Calcutta High Court
Kamala Bhuniya vs State Of West Bengal on 4 January, 2006
Equivalent citations: 2006(1)CHN439, 2006CRILJ998, 2006 CRI. L. J. 998, 2006 (2) AJHAR (NOC) 436 (CAL), 2006 (3) ALL LJ NOC 512, 2006 (3) ABR (NOC) 431 (CAL), (2006) 4 EASTCRIC 262, (2006) 1 CAL LJ 342, (2007) 1 CURCRIR 101, (2006) 1 CAL HN 439, (2006) 3 CRIMES 92, (2006) 2 ALLCRILR 32
Author: Pranab Kumar Deb
Bench: Pranab Kumar Deb
JUDGMENT Alok Kumar Basu, J.
1. The sole appellant, Kamala Bhuniya, preferred this appeal in the year 1995, challenging her conviction and sentence by the learned Addl. Sessions Judge, Tamluk in connection with Sessions Trial No. 1(1) of 1995 arising out of G. R. Case No. 865 of 1987.
2. The prosecution case in brief was that on 23rd September, 1987, between 11.30 a.m and 12 p.m. the appellant killed her husband, Netai Charan Bhuniya with an axe at village Gumai under Panskura Police Station. Getting the information of murder of Netai from the neighbours, the FIR maker rushed to the spot along with others and through the window, he saw the deadbody of Netai in a pool of blood and the appellant standing near the deadbody with the axe in her hand.
3. On getting information of the murder through the complaint, officers of Panskura police station arrived at the place of occurrence and they arrested the appellant along with weapon.
4. The police officer-in-charge of investigation, subsequently conducted inquest over the deadbody of the victim and after collection of evidence, finally chargesheet was submitted against the appellant under Section 302 of the IPC for causing homicidal death of her husband, Netai Charan Bhuniya.
5. The learned Trial Court, from the police papers and after hearing both prosecution and defence, framed charge against the appellant under Section 302 of the IPC and since the appellant pleaded not guilty to the charge and claimed for trial, the prosecution side was asked to produce its evidence in support of the charge framed against the appellant.
6. The prosecution side produced 14 witnesses during trial including the FIR maker, some neighbours of the appellant, the doctor, who conducted P.M. examination and the Investigating Officer. The prosecution side also produced the inquest report, the P.M. report and FSL report.
7. The learned Trial Judge, after considering submissions of both prosecution and defence and having regard to the evidence on record, ruled out the defence plea of insanity taken during argument and the learned Judge on perusal of evidence was convinced to hold the appellant guilty for the homicidal death of her husband and accordingly the appellant was convicted under Section 302 and she was sentenced to suffer R.I. for life and also to pay a fine of Rs. 2,000/-in default, R.I. for six months more.
8. Being aggrieved by, and dissatisfied with, the order of conviction and sentence, the appellant preferred the appeal in the year 1995, and she also prayed for interim release on bail pending disposal of the appeal but her prayer for bail was rejected and ultimately the appeal came up for hearing before us on this day in presence of Mr. Sekhar Basu for the appellant and Mr. Sushil Mahato, for the State-respondent.
9. We have heard both Mr. Basu and Mr. Mahato, over this appeal and after hearing both the sides, we propose to dispose of this appeal by delivering the present judgment in open Court.
10. Appearing for the appellant, Mr. Basu has addressed us mainly on the point that having regard to the fact and evidence available with the record, the appellant was entitled to get benefit of Section 84 of the Indian Penal Code and the learned Judge totally misdirected himself in appreciating the scope and ambit of Section 84 as urged before him during trial and for this reason, the judgment of the learned Trial Court should be set aside and the appellant should be given the benefit of Section 84 and she should be acquitted from the charge of murder.
11. Mr. Basu has, first of all, explained the legal position relating to Section 84 with reference to the celebrated judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court delivered on Section 84 and reported in the case of Dahyabhai Chhaganbhai Thakkar v. State of Gujarat .
