Chattisgarh High Court
Hanuman Singh vs Managing Director, Steel Authority Of ... on 5 April, 2022
Author: Narendra Kumar Vyas
Bench: Narendra Kumar Vyas
Page 1 of 10
AFR
HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH, BILASPUR
Reserved on 22-2-2022
Passed on 05-04-2022
WPL No. 121 of 2016
Hanuman Singh S/o Shri Bhagwati Yadav, Aged About 51
Years Ex- Operator C.H.P., 5-4 Power Plant, P.N.B.S.
Personnel No. 896077 Token No. 11002, Bhilai Steel
Plant, Bhilai, District Durg Chhattisgarh.
---- Petitioner
Versus
1. Managing Director, Steel Authority Of India Limited Bhilai
Steel Plant, Bhilai, District Durg Chhattisgarh,
Chhattisgarh
2. D.G.M. Prabhar, P.P.1/ P.E.M., Bhilai Steel Plant, Bhilai,
District Durg Chhattisgarh, District : Durg, Chhattisgarh
---- Respondents
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For petitioner : None For respondents : Mr. P.R. Patankar, Advocate.
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Hon'ble Shri Justice Narendra Kumar Vyas CAV ORDER
1. The petitioner has preferred the instant writ petition (L) assailing the order dated 6-2-2016 (Annexure P/1) passed by the respondents authority whereby the appeal filed by the petitioner against the imposition of punishment has been rejected.
2. The petitioner has filed a case before Labour Court which was registered as Case No. 04/CGIR Act.(C)/2007. The facts as reflected from the record are that the petitioner who was working as operator in Bhilai Steel Plant , Bhilai, District Durg since 19-9-1987, remained absent on duty during period from 8-1-2005 to 26-12- 2005 (149 days) without sanction of leave. It has been contended by the petitioner in his petition that he has undergone cataract operation and leave was credited in his leave account, but the Page 2 of 10 respondent has not adjusted the leave and he was treated absent from duty. There was no willful intention not to report the duty, still he was charge-sheeted. It has been further contended that he has given the application and also received fit and unfit certificate from the respondent. He has also submitted an application for medical leave, he remained absent on duty on account of ill-health, but respondents authority has mala fidely issued charge-sheet on 28- 4-2006 wherein no opportunity was given to defence his case. It has been alleged that the Enquiry Officer has promised him to give lesser punishment, therefore, he has admitted his guilt and misconduct, thereafter his services were terminated from service, therefore, he may be re-instated in service from back wages.
3. The respondents have filed their written statement denying the allegations made in the application contending that the performance of the petitioner was unsatisfactory and in the enquiry charges were found proved, therefore, punishment order has been contended. It has also been contended that departmental enquiry was conducted, in accordance with principles of natural justice after giving proper opportunity to the petitioner, therefore, he prayed for rejection of the application filed by the petitioner. Learned Labour Court vide its order dated 4-12-2009 has vitiated enquiry, against that the respondents' management has preferred miscellaneous application before the Industrial Court which registered as 01/CGIR Act/111/2010, the Industrial Court vide its order dated 11-10-2010 set aside the order passed by the Labour Court and it has held that the disciplinary enquiry initiated against the petitioner is proper. Thereafter, learned Labour Court vide its order dated 20-1-2011 has rejected the application filed by the workman by recording a finding that the punishment is proportionate to misconduct.
4. It has been further contended that, against the said order the petitioner has preferred an appeal before the Industrial Court and the same was also dismissed,and against that order he had preferred the instant writ petition (L) before this court which was registered as WPL No.3394 of 2011 and Co-ordinate Bench of this court vide its impugned order dated 27-7-2015 has dismissed the writ petition. Against that order, he has preferred the writ appeal Page 3 of 10 before Division Bench of this Court. Hon'ble the Division Bench of this Court vide its order dated 12-7-2012 passed in Writ Appeal No. 487 of 2015 has dismissed the appeal with liberty to the petitioner to make a representation with regard to quantum of punishment. The operative portion of the order is extracted below "3. Quantum of punishment primarily is prerogative of the employer. If the appellant represents with regard to the same, it does not preclude the respondents from considering it in accordance with law to their own satisfaction without being prejudiced by our reluctance to entertain this appeal".
5. In pursuance of the aforesaid order passed by Division Bench of this court, the petitioner has preferred a representation before the respondents authorities on 26-12-2015 wherein he has stated that he is an illiterate person and he was afraid with enquiry proceedings, therefore, he has admitted his guilt and termination is a major penalty which will destroy the whole life and would submit that his case may kindly be considered sympathetically instead of major punishment of termination of service, less punishment may be imposed.
6. Since no one has appeared on behalf of the petitioner before this court for defending the case of the petitioner, still this court has examined the records of the case.
