Karnataka High Court
Sri Siddanna @ Siddu S/O Ramanna Poojari vs The State Of Karnataka on 7 January, 2025
Author: S.Sunil Dutt Yadav
Bench: S.Sunil Dutt Yadav
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NC: 2025:KHC-K:60-DB
CRL.A No.200078 of 2020
IN THE HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA,
KALABURAGI BENCH
DATED THIS THE 7TH DAY OF JANUARY, 2025
PRESENT
THE HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE S.SUNIL DUTT YADAV
AND
THE HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE RAJESH RAI K
CRIMINAL APPEAL NO.200078 OF 2020
[374(Cr.PC)/415(BNSS)]
BETWEEN:
SRI SIDDANNA @ SIDDU
S/O RAMANNA POOJARI,
AGE ABOUT 21 YEARS,
OCC: AGRICULTURE,
R/O: KOLLUR VILLAGE,
TQ: CHITTAPUR,
DIST: KALABURAGI.
...APPELLANT
(BY SRI VISHAL PRATAP SINGH, ADVOCATE)
Digitally signed by
BASALINGAPPA
SHIVARAJ
DHUTTARGAON AND:
Location: HIGH
COURT OF
KARNATAKA THE STATE OF KARNATAKA
BY ITS INSPECTOR WADI POLICE STATION,
TQ: CHITTAPUR,
DISTRICT: GULBARGA,
REPRESENTED BY ADDL. STATE PUBLIC
PROSECUTOR,
HIGH COURT BUILDINGS, KALABURAGI - 585 107.
...RESPONDENT
(BY SRI SIDDALING P. PATIL, ADDL. SPP)
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NC: 2025:KHC-K:60-DB
CRL.A No.200078 of 2020
THIS CRIMINAL APPEAL IS FILED UNDER SECTION 374
(2) OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE CODE, PRAYING TO CALL FOR
THE RECORDS AND ALLOW THIS CRIMINAL APPEAL BY
SETTING ASIDE THE JUDGMENT AND ORDER OF THE V
ADDITIONAL SESSIONS JUDGE / SPECIAL JUDGE,
KALABURAGI, IN SPL. C.POCSO NO.43/2019 DATED 21 AND 23
MARCH 2020, AND ACQUIT THE APPELLANT, IN THE INTEREST
OF JUSTICE AND EQUITY.
THIS CRIMINAL APPEAL COMING ON FOR FINAL
HEARING, THIS DAY, JUDGMENT WAS DELIVERED THEREIN AS
UNDER:
CORAM: HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE S.SUNIL DUTT YADAV
AND
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE RAJESH RAI K
ORAL JUDGMENT
(PER: HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE RAJESH RAI K) This appeal by the convicted accused is directed against the judgment of conviction dated 21.03.2020 and order of sentence dated 23.03.2020 by the V-Additional Sessions/Special Judge at Kalaburagi [hereinafter referred to as 'the Special Judge'] in Special Case POCSO No.43/2019, wherein the learned Special Judge convicted the accused for the offences punishable under Sections 376 (2) (i) and (n) and 506 of Indian Penal Code, 1860 [hereinafter referred to as 'the IPC'], Sections 3(1) (w) (i) and 3 (2) (v) of the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled -3- NC: 2025:KHC-K:60-DB CRL.A No.200078 of 2020 Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989 [hereinafter referred to as 'the SC/ST (POA) Act'] and Section 6 of the Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012 [hereinafter referred to as 'the POCSO Act'] sentenced the accused - appellant to undergo rigorous imprisonment for ten years and directed to pay a fine of Rs.50,000/-, in default of payment of fine, to undergo a further simple imprisonment for 10 months for the offences punishable under Sections 376 (2) (i) and (n) of IPC and for the offence punishable under Section 6 of the POCSO Act. Accused is further sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment for 6 months and is directed to pay a fine of Rs.5,000/-, in default of payment of fine, further directed to undergo simple imprisonment for two months for the offence punishable under Section 506 of IPC. The accused is also directed to undergo rigorous imprisonment for two years and is imposed a fine of Rs.20,000/-, in default of payment of fine, further directed to undergo simple imprisonment for four months for the offence punishable under Section 3(1) (w) (i) of SC/ST (POA) Act. Lastly, the -4- NC: 2025:KHC-K:60-DB CRL.A No.200078 of 2020 accused is directed to undergo imprisonment for life i.e., first ten years of imprisonment shall be rigorous imprisonment and remaining part of the life shall be simple imprisonment and is imposed a fine of Rs.50,000/-, in default of payment of fine, further directed to undergo simple imprisonment of ten months for the offence punishable under Section 3(2) (v) of SC/ST (POA) Act. It is also directed that all the sentences enumerated supra shall run concurrently.
