Andhra Pradesh High Court - Amravati
Md Abdul Sammad Alias Munna vs State Of Ap on 10 May, 2024
Author: U.Durga Prasad Rao
Bench: U.Durga Prasad Rao
APHC010211752021
IN THE HIGH COURT OF ANDHRA PRADESH
AT AMARAVATI [3350]
(Special Original Jurisdiction)
FRIDAY, THE TENTH DAY OF MAY
TWO THOUSAND AND TWENTY FOUR
PRESENT
HON'BLE SRI JUSTICE U.DURGA PRASAD RAO
AND
HON'BLE SRI JUSTICE GANNAMANENI RAMAKRISHNA PRASAD
RT No.4/2021 and Crl.A.Nos.160, 161, 165, 167, 170, 198, 212, 251, 258 and
353 of 2021
Between:
State of Andhra Pradesh ...PETITIONER
AND
Mohammad Abdul Sammad Munna and Others ...RESPONDENT(S)
COMMON JUDGMENT:(Per Hon'ble Sri Justice U. Durga Prasad Rao) The Referred Trials 2, 3 & 4/2021 wherein judgments are pronounced today, present chilling facts of diabolical and grotesque manner of killing the trailer drivers and cleaners by the ruthless gang of dacoits while they were transporting iron load on the highway between Ongole-Nellore Districts in Andhra Pradesh.
In S.C.No.595/2010, learned VIII Additional District & Sessions Judge, Ongole in his judgment dated 18.05.2021 convicted A1 to A15 for different offences and sentenced them with different punishments as narrated in the following table. Since among them, A1 to A10 are awarded death punishment for the offences under Section 396 IPC under two counts, learned Judge submitted the entire case proceedings along with his judgment to this High Court under Section 2 366 Cr.P.C. for confirmation of death sentence and the Registry has registered the said referred proceedings as a Referred Trial No.4/2021 and listed before us. That apart, challenging the conviction and sentence, the accused have also preferred different Criminal Appeals as mentioned in the table below and those criminal appeals are also listed before us.
TABLE
Accus Name of Accused / Charges Framed Convicted and punished for the offences Referred Criminal
ed No. Resident of by the Trial Court Trial Appeal filed
(RT No. ) by accused
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
A1 Mohammad Abdul i.396 r/w 120B of i. Imprisonment for life for the offence
Sammad @ Munna IPC; U/s 396 r/w 120B IPC
Ongole
ii.396 IPC; ii.DEATH Punishment for the offence U/s
396 IPC UNDER TWO COUNTS
iii.400 IPC;
RT- Crl.A.No.161/
iv.201 IPC iii. Imprisonment for life for the offence
4/2021 21
U/s 400 IPC
iv.RI for 7 years and fine of Rs.5,000/-
IDSI 3 months for the offence U/s 201
IPC
A2 Shaik Riyaz, i.396 r/w 120B of i.Imprisonment for life for the offence U/s
Ongole IPC; 396 r/w 120B IPC
ii.396 IPC; ii.DEATH Punishment for the offence U/s
396 IPC UNDER TWO COUNTS
iii.400 IPC;
Crl.A.No.198/
iii. Imprisonment for life for the offence -do-
21
iv.201 IPC U/s 400 IPC
iv.RI for 7 years and fine of Rs.5,000/-
IDSI 3 months for the offence U/s 201
IPC
A3 Syed Hidayatulla @ i.396 r/w 120B of i.Imprisonment for life for the offence U/s
Babu IPC; 396 r/w 120B IPC
Donakonda Crl.A.No.258/
-do-
ii.396 IPC; ii.DEATH Punishment for the offence U/s 21
396 IPC UNDER TWO COUNTS
3
Accus Name of Accused / Charges Framed Convicted and punished for the offences Referred Criminal
ed No. Resident of by the Trial Court Trial Appeal filed
(RT No. ) by accused
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
iii.400 IPC; iii. Imprisonment for life for the offence
U/s 400 IPC
iv.201 IPC
iv.RI for 7 years and fine of Rs.5,000/-
IDSI 3 months for the offence U/s 201
IPC
A4 Mohammad i.396 r/w 120B of i.Imprisonment for life for the offence U/s
Jamaluddin @ Jamal IPC; 396 r/w 120B IPC
Bengalore
ii.396 IPC; ii.DEATH Punishment for the offence U/s
396 IPC UNDER TWO COUNTS
iii.400 IPC; Crl.A.No.160/
-do-
iii. Imprisonment for life for the offence 21
iv.414 IPC; U/s 400 IPC
iv. RI for 3 years for the offence U/s 414
IPC
A5 Bathala Salmon i.396 r/w 120B of i.Imprisonment for life for the offence U/s
Inamanamellur Village IPC; 396 r/w 120B IPC
ii.396 IPC; ii.DEATH Punishment for the offence U/s
396 IPC UNDER TWO COUNTS
iii.400 IPC;
Crl.A.No.170/
iii. Imprisonment for life for the offence -do-
21
iv.201 IPC U/s 400 IPC
iv.RI for 7 years and fine of Rs.5,000/-
IDSI 3 months for the offence U/s 201
IPC
A6 Yepuri Chinna i.396 r/w 120B of i.Imprisonment for life for the offence U/s
Veeraswamy IPC; 396 r/w 120B IPC
Reddypalem Village
ii.396 IPC; ii.DEATH Punishment for the offence U/s
396 IPC UNDER TWO COUNTS
iii.400 IPC;
Crl.A.No.160/
iii. Imprisonment for life for the offence -do-
21
iv.201 IPC U/s 400 IPC
iv.RI for 7 years and fine of Rs.5,000/-
IDSI 3 months for the offence U/s 201
IPC
A7 Yepuri Pedda i.396 r/w 120B of i.Imprisonment for life for the offence U/s
Veeraswamy IPC; 396 r/w 120B IPC
Reddypalem Village Crl.A.No.160/
-do-
ii.396 IPC; ii.DEATH Punishment for the offence U/s 21
396 IPC UNDER TWO COUNTS
4
Accus Name of Accused / Charges Framed Convicted and punished for the offences Referred Criminal
ed No. Resident of by the Trial Court Trial Appeal filed
(RT No. ) by accused
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
iii.400 IPC; iii. Imprisonment for life for the offence
U/s 400 IPC
iv.201 IPC
iv.RI for 7 years and fine of Rs.5,000/-
IDSI 3 months for the offence U/s 201
IPC
A8 Gundu Bhanu Prakash i.396 r/w 120B of i.Imprisonment for life for the offence U/s
@ Bhanu @ Gajani IPC; 396 r/w 120B IPC
Kothasayampet
ii.396 IPC; ii.DEATH Punishment for the offence U/s
396 IPC UNDER TWO COUNTS
iii.400 IPC;
Crl.A.No.167/
iii. Imprisonment for life for the offence -do-
21
iv.201 IPC U/s 400 IPC
iv.RI for 7 years and fine of Rs.5,000/-
IDSI 3 months for the offence U/s 201
IPC
A9 Rachamalla Sampath, i.396 r/w 120B of i.Imprisonment for life for the offence U/s
Kothasayampet IPC; 396 r/w 120B IPC
ii.396 IPC; ii.DEATH Punishment for the offence U/s
396 IPC UNDER TWO COUNTS
iii.400 IPC;
Crl.A.No.251/
iii. Imprisonment for life for the offence -do-
21
iv.201 IPC U/s 400 IPC
iv.RI for 7 years and fine of Rs.5,000/-
IDSI 3 months for the offence U/s 201
IPC
A10 Gundeboina Sridhar, i.396 r/w 120B of i.Imprisonment for life for the offence U/s
Kothasayampet IPC; 396 r/w 120B IPC
ii.396 IPC; ii.DEATH Punishment for the offence U/s
396 IPC UNDER TWO COUNTS
iii.400 IPC;
Crl.A.No.165/
iii. Imprisonment for life for the offence -do-
21
iv.201 IPC U/s 400 IPC
iv.RI for 7 years and fine of Rs.5,000/-
IDSI 3 months for the offence U/s 201
IPC
A11 Shaik Hafeez, i.396 r/w 120B of i.Imprisonment for life for the offence U/s
Ongole IPC; 396 r/w 120B IPC
Crl.A.No.161/
-do-
2021
ii.400 IPC; ii. Imprisonment for life for the offence
U/s 400 IPC
5
Accus Name of Accused / Charges Framed Convicted and punished for the offences Referred Criminal
ed No. Resident of by the Trial Court Trial Appeal filed
(RT No. ) by accused
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
A12 Arla Gangadhara Rao i.396 r/w 120B of i.Imprisonment for life for the offence U/s
@ Gangadhar, IPC; 396 r/w 120B IPC
Ongole Crl.A.No.353/
-do-
ii.400 IPC; ii.Imprisonment for life for the offence 21
U/s 400 IPC
A13 Shaik Kamal Saheb @ i.396 r/w 120B of i.Imprisonment for life for the offence U/s
Kamal @ IPC; 396 r/w 120B IPC
Kamaluddin, Crl.A.No.212/
-do-
Ongole ii.400 IPC; ii.Imprisonment for life for the offence 21
U/s 400 IPC
A14 Shaik Rahamathulla, i.396 r/w 120B of i.Imprisonment for life for the offence U/s
Ongole IPC; 396 r/w 120B IPC
ii.400 IPC; ii.Imprisonment for life for the offence
Crl.A.No.198/
U/s 400 IPC -do-
21
iii. 412 IPC;
iii. Found not guilty for the charge U/s
412 IPC
A15 Shaik Dada Peer @ i.396 r/w 120B of i.Imprisonment for life for the offence U/s
Gani, IPC; 396 r/w 120B IPC Crl.A.No.160/
Hindupur 21
-do-
ii.400 IPC; ii.Imprisonment for life for the offence
U/s 400 IPC
A16 Halim Seth Case against A16 - - -
Bengalore and A17 split up
and numbered as
PRC 8/2014 and
pending before
AJFCM, Ongole
A17 Shaukat Case against A16 - - -
Bengalore and A17 split up
and numbered as
PRC 8/2014 and
pending before
AJFCM, Ongole
II. PROSECUTION CASE:
A1, A2 and A11 to A14 are residents of Ongole; A3 is a resident of Donakonda; A4 is a resident of Bangalore; A5 and A6 are residents of Inamanamelluru of Maddipadu Mandal; A7 is the resident of Pata Malapalli 6 village; A8 and A10 are the residents of Kottasayam Peta of Hanumakonda Mandal; A15 is a resident of Hindupur, Anantapur District and some of them are inter-related and all of them are known to each other, particularly they know A1 who is having criminal history being involved in several criminal cases. For instance, A2 and A3 are brothers-in-law of A1, and A14 is the father of A2. All the accused were closely associated with each other and they intended to earn easy money by committing highway dacoitees of iron load trailers and by selling the iron.
(a) It is alleged, A1 took rooms in Hotel Narayana Palace and also Tasty Hotel, Ongole during the months of July and August 2008 and had a criminal conspiracy in the hotel rooms with other accused and hatched a plan to commit dacoitees on highway by killing the crew of trailers moving with iron load and sell the booty and get illegal benefit as its cost was high. The staff of both the hotels witnessed the staying of A1 in their hotels and having the negotiations with other accused.
(b) It is further alleged that in order to conceal the iron material and cut the stolen trailers into pieces, A1 required a big godown. So, A1 with the help of A12 obtained the godown of PW24 located at Seetharampuram Kostalu of Maddipadu Mandal on lease under a Lease Agreement.7
(c) The further case of the prosecution is that PW1 of Tamilnadu is the owner of trailer lorry bearing No.KA 01C 1852. The deceased - (1) Ramar Sekhar and (2) Perumal Subramani were the drivers of the said lorry. On 09.09.2008, the said trailer was loaded with iron belonging to BHEL, Ranipet to be transported to Mython of Bihar. On 20.09.2008, the iron was unloaded and on 23.09.2008, the driver Subramani informed PW1 that they were starting with a load of iron rods from Durgapur to Kalpakam in Tamilnadu. For the last time, on 26.09.2008, he contacted PW1 over phone stating that they were at Ongole. Subsequently there was no communication to PW1 from his drivers. After waiting for about 10 days, PW1 went to Kalpakam Factory and on knowing that his lorry with iron did not reach there, proceeded to Tada Check Post and came to know that the lorry did not cross the check post. He then enquired at Tangutur Toll Gate where the staff sought time to verify the records and provide information. Therefore, he went to Ongole and consulted the Lorry owners Association and lodged Ex.P1- report on 17.10.2008 suspecting his drivers. PW44 - S.I. of police, Ongole P.S. registered Ex.P155 - FIR in Cr.No.356/2008 for the offence u/s 406 r/w 34 IPC against both the drivers and took up investigation. Thereafter PW46 - the trainee D.S.P. and in-
charge S.H.O. of Ongole Taluk P.S. took up investigation and examined the records of Toll Plaza at Bollapalli on 20.10.2008 and came to know that the missing trailer bearing No.KA 01C 1852 passed the said Toll Gate around 08.30 to 8 09.00 PM on 26.09.2008. Further investigation was conducted by PW54 - T.Sankar Reddy, the Inspector of Police. During investigation, on reliable information that A1 took the godown on lease at Seetharampuram Kostalu near Maddipadu village for storing iron material, he went to Praveen Tobacco Godown and noticed the remnants for shifting iron material at the godown and also found the godown was locked. He examined Duddela Venkata Reddy (LW12) and PW25 - Sk. Meera Saheb, the watchmen of the godown and recorded their statements. They informed that godown belongs to PW24 and A1 took on lease the said godown from PW24 and A1 and others were visiting the godown for storing the iron material. The I.O. found the compound wall around the Praveen Tobacco godown with an entry gate. The godown is situated inside the compound wall and a wall was newly constructed at the rear side so as to prevent the entry of any others from the rear side. The I.O. was informed that during September 2008, A1 and A2 brought a welding machine into the Godown and on one night they brought a trailer lorry with iron rods and kept in the godown. During midnight, LW12 saw some persons cutting the iron rods and trailer lorry into pieces. He informed the same to PW25. When they questioned A1, A2 and A12 about their cutting activity, they warned them not to enter the godown and mind their work.
(d) During further investigation, the I.O. examined PW24 and secured Ex.P56 - copy of Lease Agreement dated 01.09.2008. He also collected cell 9 numbers of A1 and A2 and basing on the call data he secured the location of A1 and A2 at Bengaluru. Upon serving notices, he secured the presence of A1, A3 and A11 at Ongole Taluk P.S. on 09.11.2008 and examined them on 10.11.2008 in the presence of mediators PW41 and LW46 - Kankana Sanjeeva Rao, V.R.O-IV, Ongole Urban. A1, A3 and A11 have confessed that they along with other accused were involved in the present crime and other crimes and killed the drivers and cleaners and committed dacoity of the transported iron load which are subject matter of S.C.No.595/2010, S.C.No.73/2010 and S.C.No.91/2010.
(e) Regarding the present crime, A1 confessed that himself and A2 to A10 proceeded to National Highway on the midnight in the month of September 2008 in a Verna car (MO 26), TATA Indica car (MO 57) and motorcycle (MO 56) and Bajaj Platinum (MO 11) in search of iron loaded trailer lorries and they found one such trailer lorry of Karnataka registration near Ulavapadu Village proceeding towards Chennai. They overtook the trailer lorry and stopped it and A3 and A6 went to the driver and cleaner and by showing a plackard exhibiting as POLICE, and asked them to produce the lorry records stating that police officials were in the verna car. At that moment, all the accused A1 to A10 entered the cabin and caught hold the deceased - D1 and D2 and strangulated them with ropes and murdered them. After that they stuffed the dead bodies in gunny bags and shifted the bags in Indica car towards Inamanamelluru village. Later, on the same night, on the 10 instructions of A1, A5 and A7 dug a pit in the fields of Inamanamelluru Village by the side of Gundlakamma new canal. Later, A6, A8 and A9 took the two gunny bags contained the dead bodies in TATA Indica car to the Inamanamelluru Village and there A5 to A9 buried the dead bodies in the pit.
(f) The trailer with iron load is concerned, A4 drove the trailer with iron load to the godown at Seetharampuram Kostalu. A2 got unloaded the iron rods from the trailer into Praveen tobacco godown by engaging Hamalis i.e., PWs 17, 31, 34, LW15 - Sattepalli Yogaiah, LW16 - Sk. Jilani, and LW 19 - Sk. Mulla Mohammed. A2 and LW36 - Kalaam cut the empty trailer and kept the pieces of the trailer and tyres in the godown under the instructions of A1. A4 abandoned the empty power head (MO8) in the premises of Pragathi Bhavan at old ZP office as per the instructions of A12.
(g) While so, A14 along with the assistance of A12 and A13 sold the iron load under the instructions of A1 and gave sale proceeds of Rs.5.50 lakhs to A1 and the same was apportioned by A1 and others.
(h) A1, A3 and A11 led the I.O. and mediators - PW41 and LW46 - K.Sanjeeva Rao to the godown on 10.11.2008 and with the help of MO-29 keys seized from A1, the I.O. opened the shed of the godown where A1 showed Verna car (MO 6) parked in the shed. With MO 28 - key of the Verna car, which was also seized from A1, the car was got opened and inside the car certain things i.e., 11 MOs 50 to 54, 62 & 63 and exhibits P104 to P121 were found and seized. A1 further led the I.O. and mediators inside the godown and produced the cut pieces of the trailer lorry, which are MOs 2 to 7. All those articles were seized under Ex.P.22 - confessional recovery Panchanama. Later, A1, A3 and A11 were arrested and sent for judicial remand and I.O. obtained police custody of A1, A3 and A11 initially for five days from 13.11.2008 to 17.11.2008 and later got extended from 17.11.2008 to 21.11.2008 by the orders of the learned III AJFCM, Ongole and interrogated them.
(i) During the course of further investigation, on 15.11.2008, the I.O. arrested A9 and A10 and recorded their statements in the presence of mediators - PW41 and LW46 and pursuant to their confession they led the police and mediators to Singayakunta Poramboke of Inamanamelluru Village and showed the place where the dead bodies of D1 and D2 were buried. Later, the I.O. in the presence of mediators and PW6 - Tahsildar and PW7 - R.I. of Maddipadu exhumed the dead bodies and got conducted inquest. PW3 and 4 identified the dead bodies. PW40 - Civil Assistant Surgeon conducted Post Mortem and opined that the cause of death of the deceased was due to Asphyxia due to pressure on the neck and issued Post Mortem reports under Exs.P96 and P97.
(j) On 16.11.2008, A1 and A3 took the I.O. and the mediators - PW41 and LW46 and PW38 - Photographer to the scene of offence situated on the NH-5 road 12 leading from Ongole to Nellore in between KM stones, 1289-1289/200, near cross roads leading to Ulavapadu and showed them and the I.O. prepared the Ex.P132 - scene of offence observation report and Ex.P133 - rough sketch of scene of offence in the presence of mediators and also obtained Ex.P92 - photographs and Ex.P94 - compact disk through PW38.
(k) On 22.11.2008, the I.O. got information from PW12 - S.I. of Police, Tangutur that the power head of trailer lorry bearing No.KA 01C 1852 (MO8) was seized by PW11 - the A.S.I., Tangutur P.S. at Valluru village and registered Ex.P8
- FIR in Cr.No.174/2008 under Section 102 Cr.P.C.. He proceeded to Tangutur P.S. and found MO8 with a sticker bearing No.AP 28W 1198 along with original name plate bearing No.KA 01 C 1852. The I.O. opened the tool box and oil tanker with MO-1 keys and they were opened. He instructed PW12 to transfer Ex.P8 - FIR and relevant documents to Cr.No.356/2008.
(l) On 05.12.2008, the I.O. in the presence of PW41 and LW46 arrested A12 and A13 and recorded their confessional statements. A12 admitted that on his recommendation, the hotel rooms in Tasty hotel and Narayana Palace lodge were booked in favour of A1 where all the accused assembled and hatched criminal conspiracy to commit dacoity of iron load from the trailer lorries passing on the National Highway. He also confessed that during last week of August 2008 himself and A1 obtained lease of the godown of PW24 in favour of A1 under 13 Ex.P56 - Lease Agreement. Later, in the 3rd week of September 2008, on the instructions of A1, A12 and A13 went to Guntur and approached Sk. Rahim and LW39 - Pasupuleti Gopaiah and offered to sell iron rods and ultimately sold the iron rods to LW-39-Pasupuleti Gopaiah for Rs.5.50 lakhs and A1 paid Rs.25,000/- to A12 and A12 in turn gave Rs.5000/- to A13.
(m) The I.O., during the course of further investigation, arrested the remaining accused and effected recoveries and got conducted T.I. parade of A1 to A3, A5 to A13 and A15 through the relevant witnesses by the learned II AJFCM, Ongole and after completion of investigation laid the charge sheet. III. CHARGES:
The trial Court, on appearance of the accused, framed charges:
(i) U/s 396 r/w 120B and 400 against A1 to A15
(ii) U/s 396 and 201 IPC against A1 to A10 and
(iii) U/s 412 IPC against A14,
(iv) U/s 414 IPC against A4.
The accused denied the charges and claimed for trial.
During trial, on behalf of prosecution, PWs 1 to 55 were examined; exhibits P1 to P206 were marked and MOs 1 to 71 were exhibited.
After conducting 313 Cr.P.C. examination, the trial Court heard the arguments of Public Prosecutor and the defence advocates.14
IV. JUDGMENT OF TRIAL COURT:
(1) The trial Court set up the following points for determination:
(i) Whether the prosecution is able to prove that there is prior conspiracy in between Accused Nos.1 to 15 to commit the offence alleged in this case, which is punishable under section 396 r/w 120-B of I.P.C?
(ii) Whether the prosecution is able to prove the guilt of A.1 to A.10 for the offence under section 396 of I.P.C. and whether the offence U/sec. 396 of I.P.C. was committed by A.1 to A.10 in pursuance of conspiracy between A.1 to A.15?