12. Mr. Basu contends that it has been observed in the case of Hon'ble Supreme Court that to consider the case of an accused under Section 84 of the Indian Penal Code the main point for consideration would be whether at the time of commission of the offence the person concerned was suffering from mental insanity or not and it can never be a consideration whether the person was suffering from such mental insanity before commission of the offence or after commission of the offence.
13. Mr. Basu has also referred the decision of the Andhra Pradesh High Court, as reported in 1985 Criminal Law Tournal, page 1824 and submits that in a case where the plea has been taken on behalf of the accused under Section 84 of the Indian Penal Code, the Court must examine with reference to fact and evidence whether prosecution at the initial stage discharged its obligation to establish that the accused person was capable of understanding the impact of the wrongful act done by him or her and it was the specific obligation of the prosecution to show at the initial stage that there was presence of mens rea in the accused person and only when the prosecution shall discharge this initial burden, the accused person would be called upon to rebut that presumption by adducing evidence and it would be open to Court to hold conclusively with reference to fact and evidence on record as to whether the plea of insanity can be accepted and whether the benefit of Section 84 of the Indian Penal Code can be extended to the accused person, as claimed by him or her. Mr. Basu, to substantiate his contention, has also referred to a decision of the Delhi High Court, reported in 1968 Cr. LJ 1156.
14. From the decisions starting from the case of the Hon'ble Supreme Court and also from the decision of the Andhra Pradesh High Court, we may sum up of the legal position relating to Section 84 as follows :
It would be a concern for the Trial Court whether the accused person was insane at the time of commission of the offence or in other words, whether she was incapable of understanding the impact of the wrongful act committed by him or her at the time of commission of the offence.
15. The Investigating Agency is duty-bound to ascertain at the initial stage where there is any indication about the mental condition of the accused person as to whether the accused person was mentally capable of understanding the impact of his or her wrongful act:
Motive of the crime although not important in criminal trial, assumes unusual importance in case where a plea of insanity has been taken and where the victim happens to be a close relation of the accused person and finally the circumstances before and after the time of commission of the crime.
16. Mr. Basu has drawn our attention to the inquest report where at the initial stage, the Investigating Officer on receipt of the information of the congnizable offence recorded in black and white that there were indications touching the mental condition of the appellant and it was reported to the Investigating Officer that the appellant suffered from mental insanity. Mr. Basu has thereafter drawn our attention to the evidence ofP.W.1, P.W.2, P.W.5., P.W. 6, P.W.7 and P.W. 8, who were all responsible residents of the locality and who in one voice stated during trial that there was cordial relation between the appellant and her husband who was the victim and also the victim was found having without reaction soon after commission of the offence and she was found neither weeping nor laughing nor sobbing after witnessing the gruesome murder of her husband. Mr. Basu has also referred to the relevant portion of the evidence of the Investigating Officer and other witnesses to indicate that the accused never made any attempt to flee away from the scene of occurrence, nor she made any attempt to throw away the axe with which she assaulted her husband.
17. Mr. Basu contends that considering the special relationship between the appellant and the victim, when there was no motive behind the murder and considering the fact that the relationship between the two was cordial and warm and considering the fact that the accused did not have any reaction soon after commission of the offence and considering the fact that at the initial stage the Investigating Officer recorded about mental insanity of the accused accused, it was the duty of the prosecution to arrange for medical examination of the accused to prove it beyond any shadow of doubt that the accused had the mental faculty to understand the impact of her wrongful act and when that was not done, following the observation of the Apex Court which was subsequently followed by the Division Bench of both Andhra Pradesh and Delhi High Court, it can be stated firmly that in this particular case, even if there is no sufficient proof regarding mental insanity of the appellant, the appellant is entitled to get benefit of doubt when prosecution at least did not come forward with a foolproof case of mental sanity of the victim at the time of commission of the offence and hence it is the case where the Trial Court ought to have extended the benefit of Section 84 of the IPC to the appellant and should have recorded an order of acquittal.