2. The abridged facts which led to the trial of the appellant-accused are as follows:
The prosecutrix in this case was residing with her parents in Kollur village, Chittapur taluk, Kalaburagi district i.e., within the jurisdiction of the respondent - police. On 09.04.2019 she lodged a complaint before PW-13 - the then PSI of respondent-police as per Ex.P-1 alleging that the accused is the resident of the same village, who was an acquaintance of her. A year prior to 09.04.2019, he expressed his desire to marry her. Later, -5- NC: 2025:KHC-K:60-DB CRL.A No.200078 of 2020 six months prior to 09.04.2019, the accused instigated her to follow him to an agricultural field and forcibly had penetrative sexual intercourse with her. Thereafter, he threatened her with dire consequences not to disclose the same to anybody including her parents. It is the further case of the prosecutrix that, following the said incident, the accused once again on 05.04.2019 i.e., four days prior to the date of lodging the complaint, made an attempt to rape her near her place of residence. However, on hearing her hue and cry, her parents rescued her and the accused fled the spot. It is further averred in the complaint that the accused committed such an act well aware that she was a minor and also that she belonged to SC/ST community.
3. Based on the complaint Ex.P-1, PW-13 registered an FIR against the accused-appellant in Crime No.31/2019 dated 09.04.2019 for the aforementioned offences as per Ex.P-25. Subsequent to registration of the FIR, PW-13 apprehended the accused on the same day. -6-
NC: 2025:KHC-K:60-DB CRL.A No.200078 of 2020 Thereafter, the victim PW-1 was sent for medical examination. Since the offence punishable under the SC/ST Act is attracted in the case, further investigation was conducted by PW-11 i.e., the jurisdictional DCP. PW- 11 conducted further investigation by recording the statement of the victim under Section 164 of Cr.P.C. before the Magistrate as per Ex.P-2. Further, he obtained the age certificate from PW-8 as per Ex.P-12 following which the caste certificate of the victim was obtained as per Ex.P-8 from CW-19. After drawing the relevant mahazars and obtaining other necessary documents, he laid the charge sheet against accused before the Special Court for the aforementioned offences.
4. After taking cognizance of the offences and on securing the presence of the accused, the learned Special Judge framed the charges against the accused for the offences punishable under Sections 376 (2) (i) and (n), 506 of IPC, Sections 3(1)(r) (w) (i) and 3(2) (v) of SC/ST (POA) Act and Section 6 of the POCSO Act. The same was -7- NC: 2025:KHC-K:60-DB CRL.A No.200078 of 2020 read over verbatim to the accused. However, the accused denied the charges and claimed to be tried.
5. In order to prove the charges levelled against the accused, the prosecution collectively examined thirteen witnesses before the Trial Court as PW-1 to PW- 13, got marked twenty-six documents as Exs.P-1 to P-26 and identified four material objects as M.O.s-1 to 4.
6. After completion of the prosecution evidence, the learned Special Judge read over the incriminating evidence of the material witnesses to the accused as stipulated under Section 313 of Cr.P.C. However, the accused denied the same. The defence of the accused is one of total denial and that of false implication. However, the accused neither examined any witness nor got marked any documents on his behalf.
