Court, the present petition was allowed. Feeling aggrieved by the said judgment, Page 6 of 18 C/SCA/7157/2002 CAV JUDGMENT the respondent - State preferred Letters Patent Appeal No.2621 of 2004 before the Division Bench of this Court. Vide judgment dated 22.09.2005, the Division Bench quashed and set aside the order of the learned Single Judge of this Court and remanded the matter for fresh adjudication. Accordingly, after remand, the matter was taken up for final hearing and this Court heard the submissions of learned advocate Mr.V.A. Vyas for the petitioner and learned A.G.P. Mr.Swapneshwar Goutam for the respondent - State at length and examined the pleadings and documents annexed with the pleadings.
4. Learned advocate Mr.Vyas for the petitioner submitted that the petitioner was not at fault for the charge-sheet which was filed before the Court of learned Chief Judicial Magistrate, Ahmedabad as, in the midst of the investigation, the petitioner was transferred and, therefore, successor of the petitioner, before filing charge-sheet in the trial court, ought to have verified whether everything is in order or not? According to the learned advocate for the petitioner, respondent-authorities have completely ignored the defence of the petitioner that basis for Departmental Inquiry against the petitioner is the observations made by the learned trial Judge and, therefore, even if it is assumed for the sake of argument that there was some lacuna in the investigation at the level of the petitioner, the petitioner had not completed the investigation because of his transfer by the respondent - authorities and, therefore, it was for the successor - Investigating Officer to see that the investigation is completed properly before charge-sheet is filed. Secondly, learned advocate Mr.Vyas contended that the petitioner was to retire on attaining the age of superannuation i.e. w.e.f. 31.08.2002 and it is before two months of his Page 7 of 18 C/SCA/7157/2002 CAV JUDGMENT retirement, impugned order came to be passed which is not permissible in the peculiar facts and circumstances of the case. Learned advocate Mr.Vyas contended that the case against the petitioner is of no evidence and at least for two charges, the Inquiry Officer held that Charge Nos.1 and 4 are not proved and further, note of disagreement contained nothing and the authorities have not pointed out as to how the Inquiry Officer was wrong in coming to the conclusion that Charge Nos.1 and 4 stood proved against the petitioner. Learned advocate Mr.Vyas further contended that even Charge Nos.2 and 3 which, the Inquiry Officer held to be proved, there was no evidence to come to such conclusion and under these circumstances, at least for the said two charges, it can be said that the case against the petitioner is of no evidence. Lastly, learned advocate Mr.Vyas for the petitioner, after referring to the decision of the Hon'ble Apex Court rendered in the case of Chairman-cum-Managing Director, Coal India Ltd. and another V/s. Mukul Kumar Choudhuri and others reported in AIR 2010 SC 75, contended that considering the charges levelled against the petitioner, it is not a case of dismissal or removal from the service, still net effect of the order of compulsory retirement by way of punishment is that the petitioner is left to the mercy of the authorities whether the petitioner would get pension or not and if yes, to what extent?
5. Per contra, learned A.G.P. Mr.Swapneshwar Goutam for the respondent - State submitted that the Departmental Inquiry was started in view of the observations recorded by the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate in the case in question wherein, substantial part of investigation was carried out by the petitioner. Not only that, the impugned order has been Page 8 of 18 C/SCA/7157/2002 CAV JUDGMENT passed after conducting full-fledged Departmental Inquiry and, therefore, this Court may not interfere with the findings of the Inquiry Officer in a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India in light of the decision of the Hon'ble Apex Court rendered in the case of State of Uttar Pradesh and another V/s. Man Mohan Nath Sinha and another reported in (2009)8 SCC 310. Learned A.G.P. Mr.Goutam also relied upon certain provisions made in the Gujarat Police Manual and gave much emphasis to the fact that though the facility of lock-up was available, the petitioner kept arrested accused person - Mr.Abbasbhai in a private hotel at Mumbai in violation of Rule 441(5) of the Gujarat Police Manual.
6. I have given thoughtful consideration to the entire matter and carefully examined the pleadings and documents annexed with the pleadings including the judgment rendered by the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate on 29.04.1995 in Criminal Case No.2838 of 1991, charge-sheet dated 31.07.1999, briefs submitted by the Presenting Officer and the petitioner before the Inquiry Officer, inquiry report dated 22.08.2000, show cause notice dated 03.01.2001, petitioner's reply dated 20.05.2001 and lastly, impugned order dated 20.06.2002.
