Karnataka High Court
Sri Shankar B vs State Of Karnataka on 4 March, 2026
Author: M.Nagaprasanna
Bench: M.Nagaprasanna
1
Reserved on : 31.01.2026
Pronounced on : 04.03.2026
IN THE HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA AT BENGALURU
DATED THIS THE 04TH DAY OF MARCH, 2026
BEFORE
THE HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE M. NAGAPRASANNA
CRIMINAL PETITION No.9937 OF 2024
BETWEEN:
XXXXXXXX
... PETITIONER
(XXXXXXX, PARTY-IN-PERSON)
AND:
1 . STATE OF KARNATAKA
THROUGH STATION HOUSE OFFICER
KALASIPLAYA POLICE STATION,
BENGALURU - 560 002
REPRESENTED BY ITS
STATE PUBLIC PROSECUTOR,
HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA
BENGALURU - 560 001.
2 . SRI NAGABHUSHAN
S/O LATE SRI SEETHARAMAIAH
AGED ABOUT 70 YEARS,
RESIDING AT NO.H-302
GAANA RIDHI APARTMENTS
PADMA UPADHYAYA LAYOUT
NAGADEVANAHALLI
BENGALURU - 560 056.
2
MOBILE NO.9880812728
... RESPONDENTS
(BY SRI B.N.JAGADEESHA, ADDL.SPP FOR R-1;
SRI CHIRANJEEVI K.R., ADVOCATE FOR R-2 )
THIS CRIMINAL PETITION IS FILED UNDER SECTION 482 OF
CR.P.C., PRAYING TO 1.QUASH THE ENTIRE PROCEEDINGS IN
C.C.NO.20653/2023 ARISING OUT OF CR.NO.116/2023 FOR THE
OFFENCES P/U/S 323, 341, 504, 506 OF IPC INSTITUTED VIDE
ORDER DATED 18.08.2023 CURRENTLY PENDING BEFORE THE
LEARNED V A.C.J.M BENGALURU CITY ANNEXURE-B; 2.TO DIRECT
THE COURT OF THE LEARNED V A.C.J.M BENGALURU CITY TO
COMPLETE AND CONCLUDE THE TRIAL IN C.C.NO.20653/2023
EXPEDITIOUSLY WITHIN AN OUTER LIMIT OF 3 MONTHS, IF AT ALL
THE PETITIONER FAILS IN SECURING THE AFORESAID RELIEF
SOUGHT IN 55(a).
THIS CRIMINAL PETITION HAVING BEEN HEARD AND
RESERVED FOR ORDERS ON 31.01.2026, COMING ON FOR
PRONOUNCEMENT THIS DAY, THE COURT MADE THE FOLLOWING:-
CORAM: THE HON'BLE MR JUSTICE M.NAGAPRASANNA
CAV ORDER
The petitioner is before this Court calling in question
proceedings in C.C.No.20653 of 2023 pending before the V
Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate, Bengaluru arising out of crime
3
in Crime No.116 of 2023 registered for offences punishable under
Sections 323, 341, 504 and 506 of the IPC.
2. Heard XXXXXXXXX, party-in-person for the petitioner,
Sri B.N.Jagadeesha, learned Additional State Public Prosecutor
appearing for respondent No.1 and Sri Chiranjeevi K.R., learned
counsel appearing for respondent No.2.
3. Facts in brief, germane, are as follows: -
3.1. The 2nd respondent is the complainant. The petitioner is
said to be the nephew of the 2nd respondent. The 2nd respondent
had availed an overdraft facility in the name of his business M/s
Tunga Agencies from Syndicate Bank, J.C. Road Branch on 16-08-
1999 to the tune of ₹5,00,000/- by executing an agreement of
hypothecation of certain goods and moneys receivable. The co-
obligant was one Smt. Vishalamma, the mother of the petitioner.