7. After assessment of the oral and documentary evidence placed before the Special Judge, the learned Special Judge convicted the accused for the charges -8- NC: 2025:KHC-K:60-DB CRL.A No.200078 of 2020 leveled against him and sentenced him as stated supra. The said judgment is challenged under this appeal.
8. We have heard the learned counsel for the appellant Sri Vishal Pratap Singh so also the learned Additional State Public Prosecutor for the respondent - State.
9. The primary contention of the learned counsel for the appellant is that the judgment challenged under this appeal suffers from perversity and illegality since the learned Special Judge grossly failed to appreciate the evidence on record in right perspective and passed the impugned judgment based on surmises and conjuncture. He further submitted that, there is an inordinate delay in lodging the complaint by the prosecutrix. The incident allegedly took place six months prior to the date of lodging the complaint and the prosecution failed to explain the reason for such inordinate delay in lodging the complaint. He further contended that, there are serious infirmities in the evidence of the prosecutrix PW-1 about the alleged -9- NC: 2025:KHC-K:60-DB CRL.A No.200078 of 2020 date of incident. According to him, the complaint and 164 statement of the victim are contradicting each other regarding the date of incident and the manner in which the alleged rape was said to have committed by the accused. Additionally, he contended that, the prosecution has comprehensively failed to prove the age of the prosecutrix at the time of the alleged date of incident. The documents placed by the prosecution i.e., Exs.P-10 and P-11 are not the authenticated documents to prove the age of the victim as stipulated under the provisions of Rule 12 of the Juvenile Justice Rules. Nevertheless, the author of Ex.P-11 i.e., PW-8, categorically admitted in his evidence that, there is tampering in the register with respect to the age of the victim. The learned counsel by enunciating his arguments submitted that, the prosecution further failed to prove the medical evidence that the victim was subjected to penetrative sexual intercourse as stated by her simply for the reason that the doctor who examined the victim i.e., PW-10 has given her final opinion as per Ex.P-17 that there are no traces of recent sexual
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NC: 2025:KHC-K:60-DB CRL.A No.200078 of 2020 intercourse on the victim. Lastly, he contended that, the learned Special Judge failed to consider the fact that, the provisions of SC/ST (POA) Act does not attract in the instant case for the reason that, in order to attract Section 3 (2) (v) of SC/ST (POA) Act, the accused ought to have committed the act by being well within his knowledge that the victim belonged to Scheduled Caste/Scheduled Tribe community and in order to belittle her caste, he has committed the offence. But, on perusal of the entire evidence, the prosecution has not come up with such a plea. With these submissions, he prays to allow the appeal and to set aside the impugned judgment passed by the Trial Court.
10. Refuting the above submissions made by the learned counsel for the appellant, the learned Additional SPP contended that, the judgment challenged in this appeal neither suffers from perversity nor illegality and no exception can be taken from the judgment passed by the Trial Court for the reasons assigned by the Trial Court
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NC: 2025:KHC-K:60-DB CRL.A No.200078 of 2020 under a well-reasoned judgment. He contended that, the learned Special Judge analysed the evidence of the prosecutrix in great detail and on perusal of the same, the prosecutrix has categorically deposed in her evidence regarding the forcible sexual act committed by the accused on different occasions. Further, her version was corroborated by the evidence of her parents and supported by the evidence of the Investigation Officers PW-11 and PW-13. He further contended that, the prosecution has also proved the age of the victim that she was a minor at the time of the incident by placing relevant documents i.e., Exs.P-10 and P-11 issued by PW-8 the Headmistress of the school in which the victim studied. On perusal of Ex.P-11, the date of birth of the victim is mentioned as 18.09.2003. As such, on the date of incident, the victim was aged about 16 years. Further, the doctor - PW-10 who examined the victim has categorically deposed that the hymen of the victim was ruptured. As such, it is clear that the accused committed an act of penetrative sexual assault. Additionally, the Investigation Officer - PW-11
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NC: 2025:KHC-K:60-DB CRL.A No.200078 of 2020 obtained the caste certificate of the victim as per Ex.P-8 that she belonged to Scheduled Caste community. In such circumstances, on a careful perusal of the evidence of the material witnesses, the prosecution has proved the guilt of the accused beyond all reasonable doubts. With these submissions the learned Addl. SPP prays to dismiss the appeal by confirming the judgment passed by the Trial Court.