(iii) Whether A.1 to A.10 committed any act to screen the evidence of the commission of offence U/s.396 of I.P.C. which is punishable offence under section 201 of I.P.C.?
(iv) Whether the prosecution is able to prove that all the Accused i.e., A.1 to A.15 are being members of Gang of Dacoits which is punishable under section 400 of I.P.C.?
(v) Whether prosecution is able to prove the guilt of the Accused No.14 under section 412 of I.P.C.?
(2) Having observed that the prosecution case depends on circumstantial evidence and ruminating itself the principles laid down by the Hon‟ble Apex Court for evaluation of circumstantial evidence, the trial Court proceeded to decide the above points.
(3) Observations & findings of trial Court:
(a) Basing on the oral evidence of PW1 and PW15 coupled with exhibits P10 to P17 and most importantly Ex.P 203 - Toll Gate Sheet of Bollapalli Toll Plaza and Ex.P204 - sheet of Sunnambatti Toll Plaza, trial court confirmed that the subject trailer lorry 15 bearing No.KA 01C 1852 loaded with iron rods passing from Durgapur to Kalpakam crossed Bollapalli Toll Plaza but did not cross Sunnambatti Toll Plaza and missed in between.
(b) Identification of dead bodies is concerned, considering the evidence of PWs 1 to 4, it was held that the identity of dead bodies was clearly established.
(c) Cause of death is concerned, basing on the evidence of PW40 -
Doctor M.Ramachandra Rao, the Post Mortem Doctor coupled with the evidence of PWs 1 to 4 and Exs.P96 and P97 - P.M. Certificates, the trial Court held that the death of deceased 1 and 2 was a homicidal one by strangulation with a rope.
(d) Regarding the aspects of cutting the trailer lorry into pieces and abandoning the power head, the trial court basing on the evidence of PWs 9 to 13 opined that after committing murder of deceased 1 and 2, the culprits cut the trailer lorry into pieces and abandoned the power head at the compound of Pragathi Bhavan.
(e) Regarding criminal conspiracy among accused, the trial court basing on the evidence of PWs 18 to 23, 32 & 36, who are the staff in Narayana Palace and Tasty Hotel, and also the records of both the hotels covered by exhibits P22 to P27, P28 to P52, P61 to P67, came to conclusion that A1 resided in those hotels and all the accused went to meet him to speak about the iron and lorry business.
(f) Regarding A1 taking the godown of PW24 on lease, basing on the evidence of PW24, PW25 and Ex.P56, the trial court came to a positive conclusion.
16
(g) Regarding the aspect of accused using fake number plate on the trailer lorry and fake police board, the trial court, it appears, basing on 164 Cr.P.C. statement of PW39, who runs a stickering shop for vehicles and who demonstrated before the I.O. and mediators i.e., PW26 and LW54 as to how he prepared the fake trailer number and a police sign board, concluded that fake trailer number and police sign board were got prepared by accused through PW39.
(h) Identification of property such as MOs 2 to 8 is concerned, basing on the evidence of PW1, who identified his abandoned power head and cut pieces of the trailer lorry coupled with the evidence of mediators PWs 26 to 28 and LW54, the trial court confirmed the said aspect. The trial court also believed the recovery of other properties of the crime in the light of the evidence of concerned mediators.
(i) So far as MO25 - Alto car and MO26 - Verna car are concerned, the trial court having regard to the evidence of PW33, the Advocate-cum-owner of Verna car, and PW35 - the owner of Alto car, opined that they are the owners of the respective cars and A1 took Alto car from PW35 and handed over to PW33 and in turn took his Verna car and used said car in the commission of offences.
(j) Regarding the facts discovered u/s 27 of Evidence Act upon the confession of concerned accused, the trial court observed that the discovery was well established which not only included the physical objects but also the place from which the objects were recovered and the exclusive knowledge of the concerned accused. 17
(k) From the above discussion, the trial court has drawn the following conclusion:
i) At the instigation of Accused 2 and 14, the Accused 1 to 13 & 15 met in Room No.105 of Narayana Palace and designed, conspired, decided to commit the theft of iron loads from the lorries on the National High Way even by killing the driver and cleaner;
ii) The Accused 1 to 10 in pursuance of their criminal conspiracy, committed the murder of deceased 1 and 2, who are the driver and cleaner of trailer lorry bearing No.KA 01 C 1852 after 20:50 hours of 26.8.2008, when the lorry crossed Bollapalli toll plaza.
iii) The Accused 1 to 10 were physically present at the time of murder of driver and cleaner (deceased 1 and 2) of the lorry bearing No. K.A 01 C 1852;
iv) After killing the deceased 1 and 2, as per the instructions of Accused No.1, Accused 5 to 10 took the dead bodies in gunny bags and buried at Inamanmelluru village fields to cause the evidence of the commission of the offence to disappear with an intention of screening them i.e., Accused 1 to 10 from legal punishment;
v) The Accused No.2 cut the trailer lorry into pieces to cause the evidence of the commission of the offence to disappear with an intention of screening Accused 1 to 10 from legal punishment;
vi) Along with this case, S.C. 73/2010; S.C. 91/2010 and S.C. 90/2010 were tried and judgments were pronounced same day and all the Accused 1 to 15 are common Accused in this case and S.C. 73/2010 and S.C. 91/2010 and that it was clearly established that all the Accused belong to a gang of persons associated for the purpose of habitually committing dacoity.
vii) After commission of offence along with the other accused, the A4-
Jamaluddin took the lorry with iron load from the scene of offence/Ulavapadu High Way to Praveen Tobacco godown to conceal the same which he knows that it was a stolen property;
viii) Even though the charge under section 412 of I.P.C is framed against Accused No.14, there is no evidence against Accused No.14 for the offence U/Sec.412 of I.P.C in this case and that the prosecution failed to prove the charge under section 412 of I.P.C only against Accused No.14"
18
The trial court accordingly convicted and sentenced the accused as stated supra.
Hence, the Referred Trial and the concerned Criminal Appeals.
V. Heard arguments of following learned counsel for appellants in Criminal Appeal Nos.160, 161, 165, 167, 170, 198, 212, 251, 258 & 353 of 2021 and in RT No.4/2021 and arguments of Sri Y.Nagi Reddy, learned State Public Prosecutor representing the State.
Learned Senior Counsel Sri P. Veera Reddy, representing Sodum Anvesha, learned counsel for Appellant/A4 in Crl.A.No.160/2021, Appellant/A10 in Crl.A. No.165/2021 and Appellants/A2 & A14 in Crl.A.No.198/2021 Learned Senior Counsel Sri B.N.V.Hanumantha Rao, representing Smt. Sridevi Jampani, learned counsel for Appellants/A1 & A11 in Crl.A.No.161/2021 Learned Senior Counsel Sri Pappu Nageswara Rao, representing Sri Abhinav Krishna Uppaluru, learned counsel for Appellant/A8 in Crl.A.No.167/2021 Learned counsel Sri Pardhasaradhi A.V. for Appellant/A5 in Crl.A.No.170/2021 Learned Senior Counsel Sri Pappu Nageswara Rao representing Sri P.Bhaskar, learned counsel for Appellants/A6 & A7 in Crl.A.No.160/2021 Learned Senior Counsel Sri Posani Venkateswarlu, representing Sri Venkateswarulu Sanisetty, learned counsel for Appellant/A13 in Crl.A.No.212/2021 19 Learned counsel Sri Srinivasa Rao Narra for Appellant/A9 in Crl.A.No.251/2021 Learned counsel Sri Jada Sravan Kumar for Appellant/A3 in Crl.A.No.258/2021 Learned counsel Sri Thandava Yogesh for Appellant/A12 in Crl.A.No.353/2021 Learned Senior Counsel Sri B.N.V.Hanumantha Rao, representing Sri R.Sameer Ahmed, learned counsel for Appellant/A15 in Crl.A.No.160/2021 VI. POWERS AND RESPONSIBILITIES OF HIGH COURT WHEN A DEATH SENTENCE IS SUBMITTED FOR CONFIRMATION BY A COURT OF SESSION:
This aspect has been dealt with and vividly explicated by the Apex Court in Munna Pandey v. State of Bihar1. Referring to Sections 366, 367 & 368 of Chapter XXVIII and Section 386 & 391 of Chapter XXIX of Cr.P.C. a Full Bench of Apex Court speaking through Hon‟ble Justice J.B.Pardiwala made the following observations:
i) Under Section 366 when a Court of Session passes sentence of death, the proceedings must be submitted to the High Court and the sentence of death is not to be executed unless it is confirmed by the High Court.
ii) Section 367 lays down the power of High Court to direct further enquiry to be made or additional evidence to be taken upon any point bearing upon the guilt or innocence of the convict.1
MANU/SC/0965/2023=AIR2023SC5709 20
iii) Section 368 lays down the power of High Court to confirm the sentence so imposed or annul the conviction. One of the powers that can be exercised under Section 368(c) is to "acquit the accused person". Pertinently, the power to acquit the person can be exercised by the High Court even without there being any substantive appeal on the part of accused challenging his conviction. To that extent, the proceedings under Chapter XXVIII of Cr.P.C. is a proceeding in continuation of the trial. The scope of the chapter is wider.
iv) Chapter XXIX of Cr.P.C. deals with appeals. Section 391 also entitles the appellate court to take further evidence or direct such further evidence to be taken.
v) Section 386 enumerates power of the appellate court which inter alia includes the power to "reverse the finding and sentence and acquit or discharge the accused or order him to be retried by a court of competent jurisdiction subordinate to such appellate court or committed for trial". The powers of the appellate court equally wide.
vi) In the event of submission of death sentence for confirmation by a court of session and a Criminal Appeal being filed by the convict, the High Court exercises powers both under Chapter XXVIII and XXIX of Cr.P.C.
vii) Ordinarily, in a Criminal Appeal against conviction, the appellate court under Section 384 Cr.P.C. can dismiss the appeal summarily, if the Court is of the opinion that there is no sufficient ground for interference, after examining all the grounds urged before it for challenging the correctness of the decision of the trial Court. It is not necessary for the appellat court to examine the entire record for the purpose of arriving at an independent decision of its own whether the conviction of the appellant is fully justified.
viii) The position is, however, different where the appeal is by an accused who is sentenced to death, so that the High Court dealing with the appeal has before it, simultaneously with the appeal, a reference for confirmation of the capital sentence under Section 21 366 Cr.P.C. On a reference for confirmation of sentence of death, the High Court is required to proceed in accordance with Section 367 & 368 respectively of Cr.P.C. which make it clear that the duty of the High Court in dealing with reference, is not only to see whether the order passed by the Sessions Judge is correct, but to examine the case for itself and even direct a further enquiry or the taking of additional evidence if the court considers it desirable in order to ascertain the guilt or the innocence of the convicted person. In disposing of such an appeal, the High Court should keep in view its duty under Section 367 Cr.P.C. and consequently, the Court must examine the appeal record for itself, arrive at a view whether a further enquiry or taking of additional evidence is desirable or not and then come to its own conclusion on the entire material on record whether conviction of the condemned prisoner is justified and sentence of death should be confirmed (emphasis supplied).
Keeping the above observations in view, we shall proceed to decide the reference and criminal appeals.
VII. POINTS FOR CONSIDERATION IN THE APPEAL:
1. This is a case entirely based on circumstantial evidence. In a case of this nature, the Hon‟ble Apex Court in the following decisions, laid down certain principles as to how the prosecution has to establish its case:
(1) Sharad Birdhi Chand Sarda vs State Of Maharashtra 2 (2) Sahilendra Rajdev Pasvan v. State of Gujarat3 (3) Laxman Prasad V. State of Madhya Pradesh4 2 1984 (4) SCC 116 3 (2020) 14 SCC 750 4 (2023) 6 SCC 399 22 The following are the golden principles for establishing the criminal case based on circumstantial evidence.
(i) The circumstances from which the inference of guilt is sought to be drawn must be cogently and firmly established.
(ii) Those circumstances should be of definite tendency unerringly pointing towards the guilt of accused.
(iii) That the circumstances taken cumulatively should be formed into a chain so complete that there is no escape from the conclusion that within all human probability the crime was committed by an accused and those circumstances should be incapable of explanation on any hypothesis other than that of the guilty of accused and inconsistent with his innocence.
2. From the above jurisprudence, the points that emerge for consideration in the appeal are:
(i) Whether the prosecution proved the following circumstances to draw an inference of guilt of the accused and those circumstances formed into a complete chain to prove invariably the guilt of the accused?
(a) Criminal conspiracy hatched by accused in Narayana Palace and Tasty Hotel, Ongole to commit dacoity of Iron load vehicles on the Highway.
(b) Missing of the trailer lorry bearing No.KA01C 1852 and commission of dacoity of vehicle along with iron load by accused
(c) Killing of drivers and burying dead bodies by accused and their recovery by exhumation:
(d) Storage of cut pieces of lorry and stolen iron in the godown taken on lease by A1.23
(e) Abandonment of the power head of the trailer near
Pragathi Bhavan by A4 and its recovery by police of
Tangutur P.S.
(f) Selling of iron load by A12 and A13.
(g) Recoveries basing on the confessions of different
accused.
(ii) If guilt of accused is proved by establishing the above circumstances, which sections of law will attract their offences?
(iii) Whether the sentence imposed by the trial Court against the accused for different offences is legally sustainable?
(iv) To what relief?
VIII. ANALYSIS
1. Point No.1: As mentioned supra, the prosecution projected certain suspicious circumstances which, for convenient reference listed as (a) to (g). It has now to be seen whether these suspicious circumstances have been proved by the prosecution and whether they formed into a complete chain to invariably establish the guilt of accused.
(a) Criminal conspiracy hatched by accused in the two hotels. This aspect will be discussed a little while later after discussing the other circumstances.
2. Point No.1: (b) & (c): These two circumstances relate to the missing of trailer lorry bearing No.KA01 C 1852 with iron load and its dacoity by the culprits 24 after killing the drivers and burying their dead bodies and subsequent recovery of dead bodies by exhumation. These aspects have been cumulatively deposed by PWs 1 to 8, PWs 15 to 17, PWs 27, 28, 40, 41 & 46 and 54. Hence their evidence has to be scrutinized.
a) It should be noted, the fundamental defence of the accused is that all of them are innocent and they have nothing to do with the alleged offence and they were falsely implicated in the case by the police. Of course, incidentally they contended that the prosecution miserably failed to prove the commission of theft of trailer lorry with iron load and killing of the two lorry drivers by anybody and further, the prosecution also failed to connect the decomposed dead bodies found on exhumation to the drivers of trailer lorry bearing No. KA01 C 1852.
3. Missing of Trailer Lorry bearing No.KA 01C 1852 along with iron rods and its dacoity:
As per PW1's deposition, he belongs to Tamilnadu and he is the owner of trailer lorry bearing No. KA 01 C 1852 and Ram Sekhar and Perrumal Subramani were his drivers and on 09.09.2008 the trailer took iron load from Tamilnadu to Mythan in Bihar and after unloading at destination, the lorry went to Durgapur and on 23.09.2008 loaded iron rods to deliver at Kalpakam in Tamilnadu and driver Subramani informed last time on 26.09.2008 to PW1 by phone that they were at Ongole. Since there was no communication and their phones were switched off, 25 PW1 having waited for about 10 days and after making enquiries at Kalpakam Factory and also at Tada Check Post and finding no clue of his trailer lorry, went to Ongole and with the help of the members of Lorry Owners Association presented Ex.P1 - report on 17.10.2008 to PW 44 - SI of Police, Ongole Taluk PS initially suspecting foul play by his drivers and PW44 registered Ex.P155-FIR No.356/2008 U/s 406 r/w 34 IPC. His further deposition is that some time after, the police summoned him and at that time Accused 9 and 10 were with the police and they led the police and others to Inamalanelluru and there they showed a place and when dug the police recovered two gunny bags containing dead bodies which were in a putrefied condition and the dead bodies were identified by their relations and in the drawer of one of the dead bodies, MO1-keys were found which relate to the Diesel Tank and Tool Box and berth of the Power Head of trailer lorry. Again sometime after he was called by the police and he was shown MOs 2 to 8 which are the cut pieces of his trailer lorry, its tyres and Power Head. He took interim custody of the said property through Court. He produced Ex.P2-Duplicate Copy of RC Book of trailer lorry bearing No. KA01 C 1852.
4. The above oral evidence of PW1 coupled with Ex.P2 - RC Book would show that he is the owner of the trailer lorry bearing No. KA 01 C 1852 and it was found missing in mysterious circumstances while returning from Durgapur to Kalpakam with a load of iron rods. These facts, particularly the ownership of PW1 26 of the missing trailer lorry were not specifically challenged by the accused in the cross-examination.
5. Dacoity of Trailer Lorry:
Dacoity of trailer lorry with iron load is concerned, as per PW1, the driver Subramani informed by phone for the last time on 26.09.2008 that they reached Ongole and on their way to Kalpakam. However, there was no subsequent information from the drivers. Waiting for about 10 days and making enquiries at Kalpakam and Tada Check Post and on knowing that the lorry did not pass through Tada check post and reach Kalpakam, he gave Ex.P1 - report. This version of PW1 is supported by other witnesses.
(a) PW15 is the Field Assistant in the Krishna Road Carriers at Kolkata. He attends the duties of transport brokerage. He deposed that on 22.09.2008 the trailer lorry bearing No. KA 01 C 1852 was loaded with iron bars of 21.710 MTs in the SRMB Srizen Limited Company, Durgapur to deliver at Kalpakam and the drivers were R. Sekhar and Subramani. After checking their identity particulars, driving licences, RC Permit, Insurance etc., and obtaining Xerox copies, he let the vehicle.
He stated that on knowing that the load did not reach the destination even after three months, on instructions of his owner he went to Vijayawada and with the assistance of PW16, went to Ongole PS on 14.12.2008 and presented a report and handed over Ex.P10 to P17 - Xerox copies of the documents relating to the trailer 27 lorry to the police. He identified the photos of the drivers found on Ex.P.16 & 17 - driving licenses.
PW16 also deposed the same facts and also some additional facts.
(b) Then PW46 - the IO deposed that on 20.10.2008 he visited toll plaza at Bollapalli in Ongole District and verified gate records and came to know that the trailer lorry bearing No KA 01 C 1852 passed through the said toll plaza around 08:30-09:00 PM on 26.09.2008.
(c) PW8 who is Chief Administrative Officer in Toll Plaza, Tanguturu, corroborated the evidence of PW46. He deposed that on 29.01.2009 PW54 - The CI of Police, enquired about the vehicle and on verification of record he informed that the said trailer lorry crossed the toll gate through counter No.9 towards Chennai (under token No.Z034362) on 26.09.2008 at 22.50 hours.
(d) Whileso, PW5 who was the Ch. Admin Officer of NHAI of Sunnambatti Toll Plaza in Nellore District deposed that on 29.01.2009, PW54 enquired about the trailer lorry and on verification of the system he informed that the vehicle did not cross the Sunnambatti Toll Plaza in Nellore District towards Chennai in the month of September, 2008.
(e) PW54 - the successor I.O., who conducted further investigation and laid charge sheet, deposed that on 29.01.2009, he visited Tangutur Toll Plaza in Prakasam District and examined PW8 and came to know that the trailer lorry 28 bearing No.KA01C 1852 passed through Tangutur Toll Plaza on 26.09.2008 at 22.50 hours. On same day, he went to Sunnambatti Toll Plaza in Nellore District and examined PW5 and came to know that the aforesaid trailer lorry did not pass through Sunnambatti Toll Plaza during September 2008. He further deposed he obtained details regarding the passage of the trailer lorry through the above two Toll plazas from National Project Director, National Highways Authority of India, Corridor Management Unit, Ongole, under exhibits P203 and P204. A perusal of Ex.P203 would show that the trailer lorry bearing No.KA01C 1852 has passed Bolapalli Plaza on 10.08.2018 at about 14:14 hrs towards Chilakaluripet of Guntur District. (This passage is when the trailer lorry was proceeding from Tamilnadu to Bihar carrying load). Ex.P203 further shows that the said vehicle passed through Bollapalli Plaza at about 20.50 hrs on 26.09.2008 towards Ongole. (This passage is when the trailer lorry was returning from Durgapur to Kalpakam in Tamilnadu carrying iron rods). Then Ex.P204 would show that the aforesaid trailer lorry did not cross the Sunnambatti Toll Plaza between 26.09.2008 and 28.09.2008.
(f) The above oral and documentary evidence was not impeached in the cross-examination. Before us, it was argued that the I.O. ought to have obtained the CCTV footages of the two Toll Plazas to support the prosecution case and in the absence of which, the oral and documentary evidence cannot be believed. We do not find force in the said argument for the reason that, an authenticated 29 information was already provided by the Project Director of NHAI and there was no reason for him to give false information.
(g) Thus, a scrutiny of the above oral and documentary evidence pellucidly tells that the trailer lorry passed through Bolapalli Toll Plaza in PRAKASAM District on the night of 26.09.2008 but did not pass through Sunnambatti Toll Plaza in NELLORE District thereafter. It indicates that the vehicle was found missing on the highway between Bolapalli of Prakasam District and Sunnambatti of Nellore District. It is nobody‟s case that in between, the vehicle sustained breakdown or accident. Thus obviously, it may be a case of either the two drivers committing criminal breach of trust by taking away the vehicle or a case of highway dacoity by some culprits. The first possibility can be safely ruled out as we presently see that the two hapless drivers were murdered and buried and vehicle with iron load was committed dacoity by the culprits.