The 2nd respondent is said to have closed down the business and
not paid back the money i.e., the loan that was availed. Recovery
proceedings were initiated by the Bank on 27-01-2005 in
4
O.S.No.733 of 2005 both against the borrower and the guarantor
for recovery of a sum of about ₹6,00,000/-. Money is not paid
despite the settlement arrived at by the parties before the Lok-
Adalat then. 18 years passed by.
3.2. A communication is sent from J.C.Road Branch of Canara
Bank, as Syndicate Bank had merged with Canara Bank, that an
amount of ₹20,00,000/- is outstanding and has to clear the dues.
The petitioner then approaches the Bank to take steps towards
settlement of dues, at which point in time, the complainant and the
mother of the petitioner, as also the petitioner, had some
squabbles. A complaint comes to be registered before the
jurisdictional police alleging that on 02-06-2023 at around 4 p.m.
the 2nd respondent who was on his motorcycle had been abused
with filthy language, assaulted and was voluntarily restrained by
use of criminal force. This becomes a crime in Crime No.116 of
2023. The police conduct investigation and file a charge sheet
against the petitioner. The concerned Court then takes cognizance
and registers C.C.No.20653 of 2023 against the petitioner.
5
Registration of criminal case is what has driven the petitioner to this
Court in the subject petition.
4. The petitioner who appeared in person would vehemently
contend that there are serious inconsistencies in the statement of
the complainant and at the time when the alleged incident took
place, the petitioner was in the Canara Bank trying to sort out the
manner in which the loan was to be cleared. He would submit that
there is no offence that would become punishable under Sections
323, 341, 504 or 506 of the IPC. He would seek quashment of the
proceedings.
5. Per contra, the learned counsel appearing for the 2nd
respondent/complainant would vehemently refute the submissions
in contending that the Police after investigation have filed a charge
sheet. The charge sheet clearly points out voluntary restraint by the
petitioner of his uncle, the complainant. The reasons may be
manifold. But, since charge sheet is filed, it is for the petitioner to
come out clean in a full-blown trial.
6
6. The learned Additional State Public Prosecutor
Sri B.N. Jagadeesha would also toe the lines of the complainant by
seeking dismissal of the petition, on the score that the charge sheet
records the statement of persons who were around and there is
wound certificate also appended to the charge sheet.
7. I have given my anxious consideration to the submissions
made by the respective learned counsel and have perused the
material on record.
8. The afore-narrated facts are a matter of record. The
relationship between the parties is an admitted fact. The petitioner
on 02-06-2023 is said to have restrained the complainant and also
assaulted the complainant. The complainant then registers the
complaint on 03-06-2023. It becomes a crime in Crime No.116 of
2023 for the offences punishable under Sections 323, 341, 504 and
506 of the IPC. Since the entire issue has now sprung from the
complaint, I deem it appropriate to notice the complaint. It reads as
follows:
"ರವ ೆ,
7
ಾ ಾ ಾ ಗಳ ,
ಕ ಾ ಾಳ ೕ ಾ ೆ,
ೆಂಗಳ ರು ನಗರ.
ಇಂದ,
!ೕ "ಾಗಭೂಷಣ '( ೕ)ಾ*ಾಮಯ , 70 ವಷ-,
ನಂ-302, ಾ"ಾ ./ ಅ ಾಟ-2ಂ3, 3"ೇ ಮಹ5,
ಪದ7 ಉ ಾ9ಾ ಯ ೇಔ3, "ಾಗ9ೇವನಹ;<,
ೆಂಗಳ ರು ನಗರ.560056 5 -=.ನಂ-9880812728/9611854575
@ಾನ *ೇ,
Aಷಯ:-xxxxx ಎಂಬುವವರು ನನE 2ೕ ೆ ಹ ೆF @ಾ5ರುವ ಬ ೆG ದೂರು.
