Karnataka High Court
State By Kadur Police Station vs Sri Yogeesh on 9 February, 2023
Author: P.N.Desai
Bench: P.N.Desai
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CRL.A No. 900 of 2014
IN THE HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA AT BENGALURU
DATED THIS THE 9TH DAY OF FEBRUARY, 2023
BEFORE
THE HON'BLE MR JUSTICE P.N.DESAI
CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 900 OF 2014
BETWEEN:
STATE BY KADUR POLICE STATION
CHICKMAGALUR-577 101.
...APPELLANT
(BY SRI. VINAYAKA V.S, HCGP)
AND:
SRI. YOGEESH,
AGED 28 YEARS,
S/O. VEERABHADRAPPA,
OCCU:AGRICULTURE,
DRIVER OF TWO WHEELER
BEARING NO.KA-18 R-5401
HULLIGERE, YUGATI HOBLI,
KADUR TALUK-577 548.
...RESPONDENT
Digitally signed by
NAGARATHNA M (BY SMT. CHAITANYA S.G., ADVOCATE)
Location: HIGH
COURT OF
KARNATAKA THIS CRL.A. FILED U/S.378(1) AND (3) CR.P.C BY THE S.P.P.
AND ADV. FOR THE APPELLANT PRAYING TO (a) GRANT LEAVE TO
APPEAL AGAINST THE JUDGMENT AND ORDER DATED 8.7.2014,
PASED BY THE LEARNED PRL.CIVIL JUDGE & JMFC, KADUR IN
C.C.NO.798/2011, THEREBY ACQUITTING THE RESPONDENT -
ACCUSED FOR THE OFFEENCES PUNISHABLE UNDER SECTIONs 279
& 304-A OF IPC. (b) SET-ASIDE THE IMPUGNED JUDGMENT AND
ORDER PASSED BY THE PRL.CIVIL JUDGE & JMFC, KADUR DATED
8.7.2014 IN C.C.NO.798/2011 ACQUITTING THE RESPONDENT-
ACCUSED FOR THE SAID OFFENCES PUNISHABLE UNDER SECTION
279 & 304-A OF IPC BY ALLOWING THIS APPEAL AND ETC.
THIS APPEAL, COMING ON FOR HEARING, THIS DAY, THE
COURT DELIVERED THE FOLLOWING:
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CRL.A No. 900 of 2014
JUDGMENT
This appeal arises out of the judgment passed in C.C.No.798/2011 dated 08.07.2014 by the Principal Civil Judge and JMFC, Kadur, wherein the respondent/accused was acquited for the offence punishable under Sections 279 and 304A of Indian Penal Code, (for short hereinafter referred to as 'IPC').
2. In brief the case of the prosecution is that on 25.07.2011 at about 01:30 p.m. in order to purchase the medicines in the medical store situated opposite to the Government Hospital, the deceased tried to cross the National High way running towards Birur towards Kadur and at that time, the respondent being the rider of the motor cycle bearing registration No.KA-18-5401 drove the vehicle with high speed in a rash and negligent manner and dashed to Smt. Lalithamma. She fell down and sustained injuries to her head. Immediately, she was admitted to Kadur Government Hospital and from there she was shifted to Venlock Hospital, Mangalore for further treatment. She succumbed to the injuries on 29.07.2011 at 04:25 p.m. On the basis of the same, a complaint came to be lodged by son of the deceased and a case -3- CRL.A No. 900 of 2014 was registered, the police have investigated the matter and filed the charge sheet against the accused for the offences stated above.
3. The prosecution examined eight witnesses as PWs.1 to 8 and got marked thirteen documents as Exs.P1 to P13. After recording the statement of accused under Section 313 of Code of Criminal Procedure, (for short hereinafter referred to as 'Cr.P.C.') and the accused gave the defence evidence as DW.1 and also examined one Yogeesh as DW.2 and got marked one document as Ex.D1. After hearing the arguments, learned JMFC acquitted the accused. Being aggrieved by the said judgment, the State has preferred this appeal.
4. Heard Sri. Vinayaka V.S., learned High Court Government Pleader for appellant/State and Smt. Chaitanya S.G., learned counsel for the respondent.