6. Exhumation and identification of dead bodies:
(a) The exhumation and recovery of dead bodies of two drivers is concerned, on 10.11.2008, the IO arrested A1, A3 and A11 in the presence of the mediators PW.41 and LW.46 - K. Sanjeeva Rao and interrogated them and they have confessed their guilt in the present offence and in different similar offences under the cover of Ex.P.98 - mediator-cum-confessional statement. The admissible portion of their statements U/s 27 of the Evidence Act inter alia discloses the 30 broader areas where the dead bodies concerning to present offence as well as other offences were buried by different accused.
Be that as it may, within short time thereafter i.e., on 15.11.2008 the IO arrested A9 and A10 in the presence of PW41 and LW46 and interrogated them separately and recorded their statement, wherein, while admitting their guilt, they stated that they would show the exact location where they buried the dead bodies of the drivers in the present case. Ex.P124 and P125 are admissible portions of their statements u/s 27 of the Indian Evidence Act. Thus exhumation is concerned, we have the evidence of PW41 - VRO, Ongole II Town. PW6- the Tahsildar & Executive Magistrate of Maddipadu and PW7-Revenue Inspector, Maddipadu, who exhumed the dead bodies on the requisition of PW54-the I.O. The A9 and A10 led them to a place which is half a furlong from the road leading Venkatrajupalem- Inamanamellur. The Gundlakamma Project Right Canal is also passing near that place and Singayakunta is towards Northwest side. There, A9 and A10 by showing earthen spot told that they buried the dead bodies at that place. Their statement was recorded in the presence of mediators under Ex.P127.
(b) PW54 - the IO in his evidence deposed that the burial place is in S.No.338/4 of Singaayakunta Poramboke of Inamanamellur village. PW54 further stated that he requisitioned PW6 - MRO and PW7 - R.I. for conducting exhumation. He also secured PW2 to PW4, who are the relations of the deceased, 31 and PW1-the owner of the vehicle. PW6 examined PW-3, A9 and A10 and recorded their statements under exhibits P175 to 177. The statements of PWs 1 and 2 were recorded by PW7 under exhibits P178 and 179. Thereafter PW6 conducted exhumation and recorded the proceedings under Ex.P3. A9 and A10 dug the spotted place assisted by LW28 and LW29 and removed the two gunny bags wherein the dead bodies of the drivers were found. The I.O. deposed that video recording of exhumation proceedings was done under Ex.P89 - Master compact disc. After exhumation, PW6 conducted inquest over the dead body of Ramar Sekhar and prepared Ex.P4 - Inquest report in the presence of PW27 and LW48 - mediators, and the blood relations. PW3 identified the deceased with reference to his clothes MOs 14, 15 and 18. In M.O.18 - pocket drawer, a bunch of three keys (MO1) was found which was identified by PW1 as relating to oil tanker and tool box of his trailer.
(c) The I.O. further deposed that PW 7 conducted inquest over dead body of Subramanian. PW4, the co-son-in-law of deceased, identified the dead body on observing the steel rod and screws in the right thigh bone of the deceased as well as the clothes of the deceased viz., M.Os 10, 11 and 13. In M.O.11 - full drawer of the deceased, two Rs.50/- notes (MO.66) and one toll gate receipt (Ex.P180) were found. Thereafter, PW40 - Civil Assistant Surgeon conducted Post Mortem 32 over the dead bodies on 16.11.2008 and issued Ex.P96 and P97 - P.M. certificates. Some bones were preserved for conducting DNA tests.
(d) Then the next witness PW41 deposed that himself and LW46 acted as mediators for the arrest of A9 and A10 on 15.11.2008 by PW54 - I.O. and about their making confessional statement and basing on the same, their proceeding to Gundlakamma Project area near Inamalamellore village and their participation in exhumation proceedings conducted by PWs 6 and 7 and recovery of two dead bodies and their identification by their relations etc. facts.
(e) The next witness PW6 is the MRO-cum-Executive Magistrate of Maddipadu. He deposed that on 15.11.2008 on the request of PW54, he along with PW7 and VROs went to Singayakunta area of Inamalamellure situated in S.No.3/84. The police produced A9 and A10 before him and on his enquiry they revealed that they can show the place where the dead bodies were buried. He recorded their statements under Ex.P176 and 177 (the statements contain the signatures of A9 and A10). He then conducted exhumation proceedings. A9 and A10 and other coolies dug the spotted place where they found two gunny bags and on opening the bags they found one dead body in each bag. The dead bodies were having no muscles but having emaciated structure with clothes. He prepared Ex.P3 - exhumation proceedings and Ex.P4 - inquest proceedings of deceased Ramar Sekhar.
33
(f) The next witness PW7 - the R.O. of Maddipadu deposed that on 15.11.2008, on the instructions of PW6, he conducted inquest over the dead body of Perumal Subramani in the fields of Inamanamelluru village and prepared Ex.P5
- Inquest report.
(g) The next witness PW40 is the C.A.S. who conducted Post Mortem on two dead bodies. He deposed that both the dead bodies were in a highly decomposed state and cervical vertebrae were surrounded by "Ventrukala Tradu". There was inward fracture of both horns of hyoid bone with periosteal bleeding stains at the ends. He opined that cause of death was due to Asphyxia due to pressure on neck about six weeks prior to Post Mortem. He issued Ex.P96 and P97
- P.M. certificates. He stated that death was possible due to strangulation because of MO19 - Ventrukala Tradu.
(h) Identification of dead bodies is concerned, PW3 - the elder brother of deceased Ramar Sekhar, deposed that on being summoned by police, he attended the exhumation proceedings and basing on the clothes i.e., MO14 - Lungi and MO15 - T shirt, he identified the dead body as his brother Ramar Sekhar. He also identified MO17-watch of his brother.
(i) PW4 is the co-brother of deceased Subramani. He deposed inter alia that he also attended the exhumation proceedings on being summoned by police. He identified the dead body through MOs 10 to 13 clothes and also specifically basing 34 on the steel rod in the right thigh bone of the dead body. He stated that once a steel rod was inserted by surgery.
(j) Severely fulminating the above evidence, it is argued by the appellants that the above evidence could only project that the dead bodies of two male persons were located but the evidence woefully fell short of proving that they were murdered. Referring to the evidence of post-mortem Doctor it was argued that the post-mortem doctor only opined that the cause of death was due to Asphyxia due to pressure on neck but merely because there was Asphyxia, death cannot be concluded to be homicidal. Reliance is placed on Manju v. State of Delhi5. This argument is preposterous. The PM Doctor in Ex.P96 and 97 PM Reports having observed that cervical vertebra was surrounded with a ventrukala taadu (rope) and there was inward fracture of both horns of hyoid bone and presence of periosteal bleeding stains at the end, noted that cause of death was due to Asphyxia due to pressure on neck. In the evidence he stated that the cause of death may be possible due to strangulation. Therefore, there cannot be any demur that the death of the two hapless drivers is homicidal. The cited decision can be distinguished on facts. In that case the appellant allegedly caused death of her neonatal baby girl by strangulation after delivery in the hospital on the ground that the baby was a girl. The post-mortem doctor opined that the cause of death was asphyxia due to 5 (2019) 19 SCC 79 = MANU./SC/1763/2019 35 antimortem strangulation. The trial Court and High Court convicted her. However, the Apex Court having taken the attendant circumstances and totality of the evidence held that the prosecution could not establish any motive and it was quite unnatural for appellant mother to kill her own baby by strangulation. The Apex Court further observed that as per the evidence the baby girl was put in incubator with an oxygen mask and she has not opened her eyes and she did not cry after birth and there was a possibility of the death being natural . The facts are totally different in the case on hand.
(k) Then identification of dead bodies is concerned, it is vehemently argued by the appellants that since admittedly dead bodies were highly decomposed and skeletal structures were only available, their identification cannot be believed. They further argued that though the I.O. claims to have sent their bones for DNA test, the test report is not filed in Court and therefore, adverse inference has to be drawn against the prosecution. They further argued that in Ex.P127 - mediatornama, whereunder both A9 and A10 allegedly showed the burial place of the deceased, the signatures of A9 and A10 are not obtained by I.O. which indicates that the details in Ex.P127 were not furnished by those accused and Ex.P127 is a fabricated document to suit the prosecution case. They finally argued that the identification by PWs 3 and 4 is a concoction.
36
(l) On careful scrutiny of the available oral and documentary evidence, we are unable to accept the contention of the appellants. It should be noted, according to PW54 - I.O., he apprehended A9 and A10 on 15.11.2008 in the presence of PW41 and LW46 and prepared mediator report which contains the confession of A9 and A10 regarding different offences including the present offence and also the places where they buried the dead bodies relating to different offences. Out of the said statement, the relevant portions admissible under section 27 of the Evidence Act are marked as exhibits P123 to P126. While so, exhibits P124 and P125 are the portions of the statement of A9 and A10 regarding the burial place of the dead bodies and their readiness to show the said place to the mediators and police. The above entire mediator report-cum-confession statement of A9 and A10 was signed by A9 and A10 along with mediators and police. Thus, the main statement which contains the admissible portions relating to burial place of the dead bodies was signed by A9 and A10 and the said aspect has not been disputed before us.
(m) Be that as it may, Ex.P127 is another mediator report prepared by PW41and LW46 after reaching the burial place of the dead bodies. As per Ex.P127, after reaching the location, A9 and A10 showed exact location where they buried the dead bodies. This statement i.e., Ex.P.127 was signed by the two mediators and I.O. but it does not contain the signatures of A9 and A10. We do not find any serious lapse or infirmity due to the absence of their signatures on 37 Ex.P127. In fact, Ex.P127 is a consequential document pursuant to Ex.P124 and 125 which also contain the particulars of burial place of the deceased. As already noted, the said statement contains the signatures of A9 and A10.
(n) It should also be noted that PW6-Executive Magistrate after reaching the exhumation spot, examined A9 and A10 and recorded their statements under Ex.P.176 and P177. In those statements, A9 and A10 stated that they were showing the place where they buried the dead bodies. Ex.P176 & 177 contain the signatures of A9 and A10. In view of the availability of signatures of A9 and A10 on other identical and authenticated documents, the absence of their signatures on Ex.P127 will not affect the genuinity of prosecution case. In similar circumstances in Kishore Bhadke v. State of Maharashtra6 the Apex Court observed thus:
"22. It was then argued that the recovery Panchnama (Exh. 76A) did not contain signature of the accused and for which reason the same was inadmissible. Even this submission does not commend to us. In that, no provision has been brought to our notice which mandates taking signature of the accused on the recovery Panchnama. Admittedly, signature of accused was taken on the statement recorded Under Section 27 of the Evidence Act (Exh. 76 and 77 respectively). The statement of accused No. 3 (Exh. 77) bears his signature. Therefore, even this argument does not take the matter any further."
(o) So far as DNA test is concerned, it is true, though the I.O. sent exhibits P195 to 202 - letters of advices to Forensic Science Laboratory for DNA test, the report is not received. Learned Public Prosecutor argued that, however, on that count alone, prosecution case cannot be discarded if it is otherwise established. He 6 (2017) 3 SCC 760 = MANU/SC/0011/2017 38 relied on Sunil v. State of Madhya Pradesh7. We agree with learned PP. DNA test is only one mode of establishing prosecution case. Even in its absence, if prosecution is able to establish its case by other evidence, the same can be accepted. The said principle is laid by Apex Court in the above case as follows:
"3. From the provisions of Section 53A of the Code and the decision of this Court in Krishan Kumar (supra) it does not follow that failure to conduct the DNA test of the samples taken from the accused or prove the report of DNA profiling as in the present case would necessarily result in the failure of the prosecution case. As held in Krishan Kumar (para 44) Section 53A really "facilitates the prosecution to prove its case". A positive result of the DNA test would constitute clinching evidence against the accused if, however, the result of the test is in the negative i.e. favoring the accused or if DNA profiling had not been done in a given case, the weight of the other materials and evidence on record will still have to be considered."
(p) In the instant case, though the dead bodies were putrefied, still by virtue of the clothes and steel rod in the right thigh of the deceased Subramanian, their relations could identify the dead bodies. It is no doubt argued on behalf of the appellants that the prosecution has not produced the medical record of Subramani to show that earlier he underwent surgery and steel rod was inserted in his leg, but only on seeing the steel rod in the thigh of the dead body, they invented the story as if earlier Subramani underwent surgery and steel rod was inserted in his thigh. We don‟t find much force in the said argument. It should be noted that P.Ws.3 and 4 are the own kith and kin of the deceased drivers and they belong to Tamil Nadu. If really the dead bodies do not belong to the deceased drivers, there is no need for 7 ( 2017)4 SCC 393 39 them to make a false recognition and to support the police. So merely because the medical record of the deceased was not produced, there is no need to disbelieve their identifying capacity. It should be noted there are also other materials to connect the dead bodies to the two drivers. In the Ex.P5 - Inquest report, it was mentioned that inside MO11 - the full drawer of Subramani, there is a toll gate receipt marked as Ex.P180. On perusal of Ex.P.180, though the said receipt is in mutilated condition, still it depicts that it is a tollgate receipt relating to Bollapalli toll plaza. The said receipt in our view connects the dead bodies to the deceased drivers. Further, as per Ex.P4 - Inquest report relating to the dead body of Ramar Sekhar, among others, MO18 - full drawer was found wherein MO1 keys (3) were observed. PW54 stated that when he operated the keys of MO1 to the tool box and oil tanker of power head (MO8), they were opened with the keys. PW1 also identified the MO1 keys. Thus, the above oral and documentary evidence coupled with material objects would manifest that the two drivers did not commit criminal breach of trust by taking away the trailer lorry and on the other hand, they suffered gruesome murder and their dead bodies were exhumed on the statements of A9 and A10. The vehicle with iron load was obviously committed dacoity by the culprits. The criminal role of A9 and A10 is thus established by the prosecution.
(q) In spite of above satisfactory proof regarding the identification of dead bodies, Sri A.V.Pardhasaradhi, learned counsel for appellant/A5 would argue 40 that corpus delicti has not been established by the prosecution. He would mean, the dead bodies exhumed could not be identified as that of the drivers of the subject vehicle and further, it was not established that the drivers indeed met with homicidal death.
The above argument, it must be said has no force. The Indian law has widely expounded jurisprudence on the rule of corpus delicti i.e., production of dead body of the victim for proof of murder. It has been held that a murder can be proved also by other cogent evidence without producing the dead body of victim, as corpus delicti is only a rule of prudence but not rule of evidence. In Rishi Pal v. State of Uttarakhand8 while reiterating this principle, Apex Court made a survey of a slew of its judgments as follows:
"9. xxxx In Rama Nand and Ors. v. State of Himachal Pradesh MANU/SC/0209/1981 : (1981) 1 SCC 511, this Court summed up the legal position on the subject as:
... In other words, we would take it that the corpus delicti, i.e., the dead- body of the victim was not found in this case. But even on that assumption, the question remains whether the other circumstances established on record were sufficient to lead to the conclusion that within all human probability, she had been murdered by Rama Nand Appellant? It is true that one of the essential ingredients of the offence of culpable homicide required to be proved by the prosecution is that the accused caused the death" of the person alleged to have been killed.
28. This means that before seeking to prove that the accused is the perpetrator of the murder, it must be established that homicidal death has been caused. Ordinarily, the recovery of the dead-body of the victim or a vital part of it, bearing marks of violence, is sufficient proof of homicidal death of the victim. There was a time when under the old English Law, the finding of the body of the deceased was held to be essential before a person was convicted of committing his culpable homicide. "I would never convict", said Sir Mathew Hale, "a person of murder or manslaughter unless the fact were proved to be done, or at least the body was found 8 MANU/SC/0081/2013=(2013)12SCC551 41 dead". This was merely a rule of caution, and not of law. But in those times when execution was the only punishment for murder, the need for adhering to this cautionary rule was greater. Discovery of the deadbody of the victim bearing physical evidence of violence, has never been considered as the only mode of proving the corpus delicti in murder. Indeed, very many cases are of such a nature where the discovery of the dead-body is impossible. A blind adherence to this old "body" doctrine would open the door wide open for many a heinous murderer to escape with impunity simply because they were cunning and clever enough to destroy the body of their victim. In the context of our law, Sir Hale's enunciation has to be interpreted no more than emphasising that where the dead-body of the victim in a murder case is not found, other cogent and satisfactory proof of the homicidal death of the victim must be adduced by the prosecution. Such proof may be by the direct ocular account of an eye-witness, or by circumstantial evidence, or by both. But where the fact of corpus delicti, i.e. 'homicidal death' is sought to be established by circumstantial evidence alone, the circumstances must be of a clinching and definitive character unerringly leading to the inference that the victim concerned has met a homicidal death. Even so, this principle of caution cannot be pushed too far as requiring absolute proof. Perfect proof is seldom to be had in this imperfect world, and absolute certainty is a myth. That is why under Section 3, Evidence Act, a fact is said to be "proved", if the Court considering the matters before it, considers its existence so probable that a prudent man ought, under the circumstances of the particular case, to act upon the supposition that it exists. The corpus delicti or the fact of homicidal death, therefore, can be proved by telling and inculpating circumstances which definitely lead to the conclusion that within all human probability, the victim has been murdered by the accused concerned....
(emphasis supplied)
10. To the same effect is the decision in Ram Chandra and Ram Bharosey v. State of Uttar Pradesh MANU/SC/0107/1956 : AIR 1957 SC 381, where this Court said:
It is true that in law a conviction for an offence does not necessarily depend upon the corpus delicti being found. There may be reliable evidence, direct or circumstantial, of the commission of the murder though the corpus delicti are not traceable.
11. Reference may also be made to State of Karnataka v. M.V. Mahesh MANU/SC/0176/2003 : (2003) 3 SCC 353 where this Court observed:
It is no doubt true that even in the absence of the corpus delicti it is possible to establish in an appropriate case commission of murder on appropriate material being made available to the court. In this case no such material is made available to the court.
12. In Lakshmi and Ors. v. State of Uttar Pradesh MANU/SC/0715/2002 :
(2002) 7 SCC 198 the legal position was reiterated thus:
16. Undoubtedly, the identification of the body, cause of death and recovery of weapon with which the injury may have been inflicted on the deceased are some of the important factors to be established by the prosecution in an ordinary given case to bring home the charge of offence 42 Under Section 302 Indian Penal Code This, however, is not an inflexible rule. It cannot be held as a general and broad proposition of law that where these aspects are not established, it would be fatal to the case of the prosecution and in all cases and eventualities, it ought to result in the acquittal of those who may be charged with the offence of murder. It would depend on the facts and circumstances of each case. A charge of murder may stand established against an accused even in absence of identification of the body and cause the death."
It was held in Rama Nand and Ors v. State of Himachal Pradesh9:
"24. xxxx In other words, we would take it that the corpus delicti, i.e., the dead-body of the victim was not found in this case. But even on that assumption, the question remains whether the other circumstances established on record were sufficient to lead to the conclusion that within all human probability, she had been murdered by Rama Nand appellant ? It is true that one of the essential ingredients of the offence of culpable homicide required to be proved by the prosecution is that the accused the death" of the person alleged to have been killed.
25. This means that before seeking to prove that the accused is the perpetrator of the murder, it must be established that homicidal death has been caused. Ordinarily, the recovery of the dead-body of the victim or a vital part of it, bearing marks of violence, is sufficient proof of homicidal death of the victim. There was a time when under the old English Law, the finding of the body of the deceased was held to be essential before a person was convicted of committing his culpable homicide. "I would never convict", said Sir Mathew Hale, "a person of murder or manslaughter unless the fact were proved to be done, or at least the body was found dead". This was merely a rule of caution, and not of law. But in those times when execution was the only punishment for murder, the need for adhering to this cautionary rule was greater. Discovery of the dead-body of the victim bearing physical evidence of violence, has never been considered as the only mode of proving the corpus delicti in murder. Indeed, very many cases are of such a nature where the discovery of the dead- body is impossible. A blind adherence to this old "body" doctrine would open the door wide open for many a heinous murderer to escape with impunity simply became they were cunning and clever enough to destroy the body of their victim. In the context of our law, Hale's enunciation has to be interpreted no more than emphasising that where the dead-body of the victim in a murder case is not found, other cogent and satisfactory proof of homicidal death of the victim must be adduced by the prosecution. Such proof may be by the direct ocular account of an eye-witness, or by circumstantial evidence, or by both. But where the fact of corpus delicti, i.e. 'homicidal death' is sought to be established by circumstantial evidence alone, the circumstances must be of a clinching and definitive character unerringly leading to the inference that the victim concerned has met a homicidal death. Even so, this principle of caution cannot be pushed too far as requiring absolute proof. Perfect proof is seldom to be had in this imperfect world, and absolute certainty is a myth. That is why under Section 3, Evidence Act, a fact is said to be "proved", if the Court 9 MANU/SC/0209/1981=(1981) 1 SCC 511 43 considering the matters before it, considers its existence so probable that a prudent man ought, under the circumstances of the particular case, to act upon the supposition that it exists. The corpus delicti or the fact of homicidal death, therefore, can be proved by telling and inculpating circumstances which definitely lead to the conclusion that within all human probability, the victim has been murdered by the accused concerned. xxxx"
Therefore, the argument of learned counsel does not hold water. Even otherwise, in this case the dead bodies were produced and their identity was also satisfactorily established. As the dead bodies concerning to this case were exhumed on the information of A1, A3, A9, A10 and A11 they owe a responsibility to speak of their knowledge about the dead bodies and the cause of their death, who buried them and the reason for burying them. In the absence of any plausible explanation by the accused, the said circumstance along with others will point out an accusing finger against the accused. Regarding this aspect the Apex Court held as follows:
(i) In Sandeep v. State of U.P10 the Supreme Court observed thus:
"29.xxx. We find force in the submission of learned senior Counsel for the State. It is quite common that based on admissible portion of the statement of accused whenever and wherever recoveries are made, the same are admissible in evidence and it is for the accused in those situations to explain to the satisfaction of the Court as to the nature of recoveries and as to how they came into possession or for planting the same at the places from where they were recovered. (Emphasis supplied) Similarly this part of the statement which does not in any way implicate the accused but is mere statement of facts would only amount to mere admissions which can be relied upon for ascertaining the other facts which are intrinsically connected with the occurrence, while at the same time, the same would not in any way result in implicating the accused into the offence directly."10
2012(6) SCC 107 = MANU/SC/0422/2012 44
(ii) In Anuj Kumar Gupta v. State of Bihar11 the Supreme Court observed thus:
"16. In such circumstances, in the absence of any convincing explanation offered on behalf of the Appellant Accused as to under what circumstances he was able to lead the Police party to the place where the dead body of the deceased was found, it will have to be held that such recovery of the dead body, which is a very clinching circumstance in the case of this nature, would act deadly against the Appellant considered along with rest of the circumstances demonstrated by the prosecution to rope in the Appellant in the alleged crime of the killing of the deceased. Therefore, once we find that there was definite admission on behalf of the Appellant by which the prosecuting agency was able to recover the body of the deceased from a place, which was within the special knowledge of the Appellant, the only other aspect to be examined is whether the Appellant came forward with any convincing explanation to get over the said admission."