*****
"ಾನು ಈ 2ೕಲJಂಡ ALಾಸದ F ನನE ಸಂNಾರ ಸ2ೕತPಾQ PಾಸAದು/ ೊಂಡು,
9ೊಡR@ಾವ;< ಎS.'.ಎT ರNೆUಯ F ಆWೋ= ೈS ಅಂಗ5 ಇಟುY ೊಂಡು Zೕವನ
ನ[ೆ ೊಂ5ರು)ೆUೕ"ೆ. ನನ ೆ \ಾಗೂ ನನE ಅಕJನ ಮಗ xxxxx ಎಂಬುವ]ಗೂ ಈ ^ಂ9ೆ ಹಣ ಾಸು ಮತುU
ಆ U Aಷಯ ೆJ ಸಂಬಂ ದಂ)ೆ ಆತ ನನ ೆ ಕ*ೆ @ಾ5 ಅPಾಚ ಶಬ/ಗ;ಂದ ೈದು Zೕವ ೆದ ೆ
\ಾaರು)ಾU"ೆ. ^ೕQರುPಾ ೆG ."ಾಂಕ 02/06/2023 ರಂದು ಸಂbೆ 04.00 ಗಂWೆ ಸಮಯದ F ನನE
ಅಂಗ5 ೆ ನನE .c ಚಕ! Pಾಹನದ F "ಾ"ೊಬd"ೆ ಬರುeUರುವದನುE ಕಂಡು xxxxx 9ೊಡR@ಾವ;<
ಎS.'.ಎT ರNೆU ಮ ೕ. ಮುಂfಾಗದ ಊದು- ಸೂJS. ಹeUರ ಏ ಾಏa ನನE Pಾಹನ ೆJ ಅಡR ಾQ
ಬಂದು, ನನEನುE ೈಕ]ಂದ ೇಳ ೆ '; ೈiಂದ \ೊ[ೆದು, ತನE ಾ ]ಂದ ತು;ದು, ಅPಾಚ
ಶಬ/ಗ;ಂದ ೈಯು/ ]ನEನುE ಇ Fjೕ ಮುಗ 'ಡು)ೆUೕ"ೆಂದು Zೕವ ೇದ ೆ \ಾa \ೋQರು)ಾU"ೆ. ಆ
ಸಮಯದ F ನನEನುE ಅ Fjೕ ಇzÀÝ Nಾವ-ಜ]ಕರು 2ೕಲ ೆJ ಎ'd ರು)ಾU*ೆ. ನಂತರ "ಾನು ನನE
ತಮ7ನ ಮಗ"ಾದ ರಜl ೌ ೕn] ೆ ಕ*ೆ @ಾ5 ಅ F ೆ ಕ*ೆ ೊಂ5ದು/, ಆಗ ಅವನು ನನEನುE aop
ಆಸq)ೆ! ೆ 9ಾಖಲು @ಾ5 sa)ೆp ೊ5 ರು)ಾ"ೆ. ಆದ/ ಂದ "ಾನು ಈ .ನ tೇತ ೊಂಡು ತಡPಾQ
ಾ ೆ ೆ \ಾಜ*ಾQ ನನE 2ೕ ೆ ಹ ೆF @ಾ5 Zೕವ ೆದ ೆ \ಾaರುವ xxxxx Aರುದu ಸೂಕU ಾನೂನು ೕತ
ಕ!ಮ ಜರುQಸ ೇ ೆಂದು, ಈ ದೂರನುE ]ೕಡುeU9ೆ/ೕ"ೆ.
