Dr. Ajay Kumar Pandey vs All India Council For Technical ... on 9 April, 2026

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Delhi High Court - Orders

Dr. Ajay Kumar Pandey vs All India Council For Technical ... on 9 April, 2026

1. The Petitioner was offered appointment to the post of Associate Professor (Marketing Area) with Respondent No. 3 i.e., Foundation for Organisational Research and Education ["FORE"] by letter dated 11th August, 2021.

2. Clause 4 of the said letter categorically placed him on probation for a period of two years from the date of joining. It also provided that, upon completion of the said period, the probation could either be extended or the W.P.(C) 17731/2024 Page 1 of 17 This is a digitally signed order.

The authenticity of the order can be re-verified from Delhi High Court Order Portal by scanning the QR code shown above. The Order is downloaded from the DHC Server on 13/04/2026 at 21:11:24 appointment confirmed in writing. It further stipulated that, during probation, either party could terminate the service by giving "one calendar month notice or salary in lieu thereof without assigning any reason". The Petitioner joined on 22nd September, 2021.

3. On 5th January, 2023, FORE circulated its revised administrative rules with effect from 1st January, 2023. These administrative rules, inter alia, recorded that "terms and conditions specifically mentioned in the appointment letter will supersede these rules". They also contained provisions governing joining, probation, and annual review. Prior to expiry of the original two-year probation period, the Petitioner's probation was extended by letter dated 6th September, 2023 for a further period of one year, i.e., up to 21st September, 2024. The follow-up letter dated 26th September, 2023 set out, in tabular form, the expected and earned academic and publication credits for earlier assessment periods, recorded a shortfall, and expressly advised the Petitioner to plan his activities during the ensuing year so as to make up the deficiency and meet the expected credit requirements.

4. The petition also refers to an incident that occurred during the "FORE SUTRA" event on 4th April, 2024. A show cause notice dated 5th April, 2024 alleged that the Petitioner had violated protocol by presenting a memento to the Chief Guest instead of the Director and described the episode as a "deliberate personal insult" and "public humiliation". In his reply to the show cause notice, the Petitioner did not deny the occurrence; he stated that it was inadvertent, explained that he had formed an impression that he was being signalled by the Director to proceed, and assured that he would be more careful in future.

5. On 5th August, 2024, the Chair of Academic Services of FORE called W.P.(C) 17731/2024 Page 2 of 17 This is a digitally signed order.

The authenticity of the order can be re-verified from Delhi High Court Order Portal by scanning the QR code shown above. The Order is downloaded from the DHC Server on 13/04/2026 at 21:11:24 upon the Petitioner to furnish details of his publication work and other academic contributions for the period from 22nd September, 2023 to 21st September, 2024 for the purpose of confirmation. In response, the Petitioner submitted an activity report listing, inter alia, two papers described as published, certain papers under review and preparation, work relating to FORE SUTRA, and supervision of Ph.D. scholars.

6. The internal performance assessment placed on record indicates that, for the period from 22nd September, 2021 to 21st September, 2024, the Petitioner was found to be in deficit both under the earlier academic credit norms as well as under the framework of the Performance Planning, Appraisal, and Development Policy, 2024 ["PPAD Policy"]. The comparative summary records an overall deficit of 6.303 academic credits under the previous norms and, for the period from 1 st April, 2024 to 21st September, 2024, a deficit of 131.418 work units under the PPAD Policy. The summary further records 21 work units under "Teaching & Learning", zero under "Research and Publication", 20 under "Executive Education, Consulting and Externally Funded Research", and 24.508 under "Academic and Extension Services".

7. Shortly thereafter, by letter dated 20th September, 2024, FORE informed the Petitioner that, following an internal review of his performance and with the approval of the competent authority, his services would not be continued beyond 23rd December, 2024. On 21st October, 2024, the Petitioner sought a copy of the internal review report as well as the criteria for closure of probation. By a subsequent communication dated 24 th October, 2024, FORE stated that the discontinuation/termination was based on review of performance during probation; that the period beyond 21 st W.P.(C) 17731/2024 Page 3 of 17 This is a digitally signed order.

The authenticity of the order can be re-verified from Delhi High Court Order Portal by scanning the QR code shown above. The Order is downloaded from the DHC Server on 13/04/2026 at 21:11:24 September, 2024 was granted only on compassionate grounds to provide a salary cushion and not for discharge of duties; and that the Petitioner was required to complete no-dues formalities.