11. Having heard the learned counsel for the respective parties and on perusal of the entire evidence on record including the impugned judgment passed by the learned Special Judge, the points that arise for our consideration are:
(i) Whether the judgment under this appeal suffers from perversity and illegality?
(ii) Whether the learned Special Judge is justified in convicting the accused-
appellant for the offences punishable under Sections 376(2)(i) & (n) and 506 of IPC, Sections 3(1)(w)(i) and 3(2)(v) of
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NC: 2025:KHC-K:60-DB CRL.A No.200078 of 2020 SC/ST (POA) Act and Section 6 of the POCSO Act?
12. In order to bring home the guilt of the accused, the prosecution has primarily relied on the evidence of PW-1 - the prosecutrix, PW-6 the sister of the victim, PW-8 the headmistress who issued the age certificate of the victim and also the evidence of PW-10 the doctor who had examined the victim. Though the prosecution has examined in total 13 witnesses, it is not necessary for us to refer the evidence of all the witnesses.
13. On careful perusal of the evidence of PW-1 i.e., the prosecutrix, she lodged the complaint Ex.P-1 on 09.04.2019 before PW-13 the then PSI alleging that one year prior to the incident, she knew the accused and that she frequently was engaged in conversation with him over mobile phone. Thereafter, their friendship turned into love and six months prior to the date of lodging the complaint, the accused committed an act of forcible penetrative sexual intercourse on her for the first time. However, she
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NC: 2025:KHC-K:60-DB CRL.A No.200078 of 2020 neither revealed the same to her parents nor anybody else in the village. Subsequently, after six months i.e., on 05.04.2019, the accused once again made an attempt to rape her and also outraged her modesty. Following which the victim was threatened with dire consequences. On receiving the complaint, the respondent - police recorded her statement under Section 164 Cr.P.C. before the learned Magistrate as per Ex.P-2. On careful perusal of the same, it is established that one year prior to the date of lodging of the complaint, the accused has committed forcible sexual intercourse on her. Later, 15 days prior to the date of incident, he had once again committed sexual intercourse on her. However, the victim in her evidence before the Court deposed that the alleged incident of sexual assault was committed by the accused five months before lodging of the complaint and 2 to 3 months thereafter, he once again attempted to rape her. On careful analysis of these versions of PW-1, there are serious discrepancies forthcoming in her version regarding the date of the incident. The different date and months
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NC: 2025:KHC-K:60-DB CRL.A No.200078 of 2020 stated by the victim in her complaint, statement under Section 164 of Cr.P.C so also before the Court, creates doubt in the genesis of the crime. As rightly pointed out by the learned counsel for the appellant, there is inordinate delay of more than six months in lodging the complaint.
14. The Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Vijayan vs. State of Kerala1 held that, in a case where the sole testimony of prosecutrix is available, it is very dangerous to convict the accused noticing that the prosecutrix could venture to wait for 7 months for filing the FIR for rape. This leaves the accused totally defenceless.
15. Applying the findings of the Hon'ble Apex Court in the above judgment to the instant case, we have no other alternative but to hold that, there is an inordinate delay in lodging the compliant and the prosecution grossly failed to explain the same. Further, the said delay and the 1 (2008) 14 SCC 763
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NC: 2025:KHC-K:60-DB CRL.A No.200078 of 2020 discrepancies in the date of incident goes to the root of the prosecution case.