7. At the outset, it requires to be noted that in the case of State of Uttar Pradesh (supra), the Hon'ble Apex Court has observed that the legal position is well settled that the power of judicial review is not directed against the decision but is confined to the decision making process. The Court does not sit in judgment on merits of the decision and it is not open to the High Court to re-appreciate and reappraise the evidence led before the Inquiry Officer and examine the findings Page 9 of 18 C/SCA/7157/2002 CAV JUDGMENT recorded by the Inquiry Officer as a Court of appeal and reach its own conclusions. In this connection, it is relevant and fruitful to reproduce the observations recorded in para 14 of the decision rendered in the case of State of Uttar Pradesh (supra) quoted from the decision rendered in the case of State of A.P. V/s. Chitra Venkata Rao, which read as under:-
"21..........The High Court is not a court of appeal under Article 226 over the decision of the authorities holding a departmental enquiry against a public servant. The Court is concerned to determine whether the enquiry is held by an authority competent in that behalf and according to the procedure prescribed in that behalf, and whether the rules of natural justice are not violated. Second, where there is some evidence which the authority entrusted with the duty to hold the enquiry has accepted and which evidence may reasonably support the conclusion that the delinquent officer is guilty of the charge, it is not the function of the High Court to review the evidence and to arrive at an independent finding on the evidence. The High Court may interfere where the departmental authorities have held the proceedings against the delinquent in a manner inconsistent with the rules of natural justice or in violation of the statutory rules prescribing the mode of enquiry or where the authorities have disabled themselves from reaching a fair decision by some considerations extraneous to the evidence and the merits of the case or by allowing themselves to be influenced by irrelevant considerations or where the conclusion on the very face of it is so wholly arbitrary and capricious that no reasonable person could ever have arrived at that conclusion. The departmental authorities are, if the enquiry is otherwise properly held, the sole judges of facts and if there is some legal evidence on which their findings can be based, the adequacy or reliability of that evidence is not a matter which can be permitted to be canvassed before the High Court in a proceeding for a writ under Article 226.
23. The jurisdiction to issue a writ of certiorari under Article 226 is a supervisory jurisdiction. The Court exercises it not as an appellate court. The findings of fact reached by an inferior court or tribunal as a result of the appreciation of evidence are not reopened or Page 10 of 18 C/SCA/7157/2002 CAV JUDGMENT questioned in writ proceedings. An error of law which is apparent on the face of the record can be corrected by a writ, but not an error of fact, however grave it may appear to be. In regard to a finding of fact recorded by a tribunal, a writ can be issued if it is shown that in recording the said finding, the tribunal had erroneously refused to admit admissible and material evidence, or had erroneously admitted inadmissible evidence which has influenced the impugned finding. Again if a finding of fact is based on no evidence, that would be regarded as an error of law which can be corrected by a writ of certiorari. A finding of fact recorded by the Tribunal cannot be challenged on the ground that the relevant and material evidence adduced before the Tribunal is insufficient or inadequate to sustain a finding. The adequacy or sufficiency of evidence led on a point and the inference of fact to be drawn from the said finding are within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Tribunal. See Syed Yakoob v. K.S. Radhakrishna, AIR 1964 SC 477.
24. The High Court in the present case assessed the entire evidence and came to its own conclusion. The High Court was not justified to do so. Apart from the aspect that the High Court does not correct a finding of fact on the ground that the evidence is not sufficient or adequate, the evidence in the present case which was considered by the Tribunal cannot be scanned by the High Court to justify the conclusion that there is no evidence which would justify the finding of the Tribunal that the respondent did not make the journey. The Tribunal gave reasons for its conclusions. It is not possible for the High Court to say that no reasonable person could have arrived at these conclusions. The High Court reviewed the evidence, reassessed the evidence and then rejected the evidence as no evidence. That is precisely what the High Court in exercising jurisdiction to issue a writ of certiorari should not do.""
8. In the case on hand, it is not a case of the petitioner that any Rules of natural justice are violated or Inquiry Officer has violated any statutory Rules prescribed in the mode of inquiry and, therefore, sufficiency or insufficiency of evidence is not a matter which can be permitted to be canvassed before the High Court in the proceedings for a writ under Article 226 of Page 11 of 18 C/SCA/7157/2002 CAV JUDGMENT the Constitution of India. Therefore, it is not a function of this Court to re-appreciate the evidence led before the Inquiry Officer inasmuch as whether the successor Investigating Officer - Mr.Amliyar is responsible for lapses, irregularities or negligence while conducting investigation of the offence in question. It is an admitted fact that though the petitioner was made aware of observations/criticism made by the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate in respect of the investigation conducted by the Inquiry Officer in the year 1999 itself i.e. while serving charge-sheet to the petitioner, the petitioner has made no attempt to challenge the findings recorded by the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate by way of suitable proceedings before the competent Court. Therefore, it cannot be said that it is a case of no evidence and passing of the impugned order is arbitrary or cannot be allowed to stand in the eye of law.