ತಮ7 Avಾc
ಸ^/-"
8
The complaint is that the petitioner on 02-06-2023 at about 4.00
p.m. comes near the shop of the complainant which is in front of a
Urdu school, stopped the complainant from moving in any direction
and assaulted him. The police conduct investigation and after
recording statements of the complainant and others, file a charge
sheet. The summary of the charge sheet as obtaining in Column
No.17 reads as follows:
"17. ೇ ನ ಸಂwಪU Nಾ*ಾಂಶ
."ಾಂಕ 02/06/2023 ರಂದು 15.40 ಗಂWೆ ಸಮಯದ F ಈ 9ೋxಾ*ೋಪಣ ಪyYಯ 14"ೇ
ಅಂಕಣದ F ನಮೂದು @ಾ5ರುವ 01"ೇ Nಾw9ಾರರು ತಮ7 ಸೂJಟರನ F ಘನ "ಾ {ಾಲಯದ
Pಾ |Uಯ ೆಂಗಳ ರು ನಗರ, ಕ ಾ ಾಳ ೕ ಾ ಾ ಸರಹ./ನ 9ೊಡR@ಾವ;<ಯ ಾಲfಾಗ
3- ರNೆU, 2"ೇ ಾ! ಸು ೕ ಾ ರNೆUಯ F ಬರುeUರುPಾಗ 9ೋxಾ*ೋಪಣ ಪತ!ದ 12"ೇ
ಅಂಕಣದ F ನಮೂದು @ಾ5ರುವ ಆ*ೋ|ಯು ಹLೆಯ 9ೆcೕಷ.ಂದ 01"ೇ Nಾw9ಾರರನುE ಅಡRಗyY
ತ[ೆದ ] F ೈiಂದ \ೊ[ೆದು ೆಳ ೆ 'ೕ; ಾ ]ಂದ ಒದು/ ಹ ೆF @ಾ5 ಅPಾಚ ಶಬ/ಗ;ಂದ
]ಂ. ಾ!ಣ ಭಯಪ5 ರು)ಾU"ೆ;
ಆ*ೋ|ಯು 2ೕಲJಂಡ ತwೕ ನನcಯ ಅಪ*ಾದ @ಾ5ರು)ಾU"ೆಂದು ಆ*ೋ| ರುತU9ೆ.
ಆದ/ ಂದ ಈ ಆ*ೋಪ ೆ"
9. The issue now would be, whether the ingredients of the
offences so laid are met or otherwise?
10. The relationship between the parties is, petitioner is the
nephew and petitioner's mother is the sister of the complainant.
9
The two had an issue with regard to who should clear the loan that
was taken in the year 1999 which had grown up to ₹20,00,000/- in
the year 2023. The complainant narrates that the petitioner is an
independent businessman and not relative. The petitioner has also
produced documents to demonstrate, apart from CCTV footage,
that on 02-06-2023 between 4 p.m. and 4.10 p.m. he was at the
Canara Bank. Noticing this fact of the petitioner that he was not
around the complainant, the complainant while rendering his
statement changes the version that he was assaulted between 3.25
p.m. and 3.40 p.m. The further statement of the complainant is as
follows:
""ಾಗಭೂಷಣ '( ೕ)ಾ*ಾಮಯ , 70 ವಷ-, ನಂ-302, ಾ"ಾ ./ ಅ ಾಟ-2ಂ3
3"ೇಮಹ5, ಪದ7 ಉ ಾ9ಾ ಯ ೇಔ3, "ಾಗ9ೇವನಹ;<, ೆಂಗಳ ರು ನಗರ.560056 = ನಂ-
9880812728.
*****
"ಾನು ."ಾಂಕ 02/06/2023 ರಂದು ಕ ಾ ಾಳ ೕ ಾ ೆಯ F xxxxx ಎಂಬುವವರ
Aರುದu ]ೕ5ರುವ ದೂ ೆ ಸಂಬಂಧಪಟYಂ)ೆ ಈ .ನ ನನE ಮುಂದುವ ದ \ೇ; ೆಯನುE ]ೕಡುeU9ೆ/ೕ"ೆ.