8. The Petitioner thereafter submitted representations dated 25th October, 2024, 1st November, 2024, and 9th November, 2024, and also invoked the grievance redressal mechanism under the All India Council for Technical Education ["AICTE"] framework. It is stated by the Respondents that the amount payable towards full and final settlement was kept ready on 24 th January, 2025, and that on 11th February, 2025, the Petitioner executed a receipt acknowledging a sum of INR 6,38,517/- towards full and final settlement and declaring that he would have no further "claim, right, and interest" against FORE School of Management.

Petitioner's Contentions

9. The submissions advanced by Mr. Ram Manohar Vikas, counsel for the Petitioner, in support of the petition are as follows:

9.1. The impugned action cannot be treated as a routine discharge of a probationer. The case is not one of a simple assessment of suitability during probation, but of a decision shaped by hostility, arbitrariness, and a manipulated appraisal process. The Petitioner joined as Associate Professor (Marketing Area) on 22nd September, 2021; his probation was originally for two years; and the subsequent extension by one further year was contrary to the governing administrative rules. The administrative rules permitted a longer probation only where such longer period was decided at the time of appointment and incorporated in the offer itself. The extension issued on 6 th September, 2023, after the Petitioner had already entered service under a two-year probation clause, is therefore without authority and cannot sustain W.P.(C) 17731/2024 Page 4 of 17 This is a digitally signed order.

9.2. The appraisal of the Petitioner's performance during probation was fundamentally unfair. The assessment was carried out using two different yardsticks: the earlier academic credit norms for one part of the period and the PPAD Policy framework for the later part. The Petitioner's performance ought to have been assessed by a stable and known standard, rather than by shifting metrics applied partway through service. Course allocation was not entirely within the Petitioner's control. The Marketing Department Chair allocated teaching assignments, and for the academic session 2024-2025, except for the Marketing Management course, other courses were assigned only after the probation closure date. The Petitioner cannot be faulted for not generating teaching credits through courses that were either not entrusted to him in time or were structured outside his control.

9.3. The appraisal of the Marketing Management course is specifically assailed as arbitrary. Only 21 credit points were awarded under the teaching component, comprising 20 points for session preparation and delivery and one point for an induction session, while other elements under the PPAD Policy framework were ignored. On a proper application of the policy, the Petitioner would have secured substantially higher credit and crossed the threshold necessary for regularisation. The student feedback forms reflect a strong overall course rating for Marketing Management and similarly high feedback in the orientation session, which is inconsistent with the finding of deficient teaching performance.

9.4. The treatment of research and outreach components was also unfair. Papers disclosed by the Petitioner as published or under review were not properly considered. One paper, though earlier shown as under review, had W.P.(C) 17731/2024 Page 5 of 17 This is a digitally signed order.

The authenticity of the order can be re-verified from Delhi High Court Order Portal by scanning the QR code shown above. The Order is downloaded from the DHC Server on 13/04/2026 at 21:11:24 been accepted before expiry of probation and subsequently published, but no credit was given. No credit was assigned for the Petitioner's year-long work as In-charge of the Outreach Committee and for the FORE SUTRA programme. The omissions were selective and operated in one direction, portraying the Petitioner as a non-performer.

9.5. The circumstances surrounding the termination disclose a punitive colour. Prior to the discontinuation letter, the Petitioner had been served with a show cause notice dated 5th April, 2024 arising out of the FORE SUTRA event, in which the Director alleged a "deliberate personal insult"

and "public humiliation". Though the Petitioner responded on the same day treating the incident as inadvertent, the episode remained in the background as an adverse circumstance. The subsequent performance-based discontinuation cannot be viewed in isolation. The surrounding circumstances indicate that the action, though framed as probationary discharge, carries a punitive character. In this context, reliance is placed on Samsher Singh v. State of Punjab1 and A.P. State Federation of Coop. Spinning Mills Ltd. v. P.V. Swaminathan2 to contend that the Court is entitled to examine the attendant circumstances to determine the true nature of the order.

9.6. The internal review on which the decision was founded was never supplied to the Petitioner despite specific request. The discontinuation letter dated 20th September, 2024 and the subsequent communication dated 24 th October, 2024 both refer to such review. Non-disclosure of the material deprived the Petitioner of any opportunity to address the alleged deficiencies 1 (1974) 2 SCC 831.

