Allahabad High Court
Smt. Sadhana Devi vs State Of U.P.Through Prin.Secy. Food ... on 6 February, 2020
Author: Rakesh Srivastava
Bench: Rakesh Srivastava
HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT ALLAHABAD, LUCKNOW BENCH Court No. - 24 Case :- MISC. SINGLE No. - 3311 of 2020 Petitioner :- Smt. Sadhana Devi Respondent :- State Of U.P. Thru. Secy. Food & Civil Supplies & Ors. Counsel for Petitioner :- Praveen Kumar Tripathi Counsel for Respondent :- C.S.C. Hon'ble Rakesh Srivastava, J.
1. Heard Shri Praveen Kumar Tripathi, learned counsel for the petitioner and the learned Standing Counsel appearing on behalf of the respondents.
2. This writ petition has been filed praying inter alia the following reliefs:-
i) Issue a writ order or direction in the nature of Mandamus commanding the opposite party no. 4 (Supply Inspector, Lalganj, District Pratapgarh to take a decision in the light of the order dated 05.12.2014 passed by the opposite part no. 3, to allow the petitioner for distributing the essential commodities to the public in Village Panchayat - Saraijagat Singh, Block Lalganj, District Pratapgarh.
ii. To issue a writ, order or direction in the nature of mandamus commanding the opposite party no. 3 (Sub-Divisional Magistrate Lalganj, Pratapgarh) to consider the case of the petitioner and pass an appropriate order upon the representation of the petitioner dated 16.10.2019 contained as Annexure No. 8 to this writ petition, in the interest of justice.
3. According to the petitioner she was allotted a license to run a second fair price shop in village Saraijagat Singh, Block & Tehsil Lalganj, District Pratapgarh by an order made by the Sub-divisional Magistrate on 05.12.2014. As per the said order the petitioner was to complete certain formalities and thereafter lift the essential commodities for distribution. The petitioner, it is alleged, completed the formalities as required of her and on 28.12.2014 moved an application before the Supply Inspector, Lalganj for allotment of quota. The grievance of the petitioner is that more than five years have passed but till date the petitioner has not been allotted any quota for distribution.
4. Admittedly, by order date 05.12.2014, the petitioner has been allotted dealership to run a second fair price shop in the village. The order by which a second fair price shop for the village was approved, the resolution of the Gaon Sabha recommending the name of the petitioner for allotment of the license are not on record. From a perusal the letter (annexure no. 4) to the writ petition it appears that 05.12.2014 was the date fixed for holding an open meeting of the Gaon Sabha. The counsel for the petitioner has failed to demonstrate as to how the shop in question was allegedly allotted to the petitioner on 05.12.2014, the date fixed for holding an open meeting for the purpose. Be that as it may.
5. Jurisdiction under Article 226 is extraordinary, equitable and discretionary. It is well settled that if there is an inordinate delay on the part of the petitioner in filing a writ petition, and such delay is not satisfactorily explained, this Court may decline to intervene and grant relief in the exercise of its writ jurisdiction.
6. In State of M.P. v. Nandlal Jaiswal, (1986) 4 SCC 566 the Apex Court has held as under:
"24. ... it is well settled that the power of the High Court to issue an appropriate writ under Article 226 of the Constitution is discretionary and the High Court in the exercise of its discretion does not ordinarily assist the tardy and the indolent or the acquiescent and the lethargic."
It has been further stated therein that:
"24. ... If there is inordinate delay on the part of the petitioner in filing a writ petition and such delay is not satisfactorily explained, the High Court may decline to intervene and grant relief in the exercise of its writ jurisdiction."
7. In City and Industrial Development Corpn. v. Dosu Aardeshir Bhiwandiwala, (2009) 1 SCC 168, the Apex Court, while dwelling upon the jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, has held that the Court, while exercising its jurisdiction under the said Article, is duty-bound to inter alia consider as to whether the writ petition was ex facie barred by any laws of limitation.
