Central Information Commission
Arun Raj Ruhela vs Navodaya Vidyalaya Samiti on 8 January, 2019
के ीय सूचना आयोग
Central Information Commission
बाबा गंगनाथ माग, मुिनरका
Baba Gangnath Marg, Munirka
नई द ली, New Delhi - 110067
ि तीय अपील सं या / Second Appeal No.:- CIC/NAVVS/A/2017/167338-BJ
Mr. Arun Raj Ruhela
....अपीलकता/Appellant
VERSUS
बनाम
CPIO
Jawahar Navodaya Vidyalaya
Bajranggarh, Dist. - Guna
Madhya Pradesh - 473249
... ितवादीगण /Respondent
Date of Hearing : 07.01.2019
Date of Decision : 08.01.2019
Date of RTI application 22.06.2017
CPIO's response 25.07.2017
Date of the First Appeal 10.08.2017
First Appellate Authority's response 05.09.2017
Date of diarised receipt of Appeal by the Commission 25.09.2017
ORDER
FACTS:
The Appellant vide his RTI application sought information regarding Ms. Manorama Rani including her attendance records between 01.01.2016 to 20.06.2017 along with the duties assigned to her during the leaves, whether Ms. Manorama Rani served as H.M. or A.H.M and what were the duties of H.M. and A.H.M., the number of hours of service of the Music Teacher along with the duties of the Music Teacher etc. The CPIO, vide its letter dated 25.07.2017 provided a point-wise response to the Appellant wherein on some points, information sought was denied under Section 8 of the RTI Act, 2005. Dissatisfied by the response, the Appellant approached the FAA. The FAA, vide its order dated 05.09.2017, upheld the CPIO's response and disposed off the Appeal.
HEARING:
Facts emerging during the hearing:
The following were present:
Appellant: Mr. Arun Raj Ruhela in person;
Respondent: Mr. H. S. Regar, Principal through VC;Page 1 of 6
Third party: Ms. Manorama Rani through VC;
The Appellant reiterated the contents of his RTI application and stated that the desired information was deliberately not provided by wrongly claiming exemption under Section 8 (1) of the RTI Act, 2005 without explaining the reasons as to how the said exemption was applicable in his case. It was further articulated that a Divorce Case was subjudice in the District Court, Guna (MP) and that he required this information/documents to prove his innocence in the Court of law.
In its reply, the Respondent while re-iterating the response of the CPIO/ FAA and their written submission dated 27.12.2018 submitted that the information sought related to a third party and no larger public interest warranting its disclosure was justified by the Appellant. Furthermore, the Respondent stated that consent of the Third Party was also taken who categorically denied disclosing any information relating to her. The Third Party (Ms. Manorama Rani ) was also present during the hearing who alleged that she was being harassed by the Appellant and the matter related to her Divorce was under consideration in the appropriate Court. It was further submitted that she did not wish to divulge any information relating to her as sought by the Appellant in his RTI application as the same would cause unwarranted invasion to her privacy. The Commission was in receipt of a written submission from the Respondent dated 27.12.2018 wherein while reiterating the contents of the RTI application, reply of the CPIO, submitted that the Appellant was the husband of Ms. Manorama Rani (third party) and a matrimonial dispute between them was pending. Hence, in order to settle his personal scores, the Appellant was resorting to the RTI mechanism with an intention to cause unwarranted invasion to the privacy of the third party without explaining any larger public activity or interest in disclosure of the information. Therefore, while praying not to disclose any information to the Appellant, the Respondent submitted that any order passed by the Commission in the matter would be duly complied with.
The Commission referred to the definition of information u/s Section 2(f) of the RTI Act, 2005 which is reproduced below:
"information" means any material in any form, including records, documents, memos, e- mails, opinions, advices, press releases, circulars, orders, logbooks, contracts, report, papers, samples, models, data material held in any electronic form and information relating to any private body which can be accessed by a public authority under any other law for the time being in force."
Furthermore, a reference can also be made to the relevant extract of Section 2 (j) of the RTI Act, 2005 which reads as under:
"(j) right to information" means the right to information accessible under this Act which is held by or under the control of any public authority and includes ........"
In this context a reference was made to the Hon'ble Supreme Court decision in 2011 (8) SCC 497 (CBSE and Anr. Vs. Aditya Bandopadhyay and Ors), wherein it was held as under:
35..... "It is also not required to provide 'advice' or 'opinion' to an applicant, nor required to obtain and furnish any 'opinion' or 'advice' to an applicant. The reference to 'opinion' or 'advice' in the definition of 'information' in section 2(f) of the Act, only refers to such material available in the records of the public authority. Many public authorities have, as a public relation exercise, provide advice, guidance and opinion to Page 2 of 6 the citizens. But that is purely voluntary and should not be confused with any obligation under the RTI Act."