"ಾನು ಕ ಾ ಾಳ ೕ ಾ ೆಯ F ."ಾಂಕ 03/06/2023 ರಂದು ದೂರು ]ೕಡುPಾಗ ಆ*ೋ|
xxxxx ."ಾಂಕ 02/06/2023 ರಂದು ಸಂbೆ 4.00 ಗಂWೆ ೆ ನನEನುE ತ[ೆದು ಹ ೆF @ಾ5 ಅPಾಚ
ಶಬ/ಗ;ಂದ ೈದು ಾ!ಣ ಭಯ ಪ5 ರು)ಾU"ೆಂದು ನಮೂದು @ಾ5ರು)ೆUೕ"ೆ. ಆದ*ೆ ."ಾಂಕ
02/06/2023 ರಂದು ಮ€ಾ ಹE ಸು@ಾರು 3.25 ಗಂWೆ ಸಮಯದ F ಆ*ೋ| ನನEನುE ಾS ಾ•
ಟ- ರNೆUಯ ಸು ೕ ಾ ರNೆU 2"ೇ ಾ! ನ F ತ[ೆದು ೈiಂದ \ೊ[ೆದು ಮತುU ಾ ]ಂದ ಒದು/ ಹ ೆF
@ಾ5 ಅPಾಚ ಶಬ/ಗ;ಂದ ೈದು Zೕವ ೆದ ೆ \ಾaರು)ಾU"ೆ. "ಾನು ದೂರು ]ೕಡುವ ಸಮಯ ೆJ
ಮನ p ೆ "ೋPಾQದ/ ಂದ ಘಟ"ೆ ನ[ೆದ ಸಮಯವನುE ಸಂbೆ 4.00 ಗಂWೆ ಎಂದು e; 9ೆ/. ಆದುದ ಂದ
10
ಘಟ"ೆ ನ[ೆದ ಸಮಯವನುE ಮ€ಾ ಹE ಸು@ಾರು 3.25 ಂದ 03.40 ಗಂWೆ ಎಂದು ನಮೂದು
@ಾಡ ೇ ೆಂದು ೇ; ೊಳ <)ೆUೕ"ೆ. ಆ*ೋ| xxxxx ನನುE "ಾನು "ೋ5ದ*ೆ ಗುರುeಸು)ೆUೕ"ೆ.
ನನE ಸಮ‚ಮ, ಓ. ೇಳ ಾQ ಸ i9ೆ
ಸ^/- ಸ^/-"
The petitioner, to demonstrate that he was in recovery section of
the Canara Bank on the said date and time, has produced adequate
documents. The documents are perused which clearly indicate that
the petitioner was nowhere near the complainant. Visitors pass is
produced and the CCTV footage is also produced by the petitioner.
Therefore, whether the offences alleged against the petitioner
would meet the ingredients that are necessary to drive home the
crime is also necessary to be considered.
11. One of the offences alleged is punishable under Section
341 of the IPC. Section 341 of the IPC reads as follows:
"341. Punishment for wrongful restraint.--Whoever
wrongfully restrains any person, shall be punished with simple
imprisonment for a term which may extend to one month, or
with fine which may extend to five hundred rupees, or with
both."
Section 341 has its ingredients in Section 339 of the IPC. It reads
as follows:
11
"339. Wrongful restraint.--Whoever voluntarily
obstructs any person so as to prevent that person from
proceeding in any direction in which that person has a right to
proceed, is said wrongfully to restrain that person.
Exception.--The obstruction of a private way over land or
water which a person in good faith believes himself to have a
lawful right to obstruct, is not an offence within the meaning of
this section.
Illustration
A obstructs a path along which Z has a right to
pass, A not believing in good faith that he has a right to stop the
path. Z is thereby prevented from passing. A wrongfully
restrains Z."
The purport of this provision need not detain this Court for long or
delve deep into the matter. The Apex Court in KEKI HORMUSJI
GHARDA v. MEHERVAN RUSTOM IRANI1 has held as follows:
".... .... ....
11. It is in the aforementioned backdrop of events, the
statement made by the first respondent that Accused 1 to 5
were managing the affairs of the Company and had instigated
Accused 6 to construct the road must be viewed. It is one thing
to say that the Company had asked Accused 6 to make
construction but only because Accused 1 to 5 were its Directors,
the same, in our opinion, would not be sufficient to fasten any
criminal liability on them for commission of an offence under
Section 341 IPC or otherwise.