7. On the other hand, learned counsel for the respondents would submit that punishment is proportionate to misconduct and impugned order passed by the respondents dismissing the appeal is just and proper, quantum of punishment is purely prerogative of the employer and this court cannot interfere in the quantum of punishment. In support of his arguments, he has referred to judgments of Hon'ble Supreme Court in the matters of B.C. Chaturvedi vs. Union of India1, V. Ramanna vs. AP.S.R.T.C2, Om Kumar vs. Union of India3, Union of India vs. Gayanuthan4, Indian Oil Corporation vs. Ashok Kumar Arora5, Union of India 1 1995 (6) SCC 749 2 2005(7) SCC 338 3 2001(2) SCC 386 4 1997((7) SCC 463 5 1997 (3) SCC 72 Page 4 of 10 vs. P. Guna Shekaran6, Delhi Development Authority vs. Skipper Construction7, Kashinath Gupta vs. Enquiry Officer8, Chennai Metropolitan Water vs. T.T. Murli Babu 9, Union of India vs. Dwarka Prasad Tiwari10, Union of India vs. Manab Kumar Guha11, Kuldeep Singh Vs. Commissioner of Police 12, Coimbatore District Central Cooperative Bank vs. Coimbatore District Central Cooperative Union13, SBI vs. Samrendra Kishor Endow14 and G.B. Mazhajan vs. Jalgaon Municipal Counil 15 and would pray that the petition filed by the petitioner deserves to be dismissed.
8. I have heard learned counsel for the respondent and perused the record.
9. From bare perusal of the order dated 6-2-2016 (Annexure P/
1), passed the respondent management by which the appeal has been rejected and it reflects that without assigning any reason it has passed the order as under.
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10. From bare perusal of the order, it is quite clear that no reason whatsoever has been given by the respondents authority while rejecting the representation of the petitioner which shows non-application of mind and against the well settled principles of law and even administrative authority should have passed a reasoned order which has civil consequence. More precisely, to the facts of the case that by rejection of the appeal right of the petitioner has been adversely decided, even no reason has been assigned which shows arbitrariness on the part of the respondents authority and agaisnt the principle of natural justice and fair play.
11. Hon'ble 5 Judge Constitution Bench of Supreme Court in the matter of S.N. Mukherjee vs. Union of India16, with regard to natural justice in administrative law has held as under.
"35. The decisions of this Court referred to above indicate that with regard to the requirement to record reasons the approach of this Court is more in line with that of the American Courts. An important consideration which has weighed with the Court for holding that an administrative authority exercising quasi-judicial 16 (1990) 4 SCC 594 Page 6 of 10 functions must record the reasons for its decision, is that such a decision is subject to the appellate jurisdiction of this Court under Article 136 of the Constitution as well as the supervisory jurisdiction of the High Courts under Article 227 of the Constitution and that the reasons, if recorded"35. The decisions of this Court referred to above indicate that with regard to the requirement to record reasons the approach of this Court is more in line with that of the American Courts. An important consideration which has weighed with the Court for holding that an administrative authority exercising quasi-judicial functions must record the reasons for its decision, is that such a decision is subject to the appellate jurisdiction of this Court under Article 136 of the Constitution as well as the supervisory jurisdiction of the High Courts under Article 227 of the Constitution and that the reasons, if recorded, would enable this Court or the High Courts to efectively exercise the appellate or supervisory power. But this is not the sole consideration. The other considerations which have also weighed with the Court in taking this view are that the requirement of recording reasons would (i) guarantee consideration by the authority; (ii) introduce clarity in the decisions; and (iii) minimize chances of arbitrariness in decision making. In this regard a distinction has been drawn between ordinary Courts of law and tribunals and authorities exercising judicial functions on the ground that a Judge is trained to look at things objectively uninfluenced by considerations of policy or expediency whereas an executive ofcer generally looks at things from the standpoint of policy and expediency.
36. Reasons, when recorded by an administrative authority in an order passed by it while exercising quasi-judicial functions, would no doubt facilitate the exercise of its jurisdiction by the appellate or supervisory authority. But the other considerations, referred to above, which have also weighed with this Court in holding that an administrative authority must record reasons for its decision, are of no less signifcance. These considerations show that the re- cording of reasons by an administrative authority serves a salutary purpose, namely, it excludes chances of arbitrariness and ensures a degree of Page 7 of 10 fairness in the process of decision-making. The said purpose would apply equally to all decisions and its application cannot be confned to decisions which are subject to appeal, revision or judicial review. In our opinion, therefore, the requirement that reasons be recorded should govern the decisions of an administrative authority exercising quasi-judicial functions irrespective of the fact whether the decision is subject to appeal, revision or judicial review. It may, however, be added that it is not required that the reasons should be as elaborate as in the decision of a Court of law. The extent and nature of the reasons would depend on particular facts and circumstances. What is necessary is that the reasons are clear and explicit so as to indicate that the authority has given due consideration to the points in controversy. The need for recording of reasons is greater in a case where the order is passed at the original stage. The appellate or revisional authority, if it afrms such an order, need not give separate reasons if the appellate or revisional authority agrees with the reasons contained in the order under challenge.