Furthermore, the Hon'ble Supreme Court of India in Khanapuram Gandaiah Vs. Administrative Officer and Ors. Special Leave Petition (Civil) No.34868 OF 2009 (Decided on January 4, 2010) had held as under:
6. "....Under the RTI Act "information" is defined under Section 2(f) which provides:
"information" means any material in any form, including records, documents, memos, e- mails, opinions, advices, press releases, circulars, orders, logbooks, contracts, report, papers, samples, models, data material held in any electronic form and information relating to any private body which can be accessed by a public authority under any other law for the time being in force."
This definition shows that an applicant under Section 6 of the RTI Act can get any information which is already in existence and accessible to the public authority under law. Of course, under the RTI Act an applicant is entitled to get copy of the opinions, advices, circulars, orders, etc., but he cannot ask for any information as to why such opinions, advices, circulars, orders, etc. have been passed."
7. "....the Public Information Officer is not supposed to have any material which is not before him; or any information he could have obtained under law. Under Section 6 of the RTI Act, an applicant is entitled to get only such information which can be accessed by the "public authority" under any other law for the time being in force. The answers sought by the petitioner in the application could not have been with the public authority nor could he have had access to this information and Respondent No. 4 was not obliged to give any reasons as to why he had taken such a decision in the matter which was before him."
As regards the information sought regarding personal details of Ms. Manorama Rani, the Commission observed that the same fell in the category of Third Party information which was exempted from disclosure as per Section 8(1) (j) of the RTI Act, 2005 as also there was no larger public interest warranting its disclosure was justified by the Appellant. In this context, the Commission referred to the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court of India in Girish Ramchandra Deshpande vs. Central Information Commission & ors. SLP(C) No. 27734 of 2012 dated 03/10/2012 wherein it was held as under:
"13......The performance of an employee/officer in an organization is primarily a matter between the employee and the employer and normally those aspects are governed by the service rules which fall under the expression "personal information", the disclosure of which has no relationship to any public activity or public interest. On the other hand, the disclosure of which would cause unwarranted invasion of privacy of that individual. Of course, in a given case, if the Central Public Information Officer or the State Public Information Officer of the Appellate Authority is satisfied that the larger public interest justifies the disclosure of such information, appropriate orders could be passed but the petitioner cannot claim those details as a matter of right."Page 3 of 6
Furthermore, the Hon'ble Supreme Court of India in the matter of Canara Bank Rep. by its Deputy Gen. Manager v. C.S. Shyam, Civil Appeal No. 22 of 2009 dated 31.08.2017 had held as under:
"5) The information was sought on 15 parameters with regard to various aspects of transfers of clerical staff and staff of the Bank with regard to individual employees. This information was in relation to the personal details of individual employee such as the date of his/her joining, designation, details of promotion earned, date of his/her joining to the Branch where he/she is posted, the authorities who issued the transfer orders etc. etc
11) Having heard the learned counsel for the appellant and on perusal of the record of the case, we are inclined to allow the appeal, set aside the impugned order and dismiss the application submitted by the 1st respondent under Section 6 of the Act.
12) In our considered opinion, the issue involved herein remains no more res integra and stands settled by two decisions of this Court in Girish Ramchandra Deshpande vs. Central Information Commissioner & Ors., (2013) 1 SCC 212 and R.K. Jain vs. Union of India & Anr., (2013) 14 SCC 794, 5 it may not be necessary to re-examine any legal issue urged in this appeal.
14) In our considered opinion, the aforementioned principle of law applies to the facts of this case on all force. It is for the reasons that, firstly, the information sought by respondent No.1 of individual employees working in the Bank was personal in nature;
secondly, it was exempted from being disclosed under Section 8(j) of the Act and lastly, neither respondent No.1 disclosed any public interest much less larger public interest involved in seeking such information of the individual employee and nor any finding was recorded by the Central Information Commission and the High Court as to the involvement of any larger public interest in supplying such information to respondent No.1."
Similarly a reference can also be made to the judgment of the Hon'ble High Court of Delhi in the case of Union Public Service Commission v. Dr. Mahesh Mangalat (Date of Decision: 17th March, 2015) (W.P.(C) No. 7431/2011) wherein it was held as under:-
"18. Prior to the enactment of the RTI Act, access to any information pertaining to public authorities was correlated to the locus standi of the requestor. In other words, it was necessary for the information-seeker to show why he/she wanted the information before a decision could be made to give or not to give the information sought by him. With the enactment of the RTI Act this requirement has been changed drastically. The present Act abolishes the concept of locus standi as under section 6(2) of the RTI Act no reasons need to be given for seeking information. However, this restriction on disclosure of reasons cannot be misconstrued to mean that any information pertaining to a public authority or its employees is public information.
19. It is a settled law that for seeking personal information regarding any employee of the public authority the applicant must disclose a "sustainable public interest‟. Even Section 8(1) (j) of the RTI Act was enacted to ensure that all information furnished to public authorities including personal information is not given free access to. As per this Section unless the CPIO or the State PIO or the appellate authority, as the case Page 4 of 6 may be, is satisfied that the larger public interest justifies, the disclosure of any such information that invades the privacy of an individual is not permissible."