12. "Wrongful restraint" has been defined under Section
339 IPC in the following words:
"339. Wrongful restraint.--Whoever voluntarily
obstructs any person so as to prevent that person from
1
(2009) 6 SCC 475
12
proceeding in any direction in which that person has a right
to proceed, is said wrongfully to restrain that person.
Exception.--The obstruction of a private way over
land or water which a person in good faith believes himself
to have a lawful right to obstruct, is not an offence within
the meaning of this section."
The essential ingredients of the aforementioned
provision are:
(1) Accused obstructs voluntarily;
(2) The victim is prevented from proceeding in any
direction;
(3) Such victim has every right to proceed in that
direction.
13. Section 341 IPC provides that:
"341. Punishment for wrongful restraint.--Whoever
wrongfully restrains any person, shall be punished with
simple imprisonment for a term which may extend to one
month, or with fine which may extend to five hundred
rupees, or with both."
14. The word "voluntary" is significant. It connotes
that obstruction should be direct. The obstructions must
be a restriction on the normal movement of a person. It
should be a physical one. They should have common
intention to cause obstruction.
15. The appellants herein were not at the site. They
did not carry out any work. No overt act or physical
obstruction on their part has been attributed. Only
because legal proceedings were pending between the
Company and Bombay Municipal Corporation and/or with
the first respondent herein, the same would not by itself
mean that the appellants were in any way concerned with
commission of a criminal offence of causing obstructions
to the first respondent and his parents.
16. We have noticed hereinbefore that despite of
the said road being under construction, the first
respondent went to the police station thrice. He,
13
therefore, was not obstructed from going to the police
station. In fact, a firm action had been taken by the
authorities. The workers were asked not to do any work
on the road. We, therefore, fail to appreciate that how, in
a situation of this nature, the Managing Director and the
Directors of the Company as also the Architect can be
said to have committed an offence under Section 341 IPC.
...... ...... ......
19. Even as regards the availability of the remedy of
filing an application for discharge, the same would not
mean that although the allegations made in the complaint
petition even if given face value and taken to be correct
in its entirety, do not disclose an offence or it is found to
be otherwise an abuse of the process of the court, still
the High Court would refuse to exercise its discretionary
jurisdiction under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal
Procedure.
20. Indisputably, there might have been some delay on
the part of the appellants in approaching the High Court but
while adjusting equity the High Court was required to take into
consideration the fact that in a case of this nature the appellants
would face harassment although the allegations contained in the
complaint petition even assuming to be correct were trivial in
nature. The High Court furthermore has failed to take into
consideration the fact that in the first information report no
allegation in regard to acts of common intention or common
object on the part of the appellants was made out. The
appellants were not named as accused therein. It is, therefore,
really difficult to appreciate as to on what basis the complaint
petition was filed.
21. For the reasons aforementioned, the impugned
judgment and order of the High Court is set aside. The appeal is
allowed. The order summoning the appellant is quashed."
(Emphasis supplied)
14
12. Insofar as the other offences alleged under Sections 323,
504 and 506 of the IPC, the Apex Court in MOHD. WAJID v.
STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH2, has held as follows:
".... .... ....
Sections 503, 504 and 506 IPC
25. Chapter XXII IPC relates to criminal intimidation,
insult and annoyance. Section 503 reads thus:
"503. Criminal intimidation.--Whoever threatens
another with any injury to his person, reputation or
property, or to the person or reputation of any one in whom
that person is interested, with intent to cause alarm to that
person, or to cause that person to do any act which he is
not legally bound to do, or to omit to do any act which that
person is legally entitled to do, as the means of avoiding the
execution of such threat, commits criminal intimidation.
Explanation.--A threat to injure the reputation of any
deceased person in whom the person threatened is
interested, is within this section.
Illustration
A, for the purpose of inducing B to desist from
prosecuting a civil suit, threatens to burn B's house. A is
guilty of criminal intimidation."