Applying the above rule, in the instant case none of the accused, particularly A1, A3, A9 to A11 have offered any explanation for the plight of the two dead bodies which were recovered consequent upon their information. Therefore, this is one of the strong circumstances against the accused pointing out accusing finger towards them.
Consequently, the incriminating circumstances (b) and (c) in point No.1 are satisfactorily proved by the prosecution.
The next aspect is about the fate of trailer lorry and load of iron rods which we will discuss in the points infra.
11
AIR 2013 SC 3013 = MANU/SC/0741/2013 45
7. Point 1 (d):
Storing of stolen tailor lorry & iron in the godown taken on lease by A1:
The prime aspect in this circumstance is about A1 taking the godown situated in Sitaramapuram Kostalu in Maddipadu Panchayat on lease from P.W.24 apparently for iron furniture business but for keeping the stolen iron and vehicles.
Prosecution examined P.Ws.24, 25, 33, 35, 37 and 41 in this context.
8. (a) P.W.24 is the owner of Praveen Tobacco Godown. He deposed that he knows A12, who earlier worked as attender in Mandal Praja Parishad, Racherla, when this witness worked as MPP. In September, 2008, on the request of A12, he agreed to let out his godown on a monthly rent of Rs.40,000/- and on payment of four months rent as advance. The witness again stated that A12 infact came in the month of August, 2008 to him for preparing agreement with advance amount and informing that godown was infact given to one of his friends by name Munna, a Muslim man, to keep his old saman. Then, he asked A12 to obtain signature of that person to take godown on lease and then only, he would sign. Accordingly, A12 brought the agreement with the signature of the said person and then, this witness, his wife and son signed on the agreement. He produced photocopy of agreement marked as Ex.P.56. P.W.24 further stated, the original lease agreement was taken away by A12. The lease agreement was executed on 01.09.2008. He 46 received amount of Rs.1,60,000/- towards advance. G.S.Prasad Reddy and K.Anjaneyulu were attestors to the said lease agreement. He further deposed that the tenant did not pay the rent amount and three or four months later, godown was vacated.
(b) It should be noted that the prosecution prayed to declare this witness as hostile on the ground that he deviated from his earlier 161 Cr.P.C. statement to the extent covered under Ex.P.57. As per Ex.P.57, along with A12, A1 also went to P.W.24 and A12 introduced A1 to him as Munna and told that he was doing business in scrap iron and he required godown to store his stock and P.W.24 agreed. However, in his evidence, P.W.24 did not state that A1 personally approached him along with A12. Learned public prosecutor cross-examined him and this witness denied to have stated as contained in Ex.P.57. It is to be further noted that during the evidence of P.W.24, A12 was deliberately absent and therefore, learned public prosecutor requested the trial court to record that the witness identified A12. Added to it, A12 did not cross-examine P.W.24. So also, A1 did not specifically cross-examine PW.24 to the effect that he did not take on lease his godown.
(c) From the evidence of PW.24 two aspects arise for consideration. Firstly, whether A1 has taken the godown on lease from PW.24 through A12 and secondly, if so from which month. In the evidence of PW.24 though at first he stated that 47 A12 approached him in September, 2008, later he stated that A12 came to him in the month of August, 2008 for preparing agreement with the advance amount and at that time he stated that the godown was given to his friend Munna to keep his old Samaan. It should be noted that Ex.P56 - lease agreement is dated 01.09.2008. Therefore, the question of A12 approaching in the month of September, 2008 for obtaining lease of godown is highly improbable as by 1 st September, 2008 itself the lease agreement was entered. Therefore, it should be understood that A12 might have requested PW.24 for leasing the godown somewhere in the August, 2008 and obtained possession and given to his friend Munna and stated to PW.24 that it was given to his friend Munna to keep his old Samaan. Therefore, PW.24 asked A12 to obtain signature of the said Munna to take godown on lease and A12 obtained his signature and thus the Ex.P.56 - lease agreement might have been entered on 01.09.2008. The next aspect is whether the said Munna is the A1 in this case.
(d) It is true that the oral evidence of P.W.24 coupled with Ex.P56 - agreement would only show that P.W.24 let out his godown to one Sayyad Mohammad Abdul Samab Khareem on the negotiation of A12. However, since P.W.24 did not support prosecution case further, his evidence is not useful for prosecution to confirm that the lessee under Ex.P.56 is A1 himself. Therefore, the other available evidence has to be scrutinized in this regard.
48
(e) Then PW.25 is the watchman in the godown of P.W.24. He deposed that himself and one Venkat Reddy worked as Watchmen in the godown of P.W.24 during 2007-08. In the month of September, 2008, A1, A2 and A12 approached them and enquired whether the godown was vacant and they told the accused to contact P.W.24. Within three or four days, A1, A2 and A12 again came and informed them that they contacted P.W.24 and took the godown on lease at Rs.40,000/- per month. Venkat Reddy contacted P.W.24 and confirmed the lease and handed over the keys of godown to A1 and he took possession of the godown. This witness further deposed that both of them continued as watchmen of the godown on the instructions of A1. A1, A2, A12 and some others used to come to the godown in Cars. A1 informed them that he was doing iron business. One day, they brought a welding machine to the godown. Another day, they brought a trolley lorry containing iron and kept in the godown. P.W.25 further stated that himself and Venkat Reddy heard some sounds from the godown during night time. They went and peeped into the godown and saw that A1, A2, A12 and some others were cutting the iron with welding machine. When they enquired, the accused reprimanded them and asked them not to come there and stay at the gate only. Since they were doing iron business, the watchmen did not think anything more about the incident. In the cross-examination, he stated that he did not inform police or the owner of the godown about the suspicious circumstances prevailing. 49 He again stated that after peeping into the godown, he reported the suspicious circumstances to the Maddipadu police and they reduced the same into writing and they signed on it. The Maddipadu police visited the godown and inspected it. He denied the suggestion that he was deposing falsehood. He denied the suggestion of A1 that he has not seen the accused at any point of time.
(f) When we carefully scrutinize the evidence of P.W.25 in juxtaposition with P.W.24, both the depositions would cumulatively explicate that the person who took lease of the godown from P.W.24 is none other than A1. We will find in the evidence of P.W.25 that he saw A1, A2 and A12 coming to the godown and enquiring about its vacancy position and thereafter, again coming and informing that they obtained lease of the godown from P.W.24 and Venkat Reddy, the other watchman having confirmed the same from P.W.24 handing over keys of godown to them and their doing cutting work of the iron in the godown with a welding machine and when enquired, the accused scolding them etc., facts. It should be noted that unless the watchmen confirmed from P.W.24 about leasing of the godown, they would not have handed over keys to A1. There is no identity problem for the witness as he along with Venkat Reddy saw A1, A2 and A12 for so many days and interacted with them.
It is argued on behalf of appellants particularly A1, A2 and A12 that P.W.25 is a set up witness to create the story of lease, inasmuch as, if really he was the 50 watchman of the godown and reported to the police of Maddipadu PS, they should have taken action and thereby, the complicity of A1, A2 and A12 might have revealed at that time, but there is no such action and therefore, the evidence of P.W.25 cannot be relied upon. We find no much force in this argument. The evidence of P.W.25 would make it clear that though initially both the watchmen suspected the iron cutting activities of accused during night time, however, they reconciled later because the godown was taken rent for iron business purpose. For the same reason, the police of Maddipadu also might not have initiated any action at that juncture. However, by their inaction, the evidence of P.W.25 cannot be disbelieved and discarded. On the other hand, the connection of A1, A2 and A12 with the godown as spoken by P.W.25 is fortified by the episode of verna car (MO26) which we presently discuss.
(g) P.W.33 was previously an advocate in Kakinada and presently doing real estate business at Rajamundry. He deposed that in the year 2007-08 he laid a venture by name "Platinum City" near Rajahmundry and in connection with the said business, one Pullaiah a real estate broker brought A1 and introduced saying that A1 was also doing business in sale of plots. A1 talked with PW33 and informed that he will sell plots to an extent of 4000 Sq Yds. In that connection, A1 visited the office of the PW33 for five or six times in different cars stating that he was having good business circle in Bengaluru and other places and he would 51 arrange business for him also. Then P.W.33 gave Rs.3 lakhs to A1 towards business expenses. His further version is that once A1 came to his office in an Alto car (MO25) and told that he was going to Bengaluru to secure customers and requested PW33 to give his Verna Car as it was difficult to go to Bengaluru in Alto Car and took his Verna Car and left his Alto Car with PW33. The Alto Car stands in the name of PW35 who is the cousin brother of A1. When A1 did not turn up for few months, PW33 insisted PW35 to see that A1 returned his car as he was facing difficulty to move in Alto Car which has no permanent registration. On that PW35 requested him to send the Car so that he would get permanent registration. Accordingly he obtained permanent registration and sent back the Alto Car to PW33. While so, there was no communication from A1. Sometime after, PW33 came to know that A1 was involved in some offences by using his Verna Car. So he contacted Police of Ongole PS and on 23.01.2009 he went to the police station along with Alto Car and handed over the same along with documents to the Inspector of Police, Ongole under Ex.P79-mediator report. As the police seized Verna Car, he obtained interim custody of the same from the Court. He stated that the registration number of Alto Car is AP31AX8678 or 8679. The temporary registration number of Verna Car was AP05YCTR2312 and permanent Registration No. is AP05BL5879. MO25 is the Alto Car and MO26 is the Verna Car. None of the witnesses cross-examined him and hence cross-examination 52 recorded as „nil‟. As such, the evidence of PW33 stood unrebutted. Thus A1 left his Alto Car with PW33 and took away his Verna Car with him. Presently we will see that MO26-Verna Car has relevancy with the godown which was taken on lease by A1. Before that the evidence of PW35 is also to be mentioned.
(h) PW35 is the cousin of A1 and he is the owner of MO25-Alto Car. He partly supported the prosecution case. He stated that he is the resident of Visakhapatnam and engaged in furniture business and he purchased Alto Car in the year 2008 and even before it was registered, A1 took the car for attending the marriage works of his sister. Three or four months thereafter, PW35 came to know that the said car was in Ongole PS. Later he came to know that A1 was involved in several crimes. This witness went to Ongole and enquired A1 about his Car and he replied that the car was seized by Ongole Taluk Police. When he consulted the Inspector of Police, he informed that he should get the car through the Court as the said car was involved in several criminal cases. It should be noted that this witness did not support the evidence of PW33 to the effect that he obtained permanent registration number to his Alto Car and sent back to PW33. On that aspect he was declared hostile and cross-examined by the public prosecutor. His non-cooperation can be understood in view of his close relationship with A1. However, that will not debilitate the evidence of PW33 who is an independent witness and a victim in the hands of A1. He being an advocate and a businessman at a far of place in 53 Rajahmundry, there is no need for him to speak falsehood to support police. Thus, it is established that A1 has taken away MO26-Verna Car of PW33 by leaving MO25-Alto Car with him. Now the other relevant evidence will presently establish that the MO26-Verna Car was concealed by A1 in the godown and same was recovered.
(i) P.W.41 and L.W.46 are the VROs of Ongole II Town. They acted as mediators for arrest of A1, A3, A11 and for recording their statements, which contain their confession and also other facts admissible under Section 27 of the Indian Evidence Act. These witnesses also acted as mediators for recovery of certain property, documents and other things including the Verna Car belonging to P.W.33 and also the cut lorry pieces from th`e Praveen Tobacco Suppliers Godown at Sitarampuram Kostal.
(j) P.W.41 deposed that on the instructions of their Tahsildar, himself and L.W.46 went to Ongole Town Circle Office on 10.11.2008 and on the request of P.W.54 acted as mediators for the interrogation and arrest of A1, A3 and A11. He further deposed that in their presence, A1, A3 and A11 gave independent statements which inter alia contain their confession of different offences including the offence in the present case and their concealing of properties concerning to different cases. He stated that a mediator report under Ex.P.171 was prepared which was signed by the mediators and Police. He also stated that A1 and A3 54 affixed their signatures and A11 put his thumb impression on Ex.P.171. (It should be noted that since the mediator report contains the confessional statements of A1, A3 and A11, admissible portions from those statements were separately marked as Exs.P.99 to 101.) This witness further deposed that in their presence P.W.54 searched A1 and seized from him among other things, M.O.28 - Verna Car keys and M.O.29 - Car shed keys. The said seizure is mentioned in Ex.P.171 and is conveniently marked as Ex.P.101.
P.W.41 further deposed that on the same day A1, A3 and A11 led the mediators and police party to Praveen Tobacco Suppliers Godown in Sitaramapuram Kostalu and there, A1 opened the godown with M.O.29 - Godown keys and showed M.O.26 - Verna Car, which is a Hyundai Company Car parked inside Godown and opened the car with the help of M.O.28 - Car keys and inside the car, they found different things including Ex.P.106 - Temporary certificate of registration standing in the name of P.W.33 relating to the Verna Car bearing No.AP 05YC T/R 2312, Ex.P.107 - copy of e-seva receipt standing in the name of P.W.33, Ex.P.112 - Hyundai Manual Book of the car in the name of P.W.33. They also found Exs.P.113 & 114 - Cheque books of Axis Bank in the name of A1, Ex.P.107 - ICICI Bank card in the name of A1 etc. This witness further deposed that A1, A3 and A11 have also showed the lorry cut pieces and tyres covered by M.Os.2 to 7, which relate to the stolen lorry. P.W.41 stated that they were all 55 seized by the I.O. under Ex.P.122 - mediator report signed by the mediators and police and also by A1, A3 and A11.
(k) P.W.54 - I.O. has deposed in tune with P.W.41 with regard to the arrest of A1, A3 and A11 and seizure of the aforesaid property.
(l) We have carefully scrutinized the above evidence of P.W.41 and of course, the evidence of P.W.54 - I.O. Their evidence would pellucidly show that after apprehension of A1, A3 and A11 on 10.11.2008, they were thoroughly interrogated and on their revelation, the property relating to this case and other cases was recovered. The important recoveries and seizure relating to this case are M.O.26 - Verna Car belonging to P.W.33 and lorry tyres and other cut pieces covered by M.Os.2 to 7, which relate to the missing trailer lorry. P.W.1 identified the cut pieces of his trailer lorry i.e., eight lorry tyres, cut iron pieces, iron angular, references, drums etc., and obtained interim custody of the said property. It should be noted that in Ex.P.122 - mediator report-cum-seizure panchanama, the signatures of A1, A3 and A11 are found. Though P.W.41 was intensely cross- examined nothing specific could be elicited to discredit the probative value of his evidence. It is argued before us that the same witnesses i.e., P.W.41 and L.W.46 were the mediators in the present case and the remaining two other cases i.e., S.C. No.73/2010 and S.C. No.91/2010 and therefore, they are stock witnesses. We are unable to appreciate this argument. Ex.P.171 - mediator report would show that 56 after apprehension, A1, A3 and A11 disclosed before P.W.41 and L.W.46 about the commission of different offences including the present offence and concealment of the properties. So naturally P.W.41 and L.W.46 would appear as witnesses in all those cases which were disclosed under a common mediator report. It is further argued that P.W.41 is a stock witness and he gave evidence for police in other cases also. This argument also has no much force because P.W.41 is a VRO and one of his duties is to appear as a mediator in criminal cases to assist the police in maintaining law and order. As such, the evidence of P.W.41 can be safely relied.
(m) When the evidence of P.Ws.24, 25, 33, 35 and 41 is carefully analyzed, the same would establish that A1 has taken Praveen Tobacco Suppliers Godown on lease from P.W.24 ostensibly for doing iron business but he and other accused used the godown for hiding the stolen vehicles and cutting them into pieces. Finding of Verna car belonging to P.W.33 and stolen trailer lorry pieces would clearly manifest the complicity of A1, A2, A3, A11 and A12 in the offence. Thus, the prosecution established the incriminating circumstance (d) in point No.1. 57
9. Point No.1 (e) :
Abandonment of power head of stolen trailer lorry near Pragati Bhavan by A4 & its recovery:-
(a) This circumstance relates to the abandonment of power head of trailer lorry and its recovery. According to prosecution, after the commission of dacoity, A4 on the instructions of A1 drove the power head of the trailer and abandoned it near the Pragati Bhawan, Ongole. Later, police of Tangutur PS recovered the same from the abandoned place. In this context, the evidence of P.Ws.9 to 14, 26, 39 and 48 is relevant.
(b) P.W.11 is the ASI of Tangutur PS. He deposed that on 16.10.2008, he received information that a power head was stationed on the eastern side of national highway near PACE Engineering College and Valluramma Temple and he went there and verified the power head, which was in red colour. A sticker was placed over the number plate with a number AP 28W 1198. He removed the sticker and found the original number of the said power head as KA 01C 1852. (It should be noted the said number relates to the trailer lorry which was subject matter of dacoity in this case.) The driver and cleaner of the power head were not available. Therefore, in the presence of P.W.10 and L.W.52 - the mediators, he prepared Ex.P.6 - mediator report and seized the said power head. He found no documents relating to the vehicle in the power head. He noticed some phone 58 numbers and some addresses on the power head. He brought the power head to the police station and handed over to P.W.12 - the S.I. of Police.
(c) Then, P.W.12 deposed that on his instructions, P.W.11 went to the place stated supra and seized the power head and brought to the police station. Basing on the seizure, he registered a case in Crime No.174/2008 under Sec.102 Cr.P.C.
and issued Ex.P.8 -FIR. He too stated that there was a sticker on the actual vehicle number. The sticker was numbered as AP 28W 1198. The power head contained two cell numbers 9443361098 & 944333229. He made a call to those numbers, but they were switched off. He visited the spot and prepared a rough sketch and examined some witnesses and recorded their statements. Later, on 22.01.2009, he transferred the crime along with vehicle to Ongole Taluk PS as already Crime No.356/2008 of Taluk PS was under investigation with respect to the said vehicle.
(d) Other witnesses concerned with power head are:
(i) P.W.13 who is a resident of Ongole and running a canteen near Pragati Bhavan behind old ZP office. He deposed that on 28.09.2008, he observed a power head stationed in the premises of old ZP office without trolley. It was red in colour and English letters were written on the power head. It was stationed for about one week.59
(ii) Similarly, P.W.9 who is a resident of Valluru and doing water tanker business claims to have seen the abandoned power head which is in red colour on the East of the National Highway near the lorry stand.
(iii) P.W.14 is a watchman in Pragathi Bhavan office. However, he did not support prosecution case and stated that he has not seen any vehicle stationed in the premises of old ZP office.
(e) Then P.W.10 - the sarpanch of Valluru Village, deposed that on 16.10.2008 himself and LW52 - Kundam Venkata Rami Reddy acted as mediators and in their presence P.W.11-ASI has seized the MO8-power head on the National Highway near PACE Engineering College. He stated that P.W.11 has examined the vehicle and found that the number plate of the vehicle was affixed with another sticker over the actual number. Ex.P6-mediator report was prepared.
(f) Then P.W.26 - VRO, Ongole deposed that on 16.01.2009 himself and L.W.54 - Vaka Sankar Reddy another VRO of Ongole acted as mediators at the request of P.W.54 - IO and proceeded to the stickering shop of P.W.39. There, on the instructions of the IO, P.W.39 demonstrated the manner of preparing lorry numbering plates and also the police sign boards. There Ex.P58-mediator report was prepared. On the same day, the Inspector took the mediators and PW39 to a vacant site situated on the East of Police parade grounds and there he showed two power heads of the lorries and asked PW39 to identify those power heads. PW 39 60 identified the two power heads. One power head was not having number plate and other power head was affixed with a number plate. PW 39 informed that he changed the number plate of the power head which was not bearing the number plate at that time at Tettu. The other power head was affixed with number AP 28W1198. PW 39 identified the sticker on the said power head as being affixed by him. Ex.P59 - mediator report was prepared at that time. He further deposed that on the same day, on the instructions of P.W.54, himself and L.W.54 conducted test identification for the power head and cut pieces of the lorry and tyres through P.W.1 who is the owner of the said trailer lorry and he identified the power head and other parts of the trailer lorry and there Ex.P70-mediatore report was prepared.
He further deposed that later on 12.02.2010 himself and LW45 acted as mediators when CID Police handed over the power head and lorry parts to the P.W.1, in pursuance of the directions of the Court and Ex.P85-mediator report was prepared at that time.
(g) A perusal of Ex.P58 and Ex.P59 would show that on the instructions of A1 - Munna, A2 -Shaik Riyaz and others, P.W.39 prepared stickers for the power head in the present case and in another case. Be that as it may, P.W.39 who is running stickering shop in Islampet, Ongole though admitted that he knows A2-Shaik Riyaz but did not support the prosecution case. He simply stated that he does not know anything about the offence. He admitted that he signed on Ex.P58 and 59 - 61 mediator reports but he does not know the contents thereof. He was declared hostile by the prosecution and cross-examined. A perusal of Ex.P58 and P59 would show that they contain signatures of P.W.39. It is not his case that the police have obtained his signatures on Ex.P58 and P59 forcibly. Therefore, it is obvious that having signed on mediator reports he now changed his version.