16. On coming to the evidence placed by the prosecution on the alleged sexual assault committed by the accused, prosecutrix has stated that after the incident she neither revealed the same to her parents nor anybody else for a period of six months. Further, in her cross- examination, she has stated that while she was working as a coolie alongside the accused, her parents were very much present in the field. According to her, after the incident, she visited the accused's house and stayed there for four days. Thereafter, since the accused and his parents refused to solemnize the marriage of the victim with the accused, she lodged a complaint. Hence, there arises doubt in the evidence of PW-1 about her veracity in respect of the alleged sexual assault committed by the accused. In such circumstances, the evidence of prosecutrix leaves some doubt in respect of the occurrence of the incident itself as stated by her. The version of PW.1
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NC: 2025:KHC-K:60-DB CRL.A No.200078 of 2020 cannot be construed as sterling quality as held by the Hon'ble Apex Court in catena of judgments.
17. Be that as it may be, coming to the next aspect i.e., the age of the victim that she was a minor and aged about 16 years at the time of incident as claimed by the prosecution. On perusal of the evidence of PW-8 i.e., the Headmistress of the school in which PW-1 studied and Exs.P-10 and 11 the certificate and the School Register respectively, states that the victim was aged about 16 years, nevertheless as rightly pointed out by the learned counsel for the appellant, PW-8 i.e., the author of Ex.P-11 categorically admitted in her evidence that there is tampering of Ex.P-11 involving the date of birth of the victim. The prosecution failed to place the original register before the Trial Court. In such circumstances, the admission of PW-8 the author of Ex.P-11 regarding the tampering of Ex.P-11 cannot be ignored. Further, PW-8 also admitted in her evidence that, Exs.P-10 and 11 are not based on any authenticated documents like birth
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NC: 2025:KHC-K:60-DB CRL.A No.200078 of 2020 certificate issued by the concerned authorities. Further, on perusal of the evidence of PW-10 - Doctor who examined the victim also stated in her evidence that, the age of the victim was 18 years at the time of the alleged incident and the same was reiterated in the medical certificate Ex.P-16 . The co-ordinate bench of this Court in Criminal Appeal No.200109/2014 dated 05.11.2024 held regarding determination of the age of the victim at paragraph Nos.40 and 41 as under:
"40. As regards the age of the victim, it is the settled position of law that the same test of juvenility vis - a-vis an accused who seeks benefit of being a juvenile would be sufficient test to determine age of the victim. The Apex Court in Jarnail Singh v. State of Haryana, [(2013) 7 SCC 263] at para 23 has observed as follows:
"23. Even though Rule 12 is strictly applicable only to determine the age of a child in conflict with law, we are of the view that the aforesaid statutory provision should be the basis for determining age, even of a child who is a victim of crime. For, in our view, there is hardly any difference insofar as the issue of minority is concerned, between a child in conflict with law, and a child who is a victim of crime. Therefore, in our considered opinion, it would be just and appropriate to apply Rule 12 of the 2007 Rules, to determine the age of the prosecutrix VW, PW 6. The manner of determining age conclusively has been expressed in sub-rule (3) of Rule 12 extracted above. Under the aforesaid provision, the age of a child is
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NC: 2025:KHC-K:60-DB CRL.A No.200078 of 2020 ascertained by adopting the first available basis out of a number of options postulated in Rule 12(3). If, in the scheme of options under Rule 12(3), an option is expressed in a preceding clause, it has overriding effect over an option expressed in a subsequent clause. The highest rated option available would conclusively determine the age of a minor. In the scheme of Rule 12(3), matriculation (or equivalent) certificate of the child concerned is the highest rated option. In case, the said certificate is available, no other evidence can be relied upon. Only in the absence of the said certificate, Rule 12(3) envisages consideration of the date of birth entered in the school first attended by the child. In case such an entry of date of birth is available, the date of birth depicted therein is liable to be treated as final and conclusive, and no other material is to be relied upon. Only in the absence of such entry, Rule 12(3) postulates reliance on a birth certificate issued by a corporation or a municipal authority or a panchayat. Yet again, if such a certificate is available, then no other material whatsoever is to be taken into consideration for determining the age of the child concerned, as the said certificate would conclusively determine the age of the child. It is only in the absence of any of the aforesaid, that Rule 12(3) postulates the determination of age of the child concerned, on the basis of medical opinion."