26. Section 504 reads thus:
"504. Intentional insult with intent to provoke
breach of the peace.--Whoever intentionally insults, and
thereby gives provocation to any person, intending or
knowing it to be likely that such provocation will cause him
to break the public peace, or to commit any other offence,
shall be punished with imprisonment of either description
for a term which may extend to two years, or with fine, or
with both."
27. Section 506 reads thus:
2
2023 SCC OnLine SC 951
15
"506. Punishment for criminal intimidation.--
Whoever commits, the offence of criminal intimidation shall
be punished with imprisonment of either description for a
term which may extend to two years, or with fine, or with
both;
if threat be to cause death or grievous hurt, etc.--
and if the threat be to cause death or grievous hurt, or to
cause the destruction of any property by fire, or to cause an
offence punishable with death or imprisonment for life, or
with imprisonment for a term which may extend to seven
years, or to impute unchastity to a woman, shall be
punished with imprisonment of either description for a term
which may extend to seven years, or with fine, or with
both."
28. An offence under Section 503 has the following
essentials:
(1) Threatening a person with any injury;
(i) to his person, reputation or property; or
(ii) to the person, or reputation of any one in whom
that person is interested.
(2) The threat must be with intent;
(i) to cause alarm to that person; or
(ii) to cause that person to do any act which he is
not legally bound to do as the means of avoiding the
execution of such threat; or
(iii) to cause that person to omit to do any act
which that person is legally entitled to do as the means
of avoiding the execution of such threat.
29. Section 504 IPC contemplates intentionally
insulting a person and thereby provoking such person
insulted to breach the peace or intentionally insulting a
person knowing it to be likely that the person insulted
may be provoked so as to cause a breach of the public
peace or to commit any other offence. Mere abuse may
not come within the purview of the section. But, the
words of abuse in a particular case might amount to an
16
intentional insult provoking the person insulted to
commit a breach of the public peace or to commit any
other offence. If abusive language is used intentionally
and is of such a nature as would in the ordinary course of
events lead the person insulted to break the peace or to
commit an offence under the law, the case is not taken
away from the purview of the section merely because the
insulted person did not actually break the peace or
commit any offence having exercised self-control or
having been subjected to abject terror by the offender.
30. In judging whether particular abusive language
is attracted by Section 504 IPC, the court has to find out
what, in the ordinary circumstances, would be the effect
of the abusive language used and not what the
complainant actually did as a result of his peculiar
idiosyncrasy or cool temperament or sense of discipline.
It is the ordinary general nature of the abusive language
that is the test for considering whether the abusive
language is an intentional insult likely to provoke the
person insulted to commit a breach of the peace and not
the particular conduct or temperament of the
complainant.
31. Mere abuse, discourtesy, rudeness or insolence,
may not amount to an intentional insult within the
meaning of Section 504 IPC if it does not have the
necessary element of being likely to incite the person
insulted to commit a breach of the peace of an offence
and the other element of the accused intending to
provoke the person insulted to commit a breach of the
peace or knowing that the person insulted is likely to
commit a breach of the peace. Each case of abusive
language shall have to be decided in the light of the facts
and circumstances of that case and there cannot be a
general proposition that no one commits an offence
under Section 504 IPC if he merely uses abusive
language against the complainant. In King
Emperor v. Chunnibhai Dayabhai [King
Emperor v. ChunnibhaiDayabhai, (1902) 4 Bom LR 78] , a
Division Bench of the Bombay High Court pointed out
that:
17
"To constitute an offence under Section 504 IPC it
is sufficient if the insult is of a kind calculated to
cause the other party to lose his temper and say or do
something violent. Public peace can be broken by
angry words as well as deeds."
(emphasis supplied)
32. A bare perusal of Section 506 IPC makes it clear
that a part of it relates to criminal intimidation. Before an
offence of criminal intimidation is made out, it must be
established that the accused had an intention to cause
alarm to the complainant.