(h) Then P.W.48 -VRO, Ongole Urban deposed that himself and L.W.76 - K.V. Prasad acted as mediators for the arrest of A4 effected by P.W.54 - the I.O. on 13.02.2014 at Pothuraju Kaluva on the NH5 road between Ongole - Guntur. He stated that the police at that place found A4, S.K.Khadar Basha, T.Suresh Babu and K.Appaswamy Naidu and apprehended them and interrogated. A4 confessed to have committed series of offences including the present offence along with A1 and other accused. The police have recovered a black colour 9mm pistol from the abdomen of A4 and an automatic pistol made in USA bearing No.70069 on the other side. Ex.P.159 - mediator report-cum- confessional statement was prepared and signed by the police, the mediators, A4 and those three other persons.
(i) It should be noted that Ex.P.159 - mediator report is a comprehensive document which is a mediatornama-cum-confessional statement of A4 and three others, wherein A4 disclosed about the commission of different offences including the offence in the present case. So far as the present case is concerned, he stated that after commission of offence, he drove the trailer lorry with iron load to the 62 godown at Sitaramapuram Kostalu where A2 got unloaded the iron load and thereafter, A2 got cut the empty lorry into pieces and preserved them in the godown. A4 took the engine i.e., power head and abandoned in the premises of Pragati Bhavan, Ongole. As stated supra, Ex.P.159 contains the signatures of A4 and three others. P.W.48 was cross-examined by the defense side. Except giving denial suggestions, nothing specific could be extracted to impeach the credibility of this witness regarding arrest of A4 and others and their giving statements. Therefore, from Ex.P159, the facts relating to the arrest of A4 and his abandoning the power head in the premises of Pragati Bhavan which are admissible under Section 27 of Indian Evidence act can be accepted in the present case. For this limited purpose, when the statement of A4 is perused, it would reveal that A4 has driven the engine of the trailer lorry i.e., power head from the godown at Sitaramapuram Kostalu and abandoned the same near Pragatibhavan, Ongole and went away. In our view, this part of his statement is admissible in evidence since it leads to the discovery of a fact i.e., the power head was recovered by P.W.11 which was abandoned by A4. Thus, the fact relating to the origin of the abandoned power head comes from the horse‟s mouth of A4 and this fact has relevancy with the main case because the abandoned power head is a part of the trailer lorry which along with iron load was the subject matter of dacoity in the present case. 63
(j) It is argued by the appellants that Ex.P159 is a mediator-cum-confessional statement and the entire statement is marked as Ex.P.159 instead of discovery portion permissible under Section 27 of the Evidence Act and therefore, Ex.P.159 is not admissible in evidence. On this aspect the appellants placed reliance on Tekam Lakshmi v. State of A.P.12 We are unable to agree with this argument. It is true that the entire mediatornama-cum-confessional statement was by mistake marked by the trial court as Ex.P.159. General practice of the trial courts is that from out of the entire confessional statement, only the relevant portion admissible under Section 27 of Indian Evidence Act has to be marked as exhibit. Such marking of limited portion is to ensure that the court at the relevant time of appreciation of that document will confine its consideration only to the extent admissible under Section 27 of the Indian Evidence Act, but not the confessional part. However, the trial Court by mistake marked the entire document as Ex.P159 which contains both admissible and inadmissible portions. We will find such type of mistakes in respect of some other documents also in this case. Thus the question is, on account of the said procedural error committed by the trial Court, whether the admissible portions of the statements of A4 in the present instance and other accused in respect of other relevant documents have to be discarded. In Tekam Lakshmi‟s case (Supra 12) a Division Bench of Common High Court of Andhra 12 2019 (2) ALT Crl. 25 64 Pradesh having found that Ex.P7 was a confessional statement and the trial court has not marked only the relevant portion of such document held that the said document was not admissible under law. It observed that had the trial court marked the relevant portion in Ex.P7, the legality of the same would be otherwise.
We respectfully disagree with aforesaid observation of the Division Bench. Merely because the trial court committed a mistake in marking both admissible and inadmissible portions of a confessional statement, that cannot be a ground to discard the entire statement which also contains admissible portion U/s 27 of the Evidence Act. The trial court at a later stage or the appellate court can accept the admissible portion of the statement leaving aside the inadmissible portion. Instead, if the entire statement is discarded, prejudice will be caused to the prosecution. Our view gets corroborated by the judgment of Apex Court in Venkatesh @ Chandra v. State of Karnataka13. While deprecating the practice of marking the entire statement of accused, the Apex Court in that case has taken only admissible portion of the statement by observing thus:
"18. As was observed by the Privy Council (Pulukuri Kotayya and others v. King Emperor (AIR (34 1947 PV 67) the words - "with which I stabbed A" were inadmissible since they did not relate to the discovery of knife in the house of the informant. Applying this logic, only that part of the statement which leads to the discovery of certain facts alone could be marked in evidence and not the entirely of the statement. Coming to the instant case and going by the principle and the illustration highlighted by the Privy Council, out of the statement of accused No.1, only the following portion except the words printed in "italics" would be admissible and can be marked in evidence:
"....If I am taken there, I will show the spot where we committed murder, and we will show the place where we have thrown the knife 13 2023(1) Supreme 414 65 and the rod. And we will show the shop in which we sold the jewelleries."
The expression "where we committed murder" must not come on record. Similarly, all the earlier facts narrated in the statement about past history which are in the nature of self-implication, would be inadmissible as amounting to a confession made to a Police Officer. All the statements namely, Exhs.P-21 to P-24 must be read accordingly.
19.We must observe that we have repeatedly found a tendency on part of the Prosecuting Agency in getting the entire statement recorded rather than only that part of the statement which leads to the discovery of facts. In the process, a confession of an accused which is otherwise hit by the principles of Evidence Act finds its place on record. Such kind of statements may have a direct tendency to influence and prejudice the mind of the Court. This practice must immediately be stopped. In the present case, the Trial Court not only extracted the entire statements but also relied upon them." In Aloke Nath Dutta v. State of West Bengal14 the similar view was expressed by the Supreme Court stating thus:
"53. It is, however, disturbing to not that a confession has not been brought on record in a manner contemplated by law. Law does not envisage taking on record the entire confession by marking it an exhibit incorporating both the admissible and inadmissible part thereof together. We intend to point out that only that part of confession is admissible, which would be leading to the recovery of dead body and/or recovery of articles of Biswanath; the purported confession proceeded to state even the mode and manner in which Biswanath was allegedly killed.It should not have been done. It may influence the mind of the court. (See State of Maharashtra v. Damu, SCC at p.282 para 35)
54. In Anter Sing v. Stateof Rajasthan it was stated: (SCC p.663, para
11) "11. The scope and ambit of Section 27 of the Evidence Act were illuminatingly stated in Pulukuri Kotayya v.
Kind-Emperor in the following words, wich have become locus classicus: (AIR p.70, para 10) „It is fallacious to treat the "fact discovered"
within the Section as equivalent to the object produced; the fact discovered embraces the accused as to this, and the information given must relate distinctly to this fact. Information as to past user, or the past history, of the object produced is not related to its discovery in the setting in which it is discovered. Information supplied by a person in custody that "I will produce a knife concealed in the roof of my house" does not lead to the discovery of a knife;
knives were discovered many years ago. It leads 14 (2007) 12 SCC 230 = (2008) 2 SCC (Cri) 264 66 to the discovery of the fact that a knife is concealed in the house of the informant to his knowledge, and if the knife is proved to have been used in the commission of the offence, the fact discovered is very relevant. But if to the statement the words be added "with which I stabbed A" these words are inadmissible since they do not related to the discovery of the knife in the house of the informant.‟"
(But see Dhanunjoy Chatterjee v. State of W.P. SCC at pp.234-35.)
55. Therefore, we would take note of only that portion of the confession which is admissible in evidence."
In the light of above jurisprudence, when Ex.P159 is perused it contains both admissible and inadmissible portions of the statement of A4. When admissible portion is considered the same would depict that A4 disclosed the place where he abandoned the MO8-Power head. So to that extent Ex.P159 can be considered. Further, it should be noted, neither the trial court nor this Appellate Court has taken into consideration the entire statement, particularly the confessional part of the statement, but our appreciation is confined to the admissible part only. Therefore, mere wrong marking of the entire statement by the trial court, in our view, will not prejudice the appellants/accused particularly when the consideration is limited to the extent mentioned supra. Thus, on appreciation of the relevant evidence touching this circumstance, it is clear that A4 has driven the engine part of the trialer lorry i.e., power head which is subject matter of dacoity to a place near Pragati Bhavan and abandoned there, which was later recovered by P.W.11 - ASI, Tangatur and registered Crime No.174/2008 under Section 102 Cr.P.C. and 67 later, transferred the crime along with power head to the police of Ongole PS as already Crime No.3356/2008 was under investigation with regard to the said vehicle. Therefore, the prosecution established the incriminating circumstance (e) in point No.1.
10. Point No.1(f):
Selling of Iron load by A12 & A13 to iron merchant of Guntur:
According to prosecution, A12 and A13 sold the iron rods which were subject matter of dacoity to L.W.39 - Pasupuleti Gopaiah, who is an iron merchant running a shop in the name of Maruti Iron Company in Guntur. It is stated, A12 and A13 led the I.O. and the mediators i.e., P.W.16 and L.W.58 - Shaik Abdul Meer Khan to the shop of L.W.39 and informed that they sold the stolen iron to L.W.39 and on that, L.W.39 admitted to have purchased the iron from A12 and A13 and resold the same for Rs.4,00,000/- without knowing the fact that the said iron was a stolen property and surrendered Rs.4,00,000/- to the police under the cover of Ex.P.19 - mediator report.
(a) To this effect, P.W.16 - the mediator deposed in tune with prosecution case stating that on 13.12.2008, himself and L.W.58 accompanied the police along with A12 and A13 to the Maruti Iron Company of one Pasupuleti Gopaiah and the said Gopaiah revealed that A12 and A13 sold iron material to him and he in turn sold the same to others for a consideration of Rs.4,00,000/- and handed over an amount 68 of Rs.4,00,000/- to police, which was in the denomination of Rs.500/- notes, under the cover of Ex.P.19 - mediator report. It is also a fact that the prosecution during trial marked F.D.R. Receipt No.31841013966, dated 19.07.2011 issued by SBI, District Court Complex, Ongole, for Rs.4,00,000/- to show that the said amount was kept in F.D. However, L.W.39 - Pasupuleti Gopaiah was not examined by the prosecution during trial. In para 215 of the judgment, the trial court mentioned that L.W.39 was no more i.e., he was expired by the time trial commenced.
Therefore, we do not have the advantage of the evidence of L.W.39 to corroborate the version of P.W.16 and to prove the factum of sale to him. However, Ex.P.19 - mediator report contains the statement and signature of L.W.39 - Pasupuleti Gopaiah, wherein he stated that A12 and A13 approached him in the last week of September, 2008 and offered to sell 21 tons of iron rods and he purchased the same as old iron and as a part of his business, he sold the same to others for four lakhs. He stated that without knowing that the iron sold by A12 and A13 to him was a stolen property he purchased and resold the same and so saying, he returned four lakhs rupees to the I.O. in the presence of mediators. This is the gist of the statement of L.W.39. Since L.W.39 was no more, he was not examined during trial by the prosecution. Now the question is whether his statement under Ex.P.19 is admissible in evidence. In this regard, section 32(3) of Indian Evidence Act says: 69
"S.32. Cases in which statement of relevant fact by person who is dead or cannot be found etc., is relevant. - Statements, written or verbal, of relevant facts made by a person who is dead, or who cannot be found, or who has become incapable of giving evidence, or whose attendance cannot be procured without an amount of delay or expense which under the circumstances of the case, appears to the Court unreasonable, are themselves relevant facts in the following cases: -
(1) xxxx (2) xxxx (3) or again interest of maker: - When the statement is against the pecuniary or proprietary interest of the person making it, or when, if true, it would expose him or would have exposed him to a criminal prosecution or to a suit for damages.
(4) xxxxxx to (8)"
In the light of above provision, when the statement of L.W.39 is scrutinized, since he purchased stolen property, there was a possibility of his being exposed to criminal prosecution. Therefore, his statement under Ex.P.19 is relevant and admissible in evidence though he could not be examined during trial. We are fortified by the following decision:
(b) In Narpat and others vs. State 15 facts are that during the dead of night, some dacoits went to the village Deotra to commit dacoity and the villagers noticed the dacoits going towards Munnalal‟s house. There was an exchange of gun fire between the villagers and dacoits in which one dacoit Chhotey Singh got injured 15 (1961) 1 Cri LJ 591 70 and fell down and other dacoits escaped. He revealed the names and particulars of other dacoits. Later he died. After trial 4 dacoits were convicted. One of the main questions which arose for consideration before the High Court of Allahabad was whether the statement of Chhotey Singh against himself and other accused was admissible in evidence. In that context, referring to several other judgments, the High Court held as follows:
"9. In Nga-Po-Yin v. Emperor (1907) 5 Cr. L.J. 300 it was held by the Judicial Commissioner, upper Burma that, confession of an accused person who is dead implicating himself and an accomplice in a crime is admissible under Sec. 32(3) Evidence Act, and is not excluded by illustration
(b) to Sec. 30.
10. Similarly, in Janu son of Qadir Baksh v. Emperor (A.I.R. 1947 Sindh 122 ) it was held that, a confession made by one accused implicating himself and the other accused and admitted under Sec. 32(3) Indian Evidence Act can be used against the other accused. Such confession is to be regarded as a statement made by an accomplice, which requires corroboration not only as to the factum of the crime but as to the identity of the accused.
11.xxxxx
12.xxxxx
13.xxxxx
14.xxxxx.
15. So a statement admitted under Cl. (3) of Sec. 32, Indian Evidence Act need not be confined to that portion, which exposes the maker to a criminal prosecution. The statement may well extend to connected matters. So such a statement may be admitted in evidence in so far as it implicates accomplices and the maker of the statement. I am therefore of the opinion that, under CI.(3) of Sec. 32 of the Indian Evidence Act, the statement made by Chhotey Singh deceased can be used in evidence against the other accused named in that statement." (Emphasis supplied)
(c) It must be noted that though the statement of a person U/s 32(3) of the Evidence Act is admissible in evidence, however since it is in the nature of confession of a co-accused, prudence requires corroboration from other substantive 71 evidence (vide Mahabir Biswas v. State of West Bengal16). In the instant case, the statement of L.W.39 covered by Ex.P.19 was substantially corroborated by P.W.16 to the effect that A12 and A13 took the mediators and police to the shop of L.W.39 where L.W.39 identified them as the persons who sold iron to him and he surrendered an amount of rupees four lakhs as the sale consideration. Though P.W.16 was intensely cross-examined, his veracity could not be impregnated.
(d) Even otherwise, we must make it clear that assuming that the prosecution failed to prove the sale of iron by A12 to A13 to L.W.39 that will neither cut across the case of prosecution nor obviate the responsibility of accused to account for the iron that was stolen along with the vehicle by them. More vividly, the failure if any of the prosecution is only in respect of not establishing the sale of iron by A12 and A13 specifically to L.W.39. However, the other proven facts so far viz., A1 with the connivance of the A12 taking godown on lease; A1, A2 and A12 bringing lorry with iron load to the godown and undertaking iron cutting operations during night times and when questioned by watchmen rebuking them; the seizure of cut lorry pieces by the police at the instance of A1, A3 and A11; A4‟s revelation that he abandoned the power head of the trailer lorry near Pragathi Bhavan; A9 and A10 showing the burial place of the deceased drivers and consequent exhumation, would all cumulatively project the responsibility of these accused to answer about 16 1995 (2) SCC 25 = MANU/SC/0595/1995 72 the fate of iron load in the lorry. Their silence gives a scope to draw an inference that they have disposed of the stolen iron in some other manner, if not by selling to L.W.39.
Thus on considering all these aspects, we hold that the prosecution established the circumstance (f) in Point No.1 in the manner stated supra.
11. Point No.1 (g): Arrest of different accused and recoveries basing on their confessions of different accused:
Apart from the recoveries discussed supra, there are few other recoveries from the concerned accused which the prosecution claims having connection with the present case. Hence, such recoveries have to be examined now.
(a) Arrest of A7 and A8 on 21.11.2008 and recovery of M.O.9 - wrist watch belonging to the deceased:
In this context, P.W.28-VRO, Maddipadu deposed that on 21.11.2008 the I.O. arrested A7 & A8 in the presence of the mediators i.e., PW28 and LW55- Pasupuleti Venkataswamy and interrogated them. They confessed their guilt in the present case as well as other cases. So far as the present case is concerned, they stated that after commission of offence, they buried the dead bodies in the fields of Inamalamelluru near newly dug canal. They further stated that A6 took the wrist watch of one deceased and A8 took the watch of another deceased. A8 accordingly produced a wrist watch with gold colour dial and black colour strap 73 which was marked as M.O.9. Then Ex.P.72- mediator report-cum-confessional statement was prepared and it was signed by the mediators, police and A8. A7 affixed his LTM. P.W.2-the father of deceased Subramani identified M.Os.10 to 13 clothes and M.O.9 watch as belonging to his son.
(b) Learned counsels for appellants/A6 to A8 argued that the alleged identification of MOs-9 & 17-watches by PW2 and PW3 respectively is legally impermissible for the reason that as per Rule 35 of Criminal Rules of Practice and Circular Orders, 1990 issued by A.P.High Court, an identification parade for properties shall be conducted in the Court of concerned Magistrate where each item of property shall be mixed with four or five similar objects and then witness shall be called to identify the property. However, in the instant case the said procedure was given a total goby and thereby identification made by the witnesses for the first time in the Court is hit by procedural irregularity and therefore, such identification cannot be accepted. It is further argued that when such identification made by PW2 & PW3 is omitted, there will be no other evidence to connect the MOs9 & 17 to the two deceased and consequently the complicity of A6 to A8 also cannot be established.
(c) We are constrained to disagree with this argument. It is true that, when a witness for the first time, identifies the accused standing in the Court who is a stranger to him, as the culprit of an offence, or identifies a particular property in 74 Court as connected to the crime, naturally the identifying capacity of such witness will be doubtful. It is trite that a strange person or a thing which were seen for a glimpse cannot be retained in memory for long and if any witness claims to have remembered till the trial, such remembering power should be proved by an identification test before a Judicial Authority even before the trial. The purpose of such a test identification is to test and strengthen the trustworthiness of identifying witness in the Court. Rules 34 & 35 of Criminal Rules of Practice are intended to provide such procedural safeguard. While Rule 34 delineates the method of conducting identification parades of suspects through the Magistrates, Rule 35 provides for holding identification parade of properties before the concerned Magistrate. Now the question is whether holding of T.I.Parade for suspects/property is mandatory in every case and whether such T.I.Parade serves the purpose as a substantive evidence and non holding of T.I.Parade debilitates the credibility of a witness. Law is no more res integra in this regard.
(i) In Dana Yadav and others v. State of Bihar17 the Apex Court having examined several decisions, has formulated certain guidelines thus:
"(a) If an accused is well known to the prosecution witnesses from before, no test identification parade is called for and it would be meaningless and sheer waste of public time to hold the same.
b) xxxx But in case either prayer is not granted or granted but no test identification parade held, the same ipso facto cannot be a ground for throwing out evidence of identification of an accused in Court when evidence of the witness, on the question of identity of the accused from before, is found to be credible. The main thrust should be on answer to the question as to whether evidence of a witness in Court to the identity of 17 (2002) 7 SCC 295 75 the accused from before is trustworthy or not. In case the answer is in the affirmative, the fact that prayer for holding test identification parade was rejected or although granted, but no such parade was held, would not in any manner affect the evidence adduced in Court in relation to identity of the accused. But if, however, such an evidence is not free from doubt, the same may be a relevant material while appreciating the evidence of identification adduced in Court.
(c) Evidence of identification of an accused in Court by a witness is substantive evidence whereas that of identification in test identification parade is, though a primary evidence yet not substantive one, and the same can be used only to corroborate identification of accused by a witness in Court.
(d) Identification parades are held during the course of investigation ordinarily at the instance of investigating agencies and should be held with reasonable despatch for the purpose of enabling the witnesses to identify either the properties which are subject-
matter of alleged offence or the accused persons involved in the offence so as to provide it with materials to assure itself if the investigation is proceeding on right lines and the persons whom it suspects to have committed the offence were the real culprits.
(e) Failure to hold test identification parade does not make the evidence of identification in Court inadmissible rather the same is very much admissible in law, but ordinarily identification of an accused by a witness for the first time in court should not form basis of conviction, the same being from its very nature inherently of a weak character unless it is corroborated by his previous identification in the test identification parade or any other evidence. The previous identification in the test identification parade is a check valve to the evidence of identification in Court of an accused by a witness and the same is a rule of prudence and not law. (Emphasis supplied)
(f) In exceptional circumstances only, as discussed above, evidence of identification for the first time in Court, without the same being corroborated by previous identification in the test identification parade or any other evidence, can form the basis of conviction.
(g) Ordinarily, if an accused is not named in the first information report, his identification by witnesses in Court, should not be relied upon, especially when they did not disclose name of the accused before the police, but to this general rule there may be exceptions as enumerated above."