(2001) 10 SCC 83.

W.P.(C) 17731/2024 Page 6 of 17

This is a digitally signed order.

The authenticity of the order can be re-verified from Delhi High Court Order Portal by scanning the QR code shown above. The Order is downloaded from the DHC Server on 13/04/2026 at 21:11:24 or point out omissions in the assessment. Once the decision is founded on an adverse internal assessment carrying civil consequences, disclosure of the underlying material and an opportunity to respond were necessary. Reliance is placed on K.C. Joshi v. Union of India & Ors.3 to contend that even in contractual matters, action affecting livelihood must conform to principles of natural justice.

9.7. The Petitioner faced unequal treatment. Other faculty members, including those named in the petition, were continued, regularised, or permitted to remain in service despite not meeting the stated academic benchmarks. The Petitioner was subjected to a strict and adverse application of the norms, reflecting lack of even-handedness in decision-making. 9.8. The grievance redressal mechanism contemplated under the AICTE framework was ineffective in the present case. Though representations were submitted, no effective consideration ensued. No functional Grievance Redressal Committee was available to address the Petitioner's grievance, rendering the institutional remedy illusory. The Petitioner draws support from Andi Mukta Sadguru Shree Muktajee Vandas Swami Suvarna Jayanti Mahotsav Smarak Trust v. V.R. Rudani4 to contend that a writ would lie against a body discharging public functions, particularly where no effective alternative remedy exists.

9.9. The role of AICTE is invoked not merely on maintainability but on the basis of its statutory obligations. As the regulatory authority under the AICTE Act, it is required to ensure standards in technical education, including fair mechanisms for redressal of faculty grievances. The stance of 3 (1985) 3 SCC 153.

(1989) 2 SCC 691.

W.P.(C) 17731/2024 Page 7 of 17

This is a digitally signed order.

The authenticity of the order can be re-verified from Delhi High Court Order Portal by scanning the QR code shown above. The Order is downloaded from the DHC Server on 13/04/2026 at 21:11:24 non-interference in individual service matters is stated to be contrary to its statutory mandate and results in abdication of supervisory responsibility. Reference is made to State of Tamil Nadu v. Adhiyaman Educational & Research Institute5 and Parshvanath Charitable Trust v. AICTE6 to emphasise that AICTE bears a continuing obligation to ensure compliance with regulatory norms in technical institutions.

9.10. Further, the Director, at whose instance the impugned action is alleged to have been taken, did not meet the prescribed eligibility requirements under the applicable AICTE norms. This circumstance is relied upon to contend that the decision-making process itself was vitiated and reinforces the allegation of arbitrariness and mala fides. 9.11. In relief, the Petitioner seeks quashing of the discontinuation and termination communications, reinstatement with appropriate teaching work, and, in the alternative, an independent re-evaluation of the Petitioner's credit score and scrutiny of the Respondents' policy concerning probationers. Respondents' Contentions

10. Ms. Pearl Sharma, counsel for AICTE, submits that AICTE's stand is that service and salary grievances of faculty are, as a matter of policy, to be addressed at the institution level through a Grievance Redressal Committee and, thereafter, before the affiliating University or State DTE. AICTE does not itself entertain or adjudicate individual service disputes of faculty members, and the applicable regulatory framework envisages resolution of such grievances within the institutional and affiliating structures.

11. Mr. Rajesh Ranjan, counsel for Respondent Nos. 2 to 4, raises a 5 (1995) 4 SCC 104.

(2013) 3 SCC 385.

W.P.(C) 17731/2024 Page 8 of 17

This is a digitally signed order.

The authenticity of the order can be re-verified from Delhi High Court Order Portal by scanning the QR code shown above. The Order is downloaded from the DHC Server on 13/04/2026 at 21:11:24 preliminary objection to the maintainability of the writ petition on the ground that Respondent Nos. 3 and 4 are private unaided bodies and the dispute arises out of a purely contractual relationship of employment. It is contended that no public law element is involved and service disputes of employees of private educational institutions are not amenable to writ jurisdiction. In this context, reliance is placed, inter alia, on St. Mary's Education Society v. Rajendra Prasad Bhargava7 and other decisions to submit that contractual service rights cannot be enforced under Article 226.