8. In Chennai Metropolitan Water Supply & Sewerage Board v. T.T. Murali Babu, (2014) 4 SCC 108 the Apex Court opined as under:
"16. Thus, the doctrine of delay and laches should not be lightly brushed aside. A writ court is required to weigh the explanation offered and the acceptability of the same. The court should bear in mind that it is exercising an extraordinary and equitable jurisdiction. As a constitutional court it has a duty to protect the rights of the citizens but simultaneously it is to keep itself alive to the primary principle that when an aggrieved person, without adequate reason, approaches the court at his own leisure or pleasure, the court would be under a legal obligation to scrutinise whether the lis at a belated stage should be entertained or not. Be it noted, delay comes in the 3 way of equity. In certain circumstances delay and laches may not be fatal but in most circumstances inordinate delay would only invite disaster for the litigant who knocks at the doors of the court. Delay reflects inactivity and inaction on the part of a litigant -- a litigant who has forgotten the basic norms, namely, "procrastination is the greatest thief of time" and second, law does not permit one to sleep and rise like a phoenix. Delay does bring in hazard and causes injury to the lis."
(emphasis supplied)
9. In the present case, the fair price license was allegedly granted to the petitioner on 05.12.2014 and the petitioner, it is alleged, had completed all the formalities on 28.12.2014 but till date the petitioner has not been allotted any quota and she has not been permitted to run her shop. Manifestly, the cause of action, if any, accrued to the petitioner on 28.12.2014 or soon thereafter but the petitioner has filed the present writ petition on 24.01.2020, after more than five years.
10. The learned counsel for the petitioner has submitted that the petitioner has been making representations to the authorities concerned and was genuinely pursuing her remedy before them, and only when she realised that the relief would not be forthcoming, she has approached this court. In this regard the petitioner has brought on record only two representations dated 12.01.2015 and 16.10.2019.
11. The application dated 28.12.2014 and the representations mentioned above do not contain any acknowledgment of their receipt. The representation dated 16.10.2019 does not contain any reference of any previous representation. The representations, it appears, have been concocted for the purpose of the present controversy. In any case of the matter, it is now well settled that mere repeated filing of representations could not be a sufficient explanation for the delay in approaching this Court for grant of relief.
12. In Gian Singh v. State of the Punjab and Haryana High Court, (1980) 4 SCC 266 the Apex Court has held as under:
" ....seems to us that the claim is grossly belated. The writ petition was filed in this Court in 1978, about eleven years after the dates from which the promotions are claimed. There is no valid explanation for the delay. That the petitioner was making successive representations during this period can hardly justify our overlooking the inordinate delay. Relief must be refused on that ground."
(emphasis supplied)
13. In Karnataka Power Corpn. Ltd. v. K. Thangappan, (2006) 4 SCC 322 the Apex Court has opined as under:
"10. It has been pointed out by this Court in a number of cases that representations would not be adequate explanation to take care of delay. This was first stated in K.V.Rajalakshmiah Setty v. State of Mysore. This was reiterated in Rabindranath Bose case by stating that there is a limit to the time which can be considered reasonable for making representations and if the Government had turned down one representation the making of another representation on similar lines will not explain the delay. In State of Orissa v. Pyarimohan Samantaray making of repeated representations was not regarded as satisfactory explanation of the delay. In that case the petition had been dismissed for delay alone. (See State of Orissa v. Arun Kumar Patnaik also.)"
(emphasis supplied)
14. The cause of action, if any, accrued to the petitioner way back in the year 2014, but instead of immediately taking recourse to the remedy available to him under law, the petitioner took more than five years to approach this Court by means of the present writ petition. In the absence of any satisfactory explanation for the inordinate delay in filing the present writ petition., the writ petition is liable to be dismissed on the ground of delay and laches alone.
15. The writ petition is, accordingly, dismissed on the ground of delay and laches.
Order Date :- 6.2.2020 Pradeep/-