33. In the facts and circumstances of the case and more
particularly, considering the nature of the allegations levelled in
the FIR, a prima facie case to constitute the offence punishable
under Section 506 IPC may probably could be said to have been
disclosed but not under Section 504 IPC. The allegations with
respect to the offence punishable under Section 504 IPC can
also be looked at from a different perspective. In the FIR, all
that the first informant has stated is that abusive
language was used by the accused persons. What exactly
was uttered in the form of abuses is not stated in the
FIR.
34. One of the essential elements, as discussed
above, constituting an offence under Section 504 IPC is
that there should have been an act or conduct amounting
to intentional insult. Where that act is the use of the
abusive words, it is necessary to know what those words
were in order to decide whether the use of those words
amounted to intentional insult. In the absence of these
words, it is not possible to decide whether the ingredient
of intentional insult is present."
.... .... ....
37. We say so because once the complainant decides to
proceed against the accused with an ulterior motive for
wreaking personal vengeance, etc. then he would ensure that
the FIR/complaint is very well drafted with all the necessary
pleadings. The complainant would ensure that the averments
18
made in the FIR/complaint are such that they disclose the
necessary ingredients to constitute the alleged offence.
Therefore, it will not be just enough for the Court to look into
the averments made in the FIR/complaint alone for the purpose
of ascertaining whether the necessary ingredients to constitute
the alleged offence are disclosed or not.
38. In frivolous or vexatious proceedings, the Court owes
a duty to look into many other attending circumstances
emerging from the record of the case over and above the
averments and, if need be, with due care and circumspection try
to read in between the lines. The Court while exercising its
jurisdiction under Section 482CrPC or Article 226 of the
Constitution need not restrict itself only to the stage of a case
but is empowered to take into account the overall circumstances
leading to the initiation/registration of the case as well as the
materials collected in the course of investigation. Take for
instance the case on hand. Multiple FIRs have been registered
over a period of time. It is in the background of such
circumstances the registration of multiple FIRs assumes
importance, thereby attracting the issue of wreaking vengeance
out of private or personal grudge as alleged."
(Emphasis supplied)
Further, the Apex Court in the case of MADHUSHREE DATTA v.
STATE OF KARNATAKA3, has held as follows:
".... .... ....
17. To determine what are the ingredients of the
offence under Section 323IPC, it is important to read Sections
319, 321 and 323 together.
18. What emerges on a conjoint reading of the
aforementioned provisions is that, for a conviction
under Section 323IPC, there must be a voluntary act of
causing hurt i.e. bodily pain, disease, or infirmity, to
3
2025 SCC OnLine SC 165
19
another person. Therefore, it is essential that actual
hurt is caused.
19. Turning to the facts of the case, the complaint
merely states that the complainant was forcibly ejected
from the Company's office by security personnel, who
allegedly attempted to assault, physically harass, and
threaten her with dire consequences. Therefore, the
complaint does not directly attribute any voluntary act
of causing hurt to the complainant by any of the two
accused."
(Emphasis supplied)
In the light of the aforesaid judgments of the Apex Court, the
offences under Sections 323, 341, 504 and 506 are all loosely laid
against the petitioner. Neither the complaint, statement nor the
charge sheet would indicate any offence against the petitioner. The
petitioner and the complainant belong to the same family and are
fighting over clearance of loan. Therefore, the fact that the
petitioner is brought into the web of crime to wreak vengeance for
not clearing the loan cannot be ruled out. In that light, permitting
further proceedings against the petitioner would become an abuse
of the process of law and result in miscarriage of justice.
20
13. For the aforesaid reasons, the following:
ORDER
(i) Criminal petition is allowed.
(ii) Proceeding in C.C.No.20653 of 2023 pending before the V Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate, Bengaluru City and arising out of Crime No.116 of 2023 stands quashed.
(iii) The name of the petitioner shall be masked in the police records.
Sd/-
(M.NAGAPRASANNA) JUDGE Bkp CT:MJ