12. It is further contended that the Petitioner, being a probationer, which was assessed in accordance with institutional norms, that he was informed of deficiencies and granted an extension of probation to improve, but failed to meet the required academic benchmarks. The discontinuation is described as a termination simpliciter during probation in terms of the appointment conditions, which permitted discontinuation without assigning reasons. It is also stated that the assessment was carried out based on the prescribed criteria, that credit allocation and evaluation were in accordance with applicable norms, and that the Petitioner's claims regarding publications, teaching credits, and outreach work are misconceived. The Respondents deny any arbitrariness or unequal treatment, stating that performance standards were uniformly applied.

13. It is additionally pointed out that the Petitioner accepted full and final settlement of his dues and executed a declaration that no further claims subsisted, and is therefore estopped from challenging the orders thereafter. Discussion & Analysis

14. The maintainability objection goes to the root of the matter and must 7 (2023) 4 SCC 498.

W.P.(C) 17731/2024 Page 9 of 17

This is a digitally signed order.

The authenticity of the order can be re-verified from Delhi High Court Order Portal by scanning the QR code shown above. The Order is downloaded from the DHC Server on 13/04/2026 at 21:11:24 be examined first. The legal position has, in recent years, been restated with considerable clarity. In St. Mary's Education Society, the Supreme Court held that even if a private educational institution is performing a public function, not every dispute concerning such an institution becomes amenable to writ jurisdiction. What is decisive is whether the right sought to be enforced falls within the domain of public law or remains within private law. The Court emphasised that rights which purely originate in private law cannot be enforced through Article 226 merely because the institution performs a public duty in a general sense, absent a public element in the action complained of.

15. The same position was reiterated in Army Welfare Education Society, New Delhi v. Sunil Kumar Sharma & Ors.8. The Supreme Court observed that although a private unaided educational institution may discharge a public function of imparting education, a dispute relating to service conditions of its employees does not, for that reason alone, acquire a public law character. Where such service conditions are not governed by statutory provisions but arise out of contract, the public element is absent and recourse to Article 226 is not available. The Court clarified that even if education is regarded as a public duty, the nature of the dispute must bear a public law element; matters arising purely from contractual rights and obligations between the parties which are not governed by statutory provisions cannot be agitated in writ jurisdiction.

16. Tested against that standard, the present case falls squarely within the domain of private law. The dispute concerns whether a probationary faculty member of a private unaided institution was correctly assessed under W.P.(C) 17731/2024 Page 10 of 17 This is a digitally signed order.

The authenticity of the order can be re-verified from Delhi High Court Order Portal by scanning the QR code shown above. The Order is downloaded from the DHC Server on 13/04/2026 at 21:11:24 internal academic metrics, whether his publications, teaching credits and work units were properly counted, whether outreach activity ought to have earned credit, whether probation could validly be extended, and whether the institution was justified in discontinuing him thereafter. These are not matters involving any public law element. They arise from a contract of service and the institution's internal academic assessment and administration. The nature of the reliefs sought places the matter beyond doubt: reinstatement, reallocation of courses, constitution of an expert panel to recompute internal credit scores, and scrutiny of the institution's probation policy are all directed at enforcement, or recasting, of a private service relationship.

17. The Petitioner has placed reliance on Andi Mukta Sadguru for the proposition that a private educational institution may, in an appropriate case, be amenable to writ jurisdiction. That proposition, stated at that level of generality, is unobjectionable. The decision recognises that a writ may issue against a body performing a public duty where a positive obligation is owed to the affected party. At the same time, it makes clear that where the rights sought to be enforced are purely of a private character, mandamus will not lie. Seen in that light, the decision does not take the matter very far. As the decisions in St. Mary's Education Society and Army Welfare Education Society make clear, the real question is whether the dispute before the Court carries the requisite public law element. A service dispute of the present kind, concerning a probationary faculty member of a private unaided institution and not shown to be regulated by any statutory service framework, does not.

(2024) 16 SCC 598.

W.P.(C) 17731/2024 Page 11 of 17

This is a digitally signed order.