18. Mr. Mahato, on behalf of the State respondent submits that it will appear on close scrutiny of the record that at no stage of the investigation or trial starting from the initial stage, the appellant took the plea of insanity to get the benefit of Section 84 of the Indian Penal Code. Mr. Mahato submits that the remark of the Investigating Officer on the inquest cannot be of any help unless there is clinching evidence in support of the plea of insanity. Mr. Mahato contends that from the observation of the witnesses that the appellant had no reaction after commission of the murder no conclusion can be drawn that the appellant was insane at the time of commission of the murder. Mr. Mahato submits that when there is no medical report supporting the plea of insanity, at this stage no relief can be extended to the appellant from provision of Section 84 of the Indian Penal Code and the Trial Court rightly rejected such contention raised before it and, naturally, there is no scope to interfere with the order of conviction and sentence.
19. We have heard submissions of both Mr. Basu and Mr. Mahato and we have also examined the ratio of decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court as well as that of Andhra Pradesh High Court and Delhi High Court. There cannot be any dispute over the legal proposition established through the abovementioned decisions touching the scope of Section 84 of the IPC and to be more precise, there is no doubt that to extend benefit of Section 84, the Court must be satisfied that at the time of commission of the offence the appellant was suffering from mental illness or she was in such a state of insanity that she was not capable of understanding the consequence of her wrongful act.
20. It is an undisputed position of fact that whether a person suffers from mental illness or not is not a layman's guess work but it is to be established by cogent medical evidence and it is also undisputed fact that where there is no such medical evidence, the Court is to draw such conclusion from the surrounding circumstances which were not disputed from the record.
21. We have gathered from the observation of the Andhra Pradesh High Court as well as from the Delhi High Court that in a case where a plea of insanity has been taken in connection w h a murder of a close relation of the accused, motive always assumes much importance and if there is no evidence indicating motive of murder, a conclusion will certainly follow in favour of the plea of insanity.
22. It is true that from lack of motive alone, no conclusion can be drawn supporting the plea of insanity and in that case the Court is to consider other attending circumstances.
23. In this particular case, the observation of the Investigating Officer on his inquest report and the statement of several witnesses examined by the prosecution regarding the reaction of the appellant and the fact that the appellant made no attempt to flee away nor she made any attempt to remove the incriminating weapon leads us to the conclusion that when at the initial stage of investigation, the Investigating Officer gathered information about insanity of the appellant and when no attempt was made to get any medical evidence in support of that mental insanity now coupled with the fact regarding reaction of the appellant soon after commission of the offence and her subsequent conduct soon after the occurrence by not making any attempt to flee away or to remove the incriminating weapon from the scene of occurrence certainly persuade us to hold following the judicial decision of the Andhra Pradesh High Court as well as Delhi High Court that the prosecution failed to discharge its initial onus about presence of mens rea in the appellant at the time of commission of offence and from the surrounding evidence and from the lack of duty on the part of the Investigating Agency lead us to hold that the appellant at the time of commission of the offence was insane and incapable of appreciating the consequence of her act. Accordingly, she was entitled to get the benefit of Section 84 of the Indian Penal Code.
24. Accordingly, we find merit in the present appeal and we hold that the learned Judge was not justified in recording the order of conviction and sentence since the appellant was insane at the time of commission of the offence.
25. We, therefore, allow this appeal and we set aside the order of conviction and sentence. Since the appellant is in jail, we direct the Superintendent/ Correctional Home, where the appellant is detained, to release the appellant forthwith, if she is not wanted in connection with any other case. Send a copy of the judgment to the Superintendent/Correctional Home accordingly at once. Send a copy of this judgment with LCR to the learned Court below for information.
26. A xerox copy of the judgment delivered today be handed over to the learned Advocate for the appellant free of costs.
Pranab Kumar Deb, J.
27. I agree.