9. It is one of the contentions raised by learned advocate Mr.Vyas for the petitioner that proceedings of inquiry and order of punishment deserve to be quashed on the ground of un- explained delay of 8 years in initiation of inquiry. At this stage, it is worth to note that there is no any hard and fast straight jacket formula that disciplinary proceedings or order of punishment shall be quashed on the ground of delay. In fact and also at law, each case requires to be decided on its own fact and, therefore, delay in initiation of inquiry cannot by itself, be a ground for quashing inquiry proceedings or the order of punishment unless it is proved that the delay has prejudiced defence of the petitioner - delinquent. While challenging the action of initiation of inquiry or order of punishment passed on such inquiry on the ground of delay, the Page 12 of 18 C/SCA/7157/2002 CAV JUDGMENT petitioner requires to plead and prove that on account of delay in initiation of inquiry, the petitioner's defence has been prejudiced or the petitioner has adversely suffered. While considering the submissions for delay, the Court is required to take into consideration the aspects i.e. (i) length of time gap between the point of time when the delinquency is said to have been committed and issuance of charge-sheet and the explanation, if any, given by the competent authority; (ii) the nature of allegations leveled against the delinquent; (iii) time taken in the finalisation of the proceedings; (iv) prejudice, if any, suffered by the delinquent and last but not the least; (v) whether or not it will be in public interest to give clean chit to the delinquent simply because the competent authority did not initiate action within reasonable time.
10. In order to examine the contention so raised, it is necessary to keep in mind that except averment in the petition that very initiation of the Departmental Inquiry suffers from the vice of delay that has prejudiced the defence of the petitioner, no further details, particulars or facts pleaded in the petition as to how delay has prejudiced the petitioner's defence. Apart from it, the facts of the present case indicate that the State has much sufficiently explained the delay caused in issuing charge-sheet. Firstly, the lacunae/defects in the investigation conducted by the petitioner were highlighted in the judgment rendered by the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate on 29.04.1995; the State did not immediately start proceedings against the petitioner; the matter was referred to the Anti Corruption Bureau which submitted its report in the year 1998 with the recommendation that the departmental action be initiated against the petitioner. Thereafter, the matter was Page 13 of 18 C/SCA/7157/2002 CAV JUDGMENT referred to the Vigilance Cell which concurred with the opinion of the Anti Corruption Bureau. Thus, the impugned order dated 20.06.2002 was passed after consulting G.P.S.C. So, the contention raised by learned advocate Mr.Vyas for the petitioner that there was delay of 8 years in initiation Departmental Inquiry is incorrect inasmuch as the lapses/lacunae in the investigation came into light for the first time in the year 1995 when, the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate pronounced his verdict in respect of offence in question. The State Government, within span of four years, took a decision to pass the impugned order and, therefore, the contention that the order of punishment deserves to be quashed and set aside on the ground of delay in initiation of Departmental Inquiry, cannot be accepted.
11. It is also relevant to note here that neither in the reply to show cause notice nor in the present petition, the petitioner has pleaded that his defence has been prejudiced on account of delay in initiation of Departmental Inquiry. Not only that, the petitioner did not adduce any evidence either before the Inquiry Officer or in the present petition to establish that his service conditions have been adversely affected on account of delay in initiation of departmental proceedings. Therefore, the proceedings of inquiry and order of punishment cannot be set aside either on the ground of delay in issuance of charge-sheet or on merits of the case in view of the decision rendered in case of State of Uttar Pradesh (supra).
12. Learned advocate Mr.Vyas for the petitioner ventilated grievance that the petitioner cannot be held guilty of the charges levelled against him either it relates to the irregularity Page 14 of 18 C/SCA/7157/2002 CAV JUDGMENT or negligence on the part of the petitioner because, the petitioner has not completed investigation and if, something was required to be done before filing of charge-sheet, it was for the successor of the petitioner to do so. According to learned advocate Mr.Vyas, the Disciplinary Authority did not consider this vital part of the matter. Though, the submission is attractive but, in light of the principles settled in the case of State of Uttar Pradesh (supra), the Departmental Authorities are the sole judges of the facts and once the Departmental Authorities found that the lapses and lacuna surfaced in the investigation are solely attributable to the petitioner's conduct, adequacy or reliability of that evidence is not a matter which can be permitted to be canvassed before the High Court in a proceeding for writ under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. The High Court is not an Appellate Court and, therefore, findings of fact reached by the Departmental Authorities, as a result of appreciation of evidence, cannot be reopened or questioned in a writ proceedings. Therefore, the submission made by learned advocate Mr.Vyas for the petitioner that there is complete non-application of mind on the part of the respondent - authorities as the respondent - authorities did not touch successor of the petitioner - Mr.Amliyar, is devoid of merits both on facts and law.