The authenticity of the order can be re-verified from Delhi High Court Order Portal by scanning the QR code shown above. The Order is downloaded from the DHC Server on 13/04/2026 at 21:11:24

18. AICTE's position points in the same direction. Its counter makes clear that service grievances are expected to be addressed through the institution- level Grievance Redressal Committee and thereafter through the affiliating University or State DTE. AICTE does not assume for itself the role of adjudicating individual service disputes of faculty. Whether or not the Petitioner was satisfied with that framework, it indicates that no meaningful mandamus of the kind sought against AICTE can be issued in the facts of this case.

19. For that reason alone, the present writ petition is liable to fail. Even so, as elaborate submissions were addressed on the merits and the matter has been argued at some length, it is appropriate to record why, even on that plane, no case for interference is made out.

20. The Petitioner's central submission is that the assessment was manipulated and that the institution intentionally depressed his score to deny confirmation. That is a serious allegation. But the first difficulty in the Petitioner's path is the contract he accepted. The appointment letter did not promise confirmation on efflux of time. It placed him on probation for two years, expressly contemplated extension of probation, and permitted termination during probation by notice or salary in lieu, without assigning reasons. This was not hidden in fine print. It was part of the terms on which the Petitioner entered service.

21. The separate challenge to the extension of probation is also unpersuasive. Quite apart from the administrative rules, the appointment letter itself made it clear that, on completion of two years, the probation could either be extended or the appointment confirmed in writing. That is sufficient to answer the contention that extension was wholly alien to the W.P.(C) 17731/2024 Page 12 of 17 This is a digitally signed order.

The authenticity of the order can be re-verified from Delhi High Court Order Portal by scanning the QR code shown above. The Order is downloaded from the DHC Server on 13/04/2026 at 21:11:24 contractual arrangement. The subsequent letter dated 6 th September, 2023, extending probation, and the follow-up communication dated 26th September, 2023, then made the position even clearer by setting out the existing credit shortfall and calling upon the Petitioner to make good that deficiency during the ensuing year.

22. Nor does it appear correct to say that the Petitioner was kept wholly in the dark. The follow-up communication dated 26th September, 2023 quantified the deficiency. The e-mail dated 5th August, 2024 specifically called for details of publication work and other academic contributions for the purpose of probation closure. The Petitioner did, in fact, respond by submitting his activity report. The later performance summary then recorded the institution's evaluation of those very claims. Whether that evaluation was academically right or wrong in every particular is another matter. But the record does not support the suggestion that the decision emerged from nowhere or that the Petitioner was unaware of the concern being expressed about his performance.

23. The Petitioner also urges that the institution had wrongly ignored one publication and undervalued his work. The difficulty with that submission is not merely evidentiary. To examine the matter in the manner the Petitioner invites would require the Court to sit over an internal academic appraisal and decide, among other things, whether a paper should have been treated as published on the relevant date, whether papers still under review ought to have been provisionally credited, whether student feedback of 4.5 out of 5 would automatically translate into additional units, whether the Marketing Management course ought to have yielded 21 points or a higher figure under the PPAD Policy framework, whether certain activities properly fell within W.P.(C) 17731/2024 Page 13 of 17 This is a digitally signed order.

The authenticity of the order can be re-verified from Delhi High Court Order Portal by scanning the QR code shown above. The Order is downloaded from the DHC Server on 13/04/2026 at 21:11:24 "Academic & Extension Services", and whether the claim of differential treatment vis-à-vis other faculty was in fact established. It is a fact-intensive reworking of internal academic metrics, which cannot be undertaken in exercise of writ jurisdiction.

24. The Petitioner also attempted to cast the case as one of punitive termination by relying on the FORE SUTRA show cause notice and the later e-mail sent by another staff member on 6th November, 2024. That submission does not advance the Petitioner's case. The show cause notice dated 5th April, 2024 was certainly intemperate in tone. It accused the Petitioner of deliberate insult and humiliation. But nothing on record shows that it developed into disciplinary proceedings or culminated in any finding of misconduct. The impugned communications dated 20th September, 2024 and 24th October, 2024 do not refer to misconduct, nor do they employ stigmatic language. They place the discontinuation on review of performance during probation. The FORE SUTRA episode, therefore, goes no further than furnishing a surrounding circumstance from which the Petitioner seeks to infer motive. It is not shown to have supplied the foundation of the termination.

