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[Cites 16, Cited by 0]

Income Tax Appellate Tribunal - Ahmedabad

Banner International , Surat vs Assessee on 10 January, 2012

            आयकर अपीलीय अिधकरण, अहमदाबाद Ûयायपीठ 'सी', अहमदाबाद
    सव[ौी ौी डȣ.
             डȣ.के.×यागी,
                   ×यागी, Ûयाियक सदःय एवं ौी ए.
                                             ए.मोहन अलंकामोनी,
                                                        ामोनी लेखा सदःय के सम¢
 IN THE INCOME TAX APPELLATE TRIBUNAL : 'C' BENCH : AHMEDABAD
Before Hon'ble Shri D.K.Tyagi, J.M. & Hon'ble Shri A.Mohan Alankamony, A.M.)

  आयकर अपील सं. ITA No.1829/Ahd./2010 : िनधा[रण वष[ः- 2001-2002
  आयकर अपील सं. ITA No.1830/Ahd./2010 : िनधा[रण वष[ः- 2003-2004
  आयकर अपील सं. ITA No.1831/Ahd./2010 : िनधा[रण वष[ः- 2004-2005

    M/s.Banner International, Surat      -Vs-    A.C.I.T, Circle-2, Surat
   (PAN : AACFB 5280D)
   (अपीलाथȸ/Appellant)                               (ू×यथȸ/Respondent)

      अपीलाथȸ कȧ ओर से/ Appellant By : Shri Sunil Kedia, A.R.
     ू×यथȸ कȧ ओर से / Respondent By : Shri Vinod Tanwani, Sr.D.R.

          सुनवाई कȧ तारȣख / Date of Hearing              : 10/01/2012
         घोषणा कȧ तारȣख / Date of Pronouncement : 13/01/2012

                                 आदे श / Order

Per Shri A.Mohan Alankamony, Accountant Member :

The assessee has preferred these three appeals aggrieved by the order of the Learned Commissioner of Income Tax(Appeals)-II, Surat in Appeal Nos.CAS/II/159/09-10, CAS/II/187/09-10 CAS/II/188/09-10 all dated 30.03.2010 for the assessment years 2001-2002, 2003-2004 and 2004-2005 respectively passed under section 250 r.w.s. 143(3) of the I.T. Act, 1961. Since all the appeals pertain to the same assessee on identical facts and argued by the same Counsel, they are disposed off by this common order for the sake of convenience.

ITA Nos. 1829 to 1831-Ahd-10

2. The assessee has raised the following common grounds in all the three appeals. For the sake of brevity, grounds taken in one appeal are reproduced hereinbelow:

"1. The learned CIT(A) erred in law and on facts in refusing to condone the delay in filing the first appeal before him within the*time limit stipulated under S. 249(2) and thereby in dismissing the appeal in limine at threshold without going into the merits of the case.
1.1 He failed to appreciate the 'sufficient cause' demonstrated to him for condonation delay in filing in appeal under S. 249(3) in correct perspective as noted in KVAERNER BOVING CONSTRUCTION LTD vs. Dy. GIT 54 TTJ 429(Del. Bench) (1995).

1.2 He further failed to appreciate that in the light of CBDT Circular No. 2/2006 dated 17.01.2006, he was advised for not indulging in protracted litigation and therefore he was prevented from sufficient cause for not filing appeal within limitation period.

1.3 He failed to appreciate in view of CBDT circular, the assessee remained under good faith and bonafide impression of the given legal position and did not proceed to indulge in cost prohibitive protracted litigations by availing the remedy before the chain appellate authorities starting with learned CIT(A).

1.4 He ought to have appreciated that assessee need not be denied remedy by way of appeal on mere technicalities in view of the landmark Supreme Court judgment reported in 167 ITR 471(1987)(SC) and the discretion vested to him under S. 249(3) ought to been exercised in most judicious manner to promote substantial justice.