5. Learned HCGP argued that the impugned judgment and order of acquittal passed by the learned JMFC is contrary to the law, facts and evidence on record. The reasoning given by the learned JMFC is erroneous. The Trial Court has not -4- CRL.A No. 900 of 2014 appreciated the evidence of PWs.2, 3, 5 & 6, in proper perspective. They are eye witnesses to the incident. But the learned Magistrate has not appreciated their evidence. The learned JMFC has failed to consider the document produced by the prosecution. Even the learned JMFC has not properly appreciated the evidence of official witnesses PW.4 and PW.7. The learned JMFC has not raised the proper inferences on the basis of evidence on record. The nature of the accident itself shows that the accused drove the vehicle in a rash and negligent manner and in the result, the victim fell down and sustained injuries. Therefore, learned HCGP argued that the learned Magistrate has wrongly came to the conclusion and acquitted the accused. Learned counsel for the appellant in support of his arguments relied on the decision of Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Ravi Kapur Vs. State of Rajasthan reported in (2012) 9 SCC 284 and referred to paragraph Nos.12, 13, 15, 18, 20, 22 & 32 and the same reads as under:
12. Rash and negligent driving has to be examined in the light of the facts and circumstances of a given case. It is a fact incapable of being construed or seen in isolation. It must be examined in light of the attendant circumstances. A person who drives a vehicle on the road is liable to be held -5- CRL.A No. 900 of 2014 responsible for the act as well as for the result. It may not be always possible to determine with reference to the speed of a vehicle whether a person was driving rashly and negligently. Both these acts presuppose an abnormal conduct. Even when one is driving a vehicle at a slow speed but recklessly and negligently, it would amount to "rash and negligent driving" within the meaning of the language of Section 279 IPC. That is why the legislature in its wisdom has used the words "manner so rash or negligent as to endanger human life". The preliminary conditions, thus, are that (a) it is the manner in which the vehicle is driven; (b) it be driven either rashly or negligently; and (c) such rash or negligent driving should be such as to endanger human life. Once these ingredients are satisfied, the penalty contemplated under Section 279 IPC is attracted.
13. "Negligence" means omission to do something which a reasonable and prudent person guided by the considerations which ordinarily regulate human affairs would do or doing something which a prudent and reasonable person guided by similar considerations would not do. Negligence is not an absolute term but is a relative one; it is rather a comparative term. It is difficult to state with precision any mathematically exact formula by which negligence or lack of it can be infallibly measured in a given case. Whether there exists negligence per se or the course of conduct amounts to negligence will normally depend upon the attending and surrounding facts and circumstances which have to be taken into consideration by the court. In a given case, even not doing what one was ought to do can constitute negligence.
15. The other principle that is pressed in aid by the courts in such cases is the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur. This doctrine serves two purposes -- one that an accident may by its nature be more consistent with its being caused by negligence for which the opposite party is responsible than by any other causes and that in such a case, the mere fact of the accident is prima facie evidence of such negligence. Secondly, it is to avoid hardship in cases -6- CRL.A No. 900 of 2014 where the claimant is able to prove the accident but cannot prove how the accident occurred. The courts have also applied the principle of res ipsa loquitur in cases where no direct evidence was brought on record. The Act itself contains a provision which concerns with the consequences of driving dangerously alike the provision in IPC that the vehicle is driven in a manner dangerous to public life. Where a person does such an offence he is punished as per the provisions of Section 184 of the Act. The courts have also taken the concept of "culpable rashness" and "culpable negligence" into consideration in cases of road accidents. "Culpable rashness" is acting with the consciousness that mischievous and illegal consequences may follow but with the hope that they will not and often with the belief that the actor has taken sufficient precautions to prevent their happening. The imputability arises from acting despite consciousness (luxuria).
"Culpable negligence" is acting without the consciousness that the illegal and mischievous effect will follow, but in circumstances which show that the actor has not exercised the caution incumbent upon him and that if he had, he would have had the consciousness. The imputability arises from the neglect of civic duty of circumspection. In such a case the mere fact of accident is prima facie evidence of such negligence. This maxim suggests that on the circumstances of a given case the res speaks and is eloquent because the facts stand unexplained, with the result that the natural and reasonable inference from the facts, not a conjectural inference, shows that the act is attributable to some person's negligent conduct. [Ref. Justice Rajesh Tandon's An Exhaustive Commentary on Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 (1st Edn., 2010).]
18. Again, in Naresh Giri v. State of M.P. [(2008) 1 SCC 791 : (2008) 1 SCC (Cri) 324] , where a train had hit a bus being driven by the appellant at the railway crossing and the bus was badly damaged and two persons died, this Court, while altering the charges from Section 302 IPC to Section 304-A IPC, observed: (SCC pp. 794-97, paras 7-9 & 13) -7- CRL.A No. 900 of 2014 "7. Section 304-A IPC applies to cases where there is no intention to cause death and no knowledge that the act done in all probability will cause death. The provision is directed at offences outside the range of Sections 299 and 300 IPC.