(ii) In Malkhansingh and others v. State of Madhya Pradesh18 the Apex Court observed:
"As a general rule, the substantive evidence of a witness is the statement made in court. The evidence of mere identification of the accused person at the trial for the first time is from its very nature inherently of a weak character. The purpose of a prior test identification, therefore, is to test and strengthen the trustworthiness of that evidence. It is accordingly considered a safe rule of prudence to generally look for corroboration of the sworn testimony of witnesses in court as to the identity of the accused who are strangers to them, in the form of earlier identification proceedings. This rule of prudence, however, is subject to exceptions, when, for example, the court is impressed by a particular witness on whose testimony it can safely rely, without such or other corroboration. (emphasis supplied) The identification parades belong to the stage of investigation, and there is no 18 2003 (5) SCC 746 76 provision in the Code of Criminal Procedure, which obliges the investigating agency to hold, or confers a right upon the accused to claim, a test identification parade. They do not constitute substantive evidence and these parades are essentially governed by Section 162 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. Failure to hold a test identification parade would not make inadmissible the evidence of identification in court. The weight to be attached to such identification should be a matter for the courts of fact. In appropriate cases it may accept the evidence of identification even without insisting on corroboration."
(iii) In Kishore and others v. State of Punjab19 the Apex Court observed:
"8. It is true that a test identification parade is not mandatory. The test identification parade is a part of the investigation. It is useful when the eyewitnesses do not know the accused before the incident. The test identification parade is usually conducted immediately after the arrest of the accused. Perhaps, if the test identification parade is properly conducted and is proved, it gives credence of the identification of the accused by the concerned eyewitnesses before the Court. The effect of the prosecution's failure to conduct a test identification parade will depend on the facts of each case." (emphasis supplied) Thus the jurisprudence on this aspect is that T.I.Parade is only a procedural safeguard and a rule of prudence but not rule of evidence. It serves the purpose of ensuring and strengthening the trustworthiness of a witness. Though identification of the witness for the first time in Court is a weakling still the Court having regard to the facts and circumstances may accept and act upon such evidence. It should be noted though above decisions were rendered in the context of holding T.I.Parade for suspects, they can be made applicable for holding T.I.Parade for properties also.
(d) When applied the above law to the present case, the two wrist watches belong to the two deceased and they are not strange things to their kith and kin with whom the deceased lived till they breathed their last. The deceased Subramani 19 2024 (2) Supreme 257 77 is the only son of P.W.2. Both of them lived together until before the death of Subramani. Therefore, the identifying capacity of P.W.2 need not be undermined.
In the cross-examination except giving denying suggestion that M.Os.9 to 13 do not belong to the deceased, nothing specific could be elicited to destabilize the evidence of P.W.2. Apart from P.W.2, P.W.4, the co-brother of the deceased also identified the clothes of deceased. Similarly MO17 is concerned, PW3-the brother of the deceased with whom the deceased lived together had identified it. Therefore, their identifying capacity need not be doubted. In view of the above strong evidence, A7 and A8 owe a responsibility to explain about the possession of M.O.9 & M.O.17 with them in terms of Section 106 of Evidence Act. The circumstances established by the prosecution, in our view, firmly connected A7 and A8 to the dacoity of trailer lorry with iron load and murder of the two drivers.
(e) While so, it is further vehemently argued by the counsel for Accused No.7 that except the confessional statement of A7, no recovery was affected from him pursuant to his statement. As mere confessional statement is not admissible in evidence, the trial Court grossly erred in convicting A7. Reliance is placed on Indra Dalal v. State of Haryana20 to argue that but for discovery U/s 27 of Indian Evidence Act, a confessional statement cannot be relied upon. 20
(2015) 11 SCC 31 = MANU/SC/0661/2015 78
(f) There is no demur about the legal principle that a confessional statement is hit by Section 25 and 26 of the Evidence Act and exception being that it can be used only to the extent of making a discovery of a fact permissible U/s 27 of Evidence Act. In Indra Dalal's case (Supra 20) the confessional statements said to be made by the accused/appellants did not lead to any discovery in terms of Section 27 of the Evidence Act. The recovery of scooter which was said to be used to commit the offence was recovered on the basis of the evidence of a witness but not on the strength of confessional statements made by any of the accused. However, the trial Court and the High Court relied upon those confessional statements and recovery of the scooter which has no connection with those statements. In our view, the said decision can be distinguished on facts. We once again make it clear that there is no demur about the legal principle on the evidentiary value of the confessional statements. In the instant case, A7 and A8 were jointly arrested by IO on 21.11.2008 in the presence of mediators and they disclosed that A6 took the wrist watch of one deceased and A8 took the wrist watch of another deceased. Immediately the police recovered M.O.9- wrist watch from A8 which was recovered under Ex.P72-mediator report which was signed by A8 and A7 affixed his LTM. In this case their confessional statements may not be admissible in evidence. However, discovery of M.O.9 made on the strength of their statements is admissible against both of them. Our view is fortified by the 79 judgment of the Apex Court in Kishore Bhadke's case (supra 19) cited by learned PP. In that case accused 2 and 3 made joint disclosure one after another in quick succession about the spot where dead body of deceased was thrown by them. Discovery was made after their statements. The Apex Court held that fact disclosed by them and discovery made at their instance was admissible against both the accused in terms of Section 27 of the Evidence Act. Thus the discovery of M.O.9 is attributable to both A7 and A8.
(g) Arrest of A6-Yepuri Chinnaveeraswamy and recovery of M.O.17-Wrist watch, M.O.22-Rs.50/- note, M.O.23-Iron jockey and M.O.24-Iron chain: As per prosecution, P.W.54-I.O. arrested A6 on 27.11.2008 near Mangamma College on N.H.5 Road of Ongole in the presence of the two mediators i.e., P.W.30 and L.W.54-Vaka Shankar Reddy and interrogated him and A6 said to have confessed his complicity in different offences including the present offence as mentioned in Ex.P-76 mediatornama-cum-confessional statement signed by the mediators, police and also A6. As per the admissible portion of Ex.P-76 under Section 27 of Indian Evidence Act, the police have recovered M.O.17-wrist watch and M.O.22-Rs.50/- note from the person of A6. A6 stated that he took away M.O.17-wrist watch from the wrist of one of the deceased drivers. In Ex.P-76, the M.O.-17 is described as having black dial with letters SONA on it. A6 then took the mediators and police to his thatched house situated in Enamanavelluru Village of Maddipadu Mandal 80 and there shown several property items relating to different crimes and the I.O. seized them under the cover of Ex.P-77 report. Of them M.O.23-iron jokey and M.O.24-iron chain relate to the present case.
(h) P.W.30 deposed above facts in corroboration of Ex.P-76 and P-77 reports which contain the signatures of A6. It should be noted that P.W.3-the brother of deceased driver Ramar Shekhar identified M.O.17-wrist watch as belonging to his deceased brother. Both P.W.3 and P.W.30 were intensely cross-examined but nothing useful could be elicited to discredit their evidence. Thus, the above evidence establishes the complicity of A6 in the offence.
(i) The arrest of A5 - Bathala Salmon: According to prosecution, on 26.11.2008 the P.W.49-I.O. arrested A5-Bathala Salmon at the Auto Nagar in Trovagunta Panchayat of Ongole Mandal in the presence of two mediators i.e., P.W.28 and L.W.55-Pasupuleti Venkataswamy. On interrogation, A5 gave statement before the mediators about his complicity in different offences including the present offence under Ex.P73-mediatornama-cum-confessional statement. It should be noted that no consequential discovery of any fact was affected on the strength of his statement. Except his alleged confessional statement which is not admissible in evidence, no other recovery was made in terms of Section 27 of Indian Evidence Act to connect A5 to the offence. Therefore, A5 deserves benefit of doubt in the 81 present case. However, since A5 is also an accused in the connected RT No.2 of 2021 and 3 of 2021, his complicity in those cases will be examined independently.
(j) Arrest of A15 and seizure of Indica Car bearing registration No.AP 29AB 8908: According to prosecution, the accused have used M.O.26 - Verna Car and M.O.57 - Indica Car bearing registration No.AP 29AB 8908 (original No.AP 16 AP 8785). As per prosecution, on 03.12.2008 PW49-I.O. has arrested A15 near Bhavani Centre on the road leading from Addanki to Darsi and Narsaraopeta in the presence of the two mediators i.e., P.W.27 and L.W.15-Onguri Ramanaiah while A15 was moving in a Tata Indica car bearing registration No.AP 29 AB 8908 and A15 said to have confessed his guilt in different offences including the present case and said to have used the said car in commission of offences. The chassis number of the said car is 605121ETZP 77210/06 and engine No.379001153804. The mediatornama-cum-confessional statement was recorded under Ex.P-71 signed by mediators, police and also A15. The said Tata Indica car is marked as M.O.57. The said car is identified as related to S.C.No.230/2012 on the file of III Additional District & Sessions Judge‟s Court, Nalgonda (Cr.No.109/2008 of Nalgonda II Town P.S.).
P.W.27 supported the prosecution and deposed above facts.
(k) Further, P.W.47 who is the owner of Tata Indica car bearing No.AP 16 AP 8785 was also examined by the prosecution to explain the circumstances under 82 which his car was stolen and his driver was murdered. He stated that on receiving information from Ongole Police that his car was traced out and being displayed with another number, he went there and after the car was produced in Nalgonda Court, obtained interim custody of his car. P.W.47 was cross-examined but no relevant material could be elicited to impeach his credibility. It should be noted that the above evidence establishes that the above Tata Indica car was subjected to theft after committing murder of its driver which was connected to a different case i.e., Sessions Case No.230/2012 on the file of III Additional District & Sessions Judge, Nalgonda. However, except the confession statement of A15 there is no other independent material to show that the said car was used for committing the present offence and most importantly A15 participated in the present offence. Therefore, we are unable to countenance with the prosecution‟s claim that A15 partook in the present case on hand. We are constrained to hold that prosecution failed to establish the guilt of A15 in the present case. We must be hasten to say that this view of ours is confined to the present case and it will have no influence on other connected cases wherein his complicity if any has to be evaluated independently.
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12. Point No.1 (a):
Criminal Conspiracy hatched by accused in the two hotels:
According to prosecution, all the accused hatched criminal conspiracy in Narayana Palace and Tasty Hotel, Ongole to commit dacoity of iron load vehicles passing on the High Way by killing the drivers. Before discussing the evidence adduced by prosecution in this context, it is germane for us to delve on the legal contours of the offence of criminal conspiracy under Section 120A and B of IPC.
(a) The Section 120A of IPC defines criminal conspiracy thus:
"120A. Definition of criminal conspiracy:- When two or more persons agreed to do, or cause to do done, (1) an illegal act, or (2) an act which is not illegal by illegal means, such an agreement is designated a criminal conspiracy:
Provided that no agreement except an agreement to commit an offence shall amount to a criminal conspiracy unless some act besides the agreement is done by one or more parties to such agreement in pursuance thereof."
Explanation. It is immaterial whether the illegal act is the ultimate object of such agreement, or is merely incidental to that object. As can be seen, Section 120A and 120B are introduced by the Criminal Law (Amendment) Act, 1913 with a view to make the criminal conspiracy itself as a distinct and substantive offence and to make the conspirators liable for punishment for mere agreement to commit any offence. Prior to the amendment, unless an overt act took place in furtherance of the conspiracy it was not indictable. The most important ingredient of offence of conspiracy is the agreement between two or 84 more persons to do an illegal act. In pursuance whereof, even if no criminal act was done, still the conspirators are punishable for entering into the agreement to do a criminal offence. The proviso is in respect of limb (2) and it says that no agreement except an agreement to commit an offence shall amount to criminal conspiracy, unless some act besides the agreement is done by one or more parties to such agreement. Thus as per the proviso, where the agreement is not an agreement to commit an offence, the agreement does not amount to cosnpiracy unless it is followed by an overtact done by one or more persons in pursuance of such agreement. It was so held by the Apex Court in Lennart Schussler and Anr. v. Director of Enforcement and Anr.21 Another important facet of conspiracy is that all conspirators are liable for the acts of each other of the crime which has been committed as a result of conspiracy. Criminal conspiracy is like a partnership in a crime and each conspirator is the agent of other.
(b) While so, on the aspect of mode of proof of conspiracy, a slew of decisions have been rendered.
(i) In Yash Pal Mittal v. State of Punjab22 the Apex Court observed:
"9. The offence of criminal conspiracy under Section 120A is a distinct offence introduced for the first time in 1913 in Chapter VA of the Penal Code. The very agreement, concert or league is the ingredient of the offence. It is not necessary that all the conspirators must know each and every detail of the conspiracy as long as they are co-participators in the main object of the conspiracy. There may be so many devices and techniques adopted to achieve the common goal of the conspiracy and there may be division of performances in the chain of actions with one object to achieve the real end of which every collaborator must be aware and in 21 MANU/SC/0117/1969=1970 CrlJ 707 22 MANU/SC/0169/1977=(1977) 4 SCC 540 85 which each one of them must be interested. There must be unity of object or purpose but there may be plurality of means sometimes even unknown to one another, amongst the conspirators. In achieving the goal several offences, may be committed by some of the conspirators even unknown to the others. The only relevant factor is that all means adopted and illegal acts done must be and purported to be in furtherance of the object of the conspiracy even though there may be sometimes misfire or over-shooting by some of the conspirators. Even if some steps are resorted to by one or two of the conspirators without the knowledge of the others it will not affect the culpability of those others when they are associated with the object of the conspiracy."
(ii) In Mohammad Usman Mohammad Hussain Maniyar and Ors. v. State of Maharashtra23 the Apex Court observed:
"17. xxx The contention of learned Counsel is that there is no evidence of agreement of the appellants to do an illegal act. It is true that there is no evidence of any express agreement between the appellants to do or cause to be done the illegal act. For an offence under Section 120B, the prosecution need not necessarily prove that the perpetrators expressly agreed to do or cause to be done the illegal act; the agreement may be proved by necessary implication."
(iii) In Ajay Agarwal v. Union of India (UOI) and Ors.24 the Apex Court observed:
"11. The question then is whether conspiracy is a continuing offence. Conspiracy to commit a crime itself is punishable as a substantive offence and every individual offence committed pursuant to the conspiracy is separate and distinct offence to which individual offenders are liable to punishment, independent of the conspiracy. Yet, in our considered view, the agreement does not come to an end with its making, but would endure till it is accomplished or abandoned or proved abortive. Being a continuing offence, if any acts or omissions which constitutes an offence are done in India or outside its territory the conspirators continuing to be parties to the conspiracy and since part of the acts were done in India, they would obviate the need to obtain sanction of the Central Govt. All of them need not. be present in India nor continue to remain in India."
(iv) In E.K.Chandrasenan v. State of Kerala25 the Apex Court observed:
"As, however, Shri Lalit appearing for accused 1 made efforts, and sincere efforts at that, to persuade us to disagree with the finding relating to this accused being hand in glove with others, let us deal with the submissions of Shri Lalit. He contends that there is nothing to show about this accused being a conspirator inasmuch as in the meeting which had been taken place on or about 18.8.1982 with accused 9 this accused was not present. This is not material because conspiracy can be proved 23 MANU/SC/0180/1981=(1981) 2 SCC 443 24 MANU/SC/0265/1993=(1993) 3 SCC 609 25 MANU/SC/0205/1995=(1995) 2 SCC 99 86 even by circumstantial evidence; and it is really this type of evidence which is normally available to prove conspiracy."
(v) In State through Superintendent of Police, SBI/SIT v. Nalini and Ors.26 the Apex Court explicated broad principles governing the law of conspiracy some of which are:
"i) Criminal conspiracy is committed when two or more persons agree to do or caused to be done an illegal act or legal act by illegal means. When it is legal act by illegal means overtact is necessary.
ii) Not only the intention, but also agreement to carry out the object of intention is essential to constitute criminal conspiracy.
iii) Conspiracy is hatched in privacy and in secrecy. Hence it is rarely possible to establish it by direct evidence. Usually, both the existence of conspiracy and its objects have to be inferred from the circumstances and the conduct of the accused.
iv) Persons may be members of single conspiracy even though each is ignorant of the identity of many others who may have diverse role to play. It is not essential for the crime of conspiracy that all the conspirators need to agree to play the same or an active role.
v) It is not necessary that all the conspirators should agree to the common purpose at the same time. They may join with other conspirators at any time before the consummation of intended objective and all are equally responsible.
vi) The criminal conspiracy being a partnership in crime, the act of each of the conspirators make others jointly responsible. The joint responsibility extents not only to what is done by any of the conspirators pursuant to the original agreement but also to collateral acts incidental to the main act.
vii) A man may join a conspiracy by a word or by deed one who commits an overtact with the knowledge of the conspiracy is guilty. One who tacitly consents to the object of conspiracy and goes along with other conspirators, actually standing by while the others took the conspiracy into the affect, is guilty though he intends to take no active party in crime."
(vi) In Baliya v. State of M.P.27 the Apex Court observed:
"13. More often than not direct evidence of the offence of criminal conspiracy will not be forthcoming and proof of such an offence has to be determined by a process of inference from the established circumstances of a given case. The essential ingredients of the said offence; the permissible manner of proof of commission thereof and the approach of the courts in this regard has been exhaustively considered by this Court in several pronouncements of which, illustratively, reference may be made to E.K.Chandrasenan v. State of Kerala MANU/SC/0205/1995 : 1995 (2) SCC 99, Kehar Singh and Ors. v. State (Delhi Administration) MANU/SC/0241/1988 : 1988 (3) SCC 609, Ajay Aggarwal v. Union of India MANU/SC/0265/1993 : 1993 (3) SCC 609 and Yash Pal Mittal v. State of Punjab MANU/SC/0169/1977 : 1977 (4) SCC 540."
26 MANU/SC/0945/1999=5 (1999) SCC 253 27 MANU/SC/0838/2012=(2012) 9 SCC 696 87
(vii) In Chandra Prakash v. State of Rajasthan28 the Apex Court observed:
"70. While dealing with the facet of criminal conspiracy, it has to be kept in mind that in case of a conspiracy, there cannot be any direct evidence. Express agreement between the parties cannot be proved. Circumstances proved before, during and after the occurrence have to be considered to decide about the complicity of the accused. Such a conspiracy is never hatched in open and, therefore, evaluation of proved circumstances play a vital role in establishing the criminal conspiracy."
(viii) In In re: Kodur Thimma Reddi and Ors.29 High Court of Andhra Pradesh held thus:
"20. Now, the last point that remains for consideration is whether there is any proof of criminal conspiracy for which all the accused have been convicted. In a criminal conspiracy, what is to be proved is agreement and common design. It is true that this proof need not be by direct evidence and that existence of a conspiracy may even be a matter of inference deduced from criminal acts done in pursuance of a common criminal purpose. But, unless a detailed and specific proof against each of the accused that they participated in a particular design to do a particular thins has been established, there can be no conviction under Section 120B."
(c) Thus, the essential jurisprudence that percolates down from the above decisions is:
For criminal conspiracy essential ingredient is the agreement between two or more conspirators to do an illegal act or an act which is not illegal by illegal means. The presence of all the conspirators right from beginning till end to achieve the objective of the conspiracy is not essential and it is also not essential that all the members of conspiracy and their assigned acts should be known to each other.
Suffice they know and agree for the main criminal object. Since, conspiracy is 28 MANU/SC/0457/2014=(2014) 8 SCC 340 29 MANU/AP/0071/1957=AIR 1957 AP 758 88 hatched in secrecy, securing direct evidence is seldom possible. Hence, conspiracy can be proved by inference. Circumstances proved before, during and after the occurrence have to be considered to decide about the complicity of the accused.
Since conspiracy is never hatched in open, therefore, evaluation of proved circumstances play vital role in establishing the criminal conspiracy.
It has now to be seen whether the prosecution could establish the criminal conspiracy of the accused in this case.
13. The prosecution examined PWs.18 to 23, 32 & 36 to establish the conspiracy. Hence their evidence has to be scrutinized.
(a) P.Ws. 18, 19, 22 & 32 are the workers in Tasty Hotel.
P.W.18 who was the receptionist worked from June 2008 to 2010 deposed that A1 stayed in their hotel in Room No.103 for four days from 01.08.2008 by paying Rs.2.782/-. Again he stayed for one day in Room No.103 on 20.08.2008 by paying rent Rs.1,354/-. Exs.P22 to P25 are the concerned record of their hotel showing his stay. He further deposed during the period of his stay several persons came and met him, but he cannot say who they were. He identified A1 in the Court. A1 used to come in Verna car to their hotel - One Gangadhar informed their Manager about the arrival of A1.
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In the cross-examination he stated that one Srinivas is one of the partners of the hotel and he is the cousin brother of said Srinivas. It is elicited from the witness that Ex.P.22 and P24 Guest (G) registration form books contain original and duplicate receipt sheets with same serial number i.e., white sheet is original and pink sheet is duplicate and white sheet will be issued to guest and pink sheet will be retained by the hotel. It is also elicited that Ex.P25 contains both original and duplicate receipts issued in favour of two different persons i.e., original in the name of B.Y. Aravind and duplicate in the name of MAS Kareem (A1). It is further elicited that the computer generated bills will be issued to the customers.
(b) P.W.19 is also a receptionist in Tasty hotel worked from April 2008 to December 2010. He stated that A12 used to book room for A1. A1 occupied Room No.109 from 19.07.2008 to 21.07.2008 and paid rent of Rs.4,655/-. Again he stayed in Room No.106 for one day on 06.08.2008 and vacated on 07.08.2008 and paid Rs.1,616/- as room rent. Exs.P26 & 27 are the guest registration forms. The witness stated that A1 used to come in black Verna car and about 20 to 25 persons used to visit him. He specifically stated that all the accused in the Court used to visit him.
In the cross-examination, he admitted that Ex.P26 and P27 do not contain his signatures and they do not reveal that the rooms were booked by A12 for A1. Like PW.18, he too admitted that Ex.P22 and 24 books contain original and 90 duplicate receipts in white and pink colours respectively but the original of Ex.P26 stands in the name of one K. Veerraju whereas its duplicate stands in the name of A1. He stated that their hotel maintains occupancy register which contains the details of the persons occupied the rooms in the hotel but he did not hand over the occupancy register to the police. He specifically stated that on 19.07.2008 and 06.08.2008 he saw the accused and therefore, he was identifying him in the Court. He denied the suggestion that he did not work as receptionist and giving false evidence.