1.5 The learned CIT(A) ought to have appreciated that the Assessee has swung into action by filing appeal before him on having learnt the true legal position pursuant to special bench decision of Hon'ble ITAT in the case of Topman Exports in ITA No. 5769 / Mum./ 2006 giving relief to exporters under 80HHC in respect of sale of DEPB certificates and therefore no matafide is imputable to assessee for late filing appeal.

2

ITA Nos. 1829 to 1831-Ahd-10

2. The learned CIT(A) erred in law and on facts in sustaining the disallowance of relief available under S. 80HHC in respect of sale proceeds of DEPB certificates without disposing the case on merits in the light of binding special bench judgment in the case of Topman Exports.

3. The assessee has raised identical two grounds in all these three appeals with respect to condonation of delay in filing the appeal before the ld. CIT(A). The assessee is a firm engaged in the business of export of art silk fabrics, filed the return of income for the assessment years 2001-02, 2003-04 and 2004-05 on 29.10.2001, 29.11.2003 and 28.12.2004 respectively. Subsequently, assessment orders were passed under section 143(3) of the Act r.w.s. 147 of the Act for all these three years on 14.12.2007, 07.02.2006 and 25.11.2006 respectively. Against the respective assessment orders, the assessee filed appeals on 28.05.2010 for the assessment years 2001-02, 2003-04 and 2004-05, along with request for condonation of deley. There was a delay of 1 year 10 months and 16 days for the assessment year 2001-02, 3 years 8 months and 15 days for the assessment year 2003-04 and 2 years 11 months and 13 days for the assessment year 2004-05. The assessee had submitted before the ld. CIT(Appeals) that the reason for delay in filing the return was because of the wrong advise given by the assessee's counsels that not to pursue the additions/ disallowances before the ITAT and therefore the assessee had proceeded to pay the demand as per CBDT's circular no.2/2006 dated 17.01.2006. However, in view of the decision of the Special Bench of the ITAT in the case of M/s. Topman Exports and Others in ITA No.5769/Mum/2006, the assessee realized that it had a fool proof case in its favour for seeking deduction under section 80HHC.

3

ITA Nos. 1829 to 1831-Ahd-10

4. Because of the aforesaid reasons the assessee has now preferred the appeals. The assessee had petitioned before the ld. CIT(A) for condonation of delay. However, the ld. CIT(A) relied on the decisions of the following cases and denied condonation of delay.

i) Andal Sweet Stall & Tiffin Dining Hall -vs- State of Tamilnadu (1981) 48 STC 551
ii) Nihalkaran -vs- CWT (1988) 73 CTR MP 63
iii) M.S. Nulson India Ltd. -vs- CIT (1996) 219 ITR 736
iv) Collector Land Acquisition -vs- Mst. Katiji & Ors.
(1987) 62 CTR 23
v) Vedabai alias Vaijayanatabai B Patil -vs- Shantaram B Patil & Ors (2002) 173 CTR 300(SC)
vi) CIT-vs- Ram Mohan Kabra (2002) 178 CTR (P&H) 274
vii) ITO-vs- S.G. Jhaveri & Co. (2004) 89 TTJ 895
viii) Ramla & Ors. -vs- Rewa Coalfields Ltd. AIR 1962 SC 361
ix) Ajit Singh Thakur Singh & Anr -vs- State of Gujarat (1981) 1 SCC 495
x) V.V.Kudva & Anr -vs- ESIC AIR 1972 Mysore 204 The ld. CIT(A) made the following observations for refusing condonation of delay:-
" 4.7 As may be seen from the above, the facts of the Assessee's case are identical to the facts of the case of Venkatesa Paper & Boards Ltd (supra) and therefore, the ratio of that case is squarely applicable to the case of the Assessee. As in that case, the Assesse also took conscious and deliberate decision not to file appeal against the assessment order and, as in the case of Andal Sweet Stall & Tiffin Dining Hall (supra), has sought to take advantage of the decision of the Special Bench in the case of M/s Topman Exports which, as the Hon'ble Madras High Court had held, cannot be done. Thus, the Assessee has failed to show that there was sufficient cause for the delay in filing the appeal. The delay was caused because of the deliberate and conscious decision taken by the Assessee not to file the appeal. Therefore, there was nothing which was beyond the control of the Assessee which prevented it from filing the appeal within the period of limitation. An appellate authority cannot simply condone the delay because the Assessee's case is covered by a subsequent decision of another appellate authority and hence, calls for sympathy and benevolence to be meted out to the Assessee seeking relief.
4
ITA Nos. 1829 to 1831-Ahd-10 4.8 Given the facts of the Assessee's case, and placing reliance on the cases of Venkatesa Paper & Boards Ltd. (supra) and A.N.Mafatlal HUF (supra) is held that the Assessee was not prevented by sufficient and reasonable cause as envisaged u/s 249(3), from not presenting the appeal within the period prescribed u/s 249(2) of the IT Act. Therefore, there is absolutely no case for condoning such inordinate delay of 1 year, 10 months and 16 days in filing the appeal against the assessment order. The petition of the Managing Partner of the Assessee firm requesting for the condonation of the delay is therefore, rejected. Consequently, the appeal is not admitted."