25. The distinction between motive and foundation in cases of termination during probation, on which reliance was placed by the Petitioner, is well settled. In Dipti Prakash Banerjee v. Satyendra Nath Bose National Centre for Basic Sciences9, the Supreme Court explained that where findings on misconduct are arrived at in an enquiry, behind the back of the employee or without a regular departmental enquiry, an apparently simple order of termination may, in substance, be treated as W.P.(C) 17731/2024 Page 14 of 17 This is a digitally signed order.

The authenticity of the order can be re-verified from Delhi High Court Order Portal by scanning the QR code shown above. The Order is downloaded from the DHC Server on 13/04/2026 at 21:11:24 founded on those allegations and would then be open to challenge. By contrast, where no such enquiry is held and the employer merely chooses not to continue the employee in view of complaints or perceived deficiencies, those allegations remain in the realm of motive, and a termination simpliciter does not thereby become punitive. In Pavanendra Narayan Verma v. Sanjay Gandhi PGI of Medical Sciences & Anr.10, the Court reiterated the same distinction and further clarified that the use of expressions such as "unsatisfactory work and conduct" in an order of termination does not, by itself, amount to stigma, and that the matter ultimately turns on the substance of the order and the surrounding facts.

26. Measured on that touchstone, the present case does not assume a punitive character. There was no disciplinary enquiry culminating in findings of misconduct against the Petitioner, whether behind his back or otherwise. The termination order does not refer to misconduct, nor does it incorporate any material that labels the Petitioner with disqualification, blame, or moral reproach. The contemporaneous record shows that the institution proceeded on credit-based assessments and performance review. Whether that assessment was right or wrong is a different matter. It nonetheless remained an evaluation of performance and suitability. The case, therefore, is one of discontinuation during probation based on the employer's assessment of suitability, and not of punishment under a thinner label.

27. The plea of violation of natural justice must be viewed in the same setting. Where punitive action is founded on misconduct, the law insists on 9 (1999) 3 SCC 60.

(2002) 1 SCC 520.

W.P.(C) 17731/2024 Page 15 of 17

This is a digitally signed order.

The authenticity of the order can be re-verified from Delhi High Court Order Portal by scanning the QR code shown above. The Order is downloaded from the DHC Server on 13/04/2026 at 21:11:24 procedural safeguards commensurate with that action. But where the case is one of termination simpliciter during probation, especially under a contract that permits discontinuation without assigning reasons, the same procedural content cannot be imported as though the employer were imposing a major penalty. In the present case, the Petitioner was already put on notice of the shortfall through the communication dated 26th September, 2023, was granted a further year to improve, and was again called upon on 5 th August, 2024 to furnish the details relevant to the decision on probation closure. In that backdrop, the complaint of complete procedural surprise is overstated.

28. The Petitioner also sought to question the validity of the decision- making process by contending that the Director did not meet the prescribed eligibility requirements under the applicable AICTE norms. That contention does not advance the Petitioner's case. The dispute before the Court concerns the assessment of the Petitioner's performance during probation and the consequential decision not to continue his employment. Even assuming the allegation to be correct, it does not bear upon the contractual terms governing the Petitioner's appointment or the evaluation of his performance thereunder. The challenge on this score is, therefore, misplaced and does not furnish any ground for interference.

29. One further circumstance deserves mention. The Petitioner did continue to pursue the matter after the discontinuation, as he was entitled to do. The record, however, also shows that on 11th February, 2025, he signed a full and final settlement receipt acknowledging payment in full and final settlement and stating that he would have no claim, right or interest against the institution. Since the writ petition had already been filed by then, this Court does not rest its conclusion on waiver alone. Even so, that subsequent W.P.(C) 17731/2024 Page 16 of 17 This is a digitally signed order.

The authenticity of the order can be re-verified from Delhi High Court Order Portal by scanning the QR code shown above. The Order is downloaded from the DHC Server on 13/04/2026 at 21:11:24 conduct sits uneasily with the prayer for reinstatement and further reinforces the conclusion that the discretionary relief sought in the present proceedings ought not to be granted.

Conclusion

30. In these circumstances, the petition must fail. The writ petition is accordingly dismissed. Pending application(s), if any, also stand disposed of.

SANJEEV NARULA, J APRIL 9, 2026/nk W.P.(C) 17731/2024 Page 17 of 17 This is a digitally signed order.

The authenticity of the order can be re-verified from Delhi High Court Order Portal by scanning the QR code shown above. The Order is downloaded from the DHC Server on 13/04/2026 at 21:11:24

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