Section 304-A applies only to such acts which are rash and negligent and are directly the cause of death of another person. Negligence and rashness are essential elements under Section 304-A.
8. Section 304-A carves out a specific offence where death is caused by doing a rash or negligent act and that act does not amount to culpable homicide under Section 299 or murder under Section 300. If a person wilfully drives a motor vehicle into the midst of a crowd and thereby causes death to some person, it will not be a case of mere rash and negligent driving and the act will amount to culpable homicide. Doing an act with the intent to kill a person or knowledge that doing an act was likely to cause a person's death is culpable homicide. When intent or knowledge is the direct motivating force of the act, Section 304-A has to make room for the graver and more serious charge of culpable homicide. The provision of this section is not limited to rash or negligent driving. Any rash or negligent act whereby death of any person is caused becomes punishable. Two elements either of which or both of which may be proved to establish the guilt of an accused are rashness/negligence; a person may cause death by a rash or negligent act which may have nothing to do with driving at all. Negligence and rashness to be punishable in terms of Section 304-A must be attributable to a state of mind wherein the criminality arises because of no error in judgment but of a deliberation in the mind risking the crime as well as the life of the person who may lose his life as a result of the crime. Section 304-A discloses that criminality may be that apart from any mens rea, there may be no motive or intention still a person may venture or practise such rashness or negligence which may cause the death of other. The death so caused is not the determining factor.
9. What constitutes negligence has been analysed in Halsbury's Laws of England (4th Edn.), Vol. 34, Para 1 (p. 3), as follows: -8- CRL.A No. 900 of 2014
'1.General principles of the law of negligence.--Negligence is a specific tort and in any given circumstances is the failure to exercise that care which the circumstances demand. What amounts to negligence depends on the facts of each particular case. It may consist in omitting to do something which ought to be done or in doing something which ought to be done either in a different manner or not at all. Where there is no duty to exercise care, negligence in the popular sense has no legal consequence. Where there is a duty to exercise care, reasonable care must be taken to avoid acts or omissions which can be reasonably foreseen to be likely to cause physical injury to persons or property. The degree of care required in the particular case depends on the surrounding circumstances, and may vary according to the amount of the risk to be encountered and to the magnitude of the prospective injury. The duty of care is owed only to those persons who are in the area of foreseeable danger; the fact that the act of the defendant violated his duty of care to a third person does not enable the plaintiff who is also injured by the same act to claim unless he is also within the area of foreseeable danger. The same act or omission may accordingly in some circumstances involve liability as being negligent, although in other circumstances it will not do so. The material considerations are the absence of care which is on the part of the defendant owed to the plaintiff in the circumstances of the case and damage suffered by the plaintiff, together with a demonstrable relation of cause and effect between the two.' ***
13. According to the dictionary meaning 'reckless' means 'careless', regardless or heedless of the possible harmful consequences of one's acts. It presupposes that if thought was given to the matter by the doer before the act was done, it would have been apparent to him that there was a real risk of its having the relevant harmful consequences; but, granted this, recklessness -9- CRL.A No. 900 of 2014 covers a whole range of states of mind from failing to give any thought at all to whether or not there is any risk of those harmful consequences, to recognising the existence of the risk and nevertheless deciding to ignore it."
20.. In light of the above, now we have to examine if negligence in the case of an accident can be gathered from the attendant circumstances. We have already held that the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur is equally applicable to the cases of accident and not merely to the civil jurisprudence. Thus, these principles can equally be extended to criminal cases provided the attendant circumstances and basic facts are proved. It may also be noticed that either the accident must be proved by proper and cogent evidence or it should be an admitted fact before this principle can be applied. This doctrine comes to aid at a subsequent stage where it is not clear as to how and due to whose negligence the accident occurred. The factum of accident having been established, the court with the aid of proper evidence may take assistance of the attendant circumstances and apply the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur. The mere fact of occurrence of an accident does not necessarily imply that it must be owed to someone's negligence. In cases where negligence is the primary cause, it may not always be that direct evidence to prove it exists. In such cases, the circumstantial evidence may be adduced to prove negligence. Circumstantial evidence consists of facts that necessarily point to negligence as a logical conclusion rather than providing an outright demonstration thereof. Elements of this doctrine may be stated as:
• The event would not have occurred but for someone's negligence.