5. The ld. A.R. filed the following affidavit before us.

Seal of the Notary AFFIDAVIT To, The Hon'ble CIT (A), Surat.

We, BANNER INTERNATIONAL, having office at Shop No. 6007, World Trade Center, Nr. Udana Darwaja, Surat - 395002 beg to state on solemn affirmation as under:-

1. We say that Assessment order dated 14.12.2007 for A.Y. 2001- 02 U/s. 143(3) r.w.s 147 of the I. T. Act, 1961, was received by us on or about 21.12.2007 along with notice of demand u/s 156 raising demand of Rs. 60,49,021 (Rupees Sixty Lakhs Forty Nine Thousand and Twenty One) making disallowance of Rs.1,38,47,642 u/s 80HHC Act.
2. In this case the assessee is engaged In the export of Art Silk Fabrics and was having the Export Turnover exceeding Rs.10.00 Cr during the previous year and also received duty entitlement under DEPB Scheme under Foreign Trade (Development & Regulation) Act, 1992. The entire sale proceed of the DEPB was taken as profit U/s. 28 (iiid) of the Act and 90% of the same was reduced from "Profit & Gains of Business and Profession" as required by explanation (baa) of sec 80 HHC and the same proceed was further added to "Profit & Gains of Business and Profession" as per proviso to sub-section (3) of sec 80 HHC but in 5 ITA Nos. 1829 to 1831-Ahd-10 view of amendments made in to sec 80 HHC by the Taxation Law (Amendment ) Act ,2005. The further addition as per sub-section (3) was restricted in case of exporter having export turnover exceeding Rs.10.00 Cr by inserting the another proviso to that sub-

section, which was having retrospective effect and accordingly the case was reopened u/s. 147 and reassessed U/s. 143 (3) r.w.s.147 disallowing the deduction claimed U/s. 80 HHC to the tune of Rs.1,38,47,642.

3. We were legally advised not to pursue the addition/disallowance before the Hon'ble Appellate authorities. Accordingly, demand arising from such addition/disallowances were being paid in course of time as per CBDT circular No.2/2006 Dated 17.01.2006.

4. We say that Appeal could not be filed within 30 days owing to erroneous impression of law on taxability / exemption of DEPB entitlement U/s. 80 HHC

5. We say that special bench of Hon'ble ITAT, Mumbai In the case of Topman Exports & others (ITA No. 5769/Mum/2006) has very recently hold that the face value of DEPB is chargeable to tax u/s. 28(iiib) at the time of accrual of income, that is, when the application for DEPB is filed with the competent authority pursuant to exports and profit on sale of DEPB representing the excess of sale proceeds of DEPB over its face value is liable to be considered u/s. 28(iiid) at the time of its sale. On noticing the aforesaid unreported decision, we have promptly instructed our legal counsel Mr, Sunil Kedia, partner of M/s B.N. Kedia & Co. to prefer appeal before your honour in the light of aforesaid special bench decision.