(c) P.W.22 is the room boy in Tasty Hotel worked from 2008-2009 he deposed that during July and August of 2008, A1 who is present in Court and whose name is M.A.S.Kareem occupied Room Nos.103, 106 & 109. He further stated that around 10 persons who were aged 25 to 30 years used to meet him in the Hotel and they used to talk in Urdu with regard to some business. It should be noted that since this witness did not depose in tune with Ex.P55-his 161 Cr.P.C. statement in identifying those visitors, Public Prosecutor got him declared hostile and cross- examined.
In the defence cross-examination he stated that the persons who used to visit A1 used to discuss about iron business and lorries and as this witness worked as room boy he entered in the room of A1 and heard them. He however stated that he cannot identify those persons. In the cross-examination of defence side he stated 91 that he has not seen the accused before coming to the Court after the date of his occupation of the room in the hotel. He deposed that he stated before Police that M.A.S.Kareem was short with beard.
(d) P.W.32 worked as Manager of Tasty Hotel from June 2006 to 2010. He deposed that during July and August 2008 A1 stayed in the Tasty Hotel for about eight days i.e., in Room No.109 from 19.07.2008 top 21.07.2008 and in Room No.103 from 01.08.2008 to 04.08.2008 and in Room No.106 from 06.08.2008 to 08.08.2008. Again he stayed for two days i.e., 20.08.2008 and 21.08.2008 in Room No.103. A12 who was working in D.R.D.A. Department booked room for A1. A number of persons used to visit A1 and they stayed with A1 for hours together. This witness identified A2 and A4 standing in the Court as the persons visited A1. He identified Exs.P22 to P27 as the relevant records of their hotel. He further stated that Ex.P61 to P66 are the bills and Ex.P67 is the occupancy statement which he submitted to the police.
In the cross-examination he stated that he worked for four years in Tasty Hotel from 2006 to 2010. Though he admitted that in Ex.P22 & 24-guest registration books every receipt is maintained in duplicate i.e., white colour as original and pink colour as duplicate, however, he assertively stated that their hotel did not use the two colours as printed for. He stated that he cannot say who others 92 stayed in Room No.108 & 110 from 19.07.2008 to 21.07.2008. He denied the suggestion that he did not work in the said hotel and deposed falsehood.
The above is oral and documentary evidence projected by the prosecution to show that A1 stayed in Tasty Hotel and had criminal conspiracy with other accused. First we will examine the documentary evidence and later the oral evidence.
14. Ex.P22 to 27 and Ex.P61 to 67 is the documentary evidence.
(a) Ex.P22 and P24 are the Guest (G) Registration Form books got printed by Taste Residency Hotel to register the particulars of the guests stayed in their hotel. Each book contains Serial Nos.1 to 100 both in original and duplicate. As per the oral evidence of witnesses the original is in white colour and duplicate is in pink colour and original will be issued to the customer while the duplicate will be preserved by the hotel. Ex.P23, 25, 26 and 27 are the receipts in Ex.P22 and 24 books. As per prosecution witnesses the stay of A1 on different occasions in the months of July and August, 2008 was noted in the aforesaid receipts. We perused them.
(b) Ex.P23 (in Ex.P.22 book) is the Original Receipt No.69 which shows the guest‟s name as MAS Kareem and date of arrival as 01.08.2008 and occupying Room No.103 (203 is re-written as 103) and containing guest‟s signature. 93
(c) Ex.P25 (in Ex.P.24 book) is the Duplicate Receipt No.37 which shows the guest‟s name as MAS Kareem and date of arrival as NIL and occupying Room No.103 and containing guest‟s signature.
(d) Ex.P26 (in Ex.P.22 book) is the Duplicate Receipt No.23 which shows the guest‟s name as MAS Kareem and date of arrival as 19.07.2008 and occupying Room No.109 and expected date of departure as óne day‟and containing guest‟s signature‟.
(e) Ex.P27 (in Ex.P.22 book) is the Original Receipt No.85 which shows the guest‟s name as MAS Kareem and date of arrival as NIL and occupying Room No.106 and expected date of departure as „one day‟ and containing guest‟s signature.
(f) Ex.P61 and P62 are the computerized-cum-printed receipt and bill dated 21.08.2008 respectively of Room No.103 in the name of MAS Kareem for a net amount of Rs.1,259/-.
(g) Ex.P63 and P64 are the computerized-cum-printed receipt and bill dated 06.08.2008 respectively of Room No.106 in the name of MAS for a net amount of Rs.1,496/-.
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(h) Ex.P65 and P66 are the computerized-cum-printed receipt and bill dated 21.07.2008 respectively of Room No.109 in the name of MAS Kareem for a net amount of Rs.2,315/-.
15. While so, the main contention of the appellants, particularly appellant / accused No.1 is in respect of Ex.P22 to 27. It is argued that when Guest (G) registration books contain original and duplicate receipts with an intention to provide original receipts to the guest and duplicate for preservation, it is unusual and highly doubtful that Ex.P23 - Receipt No.69 original contains the name of MAS Kareem (A1) and its duplicate contains a different name of one M. Nijalingaiah; Similarly, Ex.P.25 - Receipt No.37 in duplicate contains the name of MAS Kareem (A1) and its original contains a different name of one B.Y. Aravind; so also, Ex.P26 - Receipt No.23 in duplicate contains the name of MAS Kareem (A1) and its original contains the name of one K. Veerraju; while so, Ex.P.27 - Receipt No.85 in original contains the name of MAS Kareem (A1) and its duplicate contains the name of one N. Vinodh Kumar. It is vehemently argued that these documents cannot be relied upon to conclude that A1 stayed in the Taste Hotel.
(a) We have meticulously gone through these documents and found no much substance in the said argument, for the reason, PW.32 in his cross examination has clarified this anomaly stating that though the Ex.P22 and 24 - books are printed 95 with two colours for each receipt, however the hotel authorities have not used those books with the two colours as printed for. That is why, each individual page whether it is in white or pink colour was used for registration of each individual guest. This is manifest from a perusal of all the receipts contained in the Ex.P22 and 24 - books and it is not an isolated incidence for A1 alone. May be there is an irregularity in the manner of using those G-Form Registration Books but they cannot be suspected to be manipulated for the purpose of this case. Added to it Ex.P22 to 27 are supported by Ex.P61 to 67 - cash bills and receipts corresponding to the G-Forms. The appellants could not challenge the veracity of those bills and receipts. Hence it is evident that one MAS Kareem has stayed in Taste Hotel in different spells in July and August, 2008.
16. So far as the identity of the said named person as A1 in this case is concerned, we have PWs.18, 19, 22 and 32, who have specifically identified A1. Besides, PW.19 and PW.32 stated that A12 used to book rooms for A1. PW.19 further identified A2 and A4 as the persons who among others used to come and meet A1 in the hotel. Besides, these witnesses have identified A1 and some other accused in the test identification parade conducted by P.Ws.42 and 43 - Magistrates.
(a) As can be seen, PW.42 - the II AJMFC, Ongole conducted T.I. parade on 03.02.2009 vide Ex.P148 - TIP Report wherein P.W.19 identified A1 but could not 96 identify A3. Severely fulminating the TI parade, learned Senior Counsel Sri B.N.V. Hanumantha Rao representing Smt. Sridevi Jampani for A1 and also another learned Senior Counsel Sri P. Veera Reddy representing Sodum Anvesha, learned counsel for A4 firstly argued that when the A1 was arrested on 10.11.2008 TI parade was conducted belatedly on 03.02.2009 and in between, the witness might have seen A1 in the newspapers and TV Channels wherein the crime was reported. During TI parade also A1 submitted his objection to the effect that PW.19 might have seen his face in the newspapers or TV Channels and hence the TI parade lost its significance. They relied upon the judgments of Apex Court in Satrughana Alias Satrughana Parida v. State of Orissa30 and Mahabir v. State of Delhi31 to contend the delay vitiates TI parade. Nextly he argued that PW.19 has seen A1 at the Hotel with beard. However, while conducting TI parade no non-suspect was having beard and thereby A1 was easily identified rendering TI parade a mockery. In this regard, he relied upon Rajesh Govind Jagesha v. State of Maharashtra32.
(b) Regarding the first objection, it is true that under law the TI parade shall be conducted at the earliest point of time after the accused is apprehended. There is no denial of the mandate of law. Its avowed purpose is to prevent the possibility of 30 1995 Supp (4) SCC 448 31 2007 (139) Delhi LT 155 32 (1999) 8 SCC 428 = MANU/SC/0703/1999 97 police exposing the accused to the identifying witnesses in advance. In this case there is a delay of about 2 months in conducting TI parade. However the question is whether the delay has defeated the very purpose of TI parade. It is not the case of prosecution that P.W.19 and other similar witnesses had seen A1 only once at the time of commission of offence. On the other hand, their case is that these witnesses who are the employers in the two hotels happened to see A1 and possibly some other accused for a considerably long period when A1 stayed in those two hotels during July and August, 2008. Regarding the stay of one MAS Kareem in Taste Hotel during the said period is a proved fact. In that view, their witnessing him is not confined to a lone occasion at the time of commission of offence. Therefore, their identifying capacity need not be doubted merely because of the delay in conducting the TI parade. The apprehension that due to delay, the police might have shown A1 to them to facilitate their identification does not hold good in this case because of the association of witnesses with A1 for a reasonable period to recognize him. Hence, in our view, in this case, delay cannot be a ground to reject the identifying capacity of P.W.19.
(c) Second contention of A1 is concerned, PW.42 in his cross-examination admitted that P.W.19 gave the descriptive particulars of A1 to the effect that he was a short man and red chap having long beard. P.W.42 stated that in Ex.P.148 - TIP Report he did not specifically mention whether the non-suspects were having 98 beard or not. He further admitted non-suspects did not belong to Muslim religion. In that back-drop, it is argued as if A1 alone was having beard and other non- suspects did not have the beards and thereby identification became easy. We are unable to accept this contention. In Ex.P.148, P.W.42 did not specifically mention as to whether non-suspects were having beard or not. Be that as it may, if really A1 alone was having beard and other non-suspects did not have beards, A1 must have raised his objection to that effect as he raised objection on other issue. His non- objection at the relevant time gives a clear inference that the other non-suspects must also had beards during TI parade.
The cited decision can be distinguished on facts. In that case as per FIR the complainant mentioned names of two persons and also two other unknown persons out of whom one was riding Yamaha Motorcycle with a beard. So the eye- witnesses had no acquaintance with remaining two but they could identify one of them by his beard. Despite the same, TI parade was conducted through the eye- witnesses to that accused without beard and flanked by the non-suspects also without beards which was deprecated. That is not the case here. Hence, the identification of A1 by P.W.19 need not be doubted.
(d) Then P.W.43-the III AJMFC, Ongole conducted TI parade on 24.10.2009 and submitted Ex.P.154 - TIP Report whereunder P.W.18 and P.W.32 identified A1. They could not identify A2, A3, A5, A6, A7, A8, A9, A10, A11 & A13. Here 99 also same objections as earlier were taken by the appellants. However, the reasons mentioned above will apply to present instance also.
Thus the above oral and documentary evidence would clearly show that A1 in the name of MAS Kareem has stayed in Taste Residence Hotel during July, and August, 2008 and some persons used to come and meet him and they were discussing about the iron business.
17. P.Ws.20, 21, 23 and 36 are the workers in Narayana Palace Hotel. Hence their evidence has to be scrutinized to know whether A1 and other accused stayed in the hotel and hatched criminal conspiracy.
(a) P.W.20 was the receptionist in Narayana Palace Hotel from June, 2008 to February, 2009. In his chief examination, he did not support prosecution case. He only stated that he did not have any idea whether the persons standing in the Court were ever stayed in the Narayana Palace Hotel during his tenure. The Public Prosecutor got him declared as hostile and cross-examined. He admitted to have submitted the record of their hotel covered by Ex.P.28 to P.40 to the police. Though in the TI parade conducted by P.W.43 he identified A1 to A3 as the persons stayed in their hotel, however in the cross-examination of public prosecutor he stated that he don‟t have idea about the persons whom he identified in the jail. Thus, his evidence is of no avail to the prosecution to establish its case. 100
(b) P.W.21 was the receptionist in Narayana Palace from 01.01.2008 to November, 2008. This witness specifically stated that in the months of August, September and October, 2008 A1 and A3 took rooms in their hotel for about 48 days. He identified A1 and A3 in the Court. He stated that A1 and A3 used to stay in one room and several people used to come to their room and stay for more than one hour. He stated that since A1 and A3 stayed in their lodge he identified them in the TI parade conducted by the Magistrate. He however stated that he cannot identify the persons who used to visit A1 and A3. On this aspect he was declared hostile by the public prosecutor and cross-examined. During cross-examination, he stated that Ex.P.28 to P37 were maintained in their lodge showing the stay of customers. He further stated that the guest under Ex.P.29 to P37 is the A1. He also stated that while A1 and A3 booked rooms, this witness was personally present. In the cross-examination of defence side he denied the suggestions that he was giving false evidence and identified the persons at the instance of police.
(c) P.W.23 was the room boy in Narayana Palace during 2008-2009. He deposed that in the September and October, 2008 A1 stayed in Room Nos.101, 103, 105 and 106 of their lodge and some persons in the age group of 25-50 years used to come to A1 and they used to talk in phones by locking the doors with regard to lorries and iron. He further stated that all the accused used to come to their lodge to meet A1. He said that he identified A1 to A3 in the TI parade. 101
In the cross-examination of defence side he stated that as he has seen the photo of A1 in the newspaper, he could identify him in TI parade. He denied the suggestion that he did not work in the Narayana Palace.
(d) P.W.36 worked as Manager in Narayana Palace from April, 2008 to December, 2010. He deposed that P.Ws.20, 21 and 23 worked in their hotel. He further stated that A1 took room in their lodge in the month of August, 2008 and stayed for about 48 days. The witness identified A1 in the Court and further stated that A1 used to visit and stay in their lodge often. During said period several persons used to come and meet A1. He stated that Ex.P.43, 44, 47, 49 50, 51 & 52 contains his signature. Since this witness did not speak about the stay of A3 in their lodge, learned public prosecutor got him declared hostile and cross-examined.
In the cross-examination he admitted to have stated before police about the stay of A3 and A1 in different rooms for different spells. He stated that he participated in TI parade held in the District Jail, Ongole and identified A1. In the cross-examination of defence side he stated that he saw the A1 on TV and daily newspapers prior to conducting TI parade.
(e) P.W.43 conducted TI parade wherein the above witnesses identified A1 and A3.
102
(f) When the above oral and documentary evidence is perused, the documentary evidence covered by Ex.P.28 to P.51 shows that MAS Kareem and Syed Hidaytullah have stayed in the Narayana Palace Hotel during August, September and October, 2008. Oral evidence is concerned, P.Ws.20, 23 and 36 have not supported the prosecution case in identifying the accused, inasmuch as, P.W.20 stated that he don‟t have the idea about the persons whom he identified in the jail and he cannot identify the persons standing in the Court. Whereas, P.Ws.23 & 36 stated that by seeing A1‟s photo on the TV and newspaper, they identified A1.
However, P.W.21 has clearly stated that A1 and A3 stayed in their hotel for about 48 days in August, September and October, 2008. He further stated that when the rooms were booked by A1 and A3, this witness was personally present. The documentary evidence corresponds with his evidence. Though P.W 43 conducted TI parade belatedly, however so far as identifying capacity of P.W.21 is concerned, there can be no doubt in view of the fact that A1 and A3 stayed in their hotel for a long period of 48 days between August - October, 2008 and when they took rooms this witness was personally present.
18. Thus, the oral and documentary evidence discussed supra would pellucidly explain us that A1 and A3 stayed in Taste Residency Hotel and Narayana Palace Hotel in different spells between July, 2008 - October, 2008 and many people used to visit them and they discussed about the lorries and iron business. With this 103 proved fact, whether criminal conspiracy of all the accused can be inferred is the sentient point. As we discussed earlier, criminal conspiracy since hatched in secrecy, securing direct evidence on this aspect is seldom possible. Therefore, taking into the circumstances that were proved before, during and after the occurrence, criminal conspiracy can be inferred. Ergo, the nature of the crime and facts that were proved before, during and after the crime have to be considered to decide the existence of criminal conspiracy.
(a) In this case and also in other similar cases as depicted by different mediator reports, the offences were occurred between July and September, 2008. All the offences were occurred on the national highway between Ongole and Nellore. The modus operandi in all these cases is identical i.e., the culprits committed dacoity of trucks passing with iron load on Highway by killing the drivers and concealing the dead bodies. From the nature of the crimes, it is evident that no single person can accomplish the task without the help of a group of culprits. Further, a diabolical design, meticulous division of tasks among the group of persons and ruthless execution are essential to achieve the fruition. That being so, the proven facts would show A1 and A3 occupied the two hotels during the relevant period of the three crimes and had discussions with some persons relating to lorries and iron business. The other facts proved would show A1 with the connivance of A12 took the godown of P.W.24 on lease during the relevant period. There A1, A2 and A12 104 were witnessed to have brought trailer lorry with iron load and clandestinely undertaken the task of cutting the empty lorry into pieces. A4 - the driver of A1 abandoned the power head of the lorry near Pragati Bhavan. A1, A3 and A11 as well as A9 and A10 revealed the place where the two dead bodies were buried. A12 and A13 revealed about the sale of stolen iron to the iron merchant in Guntur. A7 and A8 revealed about A8 taking away M.O.9 - wrist watch of one of the deceased after commission of offence. So also, A6 revealed about his taking away M.O.17 - wrist watch of one of the drivers and M.O.23 - Iron Jockey and M.O.24
- Iron Chain from the vehicle.
All the above instances would show that unless there was prior criminal conspiracy among the accused, their wicked act could not have been materialized. Therefore, we can safely presume the brooding of criminal conspiracy by A1 to A4, A6 to A13 in the Taste Residency, Narayana Palace Hotel, Ongole and some other places. Hence Point No.1(a) has been established by the prosecution.
19. Proved circumstances completing the chain:
(a) We have elaborately discussed the incriminating circumstances and the evidence by which they were proved by the prosecution supra. When all these proven circumstances are systematically arranged, in our considered view, they will form into a complete chain invariably projecting the guilt of Accused Nos.1 to 105 4 and 6 to 13. Running the risk of pleonasm, all of them are part of the criminal conspiracy to commit dacoity of iron loaded trucks proceeding on National Highway by killing the drivers and in pursuance of such wicked design, each one of them played his assigned role in fulfilling the object. Therefore, the circumstantial evidence unerringly established that none other than Accused Nos.1 to 4 and 6 to 13 had criminal conspiracy pursuant to which each one of them played different roles and achieved the result of dacoity and murder of the two drivers. On behalf of appellants it is argued that the case is based purely on circumstantial evidence and all the links have not been established to form into a chain and in view of the missing links, benefit of doubt should go to the accused.
Learned Senior Counsel Sri P. Veera Reddy placed reliance on Digamber Vaishnav v. State of Chhattishgarh33 wherein it is held thus:
"19. It is also well-settled principle that in criminal cases, if two views are possible on evidence adduced in the case, one binding to the guilt of the accused and the other is to his innocence, the view which is favourable to the accused, should be adopted. This principle has a special relevance in cases wherein the guilt of the accused is sought to be established by circumstantial evidence."
There is no demur about the principle. However, in this case as already observed, the prosecution could successfully establish its case beyond doubt. Hence this argument is of no avail.
33
(2019) 4 SCC 522 106
(b) However, in our considered view, the prosecution failed to prove the complicity of A5, A14 and A15 in this case. A5 - Bathala Salmon is concerned, except his alleged confessional statement which is not admissible in evidence, neither independent corroborative evidence is available against him nor any recovery is effected from him to connect A5 to this case. Hence he is entitled to benefit of doubt.
(c) Similarly, A14 - Shaik Rahmathulla is concerned, according to prosecution he too participated in criminal conspiracy and associated in selling the stolen iron. However, except the inadmissible confessional statements of co-accused, no other credible evidence is available on record to substantiate his participation in the crime. Hence he deserves benefit of doubt.
(d) So far as A15 - Shaik Dada Peer @ Gani is concerned, the IO on his arrest seized M.O.57 - TATA Indica Car bearing registration No.AP29 AB 8908 which is subject matter of theft and murder of its driver in SC No.230/2012 on the file of III Additional District and Sessions Judge, Nalgonda. Be that as it may, except the confessional statement of A15, there is no independent material to show that the said car was used for committing the present offence and most importantly, A15‟s participation in the offence. Therefore, we are constrained to hold that prosecution failed to establish the guilt of A15 in the present case. Hence he too deserves benefit of doubt.
107
However, our above observation regarding A5, A14 and A15 is confined to the present case having regard to the facts circumstances and evidence and the said observation will have no influence on other connected cases, wherein, their complicity if any, has to be evaluated independently.
20. Additional Arguments Advanced by the appellants: Some additional arguments are also advanced by the appellants which are required to be mentioned.