13. Last but not the least, it was contended by learned advocate Mr.Vyas for the petitioner that the order of compulsory retirement is out of proportion to the fault. In this connection, he has placed reliance upon the decision of the Hon'ble Apex Court rendered in the case of Chairman-cum- Managing Director, Coal India Ltd. (supra). In the said case, misconduct of the delinquent was unauthorized absence on Page 15 of 18 C/SCA/7157/2002 CAV JUDGMENT duty for six months and upon being charged of such misconduct, delinquent there fairly admitted his guilt and explained reasons for his absence by stating that he did not have any intention nor desired to disobey the order of higher authority or violate any of the Company's Rules and Regulations but the reason was purely personal and beyond his control and as a matter of fact, the delinquent there sent his resignation which was not accepted and upon such facts, the order of removal found to be unjustified since reasonable employer would not have imposed extreme punishment of removal in like circumstances. Accordingly, the Hon'ble Apex Court found that punishment was not only unduly harsh but grossly in excess to the allegations. Accordingly, the delinquent was denied back wages for the entire period by way of punishment for the proved misconduct of unauthorized absence for six months. The case cited at bar by learned advocate Mr.Vyas for the petitioner is not helpful to the petitioner in view of peculiar facts and circumstances of the present case. It is not to be forgotten that the petitioner, while working as a Police Inspector in the Vejalpur police station, kept accused person at private hotel at Mumbai City in violation of the provisions of Gujarat Police Manual, more particularly, Rule 441(5) of the Police Manual. It is not the defence of the petitioner that there was non-availability of lock-up so as to house the accused person for the purpose of preserving custody of the arrested accused or during remand period. If we read Charge Nos.1 to 4 together, then, it indicate that the petitioner extended all possible illegal help to the accused/arrested person not only in the matter of investigation but also while maintaining his custody at private hotel. In the case of State of Punjab v. Ram Singh, (1992) 4 SCC 54, the Page 16 of 18 C/SCA/7157/2002 CAV JUDGMENT Apex Court was considering a case where an employee working as Gunman in the office of the Deputy Commissioner of Police was found heavily drunk and roaming at a bus stand with his service revolver. In that context, it was observed that though taking drink by itself may not be a misconduct, and out of office hours one may take drink and remain in the house, but being on duty, disciplined service like police service personnel shall maintain discipline and shall not resort to drink or be in a drunken state while on duty. The Apex Court upheld the punishment making following observations:"
5. Thus it could be seen that the word 'misconduct' though not capable of precise definition, its reflection receive its connotation from the context, the delinquecy in its performance and its effect on the discipline and the nature of the duty. It may involve moral turpitude, it must be improper or wrong behaviour; unlawful behaviour, willful in character; forbidden act, a transgression oi established and definite rule of action or code of conduct but not mere error of judgment, carelessness or negligence in performance of the duty; the act complained of bears forbidden quality or character. Its ambit has to be construed with reference to the subject matter and the context wherein the term occurs, regard being had to the scope of the statute and the public purpose it seeks to serve. The police service is a disciplined service and it requires to maintain strict discipline. Laxity in this behalf erodes discipline in the service causing serious effect in the maintenance of law and order."
14. Needless to say that the Disciplinary Authorities are vested with the discretion to impose appropriate punishment keeping in view the magnitude or gravity of misconduct. Therefore, the High Court, while exercising powers of judicial review, cannot normally substitute its own conclusion of penalty and impose some other penalty. In Court's opinion, punishment imposed by the respondents does not seem to be Page 17 of 18 C/SCA/7157/2002 CAV JUDGMENT disproportionate to the proved charges as the Disciplinary Authority followed all the procedural requirements. Therefore, on the facts of the present case, principles of proportionality cannot be invoked as, quantum of punishment cannot be said to be wholly disproportionate to the imputation of charges.
15. Therefore, the impugned order in question cannot be said to be illegal or arbitrary or against the settled position of law and, therefore, it is not a case where indulgence of this Court is required in exercise of powers conferred under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. Hence, the present petition deserves only fate of dismissal and accordingly, the same is hereby dismissed. Rule is discharged.
(S.H.VORA, J.) Hitesh Page 18 of 18