6. We say that the delay is bonaflde and unintentional. We say that the Assessee has a very strong prima facie case on merit in the light of the law declared by the Hon'ble special bench, Murnbai. The additions/ disallowances made is prima facie opposed to express provision of law. Therefore, the Assessee did not stand to benefit by lodging the appeal late in this case. Refusing to condone delay by your honour would result in this highly meritorious matter thrown out at a very threshold and cause of justice would be defeated. The substantial amount of demand to the tune of Rs. 60,49,021- has been imposed and demanded from the assessee based on the assessment order. In fact, the delay is grossly 6 ITA Nos. 1829 to 1831-Ahd-10 detrimental to self interest. The cause of substantial justice may kindly be preferred by condoning the delay.

7. We say that no prejudice would be caused to the Respondent If the delay is condoned.

8. We say that If the delay Is not condoned It would cause grave harm and injury to us.

9. We say that the Assesses should be allowed to contest the appeal on merits and should not be shunned away on technical grounds. We say that liberal view be kindly taken while considering condonation of delay.

10. The Notice of demancdwas received on 21/12/2007 Due date for filing of appeal was 20/01/2008 and as such the delay of about one year months 10 months and ____days have occurred in filling the appeal before your office.

11. We humbly pray that delay in filing the present appeal be kindly condoned.

Solemnly affirmed at Surat For BANNER INERNATIONAL.

Sd/-

      (Hemant Borana)            Seal of the         Attested
      Mg. Partner                Notary              Sd/-
      Appellant                                      NITA J. MEVADA
      Date:                                          Advocate & Notary
                                                     Govt. of India.
                                                     Surat /Gujarat)
      I know the Signatory and Identified by me
            Sd/-
            R.M.Bakriwala
            Advocate, Palanpur Patiya, Surat

5.1 The ld. A.R. argued that the ld. CIT(A) had failed to observe the ratio in the case of KVAERNER BOVING CONSTRUCTION LTD -vs- Dy. CIT 54 TTJ 429 (Del. Bench) (1995). The assessee had not filed the appeals in order not to indulge in protracted litigation considering the circular no.2/2006 dated 17.01.2006 and that was a sufficient cause for 7 ITA Nos. 1829 to 1831-Ahd-10 not filing the appeals within the limitation period. However, the subsequent favorable decision of the Hon. ITAT rendered in the case of Topman Exports (supra) on the issue of section 80HHC in respect of DEPB certificates, which was identical to the case that of the assessee, the assessee swung into action to file the appeals. The assessee with the above submission prayed that the delay may be condoned and the issue may be remitted back to the ld. CIT(A) for adjudication, as per law and merit.

6. The ld. D.R. vehemently opposed to the submissions of the ld. A.R. and supported the order of the ld. CIT(A). He submitted that the ld. CIT(A), after careful diligence and after relying on various decisions of the higher judiciary, had correctly arrived at the decision. The ld. D.R. submitted that the order of the ld. CIT(A) may be upheld.

7. We have heard the rival submissions and perused carefully the materials on record. From the facts of the case, it is apparent that the assessee had initially decided to follow the circular no.2/2006 dated 17.01.2006 in order to avoid protracted litigation. However, the assessee firm realized that it had a genuine case to be held in its favour by virtue of the decision rendered by the Special Bench of the ITAT in the case of Topman Exports & Others (supra). Further, the assessee has placed on record the decision of the Hon'ble Delhi High Court in the case of Kvaerner Boving Construction -vs- DCIT decided on 29th September, 1995 reported in (1996) 54 TTJ Del 429 in support of its stand. The facts in that case is that:-