(a) It is argued that though the offence was occurred on the night of 27.09.2008, FIR was belatedly lodged on 17.10.2008 and there was no proper explanation for the delay. This argument, it must be said, has no venom. Though the offence was occurred on the night of 27.09.2008, none including P.W.1- the owner of trailer lorry knew about it. Since the lorry did not reach the destination at Kalpakam by the end of September, 2008, P.W.1 waited about 10 days with the hope that his drivers will reach him and thereafter started making enquiries at Kalpakam, Tada Toll Plaza and ultimately reached Ongole and there he gave Ex.P1 - report to the police on 17.10.2008. It must be noted that even in Ex.P.1 - report also, P.W.1 did not make any allegation against others but he alleged criminal breach of trust against his own drivers for, at the stage also he did not know about the fate of his trailer lorry. In these circumstances, one cannot criticize that there is delay in lodging FIR in this case. Even if there is delay as contended, the same is well explained by the prosecution. When delay in lodging FIR is properly explained, 108 prosecution case cannot be discarded as laid in State of Madhya Pradesh and Ors. v. Chhaakki Lal and Ors.34
(b) Nextly, it is argued that as per prosecution all the accused have committed three similar offences in a calendar year covered by SC No.73/2010, SC No.91/2010 and SC No.595/2010 and as such in terms of Section 223(c) of Cr.P.C, the trial Court ought to have conducted joint trial of all the three offences. Instead the trial Court conducted separate and parallel trials for the three offences causing much prejudice to the accused. Hence on that ground, the trial is vitiated in all the three cases including the present case and hence conviction and sentence are liable to be set aside. We find no force in this contention. As per Section 223 of Cr.P.C joint trial can be conducted by the trial Court if the circumstances narrated in Clause (a) to (g) of the said Section are satisfied. Joint trial is optional as per the discretion of the Court since the word "may be" is employed at the beginning of Section 223 Cr.P.C. Unless strong prejudice is established, the accused cannot contend that the separate trial vitiated the prosecution case. In this regard, the Apex Court in Nasib Singh v. State of Punjab35 explicated certain principles on the aspect of joint trial / separate trial with reference to Section 218-223 Cr.P.C as follows:
34
2019 (1) ALD Criminal 276 Supreme Court 35 (2022) 2 SCC 89 109 "39. From the decisions of this Court on joint trial and separate trials, the following principles can be formulated:
(i) Section 218 provides that separate trials shall be conducted for distinct offences alleged to be committed by a person. Sections 219-221 provide exceptions to this general rule. If a person falls under these exceptions, then a joint trial for the offences which a person is charged with may be conducted.
Similarly, Under Section 223, a joint trial may be held for persons charged with different offences if any of the clauses in the provision are separately or on a combination satisfied;
(ii) While applying the principles enunciated in Sections 218-223 on conducting joint and separate trials, the trial court should apply a two-pronged test, namely, (i) whether conducting a joint/separate trial will prejudice the defence of the Accused; and/or (ii) whether conducting a joint/separate trial would cause judicial delay.
(iii) The possibility of conducting a joint trial will have to be determined at the beginning of the trial and not after the trial based on the result of the trial. The Appellate Court may determine the validity of the argument that there ought to have been a separate/joint trial only based on whether the trial had prejudiced the right of Accused or the prosecutrix;
(iv) Since the provisions which engraft an exception use the phrase 'may' with reference to conducting a joint trial, a separate trial is usually not contrary to law even if a joint trial could be conducted, unless proven to cause a miscarriage of justice; and
(v) A conviction or acquittal of the Accused cannot be set aside on the mere ground that there was a possibility of a joint or a separate trial. To set aside the order of conviction or acquittal, it must be proved that the rights of the parties were prejudiced because of the joint or separate trial, as the case may be." In the instant case the appellants could not show any prejudice or miscarriage of justice due to the separate trial in the above three cases. Hence this argument does not hold water.
(c) It is further argued that the I.O. in his evidence gave a vivid account of the facts relating to not only the present case, but also the other two connected cases and therefore, while cross-examining the I.O., the defence side had to make a herculean task of cross-examining the I.O., not only with reference to the present 110 case, but also the other cases. We find no much force in this contention. As the three cases are identical and committed within short span by almost same accused under similar circumstances and as the witnesses are mostly common and as the accused after apprehension, while giving confessional statements, narrated about their complicity successively in all the three crimes, the I.O. while giving evidence, had to give brief description of other offences in his deposition. However, the defence side while cross-examining him, mostly confined to the facts relating to the present case rightly. Therefore, we do not find any prejudice being caused to them.
IX. POINT NO.II:
Offences committed by accused attracting different Sections of IPC:
Having confirmed that A1 to A4 and A6 to A13 were involved in the crime of dacoity with murder of the two drivers, it has now to be seen which Sections of Law will attract their offences.
(a) A1 to A4 and A6 to A10 are found guilty for the offence of dacoity with murder punishable U/s 396 IPC;
(b) A1 to A4 and A6 to A13 are found guilty for the offence of Criminal Conspiracy to commit dacoity with murder and hence punishable U/s 396 r/w 120(B) IPC;111
(c) A1 to A4 and A6 to A13 are found guilty for the offence of belonging to a gang of persons associated for the purpose of habitually committing dacoity, inasmuch as these accused have also participated in similar offences relating to RT No.2 of 2021 and RT No.3 of 2021 wherein also the judgment is pronounced today and hence liable to be punished U/s 400 IPC.
(d) A1 to A3 and A6 to A10 are found guilty for the offence U/s 201 IPC for causing the evidence of the commission of the offence to disappear with an intention to screen themselves.
(e) A4 is found guilty of the offence U/s 414 IPC for taking away the trailer lorry from the place of offence to Praveen Tobacco Godown along with iron load and then taking the power head of the trailer lorry to a different place for concealing or disposing of the same which he knows or reason to believe to be stolen property.
The above accused are liable to be punished for the offences as stated supra. Point No.II is answered accordingly.
X. Point No.III:
(a) This point relates to the aspect whether the sentence imposed by the trial Court against the accused for different offences proved against them is legally sustainable.
112
In the above context, so far as A1 to A10 are concerned, the trial Court held them guilty of the offence U/s 396 IPC and awarded death punishment on two counts for killing two drivers. It should be noted, in the instant Referred Trial as well as concerned Criminal Appeals, we held that A5, A14 & A15 are not guilty of any of the offences. In that view, the offence U/s 396 IPC is concerned, we found A1 to A4 and A6 to A10 alone are guilty. For the offence U/s 396 IPC, the punishment shall be death or imprisonment for life or R.I. for a term which may extent to ten (10) years and also fine.
(b) It is trite that under Section 354(3) Cr.P.C., the trial Judge shall, while awarding sentence of death, state the "special reasons" for such sentence. In the instant case, the trial Court upon the observations that A1 to A10 pursuant to their criminal conspiracy, brutally and mercilessly murdered the driver and cleaner by strangulating them with ropes for the purpose of committing dacoity and the crime committed by them is a rarest of the rare case and that the accused are habitual offenders as they are involved in other offences also wherein judgments are pronounced by the trial Court and therefore, there was no possibility for the accused to reform themselves and hence, no lenient view can be taken to consider imposition of alternative punishment and accordingly awarded death penalty to A1 to A10. Therefore, it has now to be seen whether the death penalty awarded by the trial Court against A1 to A4 and A6 to A10 is sustainable under law. 113
21. Learned Public Prosecutor vehemently argued that the trial Court was perfectly justified in awarding capital punishment to A1 to A4 and A6 to A10 for, there exists multiple aggravating circumstances viz., i) the accused have nurtured a diabolical motive of committing theft of the vehicles transporting iron load on highway even by killing the crew of such vehicles for wrongful gain, ii) in the process, they killed hapless, innocent, unarmed drivers and cleaners in a number of cases out of which three cases could be brought to book resulted in S.C.No.73/2010, S.C.No.91/2010 and S.C.No.595/2010 and thus the accused have criminal track record, iii) the habitual manner of committing highway dacoities coupled with murders has created shocking effect on the society on one hand and had adverse impact on the trade and transportation on the highway as the road transportation, in our nation is the main artery for trade and commerce which is being clogged, iv) the accused being the habitual offenders, expecting them to get compunction or contrition is unwarranted and therefore, except the capital punishment, any alternative punishment will not yield desired result.
Learned Public Prosecutor placed reliance on:
In Susheel Murmu v. State of Jarkhand36 the Apex Court held:
"in rarest of rare cases when collective conscience of the community is so shocked that it will expect holders of the Judicial power center to inflict death penalty irrespective of their personal 36 AIR 2004 SC 394 114 opinion as regards desirability or otherwise of retaining death penalty death sentence can be awarded".
In State of U.P. v. Shri Kishan37 the Apex Court held:
"8. Imposition of sentence without considering its effect on the social order in many cases may be in reality a futile exercise. The social impact of the crime, e.g. where it relates to offences against women, dacoity, kidnapping, misappropriation of public money, treason and other offences involving moral turpitude or moral delinquency which have great impact on social order, and public interest, cannot be lost sight of and per se require exemplary treatment. Any liberal attitude by imposing meagre sentences or taking too sympathetic view merely on account of lapse of time in respect of such offences will be result- wise counterproductive in the long run and against societal interest which needs to be cared for and strengthened by string of deterrence inbuilt in the sentencing system.
9. The Court will be failing in its duty if appropriate punishment is not awarded for a crime which has been committed not only against the individual victim but also against the society to which the criminal and victim belong. The punishment to be awarded for a crime must not be irrelevant but it should confirm to and be consistent with the atrocity and brutality with which the crime has been perpetrated, the enormity of the crime warranting public abhorrence and it should "respond to the society's cry for justice against the criminal"."
22. Per contra, learned counsel for appellants while referring to the observation of the trial Court dated 24.05.2021 in its judgment, vehemently argued that the trial Court simply noted down the aggravating circumstances in its view and unfortunately did not make any endeavour to note down the mitigating circumstances and then placing them in juxtaposition with the aggravating circumstances and making a balanced auditing to know whether aggravating 37 (2005) 10 SCC 420 115 circumstances weigh over-and-above the mitigating circumstances to conclude that it is one of the rarest of the rare cases so as to invariably award capital punishment or to see whether the mitigating circumstances outweigh the aggravating circumstances to award an alternative punishment. Thereby, great injustice was done to accused taking them to the gallows. Learned counsel would further argue that there are indeed plausible mitigating circumstances worthy of consideration but the trial Court did not endeavour to ascertain from the defence side.
Then quoting the mitigating circumstances, he would submit that primarily the case on hand is based on circumstantial evidence, inasmuch as, there is no direct evidence for proving the dacoity-cum-murder. In expatiation, he would submit, the prime link of exhumation of dead bodies was based on the confessional statement of few accused and rest of the accused were roped in basing on the principle of criminal conspiracy. However, as a whole, the case pivots on circumstantial evidence alone. In that view, he would emphasize, in a case of this nature, awarding capital punishment to A1 to A4 and A6 to A10 is unwarranted. Nextly, he argued that all the accused barring one or two are young in age and leading family life having wife, children and parents to fend. The trial Court ought to have obtained a report from the concerned authorities regarding the social status of the accused to evaluate whether awarding capital punishment is justifiable or not. He lamented that the trial Court miserably failed in that regard. He would 116 further submit that in view of the young age of the accused, there is every possibility for their reformation having regard to the advancement in the field of medicine and psychology and through an apt counselling, reformation is not impossible. However, the trial Court has not bestowed its attention on this important aspect. Learned counsel thus prayed to take lenient view and commute the death sentences into suitable alternative sentences.
23. We have given our anxious consideration to the above respective arguments. In Bachan Singh v. State of Punjab 38the Apex Court exhorted that for persons convicted of murder, life imprisonment is the rule and death sentence an exception. A real and abiding concern for the dignity of human life postulates resistance to taking a life through law‟s instrumentality. That ought not to be done save in the rarest of rare cases when the alternative option is unquestionably foreclosed. Further, law is no more res integra as to the exercise that has to be undertaken by the Courts to decide whether a case falls in the phraseology of "rarest of the rare"
or not. In a slew of judgments Hon‟ble Apex Court has reiterated that Courts are under solemn duty to conduct a balanced audit between the aggravating and mitigating circumstances which weigh against and in favour of a convict for 38 1980(2) SCC 684 117 assessing the nature of sentence. For instance, in Rameshbhai Chandubhai Rathod v. State of Gujarat39 the Apex Court held:
"34. Similarly, in Machhi Singh v. State of Punjab MANU/SC/0211/1983 : 1983CriLJ1457 the position was summed up as follows: (SCC p. 489)
38. In this background the guidelines indicated in Bachan Singh's case (surpa) will have to be culled out and applied to the facts of each individual case where the question of imposing of death sentence arises. The following propositions emerge from Bachan Singh's case (supra):
(i) The extreme penalty of death need not be inflicted except in gravest cases of extreme culpability.
(ii) Before opting for the death penalty the circumstances of the 'offender' also require to be taken into consideration along with the circumstances of the 'crime'.
(iii) Life imprisonment is the rule and death sentence is an exception. In other words death sentence must be imposed only when life imprisonment appears to be an altogether inadequate punishment having regard to the relevant circumstances of the crime, and provided, and only provided, the option to impose sentence of imprisonment for life cannot be conscientiously exercised having regard to the nature and circumstances of the crime and all the relevant circumstances.
(iv) A balance sheet of aggravating and mitigating circumstances has to be drawn up and in doing so the mitigating circumstances have to be accorded full weightage and a just balance has to be struck between the aggravating and the mitigating circumstances before the option is exercised.(emphasis supplied)"39
(2009) 5 SCC 740, 118
24. In the light of the above principle, when we perused the judgment, as rightly argued by learned counsel for appellants, the trial Court, except recording the aggravating circumstances, did not make an honest attempt to ascertain and list out the mitigating circumstances for comparison with aggravating circumstances to come to a judicious conclusion on imposition of just sentence. Needless to emphasize, Penology expounds doctrine of proportionality of punishment to every crime. To arrive at such proportionality in capital punishment, the Court must invariably make balanced audit which is lacking in this case. Therefore, to that extent, injustice was caused to the accused. In Manoj v. State of Madhya Pradesh40 the Apex Court emphasized the need to collect the mitigating circumstances at the stage of trial. It was observed thus:
"213. There is urgent need to ensure that mitigating circumstances are considered at the trial stage, to avoid slipping into a retributive response to the brutality of the crime, as is noticeably the situation in a majority of cases reaching the appellate stage.
214. To do this, the trial court must elicit information from the Accused and the state, both. The state, must-for an offence carrying capital punishment-at the appropriate stage, produce material which is preferably collected beforehand, before the Sessions Court disclosing psychiatric and psychological evaluation of the Accused. This will help establish proximity (in terms of timeline), to the Accused person's frame of mind (or mental illness, if any) at the time of committing the crime and offer guidance on mitigating factors (1), (5), (6) and (7) spelled out in Bachan Singh."40
(2023) 2 SCC 353 119 Hence, we have undertaken that solemn exercise to find out whether the mitigating circumstances projected by the learned counsel for appellants will over weigh the aggravating circumstances to conceive of an alternative punishment to the accused in this case.
25. It is true that it is a case wholly and solely based on circumstantial evidence. It is also true that the main link of exhumation of dead bodies was found on the strength of the confessional statements of one or two accused. However, merely because the case rests on circumstantial evidence, that itself cannot be treated as a mitigating circumstance. That can be treated as a catalyst to consider with reference to the other factors.
26. The next circumstance projected is that almost all the accused are young persons, leading normal social and family life with wife, children and parents. As per the charge sheet, except few accused, others are aged between 25-40 years as on the date of offence. Therefore, there is some truth in the submission of appellants that they are young and having regard to the advancements in the realm of medicine and psychology, the chances of their reformation in the prison by a systematic and proper counselling cannot be ruled out. Added to it, pursuant to the directions of this Court dated 24.01.2023 given on the strength of judgment in Manoj's case (supra 40) concerned District Probation Officers and Jail authorities furnished reports on the conduct and lifestyle of accused. A perusal shows, the 120 accused are by and large leading family life except A1 whose wife divorced and living separately along with children. The conduct of most of the accused in jail is reported to be satisfactory. Thus, taking the overall facts into consideration, we are of the considered view that there are reasonable mitigating factors which out-weigh the aggravating circumstances to commute the death sentence awarded by the trial Court to A1 to A4 and A6 to A10 into life imprisonment. Then in view of the observations made by the Apex Court in Swamy Shraddananda (2) v. State of Karnataka41 that the sentence of life imprisonment when awarded as a substitute for death penalty would be carried out strictly as directed by the Court and as approved by a Constitutional Bench of the Hon‟ble Apex Court in Union of India v. V.Sriharan @ Murugan and Ors.42, and followed in Raju Jagdish Pasawan v. State of Maharashtra43, and also having regard to the nature of the crime and manner in which it was perpetrated by the accused, and other attending circumstances, we are of the view that the Appellants/A1 to A4 and A6 to A10 do not deserve for remission before completion of 45 years of imprisonment meaning thereby, they shall undergo imprisonment for a total period of 45 years without remission.
41 (2008) 13 SCC 767 42 2016 (7) SCC 1 43 2019 (6) SCC 380 121
27. Added to above, we seriously ponder over the wretched plight of the bereaved families of the deceased driver and cleaner. We are constrained to note that lack of proper patrolling on the highway also contributed for the gruesome and „serial murders‟ of hapless drivers in a series of cases. The State being parens patriae, is obligated to look after the safety, security and lives of its citizens. Therefore, we hold that the dependent family members of the deceased are entitled to compensation from the State Government.
28. Thus, in terms of the mandate under Sub Section 2 of Section 357A of Cr.P.C., we direct the District Legal Services Authority, Ongole in Prakasam District to ascertain the particulars of dependent family members of the deceased and issue notice to them and conduct enquiry as per the guidelines prescribed under the A.P.Victim Compensation Scheme, 2015 and decide quantum of compensation payable to those dependent family members of the deceased within two (2) months from the date of receipt of a copy of this judgment. Since, this exercise will take some time, in order to provide immediate succour to the dependent family members of the deceased, we direct the State Government of Andhra Pradesh to pay ex gratia of Rs.5,00,000/- to the dependent family members of each deceased in this case through the District Collector, Prakasam District 122 within fifteen (15) days from the date of receipt of a copy of this judgment and report compliance to the Registrar Judicial of this High Court.
29. Accordingly, the Referred Trial and concerned Criminal Appeals are decided as follows:
1) R.T.No.4/2021:
The death sentence awarded on two counts to accused 1 to 10 in S.C.No.595/2010 by the VIII Additional District & Sessions Judge, Ongole and referred in this R.T.No.4/2021 is answered to the effect that the conviction and sentence recorded for all the charges against A5/Bathala Salmon is set aside and he is acquitted and whereas accused Nos.A1 to A4 and A6 to A10 are concerned, the death sentence is commuted to the sentence of imprisonment for a total period of 45 years without remission on two counts which shall run concurrently.
2) Crl.A.No.160/2021 (filed by A4, A15, A6 & A7):
Criminal Appeal is allowed so far as Appellant/A15-Shaik Dada Peer @ Gani is concerned and conviction and sentence passed against him is set aside and he is acquitted of all charges.123
Criminal Appeal filed by Appellants/A4, A6 & A7 is concerned, the death sentence imposed for the offence under Section 396 IPC is commuted to imprisonment for a period of 45 years without remission and sentence imposed for other charges is confirmed.
3) Crl.A.No.161/2021 (filed by A1 & A11):
Criminal Appeal filed by Appellant/A1 is concerned, the death sentence imposed for the offence under Section 396 IPC is commuted to imprisonment for a period of 45 years without remission and sentence imposed for other charges is confirmed.
Criminal Appeal filed by Appellant/A11 is dismissed by confirming the conviction and sentence passed against him for different charges.
4) Crl.A.No.165/2021 (filed by A10):
Criminal Appeal filed by Appellant/A10 is concerned, the death sentence imposed for the offence under Section 396 IPC is commuted to imprisonment for a period of 45 years without remission and sentence imposed for other charges is confirmed.124
5) Crl.A.No.167/2021 (filed by A8):
Criminal Appeal filed by Appellant/A8 is concerned, the death sentence imposed for the offence under Section 396 IPC is commuted to imprisonment for a period of 45 years without remission and sentence imposed for other charges is confirmed.
6) Crl.A.No.170/2021 (filed by A5):
Criminal Appeal filed by Appellant/A5-Bathala Salmon is allowed and the conviction and sentence passed against him for all the charges is set aside and he is acquitted.
7) Crl.A.No.198/2021 (filed by A2 & A14):
Criminal Appeal filed by Appellant/A2 is concerned, the death sentence imposed for the offence under Section 396 IPC is commuted to imprisonment for a period of 45 years without remission and sentence imposed for other charges is confirmed.
Criminal Appeal filed by Appellant/A14-Shaik Rahamthulla is allowed and the conviction and sentence passed against him for all the charges is set aside and he is acquitted.125
8) Crl.A.No.212/2021 (filed by A13):
Criminal Appeal filed by Appellant/A13 is dismissed by confirming the conviction and sentence passed against him for different charges.
9) Crl.A.No.251/2021 (filed by A9):
Criminal Appeal filed by Appellant/A9 is concerned, the death sentence imposed for the offence under Section 396 IPC is commuted to imprisonment for a period of 45 years without remission and sentence imposed for other charges is confirmed.
10) Crl.A.No.258/2021 (filed by A3):
Criminal Appeal filed by Appellant/A3 is concerned, the death sentence imposed for the offence under Section 396 IPC is commuted to imprisonment for a period of 45 years without remission and sentence imposed for other charges is confirmed.
11) Crl.A.No.353/2021 (filed by A12):
Criminal Appeal filed by Appellant/A12 is dismissed by confirming the conviction and sentence passed against him for different charges.
All the sentences imposed against accused shall run concurrently.126
Before parting, we will be failing in our duty if we do not extend words of our appreciation to the patient and erudite arguments of learned Public Prosecutor, learned counsels for appellants and apt and sublime assistance rendered by Court Officers, Court Masters and Law Clerks to discharge our pious obligation.
_________________________ U.DURGA PRASAD RAO, J __________________________________________ GANNAMANENI RAMAKRISHNA PRASAD, J Dated: 10.05.2024 Note: Registry is directed to forward a copy of this judgment forthwith to:
1) The Chief Secretary, Government of Andhra Pradesh, Amaravati.
2) The District Collector, Prakasam District, Andhra Pradesh.
B/o KRK/NNN