Kerala High Court
Sasidharan vs Saroja on 9 June, 2004
Equivalent citations: 2004(2)KLT885
Author: K.S. Radhakrishnan
Bench: K.S. Radhakrishnan, J.M. James
ORDER K.S. Radhakrishnan, J.
1. The legality of the clubbing of all the Rent Control Appeals by the Rent Control Appellate Authority in a case where joint trial was refused by the Rent Control Court is the moot question that has come up for consideration in this case.
2. Landlord preferred three Rent Control Petitions namely, R.C.P. Nos. 61, 62, 63 of 1992 in respect of different tenants. Landlord filed the application for joint trial before the Rent Control Court and the same was refused and all the three Rent Control Petitions were tried independently and evidence adduced separately. Rent Control Court dismissed all the petitions filed by the landlord under Section 11(3) of Act 2 of 1965. Landlord preferred three appeals before the Appellate Authority. Expressing grave concern over the Rent Control Court in not conducting a joint trial Appellate Authority clubbed all the appeals together and disposed of all the appeals by a common judgment. Appellate Authority has minuted that all the counsel had agreed for clubbing of all the appeals.
3. Sri. P.B. Krishnan, counsel for the petitioners submitted that Appellate Authority has committed an error in drawing inference from the evidence adduced in one case to determine another. Counsel submitted that the evidence adduced in R.C.P. No. 62 of 1992 was applied to decide R.C.P. No. 61 of 1992 causing prejudice to the petitioner. Ext. C1 in R.C.P. No. 62 of 1992 is the Commission report dated 19.7.1996 and Ext.C2 is the plan. Commissioner who submitted the report in that case was examined as PW.3. Tenant in R.C.P. No. 61 of 1992 had no opportunity to cross-examine the Commissioner on Ext.C1 report and Ext.C2 plan. Further, it is also stated that reliance was placed on Exts.R1(a) to R1(f) marked in R.C.P. No. 63 of 1992 to decide the fate of other cases. Counsel submitted that in a case where Rent Control Court had found that there was no justification in holding a joint trial and that all the cases were tried independently on the basis of the evidence adduced in each case, the Appellate Authority was not justified in clubbing all the appeals together after finding fault with the Rent Control Court.
4. Counsel appearing for the respondent landlord on the other hand contended that Appellate Authority has got the jurisdiction to club all the appeals together and hear them. Further counsel submitted that no prejudice has been caused to the tenants by hearing all the appeals together. Counsel submitted that Appellate Authority has clubbed all the cases together as agreed to by all the counsel. Counsel submitted that if all the appeals were heard separately considerable judicial time would be wasted and it would only lead to protracting the proceedings; Consequently counsel submitted that there is no illegality in the order passed by the Appellate Authority.
5. We find it difficult to accept the contention of the respondent landlord. Landlord has preferred petition for joint trial. Rent Control Court rejected the prayer and found that all the cases have to be tried independently. If any of the parties has got any grievance they should have challenged the said order. Appellate Authority has now found fault with the order of the Rent Control Court in not clubbing the cases together. Appellate Authority then clubbed all the appeals together and appreciated the evidence adduced by the parties in one case to decide another.
6. Appellate Authority in our view was also not justified in drawing inference from the evidence adduced in this case to decide another. In the instant case, Appellate Authority has placed reliance on Ext.C1 report and Ext.C2 plan in R.C.P. No. 62 of 1992 to gather an impression about the lie of the tenanted premises. The person who has submitted Ext.C1 report was examined in R.C.P.No. 61 of 2002 as PW3. Tenant in R.C.P.No. 62 of 2002 had no opportunity to cross examine the Commissioner since that Rent Control Petition was heard and tried separately.
7. Landlord in all the cases is the same. Tenants are different. Need urged is also the same. That by itself, in our view, is not sufficient to order a joint trial. A Division Bench of this Court in Ebrahim Ismail Kunju v. Phasila Beevi, 1991 (1) KLT 861, while dealing with the scope of Section 23 of Act 2 of 1965 in a case where eviction was sought for under Section 11(3) held that the mere fact that three shop rooms are under a common roof would not justify the running of a joint trial. In a given case Rent Control Court could take into consideration all the aspects of the matter and order a joint trial. But the question that is posed for consideration in this case is whether after having refused the plea for a joint trial and all the cases were tried independently, the appellate authority was justified in clubbing all the appeals filed against those cases together and pass a common order placing reliance on the evidence adduced in one case to decide another. This in our view would cause prejudice to the parties. We may indicate that parties had no opportunity to cross examine the witnesses in the three cases which were tried independently. They had no opportunity to peruse the documents produced in other case. Such a procedure in our view would cause prejudice to the parties. Since we have found that the appellate authority has committed a mistake in clubbing all the appeals and relying on the evidence in one case for deciding another, we are inclined to set aside the common order passed by the Appellate Authority and remand the matter back to the Appellate Authority for fresh consideration. Since joint trial was, refused each case has to be decided independently on the basis of the evidence adduced in each case. It is so ordered. We make it clear we are not expressing any opinion on the merits of the case. The matter is accordingly remanded to the appellate authority. Parties would appear before the Appellate Authority on 18.6.2004 and Appellate Authority would dispose of the same within a period of three months thereafter.