• The evidence on record rules out the possibility that actions of the victim or some third party could be the reason behind the event.
• The accused was negligent and owed a duty of care towards the victim.
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22. Still, in Mohd. Aynuddin [(2000) 7 SCC 72 :
2000 SCC (Cri) 1281] , this Court has also stated the principle: (SCC p. 74, para 8) "8. The principle of res ipsa loquitur is only a rule of evidence to determine the onus of proof in actions relating to negligence. The said principle has application only when the nature of the accident and the attending circumstances would reasonably lead to the belief that in the absence of negligence the accident would not have occurred and that the thing which caused injury is shown to have been under the management and control of the alleged wrongdoer."
It has also been stated that the effect of this maxim, however, depends upon the cogency of the inferences to be drawn and must, therefore, vary in each case.
32. In Nageshwar Shri Krishna Ghobe v. State of Maharashtra [(1973) 4 SCC 23 : 1973 SCC (Cri) 664] this Court observed that the statements of the witnesses who met with an accident while travelling in a vehicle or those of the people who were travelling in the vehicle driven nearby should be taken and understood in their correct perspective as it is not necessary that the occupants of the vehicle should be looking in the same direction. They might have been attracted only by the noise or the disturbance caused by the actual impact resulting from the accident itself. The Court held as under:
(SCC pp. 25-26, para 6) "6. In cases of road accidents by fast moving vehicles it is ordinarily difficult to find witnesses who would be in a position to affirm positively the sequence of vital events during the few moments immediately preceding the actual accident, from which its true cause can be ascertained. When accidents take place on the road, people using the road or who may happen to be in close vicinity would normally be busy in their own preoccupations and in the normal course their attention would be attracted only
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by the noise or the disturbance caused by the actual impact resulting from the accident itself. It is only then that they would look towards the direction of the noise and see what had happened. It is seldom--and it is only a matter of coincidence--that a person may already be looking in the direction of the accident and may for that reason be in a position to see and later describe the sequence of events in which the accident occurred. At times it may also happen that after casually witnessing the occurrence those persons may feel disinclined to take any further interest in the matter, whatever be the reason for this disinclination. If, however, they do feel interested in going to the spot in their curiosity to know some thing more, then what they may happen to see there, would lead them to form some opinion or impression as to what in all likelihood must have led to the accident. Evidence of such persons, therefore, requires close scrutiny for finding out what they actually saw and what may be the result of their imaginative inference. Apart from the eyewitnesses, the only person who can be considered to be truly capable of satisfactorily explaining as to the circumstances leading to accidents like the present is the driver himself or in certain circumstances to some extent the person who is injured. In the present case the person who died in the accident is obviously not available for giving evidence. The bhaiya (Harbansingh) has also not been produced as a witness. Indeed, failure to produce him in this case has been the principal ground of attack by Shri Pardiwala and he has questioned the bona fides and the fairness of the prosecution as also the trustworthiness of the version given by the other witnesses."
Hence, with these main arguments, learned HCGP prays to set aside the judgment of acquittal and to convict the accused in accordance with law.
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CRL.A No. 900 of 2014
6. Against this, learned counsel for the respondent/accused referred to paragraph No.13 of the judgment of the Trial Court wherein the learned JMFC has in detail discussed the evidence and has held that if the evidence of PWs.3, 5 and 8 are considered, it is evident that there is no Zebra crossing at the place of accident and the place of accident is a National Highway and the accident took place in the middle of the road. At the place of the accident, by the side of the road, there is a divider, the deceased crossed the road after purchasing the medicines from the medical shop without observing the movement of the vehicles, hence, the accident occurred. As a result, the deceased fell down on divider and due to the head injury, she died. Infact, the respondent/accused applied break and he also fell down from the bike and sustained injuries. Infact, it is the accused, who took the injured along with him to the hospital in one Ambulance and he has produced the ambulance receipt as per Ex.D1. The respondent/accused has given explanation by leading his defence evidence and also examined one more witness on his behalf. This clearly shows that the accident occurred due to the negligence on the part of the deceased as
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CRL.A No. 900 of 2014she has not taken any care and caution and without looking to the movement of the vehicles, tried to cross the National Highway. Even at the place of accident, there is a divider and it is a National Highway and there will be heavy movements of number of vehicles, hence, the pedestrians ought to have taken care and observe the vehicles passing on the National Highway Road. Therefore, the learned JMFC has rightly come to the conclusion that the prosecution has failed to prove the guilt of the accused and given benefit of doubt to the accused and acquitted the accused. In support of his arguments, learned counsel for the respondent has relied on following decisions:
1) Mahadeo Hari Lokre Vs. The State of Maharashtra reported in (1972) 4 SCC 758
2) Shakila Khader and Ors. Vs. Nausheer Cama and ors. reported in (1975) 4 SCC 122
3) State of Karnataka Vs. K.Shivan Urmilarao passed in Crl.A.No.2812/2011 dated 23.09.2020
4) The State Vs. Gilbart Pinto passed in Crl.A. No.1017/2019 dated 12.09.2019
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CRL.A No. 900 of 2014 5) The State of Karnataka Vs. R.K.Venkatesh passed in Crl.A. No.116/2008 dated 16.01.2014
With these main arguments, learned counsel prayed to dismiss the appeal.