41. Under Rule 12 of Juvenile Justice Rules, the documents that could be relied for the determination of the age are as follows:
"12. Procedure to be followed in determination of Age.--
Xxx (3) In every case concerning a child or juvenile in conflict with law, the age determination inquiry shall be conducted by the court or the Board or, as the case may be, the Committee by seeking evidence by obtaining--
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(a)(i) the matriculation or equivalent certificates, if available; and in the absence whereof;
(ii) the date of birth certificate from the school (other than a play school) first attended; and in the absence whereof;
(iii) the birth certificate given by a corporation or a municipal authority or a panchayat;"
18. On perusal of the above judgment passed by the co-ordinate bench of this Court, it is relatively clear that as per Rule 12 of the Juvenile Justice Rules, in order to prove the age of the child or juvenile, the procedure to be followed and the documents to be relied by the prosecution are the matriculation or equivalent certificates if available; and in the absence the date of birth certificate from the school (other than a pay school) first attended; and in the absence the birth certificate given by a Corporation or a Municipal Authority or a Panchayat. Hence, considering the above aspect, we are of the considered view that, the prosecution also failed to prove that the victim was a minor as on the date of incident.
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19. Coming to the aspect of the medical evidence placed by the prosecution to prove that the victim was subjected to sexual intercourse, on careful perusal of the evidence of PW-10 and the certificates issued by her i.e., Exs.P-15 to P-17, no doubt in Ex.P-16 PW-10 has stated that the hymen of the victim was ruptured. However, PW- 10 kept her opinion pending after examination of the victim initially and after obtaining the FSL report from the concerned authority, has issued final opinion as per Ex.P-17 which enumerates that there no traces of recent sexual intercourse on the victim. The FSL report further revealed that there is no spermatozoa found on the clothes worn either by the accused or by the victim, which were seized by the Investigation Officer, PW.11. Admittedly, there is no such physical injury found on the body of the victim. The rupture of the hymen itself cannot be a ground to conclude that the victim was subjected to sexual intercourse.
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20. On perusal of deposition of PW.10, Medical Officer, coupled with medical certificate as per Exs.P16 and 17, we are of the considered view that, the prosecution failed to prove medical evidence in this case that the victim was subjected to sexual intercourse. As such, it is hard to believe that the accused committed an act of forceful penetrative sexual intercourse on the victim.
21. In such circumstances, the Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Rai Sandeep @ Deepu v. State Of NCT Of Delhi2 has held as under:
"32. In the decision reported as Krishan Kumar Malik v. State of Haryana (supra) in respect of the offence of gang rape under Section 376 (2) (g), IPC, it has been held as under in paras 31 and 32:
"31. No doubt, it is true that to hold an accused guilty for commission of an offence of rape, the solitary evidence of the prosecutrix is sufficient provided the same inspires confidence and appears to be absolutely trustworthy, unblemished and should be of sterling quality. But, in the case in hand, the evidence of the 2 2012 (8) SCC 21 Para 32
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NC: 2025:KHC-K:60-DB CRL.A No.200078 of 2020 prosecutrix, showing several lacunae, which have already been projected hereinabove, would go to show that her evidence does not fall in that category and cannot be relied upon to hold the appellant guilty of the said offences.
32. Indeed there are several significant variations in material facts in her Section 164 statement, Section 161 statement (CrPC), FIR and deposition in court. Thus, it was necessary to get her evidence corroborated independently, which they could have done either by examination of Ritu, her sister or Bimla Devi, who were present in the house at the time of her alleged abduction. The record shows that Bimla Devi though cited as a witness was not examined and later given up by the public prosecutor on the ground that she has been won over by the appellant."