"The assessee, a foreign company, as part of a consortium arrangement contracted with National Hydro-Electric Power Corporation Ltd. (NHPC), a Government of India enterprise, to set up a turnkey hydro-electric power project at Uri, J&K. The project was approved by the Department of Energy, Ministry of Power 8 ITA Nos. 1829 to 1831-Ahd-10 under s. 44BBB of the IT Act. As part of consortium arrangement the assessee entered into a contract with NHPC for erection, testing and commissioning of mechanical plant and machinery for the Uri Hydro Electric Project. Under the agreement with NHPC, the assessee is to receive payments for storage, erection testing and commissioning of mechanical plant and machinery and also payments for marine freight and insurance in respect of shipment of capital equipment and other goods. Under the agreement, the entire tax of the contract was to be borne by the NHPC. The assessee was liable for any tax due on self-assessment pursuant to application of r. 115 of the IT Rules. The assessee paid an amount of Rs. 1,62,773 towards the tax on self-assessment as a result of application of r. 115. On the basis of the decision in the case of Chowgule & Co. vs. CIT (1992) 195 ITR 810 (Bom) holding that r. 115(c) of the IT Rules was ultra vires and beyond the scope of the provisions of the IT Act, the assessee sought refund of the tax paid on self-assessment by filing a belated appeal, as on the date of the said decision itself, limitation for filing the first appeal ran out. The CIT(A), therefore, dismissed the appeal as time- barred. Hence, the instant second appeal by the assessee before us."

7.1 In the case cited above, it was held by the Hon'ble High Court at under:

"We are of the considered opinion that only due to the bona fide reasons, the assessee, a foreign company could not file the appeal in time which is further discussed hereinafter below and that, therefore, the assessee should not be denied of being heard on its merits and rejected by merely on grounds of technicalities. In the case of Venkata Ramana Chuduva (supra) decided by the Honble Andhra Pradesh High Court, however, holds that where the decision of the High Court in Nooka Agaiah 39 STC 521 was not rendered, much less reported by the date of receipt of the assessment orders by the assessees and both the judgments of the High Court and the Supreme Court were rendered long after the period of limitation for filing the appeals in their case expired and the assessees filed appeals after the decision of the Supreme Court with a petition to condone the delay, it could not be said that the assessees had established sufficient cause for condoning the delay in filing the appeals and nothing prevented them if they chose to dispute their liability from filing an appeal within 30 days after receiving the orders of assessment. At the same time, it may 9 ITA Nos. 1829 to 1831-Ahd-10 also be seen that in the case of Sothia Mining & Mfg. Corpn. Ltd. (supra), the Honble Calcutta High Court has held that where the question whether certain expenditure was revenue or capital was in dispute and the assessee accepted the decision of the Assessing Officer for the time being and thereafter there was a judgment of the Supreme Court on the controversy raised and because of that judgment, the assessee found that it had a good reason to prefer an appeal, the AAC was competent to condone the delay in filing the appeal. Under the circumstances of these two conflicting decisions, we have to give due weightage to the later decision of the Honble Calcutta High Court as it goes in favor of the assessee in accordance with the principles of tax jurisprudence well propounded by the Honble Supreme Court in the well known case of CIT vs. Vegetable Products (1973) 88 ITR 192 (SC). In the instant case before us, as has already been said, the order of assessment was passed on 30th Sept., 1991, having been received on 22nd Oct., 1991, for which the due date of appeal before the CIT(A) was 21st Nov., 1991, admittedly. While so, the decision of the Honble Bombay High Court now relied upon by the assessee was not available, as has already been said either at the time of passing the order of assessment or during the time of the period of limitation to file the first appeal having that been delivered on 3rd/4th March, 1992. Thus, this judgment which was delivered nearly 3-1/2 months after the expiry of the limitation period for filing the first appeal is heavily relied upon and for causing the institution of the first appeal before the CIT(A) with a prayer to condone the delay as the assessee was under the bona fide belief that the position of law prior to the decision of the Honble Bombay High Court was correct and that, therefore, it constitutes a good and sufficient cause which prevented the assessee from filing the appeal. While we carefully deliberate upon the stand of the assessee which was incorporated in the petition for condensation of delay before the CIT(A) who rejected it and which has come up before us for our scrutisr in the second appeal, the decision of the Honble Gujarat High Court also in the case of Karam Chand Prem Chand Pvt. Ltd. cited supra relied upon by the assessee heavily comes to its rescue in our considered opinion. In that case, the assessee did not claim deduction in assessment on the basis of law as propounded by the High Court, but the later decision of the Supreme Court permitted the deduction and therefore revision petition to the CIT was filed based on law as later expounded by the Supreme Court even though that petition was time-barred. The questions arose as to whether there was sufficient cause to excuse 10 ITA Nos. 1829 to 1831-Ahd-10 such delay and whether the CIT was right in refusing to excuse such delay, such refusal to exercise the discretion was also judicious in a writ petition before the Honble Gujarat High Court.