7. I have perused the evidence on record.
8. PW-1- V.E. Girish is the son of deceased Lalithamma. He has set criminal law in motion by lodging the complaint. Admittedly, he has not seen the accident. He is a hearsay witness.
9. PW-2- Ramesh is also relative of deceased Lalithamma. In his evidence, it is shown he belongs to Yelambalase village. He has also not seen the accident. He has stated that he himself lodged the complaint, but actually the complaint is lodged by PW-1. He has stated in the cross-examination that he came to know about the accident over phone through one Ashok. Why he was present there is not forthcoming. So he has not seen the accident.
10. PW-3 Ashok is stated to be belonging to Vadderahalli village, wherein the deceased Lalithamma also belongs to the
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CRL.A No. 900 of 2014same village. He has stated that he was standing in front of Maruthi Medicals on 25.07.2011 and when deceased Lalithamma was crossing the road, a Hero Honda vehicle came in high speed and dashed to Lalithamma and she sustained grievous injuries and she was taken to Kadur Government Hospital and then for higher treatment to Megan Hospital, Shivamogga and Venlock Hospital, Mangaluru, where she succumbed to injuries on 29.07.2011. He has not stated where the accident occurred, the manner in which the vehicle dashed to Lalithamma. He has only stated that the accused was driving the vehicle so as endanger a human life. He has admitted it is a National Highway and several vehicles would be moving. He has also admitted that when the deceased was crossing the road in front of Gayatri Hotel, near the divider, the accident has taken place. He has admitted there is no zebra crossing in front of Maruthi Medicals, where the accident occurred. So his evidence also does not indicate that the accident occurred because of the rash and negligent riding by the accused.
11. PW-4 Revanna, PSI, Kadur Police Station has registered the case and conducted part of the investigation.
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CRL.A No. 900 of 2014
12. PW-5 Eshwarappa is the husband of deceased Lalithamma. He has also not seen the accident. He was waiting at the gate of Government Hospital, Kadur, as he was unwell and he was hospitalized. After the accident, he went to the spot and took deceased Lalithamma to Government Hospital, Kadur. Admittedly, they have filed a case for compensation under Motor Vehicles Act.
13. PW-6 Veerabhadraiah is the father of the accused. He has not supported the prosecution case.
14. PW-7 Balachandregowda, CPI, Kadur has conducted further investigation.
15. PW-8 Harisha is another alleged eyewitness. It is seen he is resident of Bengaluru. Why he was present there is not forthcoming. He also admits that PW-3 and deceased Lalithamma belong to their village. He is a chance witness. Even he has also stated that when deceased Lalithamma was crossing the road, the accused came from Birur side in Hero Honda vehicle and dashed to Lalithamma, due to which, she sustained injury to her head and left hand. He has also admitted that there is no zebra crossing, number of vehicles
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CRL.A No. 900 of 2014will be moving there. The road is very wide and it is a National Highway. This is all the prosecution evidence.
16. Against this, the accused has given his defence evidence as to how the accident occurred. He has stated that when he was riding the motor cycle, there was bus and an autorickshaw moving in front of his vehicle. He was riding the vehicle by the side of the divider and at the time of accident, an auto was moving on his left side. At that time, Lalithamma suddenly came on road after crossing the auto and though he gave horn and applied two breaks and tried to stop the vehicle, he also fell on the road and at that time, the vehicle touched Lalithamma and she fell on the divider. He has also sustained injuries. The public who had gathered at spot took him and deceased Lalithamma in the Ambulance to Shivamogaa Hospital and he has paid the ambulance charges and the receipt is produced at Ex-D1. He is cross-examined. There is nothing in his cross-examination to disbelieve his defence. He has also examined one more witness by name Kumar who also stated that the accident occurred due to the fault of the deceased Lalithamma.