(emphasis added)
22. On perusal of the above dictum, it is clear that, though there is no bar to rely solitary evidence of the prosecutrix, the said evidence of prosecutrix is to be trustworthy, unblemished and it should be of sterling quality.
23. In the case on hand, the evidence of the prosecutrix creates doubt in respect of manner in which the act was committed by the accused and she has failed
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NC: 2025:KHC-K:60-DB CRL.A No.200078 of 2020 to state the very date of incident and non-corroboration of her version with the medical evidence. Hence, testimony of PW.1 cannot be considered as sterling quality.
24. It is vehemently contended by the learned Addl. SPP that the prosecution has clearly proved the offence committed by the accused under the provisions of Sections 3(1) (w) (i) and 3 (2) (v) of the SC/ST (POA) Act.
25. We have perused the evidence of the prosecutrix, so also the evidence of PW.11, the Investigation Officer and PW.13, the then PSI who registered the FIR and the caste certificate obtained by PW.1 as per Ex.P8. The caste of the victim has not been disputed there is no doubt that she belonged to Scheduled Caste community.
26. Section 3 (2) (v) of the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989 reads thus:
"Section 3 (2) (v): Section 3 Punishments for offences of atrocities (2) Whoever, not being a
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NC: 2025:KHC-K:60-DB CRL.A No.200078 of 2020 member of a scheduled caste or a scheduled tribe
(v) commits any offence under the Indian Penal Code (45 of 1860) punishable with imprisonment for a term of ten years or more against a person or property knowing that such person is a member of a Scheduled Caste or a Scheduled Tribe or such property belongs to such member, shall be punishable with imprisonment for life and with fine;"
27. From the perusal of above provision, it is clear that in order to attract the above provision, the prosecution has to prove the aspect that the accused has committed an act to the victim by knowing well that she belong to SC/ST and also to disrespect her caste.
28. A perusal of the evidence of PW.1 or the evidence of PW.11 and PW.13, Investigation Officers, nowhere these witnesses have stated that the accused was aware about the caste of the victim and with such knowledge he has committed the sexual intercourse on her.
29. Hence, on careful consideration of the above aspect, it is clear that the prosecution has failed to prove
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NC: 2025:KHC-K:60-DB CRL.A No.200078 of 2020 the offences punishable under the provisions of the SC/ST (POA) Act against the accused.
30. On overall perusal of the entire evidence on record, in our considered view, the learned Special Judge has misread the evidence and has wrongly convicted the accused for the charges leveled against him. The evidence placed by the prosecution is not cogent, reliable, convincing and trustworthy. In such circumstances, interference is required in the impugned judgment passed by the learned Special Judge. In that view of the matter, we answer the point No.1 in affirmative and point No.2 in negative and proceed to pass the following:
ORDER Accordingly, Crl.A 200078/2020 is allowed. The judgment of conviction and order of sentence passed by the V Additional/ Special Judge at Kalaburagi in Spl.C POCSO No.43/2019 dated 21.03.2020 is set aside.
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NC: 2025:KHC-K:60-DB CRL.A No.200078 of 2020 The appellant-accused is acquitted of the offences punishable under Sections 376(2) (i) and (n) and Section 506 of IPC, Section 3 (1) (w) (i) and 3 (2) (v) of SC/ST (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989 and for the offence punishable under Section 6 of the POCSO Act, 2012.
The concerned Jail authorities are directed to release the appellant-accused forthwith, if he is not required in any other case.
The fine amount, if any, deposited by the accused shall be refunded to him on proper identification.
Registry is directed to send a copy of this order to the concerned Jail authorities.
Sd/-
(S.SUNIL DUTT YADAV) JUDGE Sd/-
(RAJESH RAI K) JUDGE SWK,NP List No.: 1 Sl No.: 40 Ct;VK