The Gujarat High Court ultimately maintained the writ petition by holding that the petition for rectification of assessment was sustainable and that, therefore, the revision petition was not barred by time as the delay in preferring the application before the CIT was rightly condoned and that the CIT was directed to proceed further in the matter and to dispose of the case on its merits according to law, besides the Honble High Court observing that ever since the decision of the Bombay High Court (referred to in that case) which was followed by three or four other High Courts, the accepted view was that the expenditure in question was capital expenditure and this view was taken as settled law and, therefore, the petitioner had no cause to invoke the revision jurisdiction of the CIT and that such situation changed on account of subsequent decision of the Supreme Court which decision alone gives cause to the petitioner to move the CIT in revision and ultimately holding that the CIT was palpably wrong in holding that the change of legal situation brought about by the decision of Supreme Court was hardly a valid ground.

7. Therefore, in the light of the aforesaid decision in the instant case too, the apparent illegality declared by the Honble Bombay High Court in the case of Chowgule & Co. (supra) on r. 115 as ultra vires, seems to have crept into the assessment and became quite patent only because of the decision of the Honble Bombay High Court. It was, therefore, only after this decision of the Honble Bombay High Court that the assessee had reason to move the appeals to the CIT(A) with a view to obtain relief in accordance with the ratio decidendi rendered by the Honble Bombay High Court. The fact that the petitioner did not keep the question alive by preferring appeal in time, was on account of the situation that before the Honble Bombay High Court took a different view in the case of Chowgule 8. Co., the legal position was practically settled in regard to r. 115. If the assessee did not keep the question alive by filing an appeal in time, it was obviously because the real legal position appeared to be settled not only to the Assessing Officer but also to the assessee and that, therefore, there was no point in pursuing the question any further. Hence, for the purpose of deciding as to whether the assessee had sufficient cause for not preferring the appeal within time, the fact that it did not keep the question alive by preferring appeal before the expiry of the 11 ITA Nos. 1829 to 1831-Ahd-10 limitation period, which was likely to prove infructuous did not make any difference. Therefore, in our carefully considered opinion, after hearing the parties at length besides in our careful deliberation over the issue in question, the delay caused by 3-1/2 months approximately from the last date of filing the appeal, i.e., 21st Nov., 1991, up to the date of judgment of the Honble Bombay High Court which is 4th March, 1992, is a bona fide one constituting sufficient cause preventing the assessee in filing the appeal before CIT(A). Now, coming to the period of delay caused subsequent to the date of delivery of the aforesaid judgment of 4th March, 1992, until the date of filing the first appeal before the CIT(A) on 24th Nov., 1992, it was submitted before us that the aforesaid decision of the Honble Bombay High Court was reported in the law journal on 24th Aug., 1992, which was brought to the notice of the assessee thereafter. If it would have been reported in the journal on 24th Aug., 1992, normally about a week or two may be taken for reaching the hands of even a regular law journal subscriber. In fact, it has been held by the decision in the case of S. Ratnam Pillay vs. ITO (1987) 20 ITD 578 (Coch) that in view of the decision in the case of Asia Tobacco Co. Ltd. vs, Union of India (1985) 155 ITR 568 (Mad), the notification dt. 29th March, 1987, in that case was effective for the assessee as well as the Department or for that matter of the public in general from 3rd April, 1979, only when it was published in the Gazette and which fell within the accounting year 1979-80 relevant to the asst. yr. 1980-81 and that, therefore, the CIT was not justified in directing the Assessing Officer to tax that amount in the asst. yr. 1979-80 based on the date of the notification. Hence, in accordance with the ratio decidendi of the Cochin Bench also, the period between the date of delivery of the Bombay High Court judgment, namely, 3rd/4th March, 1992, and the date of publication of the judgment in the journal namely, 24th Aug., 1992, or say the release of that reported journal was by the end of August, 1992 is also deemed to be excusable. After having got the knowledge of this decision thereafter, the assessee took steps for consultation and preparation of the appeal after which the relevant papers were sent to the United Kingdom for the signature of the assessee, a foreign company and from where the papers have to be returned back by taking appropriate time in this regard and after all these, the appeal could be filed by the assessee before the CIT(A) only on 23rd Nov., 1992, as urged by the assessee and which were all not disputed by the Revenue before us. Under these circumstances, we are of the considered view that the time taken approximately for consultation, preparation of the case and sending 12 ITA Nos. 1829 to 1831-Ahd-10 the papers to the United Kingdom for the signature of the assessee and getting it returned and filing it, appears to be not unreasonable but constitute a bona fide one which, therefore, could be taken as sufficient cause that has prevented the assessee from filing the appeal early. Thus, on all these grounds, we are of the clear opinion that substantial justice would be rendered by condoning the delay caused in the appeal filed before the first appellate authority. Thus, we accept the first ground of appeal of the assessee before us.