37. Having considered the rationale for the requirement to record the reasons for the decision of an administrative authority exercising quasi-judicial functions we may now examine the legal basis for imposing this obligation. While considering this aspect the Donough more Committee observed that it may well be argued that there is a third principle of natural justice, namely, that a party is entitled to know the reason for the decision, be it judicial or quasi-judiicial. The committee expressed the opinion that "there are some cases where the refusal to give grounds for a decision may be plainly unfair; and this may be so, even when the decision is fnal and no further proceedings are open to the disappointed party by way of appeal or otherwise" and that "where further proceedings are open to a disappointed party, it is contrary to natural justice that the silence of the Minister or the Ministerial Tribunal should deprive them of the opportunity." (P 80) Prof. H.W.R. Wade has also ex- pressed the view that "natural justice may provide the best rubric for it, since the giving of reasons is required by the ordinary man's sense of justice." (See Page 8 of 10 Wade, Administrative Law, 6th Edn. P.
548). In Siemens Engineering Co. case (Supra) this Court has taken the same view when it observed that "the rule requiring reasons to be given in support of an order is, like the principles of audi alteram parlem, a basic principle of natural justice which must inform every quasi-judicial process." This decision proceeds on the basis that the two well- known principles of natural justice, namely
(i) that no man should be a Judge in his own cause and (ii) that no person should be judged without a hearing, are not exhaustive and that in addition to these two principles there may be rules which seek to ensure fairness in the process of decision-making and can be regarded as part of the principles of natural justice.
This view is in consonance with the law laid down by this Court in A.K. Kraipak and Others v. Union of India and Others, [1970] 1 SCR 457, wherein it has been held:
"The concept of natural justice has undergone a great deal of change in recent years. In the past it was thought that it included just two rules namely (i) no one shall be a Judge in his own cause (nemo dabet esse judex propria causa) and (ii) no decision shall be given against a party without afording him a reasonable hearing (audi alteram partem). Very soon thereafter a third rule was envisaged and that is that quasi-judicial enquiries must be held in good faith, without bias and not arbitrarily or unreasonably. But in the course of years many more subsidiary rules came to be added to the rules of natural justice." (P. 468-69).
38. A similar trend is discernible m the decisions of Eng- lish Courts wherein it has been held that natural justice demands that the decision should be based on some evidence of probative value. (See: R. v. Deputy Industrial Injuries Commissioner ex P. Moore, [1965] 1 Q.B. 456; Mahon v. Air New Zealand Ltd., [1984] A.C. 648.
39. The object underlying the rules of natural justice "is to prevent miscarriage of justice" and secure "fair-play in action."
As pointed out earlier the requirement about re- cording of reasons for its decision by an administrative authority exercising quasi-judicial functions achieves this object by excluding chances of arbitrariness and ensuring a degree of Page 9 of 10 fairness in the process of decision-making. Keep- ing in view the expanding horizon of the principles of natural justice, we are of the opinion, that the requirement to record reason can be regarded as one of the principles of natural justice which govern exercise of power by administrative authorities. The rules of natural justice are not embodied rules. The extent of their application depends upon the particular statutory framework where-under jurisdiction has been conferred on the administrative authority. With regard to the exercise of a particular power by an administrative authority including exercise of judicial or quasi- judicial functions the legislature, while conferring the said power, may feel that it would not be in the larger public interest that the reasons for the order passed by the administrative authority be recorded in the order and be communicated to the aggrieved party and it may dispense with such a requirement. It may do so by making an express provision to that afect as those contained in the Administrative Procedure Act, 1946 of U.S.A. and the Administrative Decisions (Judicial Review) Act, 1977 of Australia whereby the orders passed by certain specifed authorities are excluded from the ambit of the enactment. Such an exclusion can also arise by necessary implication from the nature of the subject matter, the scheme and the provisions of the enactment. The public interest underlying such a provision would outweigh the salutary purpose served by the requirement to record the reasons. The said requirement cannot, therefore, be insisted upon in such a case.
40. For the reasons aforesaid, it must be concluded that except in cases where the requirement has been dispensed with expressly or by necessary implication, an administrative authority exercising judicial or quasi-judicial function is required to record the reasons for its decision".
12. If we examined the facts of the case in the light of the law laid down by Hon'ble Supreme Court in S.N. Mukherjee (supra), it is quite clear that no reason whatsoever has been assigned by the respondents Page 10 of 10 authority while dismissing the representation of the petitioner. This is nothing but arbitrariness and against the principles of natural justice, therefore, the impugned order dated 6-2-2016(Annexue P/1) deserves to be set aside and it is hereby set aside.
13. Now, the matter is remanded back to the authority to decide the appeal afresh after afording proper opportunity of hearing to the petitioner and the authority shall pass a well reasoned order.
14. With the aforesaid observations and direction, the writ petition (L) is allowed.
Sd/-
(Narendra Kumar Vyas) Judge Raju