A reference can also be made to the judgment of the Vijay Prakash Vs Union of India & Ors W.P (C) no. 803 of 2009 01.07.2009 wherein it was held as under:
22. A private individual's right to privacy is undoubtedly of the same order as that of a public servant. Therefore, it would be wrong to assume that the substantive rights of the two differ. Yet, inherent in the situation of the latter is the premise that he acts for the public good, in the discharge of his duties, and is accountable for them. The character of protection, therefore, which is afforded to the two classes - public servants and private individuals, has to be viewed from this perspective. The nature of restriction on the right to privacy is therefore of a different order; in the case of private individuals, the degree of protection afforded is greater; in the case of public servants, the degree of protection can be lower, depending on what is at stake. Therefore, if an important value in public disclosure of personal information is demonstrated, in the particular facts of a case, the protection afforded by Section 8(1)(j) may not be available; in such case, the information officer can proceed to the next step of issuing notice to the concerned public official, as a "third party" and consider his views on why there should be no disclosure. The onus of showing that disclosure should be made, is upon the individual asserting it; he cannot merely say that as the information relates to a public official, there is a public interest element. Adopting such a simplistic argument would defeat the object of Section 8(1)(j);
the legislative intention in carving out an exception from the normal rule requiring no "locus" by virtue of Section 6, in the case of exemptions, is explicit through the non- obstante clause. The court is also unpersuaded by the reasoning of the Bombay High Court, which appears to have given undue, even overwhelming deference to Parliamentary privilege (termed "plenary" by that court) in seeking information, by virtue of the proviso to Section 8(1)(j). Were that the true position, the enactment of Section 8(1)(j) itself is rendered meaningless, and the basic safeguard bereft of content. The proviso has to be only as confined to what it enacts, to the class of information that Parliament can ordinarily seek; if it were held that all information relating to all public servants, even private information, can be accessed by Parliament, Section 8(1)(j) would be devoid of any substance, because the provision makes no distinction between public and private information. Moreover there is no law which enables Parliament to demand all such information; it has to be necessarily in the context of some matter, or investigation. If the reasoning of the Bombay High Court were to be accepted, there would be nothing left of the right to privacy, elevated to the status of a fundamental right, by several judgments of the Supreme Court.
23. As discussed earlier, the "public interest" argument of the Petitioner is premised on the plea that his wife is a public servant; he is in litigation with her, and requires information, - in the course of a private dispute - to establish the truth of his allegations. The CIC has held that there is no public interest element in the disclosure of such personal information, in the possession of the information provider, i.e. the Indian Air Force. This Court concurs with the view, on an application of the principles discussed. The petitioner has, not been able to justify how such disclosure would be in "public interest" : the litigation is, pure and simple, a private one. The basic protection afforded by virtue of the exemption (from disclosure) enacted under Section 8(1)(j) cannot be lifted or disturbed.
Page 5 of 6Moreover, the Commission relied on the decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court of India in Bihar Public Service Commission v. Saiyed Hussain Abbas Rizwi: (2012) 13 SCC 61 wherein in the context of exemption under Section 8 (1) (j) of the RTI Act, 2005, the Court had held that exemption provided under Section 8 of the Act is the rule and only in exceptional circumstances of larger public interest the information would be disclosed. The relevant observations are mentioned as under:
"22. The expression "public interest" has to be understood in its true connotation so as to give complete meaning to the relevant provisions of the Act. The expression "public interest" must be viewed in its strict sense with all its exceptions so as to justify denial of a statutory exemption in terms of the Act. In its common parlance, the expression "public interest", like "public purpose", is not capable of any precise definition. It does not have a rigid meaning, is elastic and takes its colour from the statute in which it occurs, the concept varying with time and state of society and its needs (State of Bihar v. Kameshwar Singh [AIR 1952 SC 252] ). It also means the general welfare of the public that warrants recognition and protection; something in which the public as a whole has a stake [Black's Law Dictionary (8th Edn.)].
23. The satisfaction has to be arrived at by the authorities objectively and the consequences of such disclosure have to be weighed with regard to the circumstances of a given case. The decision has to be based on objective satisfaction recorded for ensuring that larger public interest outweighs unwarranted invasion of privacy or other factors stated in the provision."
The Appellant was not able to contest the submissions of the Respondent or establish the larger public interest in disclosure which outweighs the harm to the protected interests. DECISION:
Keeping in view the facts of the case and the submissions made by both the parties and in the light of the judgments cited above, no further intervention of the Commission is required in the matter. For redressal of his grievance, the Appellant is advised to approach an appropriate forum.
The Appeal stands disposed accordingly.
Bimal Julka (िबमल जु का)
Information Commissioner (सूचना आयु )
Authenticated true copy
(अ भ मा णत स या पत त)
K.L. Das (के .एल.दास)
Dy. Registrar (उप-पंजीयक)
011-26182598/ [email protected]
दनांक / Date: 08.01.2019
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