8. Insofar as the second ground of appeal is concerned which has not at all been dealt with by the order impugned by virtue of having dismissed the appeal in liming as time-barred, we set it aside to the file of the CIT(A) himself to decide it in accordance with faw after giving opportunity of being heard to the assessee duly considering merits of the case and the stand of the assessee with any relevant supporting material and the case law that may be relied upon in this regard."

7.2 Considering the facts and circumstances of the case before us and the case laws relied on by the assessee, we are of the considered opinion that the assessee's arguments have merits. The mere fact that the assessee cooperated with the Revenue based on the circular issued by the CBDT should not put the assessee on in a weaker footing. The subsequent decision by the Special Bench of the Tribunal has enlightened the assessee to knock the doors before the appellate authority for justice. In these circumstances, the request of the assessee for the delay of condonation for all the assessment years seems to be reasonable and justifiable. Therefore, in the interest of justice, we hereby condone the delay in filing the appeals before the ld. CIT(A) by the assessee and remit back the issues before the ld. CIT(A) to decide the case as per law and merit. Further the assessee is at liberty to raise any 13 ITA Nos. 1829 to 1831-Ahd-10 legal ground(s) it deems fit before the appellate authority and seek justice.

8. In the result, all the three appeals of the assessee are allowed.

इस आदे श कȧ घोषणा Ǒदनांकः 13/01/2012 को Ûयायालय मɅ कȧ गई ।

               Sd/-                                  Sd/-
            (D.K.Tyagi)                    (A.Mohan Alankamony)
           Judicial Member                  Accountant Member

                        DATED :13/01/2012

आदे श कȧ ूितिलǒप अमेǒषतः-
                     षतः
1. अपीलाथȸ
2. ू×यथȸ
3. संबंिधत आयकर आयुƠ
4. आयकर आयुƠ- अपील-

5. ǒवभागीय ूितिनिध, आयकर अपीलीय अिधकरण, अहमदाबाद ।

6. गाड[ फाइल आदे श से, उप/सहायक पंजीकार आयकर अपीलीय अिधकरण, अहमदाबाद।

Talukdar/ Sr. P.S. 14