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CRL.A No. 900 of 2014
17. I have perused the spot panchanama Ex-P11 and sketch which shows that it is a highway. The said road passes from Birur to Kadur. The accused was going on his bike on the left side which is meant for going towards Kadur. Thereafter, there is divider. Then there is another road. On the left side of the said road, there is a medical shop by name Maruthi Medical Stores, which is also a kachha road. Spot of the accident as per sketch is just two or three ft from the divider that is on the road itself. Admittedly, there is no zebra crossing or there is no passage for any pedestrian to pass through the road. On the other hand, there is a divider so that no vehicle can pass to other side of the road. It appears from the evidence that deceased Lalithamma after purchasing the medicines, may be was trying to hurriedly cross the road. Admittedly, it is National highway and number of vehicles will be moving. The pedestrians while crossing the road has to take care to see whether there are any vehicles coming on the road and the persons who drive the vehicles has to see whether any persons are crossing the road. There is no zebra crossing at the place of accident. On the other hand, the pedestrians has to take care to see atleast any vehicles are coming. Because it is only one
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CRL.A No. 900 of 2014way traffic road. It appears while suddenly crossing the road, in a hurry, without noticing the vehicles, deceased Lalithamma came on the road and unfortunate accident occurred. The explanation given by the accused by way of defence also cannot be ruled out. In view of the evidence of the prosecution witnesses, the nature of the accident and the place of the accident, possibility of pedestrians having not taken due care which is expected by the pedestrians while crossing the National Highway, which in the present facts of the case is not taken by deceased Lalithamma and hence, this unfortunate incident has occurred.
18. The decision relied by learned HCGP in the case of Ravi Kapur cited supra is in respect of mitigating circumstances and that principle cannot be disputed at all. Said decision states about reasonable care. In this case also, Road is a National Highway and it is also one way road. Therefore, any person crossing said highway has to take reasonable care to see that any vehicles are moving or coming on the said road. When there is no passage or any zebra crossing for the pedestrians to pass and when there is a divider fixed in between two roads, a person cannot cross the road at that point of time. Therefore,
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CRL.A No. 900 of 2014in view of the said principles stated in the said decision, it is the pedestrian who has to take reasonable care and caution while crossing the road. Therefore, that decision will not help the prosecution. On the other hand, it supports the explanation given and defence taken by the accused. As already stated, there are contradictions in the testimony of the witnesses and the prosecution has failed to prove beyond all reasonable doubt, the acquittal is proper. The Hon'ble Supreme Court has also stated about the interference by the Appellate Court. In this case, there were two jeeps and one jeep was going ahead of the other and a Maruthi car was also going ahead. Suddenly a bus came in a very high speed and the Maruthi car driver turned his car to one side and the bus crashed into the jeep and it has resulted in fatal accident. The facts of that case will not help the present case.
19. On the other hand, the decision relied on by the learned counsel for the respondent in the case of Mahadeo Hari Lokre Vs. The State of Maharashtra reported in (1972) 4 SCC 758, Shakila Khader and Ors. Vs. Nausheer Cama and ors. reported in (1975) 4 SCC 122 and State of Karnataka Vs. K.Shivan Urmilarao passed in
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CRL.A No. 900 of 2014Crl.A.No.2812/2011 dated 23.09.2020, The State Vs. Gilbart Pinto passed in Crl.A. No.1017/2019 dated 12.09.2019, The State of Karnataka Vs. R.K.Venkatesh passed in Crl.A. No.116/2008 dated 16.01.2014 aptly applies to the evidence on record.
20. Therefore, in view of the principles stated in the above decisions, if the evidence on record is considered, in my considered view, the judgment of acquittal passed by learned JMFC cannot be said as either illegal or perverse. Therefore, there are no grounds to interfere with the well reasoned judgment passed by learned JMFC.
Accordingly, I pass the following:
ORDER
1. The appeal filed by the State-appellant under section 378(1) and (3) Cr.P.C. stands dismissed.
2. Consequently, the judgment and order of acquittal dated 08.07.2014 passed by learned Prl. Civil Judge & JMFC, Kadur in C.C.No.798/2011 against the respondent/accused is hereby confirmed.
3. Bail bond, if any, executed by the accused, the same shall stand cancelled.
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4. Office is directed to send back the records to the trial court.
5. No order as to costs.
Sd/-
JUDGE HJ,MN List No.: 1 Sl No.: 38